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1. Under-Specification and its Sources
Since early analytic philosophy, theorists have pointed at multiple ways in which language can be 
regarded as a poor means for an effective and clear expression of thought. In continuity with this 
tradition, contemporary authors almost unanimously recognise language as being a defective means 
for communication.  In this  thesis,  I  engage with the idea that  the meaning of natural  language 
sentences fails to specify the truth-conditions of their utterances—which are what speakers employ 
in order to describe the world or to communicate the contents of their beliefs, desires, etc. to other 
individuals. The following thesis is therefore taken to hold for a large number of cases: 
[The Under-Specification Thesis] Given an utterance u of a sentence s in a context c, the meaning 
of s fails to specify the conditions in which u is true or false1. 
There are many sources of semantic under-specification. First of all, linguistic meaning can give 
rise to under-specification because language can be ambiguous, where ambiguity can be traced at 
more than one level of linguistic representation. There is lexical ambiguity, i.e. words can have 
more than one meaning:  the classic  example is  the word “bank”,  which means both “financial 
institution” and “river side”. Not only lexical items, but also syntactic forms such as phrases and 
sentences  can  be  ambiguous:  a  good  example  of  the  former  kind  of  ambiguity  is  the  phrase 
“additional  vitamin  source”,  which  means  both  “additional  source  of  vitamin”  and  “source  of 
additional vitamin”. An example of sentential ambiguity is “Every woman loves a sailor”, which 
means both “There is a sailor which is loved by every woman” and “For every woman, there is a 
sailor which that woman loves”; here the ambiguity specifically concerns the scope, i.e. the logical 
range  of  operation,  of quantifier  expressions  such  as  “every”  and  “some”  (also  written  as  the 
indefinite article “a”). Ambiguity has always been considered as a fault of natural language insofar 
as ambiguous expressions cannot be assigned a meaning and a truth-value, unless the context of use 
provides the means for selecting one interpretation at the expense of the others. 
Secondly, under-specification can arise because language can be  vague: an expression's meaning 
being vague entails that there are cases in which it is unclear whether that expression does or doesn't 
correctly describe how the world is. An example of vague expression is the predicate “is bald”. An 
individual with no hair on her head is clearly bald, while an individual with a hundred thousand 
hairs is clearly non-bald; however, there could be intermediate cases between zero hairs and one 
hundred thousand hairs in which it is just not clear whether we should describe the individual in  
question  as  bald  or  non-bald:  these  are  typically  called  “borderline  cases”.  Borderlineness  is 
standardly considered the hallmark of vagueness. Vagueness is a fault for language insofar as it 
seems, at least prima facie, that (unless some cut-off point is arbitrarily set by the speakers) uses of 
sentences containing vague predicates in borderline cases cannot be evaluated for truth and falsity.
Thirdly,  under-specification  may  come  from  the  fact  that  linguistic  meaning  can  be  context-
dependent.  Context-dependent expressions typically have no stable content across contexts.  The 
best examples of context-dependent expressions are  indexicals such as “I”, or “today”. The word 
“I” has a stable meaning but has no stable referent, that is, the referent of “I” varies according to 
who the utterer is. Similarly, the word “today” has a stable meaning but it has no stable reference,  
for its reference varies according to the day of utterance. According to the standard semantics of 
1 The failure to specify truth-conditions is best thought of as relative to focal features—such as times, places, 
manners, comparison classes, etc., and not as absolute.
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indexicals developed by Kaplan (1989), the meaning of “I” can be described as a function that maps 
the context in which “I” occurs onto the speaker of that context; similarly, the meaning of “today” is 
a function that maps the context in which “today” is uttered onto the day of utterance. Indexicality 
(which is the paradigmatic case of context-dependency) makes language “faulty” insofar as, unless 
the values of some contextual coordinates are fixed by the interpretation (such as who the utterer is 
and which day is the day of utterance) it is normally impossible to assign a truth-value to utterances 
of the sentences that contain these expressions. 
The expressions commonly  recognised as context-dependent are indexicals such as “I”,  “you”, 
“today”, “here”, “now” and demonstratives such as “this”, “that”, “there”, “then”. Authors disagree 
on whether the list  should be extended so as to include expressions whose semantic behaviour 
suggests that they might be context-dependent: for example quantifiers (“every”, “no”, “some”), 
gradable  adjectives  (“tall”,  “rich”,  “old”),  relational  expressions  (“enemy”,  “fan”),  but  also 
epistemic predicates (“know”). The dispute over whether the set of context-dependent expressions 
should be enlarged is highly relevant to the topic of this thesis: as it will become clear, I shall take a  
definite position as to the semantics of some of the expressions listed above. 
The debate over whether the set containing indexicals and demonstratives should encompass more 
expressions reveals a whole domain of phenomena connected with semantic under-specification 
which however do  not  allow an immediate labelling in terms of “context-dependency”, as I will 
illustrate later on. In what follows, I shall review those examples of this controversial domain that I  
deem  most  interesting  for  my  purposes,  which  I  shall  call  semantically  under-determined 
expressions.
As  it  has  emerged  previously,  all  context-dependent  expressions  are  also  semantically  under-
specified.  So,  as one could expect,  those expressions besides indexicals  and demonstratives for 
which the question of context-dependency arises exhibit some form of semantic under-specification. 
For some of these, the question could arise whether their under-specification is a genuine one.
Some expressions are judged semantically under-specific on the basis of the fact that sentences 
containing them undergo contextual shifts in truth-value. Occurrences of the same expression e in 
different contexts  c1,  c2 … cn give rise to different semantic values for the sentence in which  e 
occurs.  Take for example the predicate  “know”: in  a  mundane context  c1,  when I  consider  the 
question of whether I have a cup of coffee in front of me, my visual experience as of a cup is  
sufficient to make my statement of “I know there is a cup in front of me” true. By contrast, as soon 
as I enter context  c2 where I engage in a skeptical exercise, it seems that my visual experience 
doesn't offer the required epistemic support, thus making my statement of “I know there is a cup in 
front of me” false. Thus, the same sentence “I know there is a cup in front of me” can be evaluated 
as true or false, depending on the epistemic standards that are in force in the context of use (see 
DeRose 1992, 1995, Cohen 1999). Similar considerations hold for the quantifier “every”. Suppose 
that, in  c1, I assert “Everyone was accepted to the conference”; if there is no restriction over the 
domain of quantification of “everyone”, my statement is strictly speaking false, for it is definitely 
not  the case that  every individual  in the universe has  been accepted for  the conference;  if,  by 
contrast, in context  c2 the quantifier “everyone” is interpreted as ranging over my colleagues at the 
department, it turns out as true iff all of them have been accepted for the conference (on quantifier 
domain restriction, see Neale 1990, Stanley & Williamson 1995, Lewis 1996, Gauker 1997, Stanley 
& Szabó 2000). The fact that sentences containing “know” or “every” can give rise to shifts in 
truth-value across contexts is indicative of under-specification. However, I urge that the evidence is 
not conclusive. The reason is that the possibility remains open that statements like “I know there is 
a cup in front of me” and “Everyone was accepted to the conference” express constant, determinate 
contents across contexts, namely <that I know (in the only sense of “know”) that there is a cup in  
front of me> and <that everyone (in the unrestricted sense) was accepted to the conference>. What 
varies across contexts, one could contend, is just the truth-value of these utterances (see Stanley 
2005a, Hawthorne 2004 concerning “know”) or at least the truth-value of a further content which is 
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“suggested” or “implicated” by the fact of making those statements in either context c1 or  c2 (see 
Cappelen and Lepore 2005). What I am saying is therefore that, for expressions like “know” or 
“every”,  contextual  shifts  in truth-value do not  ipso facto constitute evidence of their  semantic 
under-specification, because the possibility is not ruled out that “know” and “every” respond to an 
Invariantist semantics, which assigns a stable and determinate content to statements that contain 
those  expressions  and  explains  the  utterances'  variations  in  truth-value  by  appealing  to  either 
relative truth or to pragmatically suggested contents2.
Similar considerations apply to sentences like “Jack and Jill got married”, “I've had breakfast”, “It 
will take time to get there”, “You are not going to die”. In all these cases, it has been argued that the  
meaning of these sentences under-specifies, in some sense, the truth-conditions of its utterances (see 
Carston 1988, Recanati 1989). For example, the sentence “Jack and Jill got married” is true just in 
case Jack got married and Jill got married; however, speakers usually do not mean just that; what is 
usually  meant  (and understood)  is  a  content  that  is  true  just  in  case  Jack and Jill  got  married 
together. Similarly, by uttering “I've had breakfast”, one usually means something which is true 
only  if  one  has  had breakfast  within  a  reasonably  short  span  of  time—that  very  morning,  for 
example—and not just in case one has had breakfast at least once in one's life. By claiming “It will 
take time to get there”, the normally intended content is true just in case it will take more time than 
expected to get in the salient place, for the literal meaning of the sentence is a sheer triviality, not  
worth stating in normal circumstances. Finally, one may not want use “You are not going to die” 
while meaning that, literally, the addressee is not going to die at all—for this would be a patent 
falsehood. As one can see, the meaning of each of these sentences expresses a content which is not 
the content that speakers may usually mean while uttering these sentences—whence the contention 
that  these sentences  are  “under-specific”.  On closer  inspection,  though, the under-specificity  of 
these sentences may not be a semantic one at all, for each of them expresses an entirely evaluable  
content. With respect to the semantics of each of these sentences, it makes perfect sense to adopt an 
Invariantist stance, having it that they express a determinate and constant content across contexts. 
The only fault of these sentences is that of expressing semantic contents which—albeit determinate 
and invariant—are not identical to what speakers usually mean by uttering them. This however, 
doesn't look like a genuine, “deep” semantic under-specification,  but as a “shallow”,  pragmatic 
under-specification. 
Positing the under-specification of words like “know”, “every”, “and”, but also of sentences like 
“I've  had breakfast”,  “It  will  take  time to  get  there”,  “You are  not  going to  die”  is  a  way of 
explaining some sets of intuitions,  especially those concerning cross-contextual “shifts  in truth-
value” and the gap between what the sentence says and what speakers usually mean; however, since 
it at least makes sense to go Invariantists about the semantics of these expressions, the case for their 
“deep”,  semantic under-specification is  not entirely convincing. After all,  theirs  could be just a 
“shallow”, pragmatic under-specification, that is, these expressions may truly express a determinate 
content  across  all  contexts,  but  this  content  may  not  be  what  speakers  usually  mean to 
communicate. 
2. Semantic Under-determinacy
Besides  these  potential  examples  of  “shallow”  under-specification  it  is  possible,  however,  to 
2 I take Grice (1967/1989) to have made an Invariantist point about e.g. the semantics of logical constants in natural 
language such as “but”, or “therefore”: in his view, the truth conditions of sentences like “He is rich but generous” 
and “He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave” are the same across both informal conversations and formal 
discourse, namely they are the truth-conditions of a conjunctive sentence; what changes is what, in informal 
discourse, the use itself of “but” and “therefore” suggests over and beyond the meaning of the sentence itself. Kripke 
(1977) defended the same position concerning the truth-conditions of sentences containing incomplete definite 
descriptions, by distinguishing between “semantic reference” and “speaker's reference”. Concerning the semantics 
of knowledge predicates, even more radical versions of Invariantism than those mentioned in the text are defended 
by Brown (2005) Black (2008) and Turri (2010).
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identify a group of expressions whose “deep”, semantic under-specification can be shown more 
compellingly. These expressions are such that (i) they give rise to contextual shifts in truth-value; 
(ii) going Invariantist about them really makes little, if any, sense; (iii) there is a straightforward 
intuition about their semantic defectiveness, independently of contextual shifts. These expressions, 
that I shall characterise as semantically under-determined, are going to be the focus of the present 
research. Note in passing that points (i)-(iii) are  not meant to state either necessary or sufficient 
conditions for what I call semantic under-determinacy, but merely a “singling-out procedure”, i.e. a 
practically useful set of instructions for recognising typical cases of semantic under-determinacy as 
opposed to other cases of under-specificity. In what follows, I will confine myself to a presentation 
of some examples of semantically under-determined expressions, with only a sketchy discussion of 
their potentially problematic aspects. My primary interest at the moment is  to make sense of the 
idea of semantic under-determinacy itself, independently of the solutions that might be elaborated in 
order to frame it semantically. In introducing examples of semantic under-determinacy, I will be 
partially  following  a  recent  introductory  survey  provided  by  Bach  (2012).  Let  us  consider  a 
sentence like 
(1) It's raining.
This sentence certainly undergoes variations in truth-value with relevant variations in context. For 
example, if I utter (1) while talking about Paris, in which rain is falling, my utterance of (1) shall be 
true. If I utter the same sentence while talking about Venice, where the sun is shining, the same 
sentence shall be false. The sentence “It's raining” therefore meets requirement (i) by being subject 
to contextual shifts in truth-value. This is already indicative about the semantic under-specification 
of (1). However, one may argue, it is always possible that the predicate “to rain” has an Invariantist 
semantics:  it  determines  a  stable,  full-blown  content  across  contexts,  and  what  is  subject  to 
variations is the content of the speech act performed in each different context (see Cappelen and 
Lepore 2005). This kind of Invariantism about “It's raining” I take to be seriously problematic. First 
of all, it is not sensible to suppose that an utterance of the sentence “It's raining” expresses a content 
which is true iff it's raining  tout court.  There is no such thing as raining  tout court—rainings are 
invariably located at some place. Secondly, even if there was a determinate content for (1), perhaps 
<that it's raining somewhere>, it's not clear how the sentence “It's raining” could express exactly 
this content, for it seems that that content is not strictly speaking semantically encoded: if one only 
considers the linguistic meaning of the sentence's components and the way they are combined, it 
seems that the result is simply the content <that it's raining>. For these reasons, going Invariantists 
about (1) would make little sense, as stated at point (ii). Finally, and as stated by point (iii), we do  
not need contextual shifts to make the under-specification of (1) apparent, for in the appropriate 
conditions we can have a direct intuition of its defectiveness. This is confirmed by the fact that, if 
one were to utter (1) out of the blue and with no apparent reason, it would be natural for a hearer to  
ask for specification with questions like “Where?”, “In which place?” and so on. These questions I 
take  to  be  stimulated  by  the  sentence's  inherent  lack  of  specificity  about  the  utterance's  truth-
conditions. 
These considerations strongly suggest that (1) is semantically under-determined. Do they make for 
the thought that “to rain” is context-dependent, too, in the sense that it involves some covert form of 
indexicality? Here the point is debatable; although theorists have argued for the context-dependency 
of  “It's  raining” (see Stanley 2000),  the arguments  that  have been worked out  so far  have not 
encountered a unanimous consensus (see e.g. Neale 2007). Moreover, the contextual variation in 
truth-value of “It's raining” may not depend on a defectiveness of content, but it could depend on a 
relativity of the truth-value of (1) to a parameter corresponding to a suitably cut-up “situation” or 
world-region (see Barwise and Perry 1983). In other words, no absolutely compelling case has been 
made yet to settle the context-dependency of (1). For the moment, I will be content with taking this 
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“sociological” fact as a reason for claiming that a semantically under-determined sentence like “It's 
raining” may be so in a way that has nothing to do with context-dependency (in the form of covert 
indexicality). More cases of semantic under-determinacy that prove similar to (1) are:
(2) It is windy.
(3) It is noisy.
(4) It is eerie.
The list can be extended with expressions which are semantically under-determined insofar as, as 
Bach has it, they can be used without what in the linguistics jargon are called  complements  (see 
Bach 2012). Below are two examples:
(5) Jill is ready.
(6) Lynn is late.
Here it's not difficult to ascertain that, for example, sentence (5) responds to requirements (i)-(iii).  
To begin with, point (i) is met, for (5) changes truth-value across relevantly different contexts: if I 
utter (5) while talking about Jill's preparing her Spanish test, and Jill is absolutely unprepared for 
the exam, then my utterance is false; if I utter (5) while talking about Jill's getting ready to go to the  
club and she is  absolutely ready for that,  then my utterance is  true.  Point  (ii)  is  also met,  for  
Invariantism about “being ready”  barely makes sense: first of all, an utterance of (5) cannot be true 
iff Jill is ready  tout court, for there is nothing like being ready  tout court: the predicate “being 
ready” at least implicitly suggests that readiness is instantiated with respect to a purpose. Secondly, 
even if (5) had an invariant content like <that Jill is ready for something>, it's not clear how the 
sentence “Jill is ready” could encode that content, for it seems that such a sentence does not strictly 
speaking have that meaning: indeed, by the lights of formal semantics, the linguistic meaning of (5) 
is  simply  <that  Jill  is  ready>. Finally,  ordinary speakers have the chance to  directly intuit  the 
semantic defectiveness of (5): if one were to utter “Jill is ready” out of the blue and with no evident  
motivation, the hearer would be entitled to prompt the speaker with questions like “For what?”, 
“For which purpose?”. This I take to reflect the fact that the truth-conditions of (5), such as they are 
determined by semantic conventions, do not tell how the world should be for an utterance of (5) to 
be true. These considerations again make for the idea that “Jill is ready” is semantically under-
determined. 
At the same time, it's not clear that we should draw the additional conclusion that “Jill is ready” also 
is context dependent in the way of indexical expressions. There is no clear and compelling evidence 
that “being ready” is context-dependent in the same way as “I” or “this”. Moreover, data concerning 
the  semantic  variability  of  (5)  could  receive  an  alternative  explanation,  which  doesn't  involve 
hidden indexicality but rather involves the postulation of a truth-predicate which is relative to a 
suitable parameter in the circumstances of evaluation (see MacFarlane 2007a, Gauker 2010) or to a 
situation  (see  Corazza  and Dokic 2010).  Once again,  at  least  if  we content  ourselves  with  the 
“sociological” fact that the context-dependence of “ready” is still a matter of controversy between 
scholars, it seems that (5) exhibits semantic under-determinacy but not, for that matter, context-
dependency (such as a form of covert indexicality).
The same reasoning as above could be applied to the semantic defectiveness that characterises 
gradable adjectives, such as ‘fat’, ‘tall’, ‘old’, ‘fast’, ‘rich’:
(7) The cat is fat;
(8) Lisa is tall;
(9) Fido is old;
(10) That car is fast;
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(11) Naomi is rich;
Consider for example sentence (8). Once again, it seems that points (i)-(iii) are all met. As provided 
by (i), the sentence “Lisa is tall” varies its truth-value with relevant variations in context. If the 
salient comparison class is 8-year-old children and Lisa is an extraordinarily tall 8-year-old girl, 
then  my utterance  is  true;  if  the  salient  comparison class  is  adult  basketball  players,  then  my 
utterance  is  false.  Also,  accordingly  with  (ii),  going  Invariantists  makes  little  or  no  sense.  An 
utterance of (8) cannot express a content that is true just in case Jill is tall  tout court, for there's 
nothing like being tall tout court: the notion of “being tall” at least implicitly suggests the presence 
of a comparison class, or a standard. At the same time, granting (8) expressed a content like <that  
Jill  is  tall  with  respect  to  some comparison class>,  it  remains  to  be  explained how (8)  could 
semantically encode exactly that content since, by the lights of formal semantics alone, it seems that 
the linguistic meaning of (8) is simply <that Jill is tall>. Finally, as in (iii), judgements as to the 
semantic defectiveness of (8) come spontaneously in the appropriate circumstances, for were (8) to 
be uttered just out of the blue, the hearer could legitimately reply with a request for completion like 
“For  what?”,  “With  respect  to  whom?”.  This  would  plausibly  result  from  (8)  being  directly 
understood as semantically under-specific. 
Thus again, we seem to have semantic under-determinacy. But do we have elements for concluding 
that there is context-dependency, too, perhaps in the form of hidden indexicality? Once again, the 
arguments that have been designed so far in favour of the context-dependency of “tall” and gradable 
adjectives in general (Stanley 2000) have not been universally accepted. An alternative explanation 
is always available, which consists in relativising the truth of (8) to some parameter of evaluation 
(see MacFarlane 2007a, 2009, Richard 2004, 2008) or a situation (see Corazza & Dokic 2007, 
2010).  Thus,  we  may  conclude  provisionally,  and  once  again  on  the  basis  of  “sociological” 
considerations  about  the  state  of  the  art,  that  the semantic  under-determinacy of  (8)  may have 
nothing to do with forms of context-dependency such as hidden indexicality, unless stronger and 
more persuasive arguments are provided.
The list could be extended with so-called  relational predicates such as “local”, “enemy”, “fan”, 
“neighbour”,  “immigrant”.  Here  the  semantic  under-determinacy  of  the  sentences  becomes 
particularly apparent for, as Bach notes, sentences like the following barely make sense unless a 
particular perspective is assumed as salient: 
(12) Oliver is a neighbour.
(13) Oscar is a fan.
(14) Osama was an enemy.
One can easily realise that (12)-(14) positively respond to the “singling-out procedure” suggested 
above:  (i)  they  are  subject  to  contextual  shifts  in  truth-value;  (ii)  it  makes  little  sense  to  go 
Invariantists about their content and truth-value; (iii) direct intuitions of their under-specification 
can  be  obtained whenever  an utterance  of  (12)-(14)  doesn't  seem to  presuppose  any particular 
relatum for the predicates “being a neighbour of”, “being a fan of”, “being an enemy of”. Theorists 
have advanced the idea that relational predicates such as “enemy”, “fan” are covertly indexical, i.e. 
they contain implicit argument places in their deep syntax, such that they can be either assigned a 
value or  be bound by an operator  (see Stanley 2000; Partee 1989 considers and discusses this 
option, even though she eventually discourages it). Theorists tend to disagree less about cases like 
(12)-(14), because the implicit structure of predicates such as “being an enemy” leaves little room 
for  solutions  that  dispense altogether  of relational  configurations3.  Still,  as  I  will  clarify in  the 
3 For example, speaking about relational predicates such as “local” and “immigrant” Corazza acknowledges that they 
are most intuitively characterised as relations, and thus as context-dependent terms: “The intuitive way to 
understand [utterances that contain “local” or “immigrant”] is that the predicate itself is context sensitive and, thus, 
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following sections, I believe that syntactic commitments are not strictly speaking necessary here. 
One  can  view the  relational  configuration  of  predicates  such  as  “enemy”,  “fan”  etc.  as  being 
implemented at the  conceptual/semantic rather than syntactic level, where syntactic structure and 
conceptual/semantic structure differ mainly in that the first is part of our linguistic competence, 
while the second certainly interacts with linguistic competence, but it is also part of a more general 
system of competences  that  include our  knowledge of the world,  and in general  of our social,  
cultural environment.
A further group of expressions that could be labelled as semantically under-determined is the group 
of what we may call perspectival predicates, i.e. predicates whose application requires that a point 
of view or perspective is either explicitly expressed or implicit but salient in the conversational 
setting. These include predicates that express spatial relations, such as “being left”, “being right”, 
“being nearby” “being  outside”,  “being above”,  etc.  but  also  predicates  that  express  response-
dependent properties, such as “being edible”, “being funny”, “being terrifying”, “being exciting”. 
These predicates will also include so-called predicates of personal taste, which express properties 
that  items  possess  with  respect  to  a  subject's  taste  standards,  such  as  “tasty”,  “delicious”, 
“disgusting”. Sentences containing these predicates will count as semantically under-determined to 
the extent that, as long as one remains neutral as to their semantics, intuitions tell us that (in many if  
not all of their usages) they fail to specify the appropriate relativisation for the predicate at issue at 
the level of utterance truth-conditions—in other words, they fail to specify for whom a certain item 
is tasty, delicious, disgusting, etc4.
(15) The post office is on the left;
(16) Naomi went to a beach nearby;
(17) The taxi is waiting outside;
(18) Some roots are edible.
(19) That joke is funny.
(20) That movie is terrifying.
(22) Ice cream is delicious;
(23) Rotten meat is disgusting.
Once again, the singling-out procedure previously articulated gives positive results. In each of these 
cases: (i) utterances of the same sentence in a relevantly different context give rise to a truth-value 
variation; (ii) it makes little or no sense to go Invariantist with respect to the content expressed by 
each sentence: for example, there seems to be no absolute way for anything to be on the left, nearby, 
or outside; nor there seems to be anything like being edible tout-court (which is certainly not to be 
equated with “being edible by every sentient being”),  or being funny, terrifying,  delicious tout  
court.  All these expressions seem to at least suggest an underlying relational semantic structure. 
Even conceding (15)-(23) expressed a determinate content, as e.g. <that the post office is on the left  
of something>, <that ice cream is delicious for someone> it is not clear how these contents could 
be  semantically  encoded  in  the  sentences  at  interest:  a  formal,  compositional  approach  to  the 
that the context sensitivity of the utterance is triggered by the fact that the predicate is relational. The natural way to 
understand these predicates is to view them as two-places predicates: a location is local vis-à-vis someone,     
local(p, x); a person is an immigrant vis-à-vis some country, immigrant(c, x). The dictionary registers that ‘local’ 
means ‘‘existing in or belonging to the area where you live, or to the area you are talking about,’’ that ‘immigrant’ 
means ‘‘a person who settles as a permanent resident in a different country,’’ that ‘‘a foreigner is someone who 
belongs to a country which is not your own,’’ and so forth.” (Corazza 2007: 433).
4 I should warn the reader that that the fact that predicates like “tasty”, “disgusting” are putatively  semantically 
under-determined should not be conflated with the question of their truth-conditions being intrinsically relative. That 
the two problems do not coincide can be seen in theories like Contextualism, which holds that the truth-value of 
utterances of “This ice cream is tasty” is absolute, while at the same time admitting that the sentence “This ice 
cream is tasty” doesn't specify the truth-conditions of its utterances, in that it doesn't specify for whom the ice cream 
is tasty.
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semantics  of  these  sentences  really  delivers  simple  and “minimal”  linguistic  meanings  such as 
<that the post office is on the left>, <that ice cream is delicious>. Finally, as provided by (iii), in 
appropriate conditions, an utterance of each of (15)-(23) could prompt requests for completion of 
the  form “Left  of  what?”;  “Edible  for  whom?”,  “Delicious  for  whom?”;  all  these  requests  of 
supplementation most  plausibly are  triggered by the sentence's  inherent  semantic  defectiveness. 
Thus, we have a basis for affirming that examples like (15)-(23) are semantically under-determined. 
The issue of the context-dependency of spatial, response-dependent and personal-taste expressions 
is once again a matter of controversy. Some argue that predicates expressing spatial relations are 
context  dependent  (see  Partee  1989),  while  some  others  argue  that  there  is  some  context-
dependence, which nevertheless doesn't reduce to sheer indexicality (see Hawthorne 2006). Some 
have argued that response-dependent and taste predicates are really context-dependent (Cappelen 
and Hawthorne 2009, Lopez de sa 2008, Sundell 2011), while others have preferred an explanation 
in terms of relative truth (Kölbel 2002, Lasersohn 2005, MacFarlane, MS.). The debate is still open. 
For all we know, and given the ongoing debate among semanticists, the semantic under-determinacy 
of  (15)-(23)  could  be  totally  disconnected  from  context-dependence  (in  the  form  of  covert 
indexicality).
The last group of predicates which, if I am right, should be subsumed under the semantic under-
determinacy category, is that of colour predicates. It's not immediately clear that colour predicates 
should be semantically  defective in any way.  However,  reflection concerning the conditions  of 
application of any expression denoting a chromatic  property reveals the contrary.  I  take colour 
predicates to range from predicates that attribute a certain shade of colour to predicates that attribute 
also other properties that pertain to an object's visual appearance, such as being clear, being dark 
etc.
(24) The leaves are green;
(25) The surface is red;
(26) The room is dark;
Sentences containing colour predicates certainly undergo contextual shifts in truth-value, as in (i): 
Travis notoriously argues for the variability in truth-value of (24) across different contexts. Pia, who 
has painted green the leaves of her red Japanese maple utters “The leaves are green” while talking 
to a photographer interested in green-looking items: on this occasion, she says something true. Later 
on, she utters (24) while talking to a botanist interested in naturally green items: on this occasion, 
she says something false. That going Invariantists about “green”, or “red” or “dark” is really a bad 
idea may not be immediately evident. However, a little reflection helps to recognise that there is  
nothing like being green, or red, or dark tout-court. A colour property is generally attributed to an 
object  in  some  respect:  greenness  is  invariably  greenness  in  some  part,  under  certain  light 
conditions, from a certain distance. Also, attributions of colour properties depend much on contrast 
items: a pigeon's plumage may be described as clear if contrasted with a raven's, but it may be 
described as dark if contrasted with a swan's. All these considerations help make sense of the idea 
that colour attributions cannot be absolute—they invariably involve (at least implicitly) a form of 
relativity to some respect. One could argue that a predicate such as “green” means “green in some 
respect”, thus making it that (24) expresses the content <that the leaves are green in some respect>.  
However, once again I don't see how a proponent of this view could positively argue that exactly 
that  content  is  strictly  speaking encoded by (24):  as  far  as  the  compositional  semantics  of  the 
sentence goes, it really seems that the content linguistically expressed by (24) is simply <that the  
leaves are green>. Going Invariantists about colour predicates is thus not a good idea, accordingly 
with point (ii). The semantic defectiveness of sentences like (24)-(26) can be intuitively judged in 
the appropriate conditions, as provided by (iii): when a hearer doesn't have sufficient background 
information, she is entitled to ask for completion with questions such as “Green in what respect?”,  
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“Dark with respect to what?”. 
So sentences containing colour predicates do suffer from semantic under-determinacy. Are they 
context-dependent,  too,  perhaps  because  they  involve  some  hidden  indexicality?  Arguments 
purported  to  prove  this  (see  Szabó  2001,  Rothschild  &  Segal  2009)  have  been  addressed  as 
exceedingly complicating the semantics of these expressions (see Recanati 2010, Hall 2008). As I 
will  argue throughout this thesis,  that the attribution of colour predicates suggests some hidden 
complex structure may not be a question of syntactically articulated positions, but rather a question 
of implicitly assumed conceptual/semantic structures. Once again, with colour predicates we have 
an example of expressions that exhibit some under-specificity, but that do not immediately suggest a 
covert indexicality, as it emerges from the fact that scholars haven't reached an agreement as to their 
syntactic structure.
To sum up,  in  this  section I  have aimed at  giving the reader  an idea of  what  semantic  under-
determinacy is. I have provided a (provisional) “singling-out procedure” for semantically under-
determined  expressions,  which  contemplates  three  points:  (i)  semantically  under-determined 
expressions give rise to cross-contextual shifts in truth-value; (ii) it makes little if no sense to go 
Invariantists  as  to  the  semantics  of  these  expressions;  (iii)  intuitions  as  to  their  semantic 
defectiveness can be triggered independently of any contextual shift. Expressions which meet points 
(i)-(iii) have a good chance of being semantically under-determined; an additional, indirect piece of 
evidence that this might be the case is given by the fact that scholars haven't reached an agreement 
yet concerning the underlying syntactic structure of these expressions, in that they haven't clearly 
established whether these expressions are, for instance, context-dependent, perhaps because they 
involve hidden forms of indexicality.
3. The Under-articulation Account
The preceding sections have been devoted to tracing the boundaries of the phenomenon on which I 
wish  to  concentrate  in  my  research:  semantic  under-determinacy.  So  far  I  have  reached  the 
following,  rather  provisional  result:  semantic  under-determinacy  is  a  kind  of  semantic  under-
specification,  which  manifests  itself  along  the  lines  traced  by  (i)-(iii),  and  which  doesn't 
immediately  strike  as  an  example  of  context-dependence,  as  for  instance  a  case  of  hidden 
indexicality. I have been concerned with offering a good number of examples of semantic under-
determinacy, the primary aim being that of helping the hearer to make sense of the notion itself. For 
ease of exposition, I repeat here some of the examples with which I have illustrated the notion of 
semantic under-determinacy: 
(1) It's raining;
(5) Jill is ready;
(8) Lisa is tall;
(17) The taxi is waiting outside;
(24) The leaves are green.
So far, I have merely hinted at the fact that semantic under-determinacy is different from ambiguity,  
vagueness, indexicality, but I haven't entered into a detailed argument about how this difference 
should be traced and motivated. In Chapter 1 of the thesis, my initial concern is precisely that of 
differentiating semantic under-determinacy from these phenomena. Indeed I maintain that, if one 
wishes to gain full comprehension of the phenomenon of semantic under-determinacy, one should 
be able to sharply demarcate it as opposed to other phenomena of semantic under-specification. The 
problem I shall deal with in Chapter 1, which I will call “The Demarcation Problem”, may be thus 
formulated:
[The Demarcation Problem]:  Is  there a feature which distinguishes semantic under-determinacy 
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from other phenomena of semantic under-specification?
Answering the  Demarcation Problem requires pointing at at least one feature which semantically 
under-determined expressions have, but which other expressions do not have, which may enable 
one to trace a significant distinction between the former and the latter. Note that dealing with this 
problem doesn't require that one identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for semantic under-
determinacy—the problem may be successfully dispensed with even by providing merely necessary 
conditions. In Chapter 1, I argue that the feature which distinguishes semantic under-determinacy 
from the rest of the other semantically under-specific expressions is that it is explainable solely in  
terms of under-articulation, that is to say in terms of lack of linguistic material only. In the present 
section, I will anticipate the main arguments I will provide in favour of this thesis. 
In  Chapter 1 I  draw attention on the fact  that  some theorists  have recommended to resist  the 
temptation  to  “domesticate”,  i.e.  to  reduce,  semantic  under-determinacy  to  any  other  familiar 
phenomenon, such as the already mentioned ambiguity, vagueness, indexicality. This I refer to as a 
recommendation to follow a “no-domestication” policy. 
Let us start with the temptation to claim that semantic under-determinacy is reducible to ambiguity. 
I take it that the necessary conditions for ambiguity at the lexical level are that (1) there be a single 
lexical entry to which more than one meaning is assigned by the dictionary; (2) the number of the 
meanings,  although it  can increase or decrease as time goes by,  has to  be definite,  for reasons 
connected to language acquisition and memory. If we move to the syntactic level, the condition 
becomes that there be a single combination of lexemes which can be associated with a definite 
number of phrasal/sentential tree-structures. Let me now consider one of the sentences which we 
have characterised as semantically  under-determined:  “Jill  is  ready”.  Prima facie,  this  sentence 
seems to be associated with one single tree-structure, thus violating the necessary requirement for 
syntactic ambiguity. Moving to the lexical level, one could surmise that the lexical entry “ready” is 
associated  with  more  than  one  meaning  ready1,  ready2,  ready3 …  readyn,  which  gets  selected 
according to the context of utterance. To this idea one can object that, since one can be ready for 
indefinitely many purposes, the word “ready” will have to be ambiguous between indefinitely many 
meanings. This goes against the necessary requirement (2) for ambiguity. In sum, there are prima 
facie good reasons for resisting a reduction of semantic under-determinacy to ambiguity (see also 
Travis 1997, Bezuidenhout 2002).
One could sympathise with the view that semantic under-determinacy is reducible to  vagueness. 
Even though the matter of what vagueness is is itself under discussion let us assume, in line with the 
mainstream conception,  that a necessary feature of vagueness is  the obtaining of borderline,  or 
unclear  cases  (e.g.  of  baldness,  tallness,  fatness,  etc.).  Now one should definitely concede that 
expressions like “It's raining”,  “Jill  is  ready”,  “Lisa is tall”,  “The leaves are green” do contain 
predicates that give rise to borderline cases—after all, there are borderline cases of raining, as well 
as borderline cases of readiness, tallness and greenness (the latter two are indeed paradigmatic cases 
of vagueness!).  However the particular  defectiveness that  makes these expressions semantically 
under-determined is not connected to their being vague. To illustrate, consider an utterance of “It's 
raining” which one assesses as not determinately true or false (maybe because drops of water are 
falling from the sky at too large a distance from each other); now I figure that, in order for one to be 
able to say that the utterance doesn't have a definite evaluation in the first place, one needs to figure 
out the location where the phenomenon is taking place—Paris, Venice, London … . That is, in order 
to  judge  about  the  vagueness  of  a  statement  of  “It's  raining”  one  must  previously  resolve  its 
semantic  under-determinacy  as  to  the  location  of  the  rain.  Similarly,  one  could  envisage  an 
utterance of “X is green” which is clearly true, because x is a clear case of greenness. However, this 
doesn't erase the fact that the sentence uttered suffers from semantic under-determinacy, in that it 
doesn't tell in what respect x is green. This seems to make a case for the idea that semantic under-
determinacy is not reducible to vagueness (see also Travis 1997, Bezuidenhout 2002).
16
What about the idea that semantic under-determinacy is reducible to indexicality? In the preceding 
sections,  I  mentioned the fact  that  there's  quite  a lively debate with regard to this  issue.  Some 
theorists starkly defend the idea that certain semantically under-determined expressions, as e.g. “It's 
raining” (Stanley 2000) or “The leaves are green” (Szabó 2001) are really covertly indexical. I have 
briefly mentioned that other theorists oppose this attempt to reduce semantic under-determinacy to 
indexicality  by  appealing  to  various  ways  of  relativising  the  truth-predicate.  The  fact  that  no 
account has clearly prevailed in the debate already suggests that a reduction of semantic under-
determinacy  to  indexicality  is  not  straightforward.  This,  however,  is  nothing  more  than 
acknowledging a  sociological  fact:  what  is  needed is  an  argument  that  shows the  point  at  the 
conceptual/theoretical level, not merely at the sociological one. 
Just  like  indexicals,  semantically  under-determined  expressions  fail  to  specify  the  content-in-
context of their utterances: for instance, the linguistic meaning of “I wear glasses” fails to specify 
the content of its utterances, for the simple reason that “I” needs to be assigned a referent in context. 
In the same vein, one could say that the linguistic meaning of “It's raining” or “Jill is ready” or “The 
leaves are green” fails to specify the content-in-context of their utterances. The content of these 
sentences needs to be supplemented in some way: for example, one needs to specify the location of 
the rain, the purpose of Jill's being ready, the respect in which the leaves are green, etc. Is this 
equivalent to the assignment of a reference to “I”, or even to “here”, “there”, etc.? My claim is that 
there is a difference between how indexicality is resolved and how semantic under-determinacy is 
resolved. Let me preliminarily distinguish between  pure indexicals and  spurious indexicals. The 
former are indexicals whose reference is fixed independently of the beliefs of the speaker: in this 
sense, “I” is certainly a pure indexical. The latter have their reference fixed also as a function of the  
speaker's beliefs and intentions: for instance, the reference of “here” can vary in its width depending 
on  what  portion  of  space  the  speaker  intends  to  refer  to  with  her  use  of  “here”.  Given  this  
distinction,  I  shall  say  that  at  least  pure indexicals  are  mechanisms  of  contextual  reference-
assignment that are designed for being determinately saturated. That is, at least pure indexicals are 
designed in such a way that, once the term's occurrence is assigned a referent according to the value 
taken by a certain parameter in a certain context k, the under-specification of the expression is ipso 
facto resolved, in the sense that its content becomes as specific as it may be, even in any further 
circumstance c in which the utterance may be re-considered. For example, “I” is construed in such a 
way that, once the reference of “I” in “I wear glasses” has been assigned in a context k, the resulting 
content being <that X wears glasses>, the content-in-context of the pronoun “I” is as specific as it 
may be, no matter the circumstances  cj in which the original utterance may get reconsidered.  By 
contrast, if a semantically under-determined expression gets supplemented with extra content in a 
certain  circumstance  ck,  it  is  not  obvious  that  the  under-specification  is  resolved  for  all  the 
circumstances cj … ci in which the utterance could be re-considered. For instance, suppose that the 
content of “It's raining” is supplemented in the circumstance  c1 so as to result in  <it's raining in 
Paris>. In some other circumstance c2, the following question could arise: is it raining in Paris if it 
is raining only in the center of the city? In circumstance c3, one could wonder: is it raining in Paris 
if it is raining over many scattered spots of the town? I envision that the content <that it's raining in  
Paris> obtained  in  c1 may  turn  out  as  not  responding  to  the  demands  that  may  arise  in 
circumstances c2 and c3, where more precision is required. Let us call this phenomenon of potential 
insufficiency of a contextually enriched content to respond to the precision demands that arise in 
other circumstances “Reiteration Effect”. Thus,  semantic under-determinacy is set apart from (at 
least pure) indexicality by the fact that (pure) indexicality resolution is set up in such a way that it's  
expected not to generate further under-specificity (in other circumstances), while semantic under-
determinacy resolution may generate further under-specificity (in other circumstances), thus giving 
rise to a “Reiteration Effect”.
Having argued for a distinction between semantic under-determinacy and, respectively, ambiguity, 
vagueness and indexicality, I believe that a crucial step should be taken. Besides distinguishing 
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semantic under-determinacy only in negative terms—like in the case of ambiguity and vagueness—
or in terms of the effects it produces—such as the Reiteration Effect—the theorist should also try to 
trace the distinction on the basis of what causes/explains semantic under-determinacy. In this way, I 
believe  that  the  answer  to  the  Demarcation  Problem would  be  deeper  and  theoretically  more 
satisfactory.
The answer I suggest for the Demarcation Problem starts from the following consideration: it can 
be argued that semantic under-determinacy obtains because (and only because) the sentences that 
we use are under-articulated. I shall embrace the following claim:
[The Under-Articulation Claim]  The meaning of a sentence  s under-determines the content and 
truth conditions of its utterance u because (and only because) s is under-articulated.
A sentence  s is under-articulated iff, when an utterance  u of  s is performed, another sentence s'  
could have been uttered instead of s, which articulates more linguistic material than s and has the 
same truth-conditions as  u (which I take to be fixed by the utterer's intentions). In other words, a 
sentence s is under-articulated iff the truth-conditions expressed by the speaker in a context c with 
an utterance u could have been expressed by a more articulated sentence s'. 
It is arguable that under-determined sentences turn out as being so because (and only because) they 
are  under-articulated,  i.e.  they  are  “too  brief”  to  exhaustively  express  the  intended  content-in-
context of their utterances. So for example if, talking about Paris, Eva utters “It's raining”, we may 
say that the sentence that she utters is under-determined because (and only because) Eva, in the 
same context, could have used the sentence “It's raining in Paris”, which articulates more linguistic 
material  and  expresses  the  same  truth-conditions  of  her  actual  utterance  of  “It's  raining”  as 
performed  while  talking  about  the  weather  in  Paris.  Analogously,  if  Eva  utters  “Jill  is  ready” 
meaning <that Jill is ready to take the exam>, we may say that the sentence that she uses is under-
determined because (and only because) she could have used a more articulated sentence in order to 
express the same content, for example “Jill is ready for the exam”. Similarly, if Eva utters “The 
leaves are green” meaning <that the leaves are green on the outer surface>, we may say that the 
sentence she used is under-determined because (and only because) she could have used a more 
articulated sentence like “The leaves are green on the outer surface” in order to express the same 
content. 
The answer to the Demarcation Problem I would like to advance is therefore the following: what 
distinguishes semantic  under-determinacy from other phenomena like ambiguity,  vagueness and 
indexicality is that it is explainable solely in terms of under-articulation. Let me elaborate on this 
proposal. It seems fair to claim that ambiguous and vague expressions are such because of under-
articulation: after all, were the speaker to use more words, she would have the chance to avoid both 
ambiguity  and  vagueness.  Moreover,  indexicality  as  well  may  be  caused  by a  form of  under-
articulation: after all, one could always use her full name instead of the pronoun “I”, thus avoiding 
the under-specification proper of indexicality. Even though all this seems correct at first glance, my 
view is that the claim is not sustainable that these expressions suffer from ambiguity, vagueness or 
indexicality only because of under-articulation. Some additional mechanism is required in order to 
explain the specific semantic under-specification they suffer from: for ambiguity, there is the fact 
that more than one meaning is associated with the same word; for vagueness, there is the fact that 
there are cases of unclear application of predicates;  for indexicality,  there is the fact that some 
words can be used as context-sensitive devices of reference.  The only kind of semantic  under-
specificity for which it seems possible to argue that it is generated exclusively by lack of articulation 
is semantic under-determinacy (presumably, both in its “deep” and “shallow” varieties, though the 
focus here is just on the former). To recapitulate, the answer I suggest for the Demarcation Problem 
is the following: the feature that distinguishes semantic under-determinacy from other phenomena 
of semantic under-specification such as ambiguity, vagueness and indexicality is that, unlike these 
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phenomena, semantic under-determinacy is explainable in terms of under-articulation only.
I  believe that embracing an under-articulation account as a way of answering the  Demarcation 
Problem marks  an  advancement  in  our  understanding  of  the  peculiar  kind  of  semantic  under-
specification of sentences like “It's  raining”,  “Jill  is  ready”,  “The leaves are  green”,  etc.  These 
sentences  have  been troubling for  philosophers  of  language on the account  that  their  semantic 
under-specification couldn't be clearly assimilated to any familiar type of under-specification, such 
as ambiguity, vagueness, indexicality etc. My suggestion in the present work is that semantic under-
determinacy  should  be  thought  of  as  a  sui  generis phenomenon,  whose  boundaries  can  be 
effectively captured by emphasising the idea that it is a phenomenon explainable in terms of under-
articulation only.
4. Communication despite Under-determinacy
After having faced the issue of the demarcation of semantic under-determinacy as opposed to other 
phenomena  such as  ambiguity,  vagueness,  indexicality,  it  is  time  to  move  to  another  pressing 
problem which  relates  to  semantic  under-determinacy.  The problem is  how, given this  kind  of 
under-determinacy, successful communication is possible. How is it that speakers who use under-
determined  sentences  manage  to  be  understood  by  their  hearers?  The  problem  is  stated  by 
considering  the  point  of  view of  the  potential  listener  of  one  of  the  sentences  that  have  been 
surveyed so far.  What is to be explained is the general mechanism by which the listener of an 
utterance of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green” etc. manages to understand what 
the utterer means.  Since the issue specifically concerns the  comprehension of  under-determined 
utterances, it could be formulated as follows:
[The Comprehension Problem] What is the general mechanism by which the listener of an under-
determined sentence s acquires comprehension of what the speaker means by uttering s?
A variety of answers is compatible with the Comprehension Problem. Assessing whether there is 
one answer that fares better than the others is what I focus on in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis. I 
will isolate the answers that could be given by some of the most popular philosophical approaches 
to utterance comprehension; I will discuss and criticise each of these answers, and finally I will 
propose  a  new  and  hopefully  more  perspicuous  solution,  which  makes  use  of  the  notion  of 
“conceptual constraints”. In this section, I shall provide a summary of the contents of Chapters 2, 3 
and 4, in which I consider different ways of tackling the Comprehension Problem.
In Chapter 2, I consider a Radical Contextualist approach to utterance comprehension. The central 
claim of Radical Contextualism is that the truth-conditional aspects of an utterance, equated with 
what a speaker “says” (as opposed to what she “implies”) are determined to a significant degree by 
free pragmatic  processes,  i.e.  by  pragmatic  processes  that  do  not  respond  to  any  syntactic 
constraint. Such processes include free enrichment, strengthening and loosening of meaning (see 
Carston  2002,  Recanati  2004),  semantic  transfer  (see  Nunberg  1995)  and  so  on.  The  Radical 
Contextualist answer to the Comprehension Problem will thus be phrased as follows:
[The Radical Contextualist Response] Free pragmatic processes are necessary in order to achieve 
comprehension of utterances of semantically under-determined sentences.
The Radical Contextualist Response entails that, if no pragmatic process can be carried out by the 
hearer, perhaps because she has no access to the contextual information that would allow her to 
pragmatically supplement the sentence's defective meaning, then the hearer will not understand (i.e. 
know the truth-conditions of) an utterance of a semantically under-determined sentence5. I argue 
5 Note that the same does not hold for what I call “shallow” under-specificity: in the shallow case, comprehension is 
still possible, by the lights of the Radical Contextualist, even in the absence of pragmatic effects. For instance, if a 
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that  this  is  not  true  in  general.  Hearers  can  and do understand utterances  of  under-determined 
sentences, even if they do not have access to contextual information. The whole issue obviously 
turns on what one means when one talks about “understanding” or “comprehension”. 
My criticism of the Radical Contextualist Response takes as its starting point the remark that the 
Radical Contextualist Response implicitly assumes a notion of comprehension which I call RC-
comprehension.  As  proponents  of  the  Radical  Contextualist  approach  seem  to  assume,  RC-
comprehension is knowledge of the truth-conditions of an utterance in the specific context in which 
the utterance is made (see Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, Carston 1999, Recanati 1989). Thus, a 
hearer  acquires  RC-comprehension  of  an  utterance  of  “It's  raining”  just  in  case  she  has  the 
information available that the speaker is talking about e.g. Paris, and she uses this information in 
order  to  derive  that  the  utterance  is  true  just  in  case  it's  raining  in  Paris.  If  we  interpret 
“comprehension” as RC-comprehension, then it correctly follows that a precluded access to the 
context in which the utterance is performed implies a lack of comprehension. This much can be 
granted. 
However,  RC-comprehension  is  certainly  not  the  only  notion  of  comprehension  available.  I 
introduce the notion of Intuitive Comprehension, which is knowledge of the truth-conditions of any 
arbitrary utterance of a sentence in any arbitrary context. Intuitive Comprehension has to do with 
the truth-conditional knowledge that a hearer can achieve about an utterance independently of the 
information that pertains to the specific context of that utterance.
I  then show that,  even when it  is impossible for them to carry out any pragmatic processes in 
specific  contexts,  speakers  can  nevertheless  achieve  at  least an intuitive comprehension  of 
utterances of semantically under-determined sentences. This is apparently accomplished in virtue of 
the fact that hearers can expand the minimal semantic content delivered by formal semantics alone 
by employing some very general constraints, which may be described as semantic/conceptual in 
nature. For example, in figuring out the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance of “It's raining”, 
hearers may expand the minimal content yielded by formal semantics alone, <that it's raining>, by 
employing  the  semantic/conceptual  constraint  to  the  effect  that  every  episode  of  rain-falling 
necessarily happens at some location, and thus derive that that utterance is true (in any context of 
utterance) iff it's raining at some location; in figuring out the intuitive content of “Jill is ready”, they 
may  apply  to  the  minimal,  formal  semantics  derived  content  <that  Jill  is  ready> the 
semantic/conceptual constraint to the effect that every instance of readiness is necessarily readiness 
for some purpose, and thus derive that that utterance is true (in any context) iff Jill is ready for some 
purpose. 
The constraints I have mentioned are both conceptual and semantic, in that they constrain not only 
concept-use, but also the correct use of terms like “rain”, “ready”, “green” in ordinary linguistic 
practices. Nevertheless, I will generally prefer to address them only as conceptual constraints. That 
is because I believe that the conceptual domain is more stable than the semantic domain, insofar as 
one could be competent about a concept F by at the same time having false beliefs on the meaning 
of the term e which is associated with F in a certain language L; by contrast, if one is competent on 
the meaning of a certain term e in language L, one is generally also competent on the concept  F 
associated with this meaning. In other words, the conceptual domain is cross-linguistic and more 
stable than the semantic domain, which is tied to linguistic competence. In most of the cases I will 
scrutinize, conceptual constraints and semantic constraints will coincide de facto, for I am acting on 
the assumption that speakers and listeners are competent users of the English language. For them, 
knowing the meaning of “rain” entails that they are also competent about the concept RAIN.
So, conceptual constraints coincide with semantic constraints for every competent user of a certain 
hearer listens to the sentence “I've had breakfast” and has no access to a context in which pragmatic processes could 
be carried out, then she still can understand the sentence for what it strictly speaking means, namely <that the 
speaker has had breakfast at least once in her life>. Thus, failure to run pragmatic processes does not prevent 
comprehension when the under-specificity at issue is “shallow” or merely pragmatic.
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expression e in language L. The peculiarity of this kind of constraints is, however, that they operate 
on an expression's semantics without being necessarily connected with the syntax of the expression. 
I will argue that the application of conceptual (semantic) constraints doesn't respond to syntax, but it 
rather responds to pre-determined “schemata”, or ways of organising thought and discourse about 
matters such as rain-falling, being ready, etc. Cognitive schemata in particular determine what I call 
standard cognitive formatting, i.e. standard structures for thought.
The  following  image  illustrates  the  way  I  conceive  the  relation  between  syntax,  semantics, 
conceptual  constraints  and  pragmatics.  Syntax  concerns  the  relations  between  the  terms  of  a 
language  L,  and  determines  which  expressions  are  well-formed  and  which  are  not.  Semantics 
concerns the truth-conditions of utterances of (well-formed) sentences in L. Conceptual constraints 
concern the correct way of structuring thought about any matter. Conceptual constraints  coincide 
with  semantic  constraints  for  every  speaker  who  masters  the  meaning  of  an  expression  e in 
language  L. They, however, have a wider scope, in that they may be involved in other cognitive 
activities  which  do  not  directly  relate  to  the  interpretation  of  utterances.  Finally,  pragmatics 
concerns  the  use  of  language  and  supplies  the  means  to  determine  which  utterances  enjoy 
distinctively pragmatic virtues such as informativeness, relevance, perspicuity, clarity, etc.







Use-related virtues of 
utterances.
Semantic constraints = Conceptual constraints 
for competent users of any expression e in L.
Let  us  now go back to  the  notion  of  intuitive  comprehension.  My hypothesis  is  that  intuitive 
comprehension reveals the hearer's capacity to reconstruct the content and truth-conditions of an 
under-determined  utterance  by  employing  the  pre-determined  “scaffolding”  provided  by  the 
standard  cognitive  format  that  regulates  thoughts  (and  discourse)  on  the  relevant  matters:  for 
example, the standard cognitive format for thought and discourse about rain-events, about states of 
readiness, of greenness, etc. I conclude by stressing the fact that conceptual (semantic) constraints 
might have a fundamental role in the comprehension of semantically under-determined sentences, 
even when this  comprehension is  about  utterances in specific contexts to  which the hearer has 
access. In this perspective, the Radical Contextualist Response, which is formulated solely in terms 
of free pragmatic processes, looses much of its appeal in favour of a response to the Comprehension 
Problem that  explicitly envisages the contribution of  constraining elements  that are conceptual  
(semantic)  in  nature.  At  the  end  of  Chapter  2,  I  therefore  endorse  the  view  that  conceptual 
(semantic) constraints play a role in the comprehension of utterances of under-determined sentences 
(even in specific contexts):
[The  Conceptual  Constraints  Claim] Conceptual  (semantic)  constraints  play  a  role  in  the 
comprehension of utterances of under-articulated sentences. 
The claim is still very much provisional and needs further qualification. In particular, it immediately 
elicits a question as to the status of these constraints. Conceptual constraints may be characterised 
as ways of organising information (and hence also thought and discourse) about the world. A claim 
based on this characterisation may however sound too simplistic and commonsensical. All humans 
organise  information  about  the  world  according  to  certain  constraints;  however,  the  genuine 
question is how and at which level these constraints affect utterance comprehension. 
The issue is challenging, insofar as one may observe that talk of conceptual (semantic) constraints  
could  be  dispensed  with,  in  favour  of  talk  about  syntactic  constraints.  Appealing  to  syntactic 
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constraints may seem to guarantee a more “compact” explanation of how utterance comprehension 
is  possible  in  cases  of  under-articulation,  for  syntactic  constraints  undoubtedly  fall  under  the 
domain of linguistic competence. Several authors in the last decade have put a strong emphasis on 
the alleged role of syntactic constraints  in the comprehension of semantically under-determined 
sentences like “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green” etc. (see Stanley 2000, Stanley 
& Szabó 2000, Szabó 2001, King & Stanley 2005). I shall therefore explore the possibility that 
what  I  have  introduced as  conceptual  (semantic)  constraints  are  really syntactic  constraints  on 
interpretation. As it will emerge, the proposal has more than one weakness.
In  Chapter  3,  my  focus  shifts  to  a  less  radical  brand  of  Contextualism,  known  as  Indexical 
Contextualism. The focal claim of Indexical Contextualism is that all the processes by which an 
utterance's content is supplemented contextually are traceable to the sentence's logical form (see 
Stanley 2000). Since there is no process of content supplementation that is not controlled at the 
syntactic level, all such processes are reduced to forms of indexicality resolution broadly conceived, 
i.e. of satisfaction of empty positions at some level of syntax. So for example, the process by which 
the content of an utterance of “It's raining” is supplemented with a locational element like <Paris> 
is supposed to be triggered by the presence of a hidden argument for locations in the logical form of 
the  predicate  “to  rain”.  The  predicate  is  postulated  as  denoting  a  relation  between  times  and 
locations rain(t, l), where the locational argument is not articulated at the superficial grammatical 
level but nevertheless marks a position in deep syntax. With this picture in the background, we can 
suppose that the Indexical Contextualist will address the Comprehension Problem in the following 
way:
[The Indexical Contextualist Response] The comprehension of utterances of semantically under-
determined sentences necessarily depends on the resolution of covert forms of indexicality (e.g. 
saturation of hidden slots in logical form).
Before moving on, let me make a clarificatory remark: I already argued in Chapter 1 that semantic 
under-determinacy  should  not  be  conflated  with  context-dependency  and,  specifically,  with 
indexicality. In addressing the Indexical Contextualist Response, my purpose is certainly that of 
indirectly  supporting  this  claim.  That  is,  in  demoting  the  claim that  conceptual  constraints  are 
reducible to mere positions in logical form, I aim at corroborating the point that semantic under-
determinacy is not a species of indexicality. 
Let us then return to the Indexical Contextualist Response. In order for the Indexical Contextualist 
Response to be successful, it has to be admitted that sentences such as “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, 
“The leaves are green”, which we have characterised as ultimately under-articulated, all really share 
a covertly indexical structure, which means that the predicates that occur in them feature some 
extra-argument  place  at  a  deep  level  of  syntax.  Thus,  the  predicate  “to  rain”  has  to  have  the 
structure  rain(t, l), which includes a hidden argument for locations  l; the predicate “being ready” 
has to have the structure  ready(x, y), where  y is a purpose- or activity- argument; the predicate 
“being green” has to have the structure green(x, y), where y is a respect- or part- argument. This all 
has to be accepted in order for the Indexical Contextualist response to get off the ground. However,  
are  there any good reasons to  accept  all  this?  Are there any good reasons to  revise our views 
concerning the syntactic structure of predicates like “to rain”, “being ready”, “being green”? The 
aim  of  Chapter  3 is  precisely  that  of  questioning  the  reasons  that  proponents  of  Indexical 
Contextualism advocate in support of this “revisionary” proposal. 
The most interesting defence of Indexical Contextualism is known as the Binding Argument (see 
Stanley 2000). Very sketchily, the Binding Argument purports to establish the Indexicalist position 
about the structure of sentences like “It's raining”, “Jill is ready” etc., by means of the following 
reasoning. First, a sentence like “It's raining” can be embedded into a more complex sentence which 
contains a quantification over locations, as for instance “Everywhere I go, it rains”. This complex 
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sentence gives rise to a bound reading, in which a putative locational variable is controlled by the 
quantifier “everywhere”. Under this reading, the sentence expresses the content <for every location  
x where the speaker goes, it's raining in x>. The crucial step in the argument then consists in saying 
that,  if  the bound reading is  possible,  then there must be a bindable variable articulated in  the 
logical  form of  the  embedded sentence  “...  it  rains”.  If  the  bindable  variable  is  present  in  the 
embedded sentence  “...  it  rains”,  then  it  must  be  present  in  the  sentence  even  when it  occurs 
unembedded. In conclusion, the sentence “It rains”/“It's raining” must contain a hidden indexical 
element corresponding to a locational variable.
This argument has been criticised on many fronts. My criticism could be thus summarised. The 
Binding Argument allegedly shows that the syntactic structure of predicates such as “to rain” has 
more complexity than meets the eye, in that it contains a hidden extra-position. This assumption at 
the syntactic level, however, brings to an incorrect account of all those occurrences of the predicate 
“to rain” in which the predicate clearly is used with a non-complex, monadic syntactic structure: 
call these cases “Zero Readings”. Consider, for example, the following sentence:
(27) Every time water falls from the sky, it rains.
In this sentence, the predicate “to rain” seems to have the simple, monadic structure rain(t) where 
raining is a property of times, or events; that is, the predicate seems to involve no hidden locational 
argument place. Indeed, (27) could be read as expressing the content <every time t water falls from 
the sky, a raining-episode occurs at t>. If, however, the predicate did contain a hidden locational 
argument  thus  having a  dyadic  structure  rain(x,  y),  then  (27)  would  forcedly  become an  open 
sentence, whose content is <every time t water falls from the sky, it rains in l at t>. This content is 
unevaluable  unless  a  value  is  provided  for  the  free  variable  l.  However,  it  seems  that  (27)  is 
perfectly evaluable with no need for any value assignment. The Indexicalist could respond to this 
challenge  by  interpreting  (27)  as  having a  bound reading.  For  instance,  by  supposing that  the 
quantifier “Every time water falls from the sky” binds a location variable in the embedded clause “it 
rains”, as in <For every time t and every place l in which water falls from the sky, it rains at l at t>. 
This reading seems fine, however, two considerations are called for: firstly, the bound reading is 
available even for the theorist who doesn't believe that “to rain” has structure rain(x, y) (for instance 
an  event-semanticist:  see  below  for  further  details);  secondly,  what  really  should  trouble  the 
Indexicalist  is  the fact  that  zero-readings cannot  be explained with the idea that  what  seems a 
monadic  predicate  is indeed  a  monadic  predicate  rain(t).  The  Indexicalist  can't  have  a  direct 
explanation of zero-readings—simply in terms of monadic predicates. Rather, he has to resort to 
bound readings in order to comply with the intuition that sentences like (27) are not open sentences. 
By contrast, the non-Indexicalist can easily account for zero-readings by simply pointing at the fact 
that a predicate like “to rain” has a monadic syntactic structure rain(t). 
These  considerations  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  postulating  a  complex  syntactic  structure  for 
predicates such as “to rain” (but also “being ready”, “being green”, etc.) on the account that this 
allows to explain bound readings  blocks the possibility  of adequately explaining  zero-readings. 
Adopting an event-analysis  and semantics  like the one suggested by Davidson (1967),  Parsons 
(1990),  Cappelen  and  Hawthorne  (2007)  and  Recanati  (2010)  could  probably  guarantee  an 
acceptable account of both bound readings and zero-readings. I therefore sympathise with all those 
authors who give up any assumptions as to the hidden syntactic structure of predicates like “to rain” 
and prefer  to see bound readings  (and zero-readings) as displaying relations between structural 
aspects of events (for instance, between their spatial and temporal aspects). This, however, is not the 
main point of the chapter. The crucial point is that, if an event-analysis is taken on board, then it  
becomes  apparent  that  the  Indexical  Contextualist's  commitments  as  to  the  syntactic  form  of 
expressions are dropped in favour of a commitment to aspects that reflect the way we organise 
information  about  events  of  raining,  of  being  ready,  of  being  green  at  a  genuinely  
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conceptual/semantic  level.  The  fact  that  the  internal  structure  of  events  of  raining,  but  also 
supposedly of states of readiness and of states of greenness enters into the way we make sense of 
the semantics of sentences (in both bound readings and zero-readings) may reveal an interaction 
between the way we organise thought and discourse about the world and the way we interpret 
sentences. Ultimately then,  abandoning syntactic commitments may bring the theorist to embrace  
commitments  at  a  conceptual/semantic  level,  thus  going  in  the  direction  of  an  account  which 
regards  conceptual  constraints  as  positively involved in  the  comprehension of  under-articulated 
sentences, at the expense of syntactic constraints.
In Chapter 4, I consider the idea that conceptual constraints may be reduced, at a semantic level, to 
parameters for evaluation. This idea implies essentially engaging with forms of Truth-Relativism. 
Semanticists have so far identified two forms of Truth Relativism—a “moderate” and a “radical” 
form. Both the “radical” and the “moderate” versions of Truth Relativism postulate that the truth-
value of a sentence is relative to a circumstance of evaluation that encompasses more parameters 
than just  a possible worlds- parameter:  this  common formal  move I  call  the “Extra-Parameters 
Move”. Thus for example, Temporalists (Prior 1968, Kaplan 1989) postulate that tensed sentences 
are true with respect to a possible world-parameter  w and a time-parameter  t;  Relativists  about 
epistemic  modality  (Egan,  Hawthorne,  Weatherson  2005,  Egan  2007,  Egan  2011)  have  it  that 
sentences of the form “It might be that φ” are true relative to a possible world-parameter w and an 
epistemic standard-parameter e. 
The aspect on which moderate and radical relativists diverge has to do with how the value of the  
extra-parameters  is  fixed.  Moderate  Relativists,  also  known  as  Non-Indexical  Contextualists 
(Kaplan 1989, Lewis 1980, Kölbel 2002, Recanati 2007) have it that the value of extra-parameters 
is fixed at the circumstances of the context of utterance; Radical Relativists have it that the value of 
the  extra-parameters  is  fixed  at  the  circumstances  of  a  context  of  assessment,  which  may  be 
different and completely independent of the context of utterance (see MacFarlane 2005a). 
As I mentioned in section 2 as a merely “sociological fact”, theorists have explicitly endorsed or at 
least foreshadowed a Truth Relativist approach as a way of opposing Indexical Contextualism. A 
potential route for those who are unconvinced by the conceptual constraints view and by Indexical 
Contextualism would therefore be that of trying to reduce conceptual constraints to parameters of  
evaluation. 
Supposing that conceptual constraints are parameters of evaluation entails endorsing a view about 
the truth-conditions of under-determined sentences which is compatible with something like the 
following statements: An utterance of “It's raining” is true relative to a possible world-parameter w 
and a location-parameter  l;  an utterance  of  “Jill  is  ready” is  true  relative  to  a  possible  world-
parameter w and a purpose-parameter p; an utterance of “The leaves are green” is true relative to a 
possible world-parameter  w and a respect-parameter  r. I presume that the Truth Relativist would 
therefore address the Comprehension Problem by giving the following response:
[The Relativist Response] Comprehension of utterances of semantically under-determined sentences 
necessarily requires recognising a form of truth relativity. 
I approach critically the Relativist Response by assessing whether this kind of solution is  enough 
motivated for the purposes of capturing conceptual (semantic) constraints. I first consider Radical 
Relativism and subsequently Moderate Relativism, also known as Non-Indexical Contextualism. 
Concerning Radical Relativism, I survey the two main motivations that have led theorists to endorse 
this view in recent years: (1) capturing disagreement on matters “of inclination” and (2) capturing 
retraction on matters “of inclination” (see MacFarlane 2005a, 2007b, MS.). I argue that neither of 
these  motivations  has  any bearing  on the  issue  of  capturing  conceptual  (semantic)  constraints. 
Radical Relativism is not the best option for accounting for these constraints, because the notion 
itself of “assessment-sensitive” truth is tightly linked to the “perspectivality” of truth i.e. to the 
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dependence of truth on points of view that cannot be reduced to any objective aspect of the world, 
such  as  taste  standards,  epistemic  states-standards,  moral-code  standards.  However,  conceptual 
(semantic)  constraints  do not  in general concern perspectives;  they may at  best  be regarded as 
determining a truth-predicate which is merely “feature-sensitive”, i.e. which is relative to objective 
aspects of the world, such as times, locations, comparison classes, purposes, parts, respects etc. The 
best option to account for conceptual (semantic) constraints within an extra-parameters framework 
may therefore be a Moderate Relativism—also known as Non-Indexical Contextualism. 
The problem with Non-Indexical Contextualism, though, is that it gives a strained account of what 
semantic under-determinacy is. In particular, Non-Indexical Contextualism forces the theorist  to 
radically re-frame the intuitions of semantic under-determinacy with which all theorists in this area 
of investigation start. More to the point, if Non-Indexical Contextualism is true, intuitions as to the 
semantic under-determinacy of sentences like “It's raining”, “Jill is ready” etc. cannot be intuitions 
about content, but they have to be intuitions about the utterance's circumstances of evaluation. This 
radical re-framing is, however, methodologically suspect: it doesn't seem fair that a theory which 
starts with a certain pool of data winds up distorting those initial data as a result of the theory itself 
having  been  established.  Thus,  it  seems  that  we  have  some  reasons  to  reject  Non-Indexical 
Contextualism too, as an account of conceptual (semantic) constraints.
Given  the  failure  of  both  Radical  Relativism  and  Non-Indexical  Contextualism  to  capture 
conceptual (semantic) constraints, and given also the previous failure of Indexical Contextualism, I 
conclude  that  we  should  abandon  any  attempt  to  reduce  such  constraints  to  either  syntactic 
components, such as hidden positions in deep syntax, or to aspects of evaluation, such as extra-
parameters  for  the  relativisation  of  truth-value.  Rather,  we  should  take  conceptual  (semantic) 
constraints as operating at an independent level. In  Chapter 5, I will provide a picture in which 
conceptual (semantic) constraints operate on an utterance's truth-conditions not because they obey 
to  any  syntactic  restrictions  or  restrictions  about  evaluative  aspects,  but  because  they  obey  to 
restrictions imposed by “schemata” or frames, which are ways of organising thought and discourse 
about the world.
5. The Conceptual Constraints View
In the preceding sections, I suggested that we should move away from a reduction of conceptual  
constraints either to aspects of syntax or to parameters for evaluation. Instead we should be ready to 
approach these constraints as operating on an independent level.
I  take conceptual constraints  to be primarily  ways of structuring and organising thought about  
certain matters. We structure thought about metereological matters in terms of phenomena such as 
rain-falling, snow-falling, etc. that concern locations; we structure thought about being ready in 
terms of purposes or activities for which one is ready; we structure thought about being green in 
terms of being green in some respect, or part, or against some comparison class. That thought about 
these matters is structured thus may be explained by the fact that subjects belonging to a certain 
(environmental, cultural, social, linguistic) group need to think in the same terms in order for their 
thought to adequately fit reality and the way other subjects think about and describe this reality. In 
figurative terms, subjects that belong to the same (environmental, cultural, social, linguistic) group 
need to share a  standard cognitive format for thought about certain matters. To characterise the 
phenomenon in terms familiar to cognitive psychologists, we may view conceptual constraints as 
evoking  very  general  and  fundamental  schemata6,  i.e.  structured  configurations  divided  into 
different  “dimensions” or  “slots” that  have to  be completed with specific  kinds of  values.  The 
attainment of the appropriate cognitive formatting could be depicted as a mechanism of cognitive 
“slot-filling”. 
In this thesis, I will be mainly talking about conceptual constraints, rather than semantic constraints. 
The reason for this choice is that I believe that the conceptual domain is  more stable  than the 
6 For the notion of schema, see Rumelhart and Ortony 1977, Rumelhart 1980, Cohen and Murphy 1984.
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semantic domain. For example, it could be the case that one is competent on a concept F but at the 
same time one has false beliefs about the meaning of a word e which, in a language L, is associated 
with F. Or, it could be the case that one who doesn't master the meaning of a certain word e in a 
language L (which, by hypothesis, is associated with concept F) manages to comprehend that word 
with the help of her mastery of precisely F. The upshot of these considerations is that conceptual 
constraints are not as tied to language and linguistic competence as semantic constraints are: being 
cross-lingustic, they seem more stable and reliable.
It is however important to keep in mind that, when one is a competent user of a word e in language 
L,  one  certainly  also  masters  the  concept  F associated  with  e.  So for  competent  users  of  any  
expression e of L, conceptual constraints and semantic constraints coincide, as a matter of fact. For 
instance, knowing the meaning of the word “rain” in English entails mastering the concept  RAIN 
associated with it. In all the cases I will consider (“It's raining”, “The leaves are green”, “Jill is  
ready”, etc.), it will be a tacit assumption that the hearers and speakers involved are competent users 
of the English language and, as a result, also competent users of the relevant concepts. Thus, even 
though in what follows I will tend to use the the notion of conceptual constraints at the expense of 
that of semantic constraints, I will nevertheless maintain that, in the specific cases I will scrutinise,  
talk of conceptual constraints might be safely substituted by talk of semantic constraints, since I will 
assume that hearers (and speakers) are competent language users.
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  question  of  how  conceptual  constraints  affect  the  comprehension  of 
utterances of semantically under-determined expressions. On the assumption that hearers master the 
relevant  constraints,  we can  suppose  that  hearers  exploit  conceptual  constraints  (together  with 
information about the context, the speaker's intentions and so on) in order to reconstruct the content 
and truth conditions of utterances of under-determined sentences. Let us see how this might happen 
by making an example.
Suppose a speaker utters “Jill is ready”. This sentence is semantically under-determined. Provided 
that the hearer is a competent user of the predicate “being ready” as well as of the concept READY, 
she can use the conceptual (but, in this case, also semantic) constraint that readiness is readiness for 
some purpose/activity, plus information that she may have gathered from the context concerning 
Jill's particular purpose, in order to reconstruct the truth-conditions of this utterance. The hearer 
may be in a position to perform this reconstructive task insofar as these conceptual constraints are 
part  of  the  cognitive  format  for  thought  and  discourse  that  she  (the  hearer)  and  the  speaker 
presumably  share.  A precondition  for  doing  this  is  certainly  that  the  hearer  has  at  least  the 
background presupposition that the speaker is a competent language- and concept-user, i.e. that she 
structures thought and discourse about being ready in terms of being ready for some purpose. If this  
presupposition is in place and there are no reasons for defeating it, then the hearer can proceed 
applying her own conceptual/semantic competence. 
The interpretation of an utterance of “Jill is ready” may therefore be regarded as resulting from a 
combination of competences: first, there is a subject's mastery of a compositional, syntax-driven 
semantic system, which plausibly constitutes what we call “linguistic competence”; secondly, there 
is  one's  conceptual/semantic  competence,  which integrates  the results  of  linguistic  competence; 
third, there is one's capacity to gain information from the context, which may provide additional 
propositional material. So for instance, the hearer may employ her linguistic competence in order to 
decode  the  sentence's  content <that  Jill  is  ready>;  by  exploiting  the  conceptual  (semantic) 
constraint that readiness is such only with respect to a purpose/activity, she may “expand” such a 
minimal content so as to obtain a suitable extra conceptual/semantic slot. Context may provide her 
with information concerning the value with which the slot should be filled—for example, skiing. 
The combination of conceptual/semantic constraints application and contextual information allows 
her to derive the content <that Jill is ready for skiing>.
So far I have described the way the process may be taken to unfold, but I haven't said anything 
concerning its nature. Is this process semantic or pragmatic? Is it inferential or non-inferential? Is it 
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conscious? Does it involve any particularly sophisticated cognitive abilities?
“Conceptually  constrained”  processes  depart  from  semantic  processes  in  that  they  do  not 
exclusively govern the interpretation of linguistic constructions,  but are supposedly involved in 
enterprises that are not purely language-related. Nevertheless, conceptual constraints  are semantic 
constraints in a very important sense. As I have already made clear, conceptual constraints coincide 
with semantic constraints for competent users of any expression e of language L. If this is the case, 
then the processes  triggered by such constraints  doubtless  belong to semantics.  The peculiarity 
about these constraints is that, even though they determine genuinely semantic, truth-conditional 
effects,  thus  helping to  figure out  “what  is  said” by an utterance,  they do so in  a way that  is  
unconstrained  by  syntax.  Thus  for  instance,  the  semantic  content  of  “It's  raining”  established 
compositionally on the basis of syntax alone is the proposition <that it's raining>. The application 
of conceptual constraints “expands” the conceptual/semantic structure of that content so as to obtain 
something like  <that  it's  raining  somewhere>.  Note  however  that  this  process  of  “expansion” 
unfolds independently of any constraints posed by the syntax of the sentence. Conceptual/semantic 
constraints therefore determine semantic, but syntactically unconstrained processes. The following 
chart  illustrates  the  way  I  conceive  the  relation  between  semantics,  syntactic  constraints  and 
conceptual/semantic constraints on the one hand, and pragmatics on the other. As one can see, both 
syntactic  constraints  and  conceptual  constraints  (together  with  contextual  information,  where 
appropriate) concur to determine the truth-conditions of an utterance, or “what is said” by it: this 
licenses the claim that they both give a contribution to the semantics of the utterance. Pragmatics, 
on the other hand, concerns what the utterance conveys rather than say.
What is said 
(Semantics)
Syntactic constraints “It's raining” is true iff it's raining.
Conceptual (semantic) 
constraints
“It's raining” is true iff it's raining 
somewhere (contextual info may be 
plugged in, if appropriate: e.g. in Paris);





More on the nature of conceptually constrained processes will be said in section 7 of Chapter 5.
Conceptually constrained processes are to be viewed as inferential in the standard sense of the term, 
i.e. as involving a set of premisses that lead to a conclusion  via a valid pattern of inference. The 
performance of the inference is to be understood as implicit, or tacit. This inferential conception is 
to be contrasted with views of processes of utterance comprehension as purely translational (see 
Millikan 2004), as associative (see Recanati 2002b), or as guided solely by cognitive mechanisms 
such as “path-of-least-effort” mechanisms (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). I refer to section 3 
of Chapter 5 for these issues.
Moreover,  even though conceptually  constrained processes  are  inferences  which hearers  run in 
order  to  work  out  the  truth-conditions  of  an  utterance  in  a  certain  context,  they  need  not  be 
inferences  that  result  in  attributions  of  attitudes to  the  speakers,  where  typical  attributions  of 
attitude are of the form “X means that P”, “X believes that P”, “X intends that P”. For example, the 
conceptually constrained interpretation of Ann's utterance of “Jill is ready” needs not produce as its 
result the proposition <that Ann means that Jill is ready to ski>. If the conceptual constraints view 
is  correct,  the hearer  who interprets  an utterance of “Jill  is  ready” only needs  to go through a 
“mechanical” process of expansion of the sentence's conceptual/semantic structure, so as to obtain 
an extra conceptual/semantic slot which she may fill-in with information gained from the context of  
utterance.  This  “mechanical”  process  of  structure-expansion  and slot-saturation  doesn't  need  to 
involve the subject's meta-representational capacities. Granted, the hearer may exercise her meta-
representational  capacity to  enquire some background aspects  of the situation of utterance—for 
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example, to discover what the speaker is talking about, what she's making reference to, and so on.  
This,  however,  does not entail  that the result  of the  overall utterance interpretation need be an 
attribution of attitude or intention of the form X means/believes/intends that p. In other words, even 
if meta-representation may still be conceived as part of the interpretive process, this fact needs not 
affect  the  structure  of  the  interpretive  process  conclusion,  which  may  remain  an  object-level 
representation. The view of conceptually constrained processes as inferences having object-level 
conclusions  contrasts  with  the  Gricean  model,  which  envisages  interpretive  inferences  that  are 
meta-representational  through  and  through,  and  also  with  the  Relevance-Theoretic  model  (see 
Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, Carston 2002), which envisages inferences whose premisses are not 
necessarily  meta-representational,  but  whose  conclusion  is.  More  will  be  said  on  this  issue  in 
section 4 of Chapter 5.
Further developments for the conceptual constraints view will presumably have to ascertain how far 
a conceptual constraints account can be extended: do we need conceptual constraints just to explain 
the comprehension of semantically under-determined sentences? Or do conceptual constraints play 
a role also in the reference-assignment of pronouns, in the interpretation of compound expressions, 
idiomatic  expressions,  figurative  speech  and  so  on?  Another  interesting  topic  of  investigation 
concerns  the  extent  to  which  users  that  are,  by  hypothesis,  employing  conceptual  constraints 
produce  meta-representations  as  the  results  of  their  comprehension  process.  I  reserve  these 
challenging developments for future work.
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In the present work, I will be concerned with the semantics of sentences like the following:
(1) It's raining;
(2) Jill is ready;
(3) Lisa is tall;
(4) The leaves are green;
What  is  interesting  about  these  examples?  As  I  already  anticipated  in  the  Introduction,  these 
sentences contain expressions which suffer from a form of semantic under-specification, and yet are 
not clear examples of, for instance, ambiguity, vagueness, or context-dependence. For convenience, 
I have decided to call these expressions semantically under-determined. In this section, my purpose 
is that of fostering some pre-theoretic intuitions about their defectiveness. 
Before  proceeding,  it  will  be  appropriate  to  fix  some  terminology.  Following  the  standard 
contemporary conception—which traces back to Kaplan (1989), Lewis (1980) and Stalnaker (1970)
—I  will  call  semantics the formal device whose task is  to determine the truth-conditions of a 
sentence in context, at (at least) a possible world. Semantics standardly takes as its input a couple 
formed by a sentence s and a context  c, and delivers the truth-conditions of  s at the world of the 
context wc. This process follows a principle of compositionality, according to which the meaning of 
a  sentence  in  context  is  determined by the  meanings  (in  context)  of  its  components  and their 
syntactic arrangement.
In this framework, I will talk of semantic content as the output of these compositional processes, 
which is  standardly to be evaluated at  a possible world.  I will  use as equivalents of “semantic 
content” also expressions like “sentence meaning”, “what is strictly speaking said”, “the semantics 
of  the  sentence”,  etc.  Semantic  content  is  determined solely  by the  content  (in  context,  where 
appropriate) of the sentence's components, according to the way these components are syntactically 
arranged. Syntax provides the rules by means of which well-formed sentences can be set apart from 
ill-formed ones, and acts as a constraint on interpretation in the sense that only what is syntactically 
articulated  in  a  sentence  goes  into  the  sentence's  interpretation.  So  for  example,  the  semantic 
content of (1) results from composing together the meanings of It, is, raining, thus resulting in the 
content that it's raining. This content is what should be evaluated at a circumstance—usually a 
possible world, notably the world in which the utterance of (1) is performed. Similarly, the semantic 
content of (2), resulting from composition of the words' meanings, is that Jill is ready. The semantic 
content of (3) is that Lisa is tall, while that of (4) is that the leaves are green.
Semantic  content  thus  conceived—as the  result  of  compositionality-driven interpretation—often 
doesn't  deliver  any  propositional  item,  where  a proposition is  a  content  (in  context)  which  is 
amenable to evaluation in terms of truth and falsity (at at least a world). Whenever the semantic 
content of a sentence s doesn't deliver an evaluable content (in context) for utterances of s, and (as 
already mentioned in the  Introduction)  this  apparent semantic defectiveness is  not  prima facie 
imputable to any explicit  form of ambiguity,  vagueness, indexicality or ellipsis, I shall  say that 
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semantic content gives rise to semantic under-determinacy. In this section, I will confine myself to 
providing some examples of the phenomenon, to make it vivid to the reader.
Imagine that, at time t, you happen to hear an utterance of (1). The semantics of English enables 
you to know that what has been said is that it is raining at t (where the specific time t is plausibly 
incorporated into the present tense). In most cases, upon hearing an utterance of (1), it would take 
just a look outside the window to check whether it is true. However, suppose you looked out of the 
window but you saw no rain falling. It doesn't follow that the speaker's utterance of (1) is false. It  
could be raining somewhere else, e.g. in Paris, and the speaker may be talking about precisely that 
place. But how would you know that? No specifics concerning the location of the rain are provided 
by what (1) strictly speaking says, i.e. by its semantic content. In this case, one shall say that the 
meaning of (1) doesn't say how the world should be in order for an utterance of it to be true.
Suppose now you hear an utterance of (2). Unless you are sufficiently informed about what the 
speaker is talking about, you are probably going to find this utterance poorly informative; most 
prominently, you are likely to feel at a loss as to whether what has been said is true or false. What  
the sentence means, i.e. the semantic content  that Jill is ready fails to determine how the world 
should be in order for an utterance of (2) to be true, because it fails to specify what activity Jill is 
ready for. 
Now consider an utterance of (3) made by a speaker who is referring to Lisa, a 25-year-old woman. 
It should not be difficult for you to understand what the speaker says, nor to know whether the 
utterance is true or false: you only need to know who Lisa is, and what her approximate height is.  
Indeed, language users do not have any difficulty in understanding and evaluating utterances like 
that of (3): but that, I submit, is because there is a  default standard for being tall, which is the 
average height of humans of the community one belongs to. Suppose for a moment this default 
standard was not operative: the speaker is talking about Lisa's height for a basketball player. Now 
the situation changes. For, even if Lisa is a tall person, she may fail to be tall for a basketball player.  
If this were the case, the speaker's utterance of (3) would be false. So, is it so straightforward in the 
end that Lisa is tall? What standard has to be taken into consideration in order for this judgement to 
be true? Again, it seems that the meaning of (3) (that Lisa is tall) cannot be of help. No salient 
standard is specified at the level of semantic, compositionally-driven interpretation. So it seems that 
the semantic content of (3), just like in the previous cases, doesn't fully specify how the world 
should be in order for an utterance of (3) to be true.
Finally, imagine that you hear an utterance of (4), while the speaker is referring to the leaves of the 
plant which is sitting in the corner of her living room. You may be able to evaluate (4) just by seeing 
what the colour of the leaves is. In general, language users establish the truth or falsity of sentences 
of the form “x is green” by looking at how x looks. However, suppose the plant in question looked 
green on the outside, but just because a child painted it green; under the paint, the plant's leaves are 
actually red. It seems now that the utterance of (4) is false: strictly speaking, the leaves are not 
green, even though they look green because they were so painted. In light of these facts, is it now so 
obvious that the leaves are green? In what way should the leaves be green in order for (4) to say 
something true? The meaning of (4) (that the leaves are green) cannot specify in which sense the 
leaves have that colour: further details from the context of utterance are required. So again, and just 
like in the previous examples, the semantics of (4) seems to fail to specify how the world should be 
in order for an utterance of (4) to be true.
What examples (1)-(4) show is that some of the sentences we use seem to fail to specify the truth-
conditions  of  their  utterances.  The  idea  is  that,  if  one  is  to  hear  an  utterance  of  any of  these 
sentences without being provided with further contextual information, one is left in the dark as to 
what must be the case in the world in order for what one has heard to be true. What sentences say in 
virtue  of  their  meaning  alone  is  “too  poor”  in  order  for  utterances  of  those  sentences  to  be 
evaluated. In the following section, I will be concerned with introducing the reader to the historical 
framework in which the idea of semantic under-determinacy has risen.
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2. Historical background
2.1 Grice and the Saying-Implicating distinction
Grice's seminal work on the semantics of logical connectives such as “and” and “or” is often cited 
as responsible for having introduced a very sharp separation between what is conventionally “said” 
by a sentence and what is communicated, or “implicated” by an utterance of that sentence. The 
Gricean distinction has it that what a certain sentence says is the result of the combination of the 
words' conventional meanings. In  Logic and Conversation, Grice writes: “I intend what someone 
has  said  to  be  closely  related  to  the  conventional  meaning  of  the  word  (the  sentence)  he  has 
uttered.” (Grice 1967/1989: 25). In addition to the conventional element, what is said is strictly 
bound to the elements explicitly articulated in the sentence's syntax. Grice makes it clear that what 
composes what is said must track the way the sentence is arranged, in that it must correspond to 
“the elements of [the sentence], their order, and their syntactic character” (Grice 1969/1989, p. 87).
Note that, even if a sentence's meaning is conventional, this does not imply that it does not take the 
context of use into account. It is compatible with the Gricean picture that the semantics of some 
words, like for instance indexicals such as “I” and “you” or demonstratives like “he”, involves a 
form of contextual saturation in order for their  reference to be fixed; ambiguous terms as well 
require contextual disambiguation. Here is a passage in which it is clear that the semantic value of  
both such kinds of terms fully belongs to what is conventionally “said”:
Suppose someone to have uttered the sentence “He is in the grip of a vice” […] [F]or 
a full identification of what the speaker had said, one would need to know: (a) the 
identity of x; (b) the time of the utterance; (c) the meaning, on the particular occasion 
of utterance, of the phrase “in the grip of a vice”. (Grice 1967/1989: 25)
On point (a), Grice seems to grant that, in order to understand what has been said, one needs to 
assign a referent  (in context)  to the occurrence of “he”; while  on point  (c),  Grice seems to be 
admitting that the meaning of the phrase “in the grip of a vice”, disambiguated in context, is to 
become part and parcel of what has been said as well. So, that context is taken into account does not 
mean that linguistic conventions are being less applied in figuring out what is being said. In general, 
then, we can say that what a sentence says is the result of applying a set of linguistic conventions,  
some of which do not dictate to take the context into consideration, some of which do.
Besides the notion of what is said, Grice leaves room in his framework for contents that can be 
communicated  without  being  said.  Such  further  contents  are  called  by  Grice  implicatures.  An 
example of implicated content may be the following: A and B are visiting a friend. After a a couple 
of hours, A announces “It's 6 o'clock” to B. B can interpret A as saying <that it's 6 o'clock> in order 
to suggest or implicate that, for instance, it's time to leave. As it can be noticed, an implicature is a 
proposition  inferred  from  the  fact  that  a  certain  sentence  (“It's  6  o'clock”)  with  a  precise 
conventional  meaning  (<that  it's  6  o'clock>),  has  been  uttered.  What  is  communicated  via 
implicature is a distinct content from that expressed by sentence meaning alone. This additional 
content  normally  has  no  bearing  on  the  truth-condition  of  what  is  conventionally  said  by  the 
sentence: it is, in general, truth-conditionally distinct and autonomous. 
How are implicatures generated from conventional meaning? In general, Grice maintains that an 
implicature is built up from an already established sentence meaning plus some contextual pieces of 
information. However, he admits that some implicatures are directly built into the very meaning of a 
term; that is, nothing more than the conventional meaning of the term employed is needed in order 
to generate the implicature. This is what he calls a  conventional  implicature. An example may be 
provided by the word “but”. “But” gives the same truth-conditional contribution as “and”: hence, 
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what a sentence like “He is rich, but generous” can be regarded as saying is that the demonstrated  
person is rich and generous. Nonetheless, the mere use of a word like “but” commits the speaker to 
(and prompts the hearer to understand) the proposition <that B is rich and,  in contrast with this,  
generous>. Since this proposition is not strictly speaking said, Grice concludes that it is implicated 
by convention, i.e. by the mere fact that the expression “but” is used.
Other kinds of implicature, not directly generated by the semantic properties of expressions, arise in 
connection with the idea that having a conversation is a matter of cooperation. A conversation is 
usually not an exchange of linguistic expressions totally disconnected from each other. At any stage 
of the conversation, there shall be some expected, appropriate contributions, that speakers should 
give.  In normal  conditions,  speakers will  therefore try to  make it  that  their  contribution to  the 
overall conversational enterprise is as appropriate as possible; hearers too will struggle in order to 
interpret the moves that their interlocutors make as most appropriate and helpful for the sake of the 
conversation. In general then, it seems that being engaged in a conversation involves what Grice 
calls the Cooperative Principle:
Cooperative Principle: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at 
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange 
in which you are engaged. (Grice 1967/1989: 26).
There  is  more  than  one  aspect  in  which  a  conversational  participant's  contribution  might  be 
appropriate—or  not  appropriate.  Grice  individuates  four  of  these  aspects,  which  he  calls 
“categories” (borrowing the term from Kant); to each of these categories there corresponds a maxim 
(accompanied by a set of sub-maxims) for the related appropriate behaviour in a conversational 
exchange. The first of these four maxims pertains to the category of Quantity, i.e. the amount of 
information that one is allowed and encouraged to provide in the course of a conversation:
Quantity: (i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the  exchange). (ii)  Do not make your contribution more informative 
than is required. (ibid: 26);
The second maxim is about the Quality of the contribution that one is allowed to provide. Here it is 
assumed that the quality of a true utterance is better than the quality of a false one, and that the  
quality of a warranted or justified utterance is better than the quality of an unwarranted one.
Quality: (i) Do not say what you believe to be false. (ii) Do not say that for which 
you lack adequate evidence.
The  third  maxim  concerns  the  Relation  of  one's  contribution,  presumably  with  respect  to  the 
previous  contributions  and  to  the  general  goal  of  the  conversation:  The  idea  is  that  one's 
contribution must  relate  in  some clear  way with these two elements,  hence the requirement  of 
relevance.
Relation: (i) Be relevant;
Finally, the fourth maxim covers the category of Manner, that is, not the category of “what” is said 
but that of “how” what is said is said. Here the super-maxim, comprehensive of the other more 
specific sub-maxims, is “Be perspicuous”. The sub-maxims are:
Manner:  (i)  Avoid  obscurity  of  expression;  (ii)  Avoid  ambiguity;  (iii)  Be  brief 
(avoid unnecessary prolixity); (iv) Be orderly.
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How is the notion of implicature connected to the maxims? In general, an implicature may arise 
every time a speaker, by saying what she says, fails to fulfil one of the maxims, even though there is 
no reason for the hearer to suppose that she is not being cooperative. There are at least two ways in 
which a speaker might fail to satisfy a maxim. First, the speaker may commit an “unnoticeable” or 
“quiet” violation, such as that in the following dialogue:
(5) a. Alice: “Shall we go to the movies tonight?”
b. Grace : “I am tired”.
Grace's response is not immediately relevant with respect to Alice's question. So Grace's answer 
seems to be violating the maxim of Relation: what she literally says is not immediately related to 
the content of Alice's  utterance,  and cannot therefore count as an appropriate answer to Alice's 
question.  Still,  suppose  that  Alice  has  no reason to  think  that  Grace  is  not  cooperating  to  the  
conversation. In light of this datum, Alice should be able to run the following inference (which I 
adapt  from Grice  1967/1989):  “Assuming that  Grace  is  being  cooperative,  she  could  not  have 
uttered what she uttered unless she thought that she doesn't want to go to the movies; she knows 
that  I  can  derive this  supposition  given what  she said;  she has  done nothing to  stop me from 
thinking that she thinks that she doesn't want to go to the movies; she wants me to think that she 
doesn't want to go to the movies; therefore, she is implicating that she doesn't want to go to the 
movies”.
Another way an implicature might be generated is through explicit violation or “flouting” of one of 
the maxims. Such a blatant violation should trigger in the hearer a chain of reasoning similar to that  
reproduced above, of course provided that the hearer has no reason to doubt that the speaker is still 
being cooperative. A notorious example of maxim-flouting is irony: I could comment on my friend 
X's having betrayed me by saying “X is a fine friend”. By using this sentence, I would be patently 
violating the maxim of Quality, for I would be uttering something strictly speaking false. Still, if my 
hearer regards me as cooperative, she could engage in the following train of thought: “I have no 
reason to think that she is not being cooperative; the only reason for her to utter what she uttered is 
that she thinks that X is an awful friend; she knows I can derive this supposition based on what she 
said; she has done nothing to stop me from thinking that she thinks that X is an awful friend; she 
wants me to think that X is an awful friend; therefore, she is implicating that X is an awful friend”.
In general, when speaking about the process of implicature-calculation, it is taken as understood 
that  the  hearer  has  to  go through what  is  being  said (in  virtue of  its  linguistic  meaning)  by a 
sentence first, in order to subsequently understand what is being implicated by the act of uttering 
that sentence. This becomes clearer if we consider the step-by-step reasoning that, according to 
Grice, leads to the derivation of an implicature. Suppose Grace asks Alice whether Charles is good-
looking. As a response, Alice utters “Charles is a very smart person”. The answer clearly is off-
topic, in that it doesn't provide information about the way Charles looks, in contrast with what was 
required by Grace's question. In Grice's terms, the maxim of relation is violated, in that Alice's 
answer as to the intelligence of Charles is totally unrelated with the question of Charles' look. How 
could then the hearer of Alice's answer make sense of her utterance? Grice's answer is that the 
hearer may go through a reasoning such as those exemplified above, whose first premise is:
[1] Alice said that Charles is a very smart person;
and whose conclusion is:
[n] She is implicating that Charles is not good looking.
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As one can note, the first premise of the reasoning is one in which the notion of saying occurs. Even 
though at this stage the notion could be totally theoretically unladen, it is worthwhile to note that, in 
order to derive what she meant to communicate, Grace cannot but go through what Alice conveyed 
by using the means that she and Grace are most likely (at least in their circumstances) to share: the 
English language. Implicature-calculation is therefore a reasoning in which one of the premises 
(usually, the first) has the form “X said that that p”, where the notion of saying seems tightly linked 
with that of linguistic meaning. So, if the notion of implicature is ever plausible, then it requires that 
something is said in the first place,  where the notion of “saying” is intimately related with the 
meaning expressions have in virtue of linguistic conventions.
2.2 Undermining Grice's Distinction
Some authors have questioned Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated, on 
the account that the notion of what is said, which is essential in making sense of the concept of 
implicature, is hardly ever exemplified: There is hardly ever anything around corresponding to what 
is said in Grice's sense.
In  Travis'  (1985/2008)  interpretation  of  Grice,  the  notion  of  what  is  said  is  composed by two 
elements, which we might call a “conventional” element and a “truth-conditional” element. What 
does this mean? When an utterance of a sentence is performed, what is said is, in Travis' reading of 
Grice: (i) the result of the application of linguistic conventions, and (ii) what is “strictly speaking 
true”,  i.e.  what  in  the  utterance  would  be  true  or  false,  regardless  of  the  implications  or 
presuppositions raised by the utterance itself. Travis (1985/2008) illustrates (ii) with the help of an 
example made by Grice himself:  what  is  said by an utterance of “He is  an Englishman;  he is 
therefore, brave” is  that a certain individual is an Englishman and is brave. An utterance of such 
sentence would normally raise the implication that the man's being brave is a  consequence of his 
being an Englishman. However, Grice argues, even if the man's being brave didn't follow from his 
being English, the sentence would still be  strictly speaking true: “Grice takes it that the relevant 
person's being an Englishman and being brave is enough to make what was said, strictly speaking, 
true […].” (Travis 1985/2008: 22) 7.
At first sight, the conventional and the truth-conditional component seem to live together quite well. 
However, Travis points out, difficulties are behind the corner. Consider an utterance of the sentence 
“The leaves are green”. If this utterance were to implicate anything, it would have to say something 
in the first place. In order to determine what the sentence says, we should be able to identify what  
makes the sentence strictly speaking true. However, determining such a thing is not straightforward 
at all. To illustrate the case, consider the following situation (inspired by Travis (1997)): 
Case A: Pia has just bought a ficus to be placed in the living room. The leaves of the 
plant  have  a  characteristic  dark  and  shiny  green  shade.  Contemplating  her  new 
purchase, Pia utters “The leaves are green”. The ficus' leaves' being green makes the 
sentence Pia uses true.
Case B: Pia owns a Japanese maple, whose leaves are characteristically red. One day, 
Pia decides that she would like her Japanese maple's leaves better if they were green; 
therefore, she buys green dye and colours them green. Once she has finished, and 
7 Travis's way of reconstructing Grice depicts him as very much in the footsteps of Frege, who expresses a very 
similar point of view about “and” and “but”. He writes: “The word 'but' differs from 'and' in that with it one 
intimates that what follows is in contrast with what would be expected from what preceded it. Such suggestions in 
speech make no difference to the thought. A sentence can be transformed by changing the verb from active to 
passive and making the object the subject at the same time. In the same way the dative may be changed into the 
nominative while "give" is replaced by "I receive". Naturally such transformations are not indifferent in every 
respect; but they do not touch the thought, they do not touch what is true or false” (Frege 1956 p. 295-6, my italics).
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while contemplating her work, Pia utters “The leaves are green”. The painted leaves' 
being green make the sentence Pia uses true.
It seems that what is said by the sentence “The leaves are green” is different in Case A and in Case 
B. Why? Because in each case, what makes the sentence true is a different way for the leaves of 
being green. The property of being green in Case A, such that it makes  that particular utterance of 
“The leaves are green” true, is different from the property of being green in Case B. So it seems that 
in  the  two  cases,  the  same  sentence  “The  leaves  are  green”  says  two  different  things.  So,  
determining “what makes the sentence strictly speaking true” is of no help for determining what the 
sentence  says.  Since  the  sentence  is  made  true  by  different  states  of  affairs  in  different 
circumstances,  what is  said with that  sentence changes across those circumstances.  If  there are 
many things that “can be said” with a sentence in different circumstances, there's nothing such as 
what that sentence “says”. As Travis puts it: “there are at least several distinct things to be said […] 
in one or another speaking of our sample words […]. If so, then it is incorrect to speak of “what is 
said” […] in speaking those words” (Travis 1985/2008: 26). 
However, one might object, taking “what makes a sentence true” as a guide for determining “what a 
sentence says” is misguided. After all, sentences have meanings! So, what is said by the sentence is 
presumably determined by the sentence's conventional meaning. For example, what “The leaves are 
green” says shall be determined by its conventional meaning, which yields the content  <that the  
leaves  are green>.  But,  again,  here  Travis  notes  a  difficulty:  what  makes  the simple  semantic 
content <that the leaves are green> true or false? The meaning of the sentence does nothing to 
make what the sentence says capable of being true or false in any circumstance, in that it fails to 
exhaustively  indicate  what  should be the case in  order  for  an utterance  of  that  sentence to  be 
evaluable. For example, one may ask in what way the leaves would have to be green in order to 
count as such: would they have to be green on the outer surface? Or beneath the surface instead? 
And so on. As a consequence of these considerations, Travis concludes that sentence meaning is not 
what is said by the sentence, for it doesn't say anything such that could be true or false. “When what 
is said may be true or false, then, what is said in speaking given words cannot be revealed by their  
meanings […] on that speaking alone” (Travis 1985/2008: 33). 
In sum, the reason why the Gricean distinction between saying and implicating doesn't stand is that 
the very Gricean notion of what is said is a non-starter: on the one hand, we cannot determine “what 
is  said”  on  the  basis  of  “what  makes  the  sentence  strictly  speaking  true”,  for  “what  makes  a 
sentence strictly speaking true” changes from context to context, thus making it that there is no one 
single thing that the sentence, all by itself, says; on the other hand, we cannot determine “what is 
said” on the basis of conventional meaning, because meaning turns out as seriously under-specific. 
2.3. Beyond the Gricean Distinction: Pragmatic “What is Said”, Explicature and Impliciture
If Travis is right, and there's no way to determine “what is said” by a sentence, then the Gricean 
picture happens to be under threat. If a sentence doesn't say anything in virtue of its conventional 
semantic  properties,  then  what  is  said  will  have  to  be  determined  by  something  other  than 
convention.  In  the  view  of  Travis  and  others  (see  below),  extra-linguistic,  pragmatic factors 
intervene in determining what is said. If what is said is determined by elements that do not pertain 
to the semantic conventions of language, then Grice's initial distinction between what is said and 
what is implicated gets blurred.
Those theorists that are happy to undermine the Gricean sharp distinction between “what is said” 
and “what is implicated” are all keen on the idea of there being a third layer between the sentence's 
conventional meaning and what is implicated by utterances of that sentence. This third layer still 
provides the truth-conditions of the uttered sentence, even though it is somewhat richer than the 
simple sentence's meaning: it is, as it were, a level for “pragmatically enhanced” sentence-meaning. 
Recanati (1989, 2001) calls this level “what is said” and characterises the notion in opposition to 
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both sentence meaning, which is too under-determined to deliver a propositional (i.e. evaluable) 
content, and to implicature, which is an altogether separate proposition. Thus he writes:
The distinguishing characteristic of sentence meaning (the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence-type)  is  that  it  is  conventional  and  context-independent.  Moreover,  in 
general at least, it falls short of constituting a complete proposition, i.e. something 
truth-evaluable. In contrast, both 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' are context-
dependent  and propositional.  The difference between 'what  is  said'  and 'what  is 
implicated' is that the former is constrained by sentence meaning in a way in which 
the implicatures are not. What is said results from fleshing out the meaning of the 
sentence  (which  is  like  a  semantic  'skeleton')  so  as  to  make  it  propositional. 
(Recanati 2001: 76) 
Similarly  Carston  (1988,  2002,  2004),  who  largely  shares  her  view  with  Sperber  and  Wilson 
(1986/1995), writes the following about the distinction between the sentence's linguistic meaning, 
implicature and a third, intermediate level of content, which she calls “explicature”:
An  explicature is  a  propositional  form  communicated  by  an  utterance  and  is 
pragmatically  constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  propositional  schema  or  template 
(logical form) that the utterance encodes; its content, therefore, is an amalgam of 
linguistically decoded material and pragmatically inferred material. An implicature is 
any other propositional form communicated by an utterance; its content consists of 
wholly pragmatically inferred matter. (Carston 2004, 824)
As for Bach (1994a, b), he names the third level “impliciture”. The notion he employs, though still 
related to the ones characterised in the quoted passages above, is slightly different from that put 
forth by Recanati and Carston. While Recanati and Carston have it that the sentence's meaning 
remains  implicit,  while  what  is  explicitly  conveyed,  through  a  combination  of  linguistic  and 
pragmatic elements, is the augmented “what is said” or “explicature”, Bach wishes to emphasise the 
implicit character of this third level of significance. This stress on implicitness depends on the way 
Bach conceives the contents of sentences. In Bach's view, the content expressed by the utterance of 
a sentence is akin to a  structured proposition,  i.e. a sentence-like entity, consisting in objects and 
properties  bound by appropriate  relations.  Structured  propositions  typically  maintain or  at  least 
faithfully  reflect  the  structure  of  the  sentences  that  express  them.  If  propositions  are  thus 
constrained to the structure of sentences, then it follows that, at the explicit level, no elements that  
are  extraneous  to  the  sentence's  structure  can  be  included in  the  proposition  expressed  by the 
utterance. Rather, these extraneous elements belong to the  implicit part of the utterance's content, 
i.e. that part of the content which is left verbally unexpressed. This entails that an utterance of a  
sentence  s,  which  explicitly  expresses  the  proposition  p,  may  implicitly express  a  different 
proposition q. This proposition is what Bach calls “impliciture”. 
Apart from these technical details, an impliciture is, just as Recanati's “what is said” and Carston's 
explicature, the result of a pragmatic augmentation of sentence meaning, which for Bach is often 
semantically under-determined. Thus he writes:
Implicitures  go  beyond what  is  said  [NB:  here  by  “what  is  said”,  Bach  intends 
“sentence  meaning”],  but  unlike  implicatures,  which  are  additional  propositions 
external to what is said, implicitures are built out of what is said. Even when there is 
no figurative use of words or phrases, as in metaphor, in impliciture [...] what the 
sentence means does not fully determine,  even after ambiguities are resolved and 
indexical references are fixed, what the speaker means. (Bach 1994b: 273)
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To sum up, the demotion of the Gricean paradigm has given impulse to an alternative view, which 
has turned the Gricean dichotomy into a three-layers partition: at the first level, there is meaning, 
which  is  determined  by  linguistic  conventions,  but  often  fails  to  deliver  the  utterance's  truth-
conditions; at the second level, there is “pragmatically enhanced” meaning, i.e. semantic content 
appropriately  enriched,  or  expanded  in  response  to  pragmatic  demands;  at  the  third  level,  the 
Gricean notion of “what  is  implicated” is  preserved,  as  a level  of  significance which radically 
departs from the utterance's truth-conditions—even the pragmatically augmented ones.
2.4 A Challenge to Compositionality
To accept, as Travis does, that the meaning of some sentences fails to specify the truth-conditions of 
utterances,  seems to lead to a view in which the content of these sentences is determined by a 
combination of semantic and pragmatic processes. A consequence of this is that the boundary itself 
between the “semantic domain” and the “pragmatic domain” gets blurred. Theorists have looked at 
this conclusion as a challenge to the idea of the compositionality of utterance content (see Stanley, 
2000, 2002, 2005b, Stanley & Szabó 2000, King & Stanley 2005). In this section, I will introduce 
some views which contrast the idea that a sentence's content in context is compositional and explain 
why their proposal is problematic. 
Let us accept the following formulation of the Principle of Compositionality:
[The Principle of Compositionality] The content of an utterance  u of a sentence  s is determined 
(modulo ambiguity resolution and contextual reference-assignment) by the semantic content of the 
components of s and their syntactic combination.
In a standard formal semantic framework, the input of the semantic interpretation of a sentence s is 
an “interpreted logical form”, i.e. a complex entity which contains the meanings of the sentence's 
constituents (such as they are found in the lexicon) and the sentence's syntactic form, while the 
output corresponds to the sentence's truth-conditions. Suppose one has a fragment of the English 
language L which  contains  only  the  proper  name “Spot”  and the  predicate  “is  happy”.  “Spot” 
denotes the individual o and “is happy” denotes a function form individuals to truth-values, which 
maps onto truth the individuals that are happy and onto falsity the individuals that are not happy. 
The semantic interpretation of a sentence like “Spot is happy” will proceed from the compositional 
semantic rule to the effect that, whenever a sentence is composed by a name “α” and a predicate 
“φ” in the form “φ(α)”, then the sentence will be true if and only if the reference of the name, α, is 
in the extension of the predicate φ. In the case at hand, the sentence “Spot is happy” will be true iff 
the individual  o which is referred to by the name “Spot” is in the extension of the predicate “is 
happy” (i.e. iff the function denoted by “happy” maps o onto truth). This way of determining the 
interpretation of a string of symbols is characteristic of a compositional semantics, i.e. a semantics 
according  to  which  the  meaning  of  a  complex  expression  is  determined  by  the  meanings  (in 
context) of its components and their syntactic composition. 
Now, among the theorists who accept semantic under-determinacy, some may feel attracted to the 
view that not only semantic processes, but also pragmatic processes contribute to the determination 
of the content of utterances of these expressions, where this implies that compositional rules will 
not be the sole determinants of the utterance's content. In other words, those who are happy to admit 
an intrusion of pragmatic processes into semantic interpretation may be willing to commit to the 
idea that utterance content is not determined compositionally.
As we argued in the Introduction and illustrated in section 1, colour predicates such as “green” or 
“red” might be considered as giving rise to semantic under-determinacy. Consider for example the 
phrase “Red pen”. If we abide by the principle of compositionality, we have to say that the meaning 
of “Red pen” is determined by the meaning of “red” and the meaning of “pen” in the way illustrated 
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above; here the way the predicate “red” contributes to the overall phrasal meaning may be such that 
the phrase results as expressing something like  <pen with red ink>. Now the same phrase in a 
different  context  may express  a  different  content,  perhaps something like  <pen made with red  
plastic>.  If  “red” means the same in both phrases,  how come that  the overall  interpretation is 
different? According to Lahav (1989), this variation in the truth-conditional contribution of “red” 
suggests that its semantics (and the semantics of similar adjectives) is non-compositional: that is, in 
the interpretation of a complex expression that contains an occurrence of “red”, the word's meaning 
gives only a partial contribution. There must be some additional, intrinsically non-compositional 
(probably pragmatic) mechanism which operates in combination with the rules of compositionality 
in delivering the content of each of the different complex expressions in which the word “red” 
occurs. Similar points about the semantics of quantified phrases like “Every students”, are advanced 
in Pelletier (1994, 2003).
If  theorists  such as  Lahav and Pelletier  are  right,  then at  least  when it  comes to  the  semantic 
workings of certain groups of expressions, such as colour adjectives and quantifiers, it is legitimate 
to say that the content and truth-conditions of sentences that contain these terms are not determined 
compositionally;  non-compositional  and  plausibly  pragmatic  mechanisms  “intrude”  in  the 
determination process. If that is so, a truth-conditional semantics project such as that set out by 
Frege  (1893/1903),  or  in  Wittgenstein's  Tractatus or  in  Tarski  (1936),  and  applied  to  natural 
language by philosophers such as Davidson (1967a), Lewis (1970), Montague (1974), is mistaken, 
in that it fails to capture the real semantic functioning of some expressions. The central assumption 
shared  by  all  these  theorists  is  that  meaning  determines  truth-conditions,  where  the  word 
“determines” means that a sentence's truth-conditions are determined uniquely by the meaning (in 
context) of the sentence's components and their syntactic combination. If there is semantic under-
determinacy, however, meaning doesn't strictly speaking determine truth-conditions, and something 
other  than  meaning—e.g.  pragmatic  mechanisms—must  enter  the  scene.  The  truth-conditional 
semantics projects gets therefore undermined.
But  would  it  be  such  a  big  deal  if  truth-conditional,  compositional  semantics  were  mistaken? 
There's no need to be dogmatic here in order to see that a compositional semantics has virtues that  
should be regarded as valuable in their own right. I take it that, primarily, a compositional semantics 
helps  make sense of  that  part  of  our  communicative behaviour  that  falls  under  the  heading of 
linguistic behaviour.  It  sets  language apart  from the  rest  of  our  communicative  behaviour,  and 
captures what makes language special as opposed to gazes, gestures, vocal signals, etc. Thus, it is 
important to maintain compositionality to the extent that it is important not to loose sight of the 
peculiarity of language as opposed to other devices of communication human beings have at their 
disposal. 
A further motivation for not abandoning a compositional account (advocated by Stanley, 2002), is 
that, if we accept the contribution of pragmatic processes that are not linguistically controlled, and 
hence which do not follow compositional rules, then we have no means to constrain the effects of 
these processes. This point rests on the assumption that pragmatic effects can be “constrained” only 
if they are tied to syntactic structures, which of course respond to compositionality. If syntactic 
constraints are given up, then virtually any pragmatic mechanism can operate on content—even 
mechanisms that hearers cannot actually manage. For instance, it seems impossible that a hearer 
could pragmatically  supplement  the content  of  an utterance of  “Everyone likes  Sally” so as to 
obtain <everyone likes Sally and his mother>. However, if we abandon a syntactic (compositional) 
approach, it  seems that we have no means to explain why this is not feasible.  In conclusion, a 
compositional semantic model should be preserved, on pains of losing a way of constraining the 
effect of pragmatic processes.
To sum up, acknowledging semantic under-determinacy may lead the theorist to regard utterance 
content as also pragmatically determined. This has been considered as an attack to compositional 
semantics.  Compositionality is valuable in itself  and also for the constraints  it  poses on “wild” 
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pragmatic  effects.  For  these  reasons,  some  theorists  have  argued,  we'd  better  not  forsake 
compositionality. 
3. The Demarcation Problem
In the preceding sections, I introduced the notion of semantic under-determinacy, initially by simply 
fostering some pre-theoretic intuitions and subsequently by framing the problem historically. I have 
gone through Grice's saying-implicating distinction and Travis' rejection of the distinction, on the 
account that there is no such thing as “what a sentence says”. I subsequently introduced theories 
which supplement the Gricean saying-implicating dichotomy with an intermediate level of content, 
which is called by Carston “explicature”, by Recanati “what is said” and by Bach “impliciture”. 
This intermediate layer of content consists of the sentence's compositionally determined semantic 
content (in context)  plus additional material which is supplied by pragmatic processes. Finally, I 
have illustrated how theorists  who welcome this additional level of content may be charged of 
rejecting the principle of compositionality—where this means rejecting the idea that the content of a 
sentence (in context) is determined exclusively on the basis of the meaning of its components and 
their syntactic arrangement.
Having introduced the notion of semantic under-determinacy and its implications, in this section I 
would like to concentrate on a question which has been tackled only marginally by those theorists  
who have been engaged with this idea. The problem concerns drawing a sharp demarcation between 
cases of semantic under-determinacy and cases of semantic under-specificity which are clearly due 
to ambiguity, vagueness, indexicality, ellipsis and so on. I will call this The Demarcation Problem, 
which could be thus formulated:
[The Demarcation Problem] Is there a feature of semantically under-determined expressions which 
sets  them apart  from other  cases  of  semantic  under-specificity,  such  as  ambiguity,  vagueness, 
indexicality, ellipsis, etc.?
I  believe that  providing a  satisfying answer to  the Demarcation Problem is  a key step for any 
theorist who wishes to understand the nature and extent of semantic under-determinacy in natural 
language. Such an answer is particularly called for also in view of the fact that (as I will illustrate in  
section 5) theorists have so far only succeeded in saying what semantic under-determinacy is not—
not  ambiguity, not vagueness, not indexicality, not ellipsis (see Searle 1980, Travis 1975, 1997, 
Bezuidenhout  2002).  This  however,  doesn't  yet  license  any claims  as  to  what  semantic  under-
determinacy is. In this chapter, my aim is that of saying something more than simply what semantic  
under-determinacy is not, even though I won't engage in the attempt of saying any final word about 
what semantic under-determinacy is: that is, I will try to do best than merely negatively characterise 
semantic under-determinacy, even though I won't  aim at providing any necessary and sufficient 
conditions for its identification. Providing an answer to the Demarcation Problem is a compromise 
between the unsatisfying result of characterising semantic under-determinacy only negatively (by 
saying  what  it  is  not)  and  the—probably  too  ambitious—attempt  to  define semantic  under-
determinacy. In order to answer the Demarcation Problem, it will be sufficient to point at at least 
one  feature which  semantically  under-determined  expressions  have  which  is  not  shared  by 
ambiguous,  vague,  indexical  or  elliptical  expressions.  If  there's  at  least  one  feature  which 
semantically under-determined expressions have and which these other expressions do not have, 
then the Demarcation Problem will have been answered to. Answering the Demarcation Problem 
will not coincide with providing a definition of semantic under-determinacy insofar as the feature at 
issue needs not be necessary and sufficient—it may just be necessary.
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to providing an account which can fulfil the need for an 
answer to the Demarcation Problem. The tasks I will undertake in the next sections will therefore be 
the following: first, I will reconstruct the main argument that has been provided so far in order to  
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draw attention on semantic under-determinacy (section 4); then I will move to the arguments so far 
advanced  in  order  to  set  semantic  under-determinacy  apart  from  other,  apparently  familiar 
phenomena: as it will emerge, all these arguments just succeed in telling us what semantic under-
determinacy is not (section 5). In sections 6-9, I will try to pin-down the source of semantic under-
determinacy by introducing the notion of under-articulation and, subsequently, I will set forth an 
answer to the Demarcation Problem which employs this very notion. In sections 10, I will confront 
an important objection to the proposal.
4. The “Context-Shifting” Argument
The considerations set forth in the  Introduction were aimed at providing a provisional way of 
restricting  the  scope  of  semantic  under-determinacy to  those  under-specific  expressions  which, 
however,  did  not  immediately  strike  us  as  examples  of  ambiguity,  vagueness  or  context-
dependency. Indeed, delimiting the scope of application of the word “semantic under-determinacy” 
is not an easy task. Triggering intuitions as to the semantic defectiveness of sentences like “It's 
raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green” etc. (see  sections 1 and  2.2) is not equivalent to 
providing  an  argument  for  their  semantic  under-determinacy.  Intuitions  of  defectiveness  surely 
point  in  the  direction  of  some under-specification,  but  that  is  still  too  unqualified:  the  under-
specification  could  be  explained  as  a  form  of  ambiguity,  vagueness,  indexicality  and  so  on. 
Proponents of semantic under-determinacy therefore need an argument in order to establish that the 
under-specification they are pointing at is not an instance of any other familiar phenomenon. The 
typical argument to this end is what has been called “The Context-Shifting Argument” (CSA)8 (see 
Travis  (1975,  1985/2008,  1996,  1997) and Bezuidenhout  (2002)).  The argument  could  be  thus 
reconstructed: 
CSA
[1] Suppose a sentence s is uttered within a context c1, where it turns out true;
[2] Suppose the same sentence s is uttered in a second context c2, where it turns out false;
[3]  There  is  no prima  facie reason  to  think  that s contains  any  indexical,  ambiguous,  vague 
components, nor that it involves sentential ellipsis;
[4] Between the first and the second utterance, no relevant change in the way the world is has occurred;
[5] The meaning of s semantically under-determines its utterances' truth-conditions.
Let us illustrate how [5] is obtained from [1]-[4]. The argument has the structure of an inference to 
the best explanation. The question might be put this way: in light of the conjunction of [1]-[4], how 
is the truth-value shift of s to be explained? For these authors, the explanation lies in the linguistic 
content of  s's being in defective in some peculiar way. For, as they reason, if the truth-value of  s 
varies across contexts, even though how the world is doesn't change, and there is no reason to  
suppose that s exhibits any form of indexicality, ambiguity, vagueness, ellipsis etc., this means that 
the linguistic content of s is not determined enough to give the truth-conditions of its utterances in 
c1  and c2. To illustrate how the argument works, here is Travis's famous green leaves example:
Pia's Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is the colour of 
leaves, she paints them. Returning, she reports, "That's better. The leaves are green 
now". She speaks truth. A botanist friend then phones, seeking green leaves for a 
study in green-leaves chemistry. "The leaves (on my tree) are green" Pia says. "You 
can have those". But now Pia speaks falsehood. (Travis 1997: 89)
In this  example,  the same sentence can acquire  different  truth values,  even though no relevant 
changes in words and worldly conditions occur (the maple leaves keep being painted green both on 
8 This term is due to Cappelen and Lepore (2005).
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the first and on the second occasion). So, when uttering “The leaves are green” the first time, Pia 
utters something true, whereas she utters something false while she speaks the same words with her 
botanist  friend.  Now there's  no  prima facie reason to think that  that  particular  utterance of the 
predicate  “being green”  exhibits  ambiguity,  indexicality,  vagueness,  nor  that  the  sentence “The 
leaves are green” is elliptical. In view of these considerations, that one single sentence can shift its  
truth-value across contexts in this way is explained by the fact that: 
What [...] words mean leaves it open for them to be used (in suitable circumstances) 
to say any of various things, each true under and on, different conditions. There is no 
one set of conditions under which those English words […] would be, or say what is, 
true. Nor even one condition which is the condition for them to be true. If differences 
in  truth  condition  make  for  different  propositions,  then  what  those  words  mean 
makes no one proposition the one (modulo referents)  they express. (Travis 1996: 
454-455).
Similar remarks—only with slight changes in terminology—can be found also in other authors. In 
the following quotes, both Carston and Recanati give voice to the same idea:
The  linguistic  semantics  of  the  utterance,  that  is,  the  meaning  encoded  in  the 
linguistic expressions used […] under-determines the proposition expressed (what is 
said). (Carston 2002: 19-20). 
Semantic interpretation,  characterized by its  deductive character,  does not deliver 
complete propositions. (Recanati 2004: 91).
Context-Shifting Arguments can be regarded as successful only if their premisses are adequately 
warranted.  With  regard  to  this  demand  of  warrant,  the  premise  that  stands  most  in  need  of 
justification is certainly [3], which states that there is no prima facie reason to think that a sentence 
like, for instance, “The leaves are green” contains any indexical, ambiguous, vague components, 
nor that it involves sentential ellipsis. This claim needs to be sustained by detailed, case-by-case 
arguments  aimed  at  ruling  out  that  semantic  under-determinacy  is  identified  with  any  other 
phenomenon of semantic defectiveness. I shall turn to a reconstruction of these arguments in the 
next section.
5. No Domestication
As  we  noted  earlier,  proponents  of  the  semantic  under-determinacy  thesis  make  much  of  the 
assumption that there is no (prima facie) reason to think that what is going on in examples like Pia's 
story is a manifestation of some phenomenon like indexicality, ambiguity, vagueness, etc. In their 
view the under-determinacy shown by Pia-style cases is not reducible to any phenomenon of under-
specification already familiar in the study of natural languages. In this section I shall survey the 
motivations that have been advanced to support this idea. 
[1]  No  ambiguity: It  has  been  argued  that  semantic  under-determinacy  cannot  be  a  case  of 
ambiguity. First, the semantic variability typical of semantic under-determinacy and of ambiguity is 
different in kind: words like “green” have indefinitely many senses depending on context, while 
ambiguous words have definitely many senses, independently of the context in which they are used 
(see  Bezuidenhout  2002:  107-8).  Secondly,  I  take  it  that  the  necessary  conditions  for  lexical 
ambiguity are that (1) there be a single lexical entry to which more than one meaning is assigned by 
the dictionary; (2) the number of meanings, although it can increase or decrease as time goes by, has 
to be definite, for reasons connected to language acquisition and memory. Let us then consider a 
word like “green”. One could surmise that the lexical entry “green” is associated with more than 
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one meaning  green1,  green2,  green3 … greenn,  which  gets  selected  according to  the  context  of 
utterance. To this idea one can object that, since there are indefinitely many ways of being green, 
the word “green” will have to be ambiguous between indefinitely many meanings. This, however, 
goes against the necessary requirement (2) for ambiguity. Thirdly, take a typically ambiguous word 
like “bank”. If Sam goes to the bank (in the sense of a financial institution) and Sal goes to the bank 
(in the sense of river side), then, once “bank” is disambiguated in context, it is false to say “Sam 
and Sal both went to the bank”. This however, wouldn't happen with “green”. Suppose Pia painted 
the leaves green, making them green on the outside; Lia, on the other hand, brings a green parrot.  
Even in light of these differences between the ways of being green of the leaves and the parrot, it 
would seem correct to state “The leaves and the parrot are both green” (see Searle 1980: 224).
[2] No Indexicality: Travis makes the following case, speaking from a Fregean point of view on 
indexicality: First of all, it doesn't seem part of what “green” means that it points at a parameter, just 
like  “I”  points  at  the  speaker-parameter  or  the  present  tense  points  at  the  time  of  speaking. 
Secondly, if the speaker were to hear an utterance of “I am in Paris”, but was in the dark about what  
the context of utterance was, she could still know what state of affairs the meaning of the sentence 
describes: namely, that the speaker is in Paris. This is because it is part of the meaning of “I” that,  
whatever its referent, it shall always be identical to the speaker. The same doesn't hold for “The 
leaves are green”: upon hearing an utterance of “The leaves are green”, while being in the dark 
about the context of utterance, the hearer cannot know  what state of affairs is described by the 
utterance because “green” doesn't point to any fixed parameter and so, unless more information is 
provided, the sentence doesn't describe any state of affairs (see Travis 1997: 91-94). 
A further argument against the equation of semantic under-determinacy with indexicality can be 
read in Searle (1980) (and also in Travis 1997, but somewhat between the lines): suppose that a 
term like “green” is associated with a free variable that takes different values in different contexts, 
thereby making the word express a different property on each occasion.  So for example,  when 
“green” takes as argument on the outer surface, it expresses the property of being green on the outer 
surface, while if it takes as argument underneath the paint it expresses the property of being green 
underneath the paint. This move, it is argued, would not make the truth-conditional contribution of 
“green” determined, even once the argument has taken a value in context. For suppose the value of 
the variable were fixed in context  ci so that “green” expressed the property  <being green on the  
outer surface>. There would be  n ways for taking an item to be green on the outer surface: for 
example, because a green light shines on it, or because, even though the item is not exclusively 
green on the outer surface, for present purposes it is convenient to call it “green” just in case it is 
green on a sufficiently great part of its surface, or because, even though the item is not entirely 
green on its outer surface, it looks entirely green when looked at from far away... and so on. So, fix 
the (putative) variable value of “green” in ci, thereby resolving indexicality, and still it will be an 
open question which property the predicate expresses in  ci,  thereby leaving the semantic under-
determinacy of the predicate unaltered.
Other considerations against the indexicality proposal are voiced by Bezuidenhout: first of all, she 
says, the proposal sounds  ad-hoc, in the sense that “it posits a hidden variable not for any well-
motivated syntactic reason, but simply because it wishes to subsume [semantic under-determinacy] 
under  the  heading  of  something  allegedly  better  understood.”  (2002:  113).  Moreover,  since 
semantic under-determinacy is highly pervasive, this entails that the theory “would have to posit 
syntactic  representations  positively  bristling  with  hidden  indexicals”  (2002:  113),  and  the 
proliferation  of  hidden  indexical  elements  is  not  desirable  neither  for  the  sake  of  theoretical 
economy and elegance, nor for its cognitive plausibility.
[3] No vagueness: semantic under-determinacy cannot be vagueness either. Even though the matter 
of what vagueness is is itself controversial, let us assume, in line with the standard conception, that 
a necessary feature of vagueness is the obtaining of borderline, or unclear cases (e.g. of baldness, 
tallness, fatness, greenness etc.). Now one should of course concede that an expression like “green” 
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does give rise to borderline cases—after all, there are many cases in which, by looking at an object, 
we cannot tell whether it is green or yellow, or green or blue. However the particular defectiveness 
that makes “green” semantically under-determined is arguably not connected with its being vague. 
To  illustrate,  consider  an  utterance  of  “The  leaves  are  green”  which  one  assesses  as  not 
determinately true or false (maybe because the leaves are of an intermediate shade between green 
and yellow); in order for one to be able to say that the utterance doesn't have a definite evaluation in 
the first place, one needs to already have figured in which respect the salient leaves are to be said 
green—on the outside, underneath the surface, etc. That is, in order to judge about the vagueness of 
a statement of “The leaves are green” one must previously resolve the semantic under-determinacy 
of the sentence's content as to the respect in which the leaves are green. (The same, of course, holds 
also for cases in which an utterance of “The leaves are green” has a definite truth-value. So, any 
judgement concerning truth value requires a prior resolution of semantic under-determinacy.) This 
seems to make a case for the idea that semantic under-determinacy is not reducible to vagueness, on 
the  account  that  acknowledging  vagueness  implies,  at  least  in  some cases,  resolving  precisely 
semantic under-determinacy (for similar considerations, see Travis 1997: 91; Bezuidenhout 2002: 
115). 
[4] No ellipsis: It could be suggested that semantic under-determinacy is just sentential ellipsis. But 
this is implausible, too. For suppose that “The leaves are green” were elliptical for some longer 
sentence, namely “The leaves are green underneath the paint”. How is this supposed to be found out 
by the listener of an utterance of the former sentence? Elliptical sentences usually fail to articulate 
linguistic material which was articulated in some previous utterance. An utterance of an elliptical 
sentence is typically  infelicitous if the audience is not in a position to recover the elided material 
from previous speech. By contrast, it seems that “The leaves are green” could be felicitously uttered 
even if no previous sentence has been articulated before that (provided that the utterance has a 
sufficiently rich background of presuppositions, for example as to what part of the leaves is being 
discussed). This seems a good reason to rule out that semantic under-determinacy is just a case of 
sentential ellipsis.
I believe that the points raised at [1]-[4] are on the right track. Semantic under-determinacy should 
not  be  reduced  to  any  already  familiar  phenomenon  of  semantic  defectiveness  like  ambiguity, 
indexicality, vagueness, ellipsis and so on. In what follows, I will act on the assumption that a no-
domestication policy, as I shall call it, is the way to go if one wants to make sense of the peculiarity 
of semantic under-determinacy as opposed to other phenomena of semantic defectiveness already 
present in language. Still,  I  believe that the no domestication policy isn't  enough to provide an 
account  of  what  makes  semantic  under-determinacy different  from  all the  phenomena  thus  far 
surveyed. That is, adoption of the no-domestication policy doesn't yet license the theorist to say 
what distinguishes semantic under-determinacy from all the other cases of semantic defectiveness, 
for it doesn't point at any feature which semantically under-determined expressions have which all 
other expressions lack. What in section 3 I called the Demarcation Problem still needs an answer. 
As it will appear in the following sections (especially sections 8-11), my attempt will be that of 
differentiating  the  phenomenon of  semantic  under-determinacy by identifying  its  source.  I  will 
attempt  to  capture  what  makes  semantic  under-determinacy  peculiar  and  different  from  the 
phenomena listed above by exploring the issue of what more basic phenomenon might lie at the 
origin of it. Doing this will enable me to make sense of the difference between semantic under-
determinacy and other phenomena like indexicality, ambiguity, vagueness and ellipsis.
6. What is the Source of Semantic Under-determinacy?
As we have seen, authors such as Searle, Travis, Bezuidenhout, Recanati, Sperber and Wilson and 
Carston all have subscribed to the claim that sentences like “The leaves are green”, “Jill is ready”, 
“It's raining” are semantically under-determined. Moreover, their view commits them to saying that 
semantic  under-determinacy is  irreducible  to  any other  already familiar  phenomenon of  under-
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specification such as ambiguity, indexicality, vagueness or ellipsis. Many arguments are available to 
the theorist who wishes to negatively characterise semantic under-determinacy—i.e. to say what 
semantic under-determinacy is not. Having established this much, there is one residual question that 
is  left  open,  corresponding to  the  Demarcation Problem:  is  there a  feature which distinguishes 
semantic  under-determinacy  from all  these  other  familiar  phemomena? In  what  follows,  I  will 
attempt to deal with the Demarcation Problem by exploring the issue of what lies “at the source” of 
semantic under-determinacy. The first step in this direction will therefore imply asking ourselves a 
question like the following: in virtue of what are semantically under-determined expressions such? I 
believe that the following are the most spontaneous answers to the previous questions:
Answer (1)
Sentence meaning under-determines utterance content (and truth-conditions) because meaning itself  
is indeterminate;
Answer (2)
Sentence meaning under-determines utterance content (and truth-conditions), but meaning itself is 
determined: it just fails to determine the content-in-context of utterances.
I will deal with each of these answers in the following two sub-sections.
6.1 Indeterminacy of Meaning
Let us begin by considering Answer 1. Stated as it is and with no further qualifications, it is a very 
strong answer. Saying that meaning is indeterminate means endorsing a view at the metaphysical 
level: that is, it means maintaining that nothing in the world can settle the question of what the 
meaning  of  a  certain  expression  is.  Throughout  the  history  of  analytic  philosophy,  different 
arguments have been invoked to support this thesis. The most famous is probably the one mounted 
by Quine in support of his thesis about the indeterminacy of translation. What Quine takes to have 
shown with his famous example from radical translation (see Quine, 1960, 1968) is that for any 
sentence,  no matter  if  in our own mother tongue or in the most remote foreign language,  it  is 
possible to provide an indefinite number of translations that fit the relevant objective facts about 
language use and yet are incompatible with each other. The upshot of these remarks is that there is 
no fact of the matter as to which is the correct translation of the sentence at issue; this ultimately 
entails that there is no fact of the matter as to what the sentence at issue means, nor as to what its  
truth-conditions  are:  both  intension  and  extension  are  indeterminate,  or  inscrutable.  Another 
influential argument that brings to the conclusion that meaning is indeterminate can be found in 
Kripke's  (1982)  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein's  rule-following  argument  in  the  Philosophical  
Investigations.  The argument  (as reconstructed by Kripke) goes like this:  although one may be 
confident that, in performing a calculation like 7+5=12, one is using the “+” sign as denoting the 
“plus” function, in one's past one might as well have used “+” as meaning a completely different 
function—say, the “quus” function. How does one know one has never used “+” as denoting the 
“quus” function? There is  no past  or present  fact  one can point  at  that  could help settling the 
question—neither pertaining to one's behaviour or pertaining to one's internal mental states. In other 
words,  one's  past  (and  present)  actions  and  thoughts  are  compatible  with  having  used  “+”  as 
meaning plus as well as quus. If this is the case (and if any speaker can be subject to this kind of 
challenge) then it follows that the meaning itself of “+”, and that of any other linguistic expression, 
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is  indeterminate9,  that  is,  no fact  in  the world can  establish that  an expression  e has  a  certain 
meaning.
Unless  some  qualifications  are  provided,  the  semantic  indeterminacy  thesis,  such  as  it  is,  is 
compatible with the idea that meaning can be shaped by the intentions, beliefs, and communicative  
purposes of the speakers. This view is suggested by the following passage by Brandom10: 
A word – 'dog', 'stupid', 'Republican' – has a different significance in my mouth than 
it does in yours, because and insofar as what follows from its being applicable, its 
consequences of application, differ for me, in virtue of my different collateral beliefs 
[…]. [...D]ifferent interlocutors […] use different concepts, attach different meanings 
to their words. (Brandom 1994: 587-8)
The link between the thesis of meaning indeterminacy and the idea that meaning depends on the 
speakers' beliefs and intentions is easy to see: to the extent that there is no fixed semantic property 
that  linguistic  items  have,  there  is  room left  for  their  users  to  confer  a  meaning  to  linguistic 
expressions, according to the conditions of application that seem most appropriate, depending on 
the collateral beliefs and intentions of the users themselves.
This  position is  subject to the following difficulty,  which makes it  ultimately unappealing as a 
theoretical option for the theorist engaged in a study of how communication works. It seems that 
whether a word, or any linguistic item, is used correctly or incorrectly depends on whether the user 
employs that linguistic item for what it means. In other words, the correctness or incorrectness of 
linguistic use seems to be based on the fact that terms have independent semantic properties. If 
Answer 1 is true, and if no other qualifications concerning the nature of meaning indeterminacy are 
provided, then it is easy to fall prey of the thought that what decides the correctness or incorrectness 
of linguistic use is principles that are not immediately semantic, but are pragmatic in nature and 
pertain  to  convenience,  informativeness,  perspicuity  with  respect  to  the  beliefs,  intentions  and 
communicative  aims  of  the  speaker.  These  principles  do  not  respond  directly  to  the  semantic 
properties of the words; they rather “shape” these properties according to the occasion of use and 
according to what the speakers believe and are aiming at. This implies that, if it is correct from this 
purely “pragmatic” point of view that a speaker employs the word w as if it meant p, and if the use 
doesn't generate incomprehension between the speaker and his audience, then the use is correct. If 
this possibility is admitted, however, then the problem arises of how to distinguish between what we 
ordinarily consider as  strictly speaking correct uses (i.e. uses that follow the “semantics” of the 
words)  and  uses  that  are  not  strictly  speaking  correct,  but  are  merely  admissible given  the 
9 Finally, Putnam could be regarded as another supporter of the meaning indeterminacy view, because of his 
endorsement of a position called “Internal Realism” (see Putnam, 1978): roughly, Internal Realism has it that the 
claim that there is a “correspondence” or “reference” relation between the words of a language and the world cannot 
be an absolute claim, but it can only be a theory-relative claim. Putnam defends this idea with a twofold 
argumentative strategy: on the one hand, he emphasises the unintelligibility of the hard-core realist claim to the 
effect that a theory with various epistemic virtues (completeness, consistency, correctness in prediction, simplicity, 
plausibility) might still be false. On the other hand, he shows that a weaker claim is true: that a theory with such 
epistemic virtues might be just one among the various theories with which we capture the world. This literally 
“dissolves” the issue of a theory's absolute truth/falsity, because it makes the semantic relations like “satisfaction”, 
“reference” and “truth” ultimately theory-relative (i.e. epistemic).
10 But see also Bilgrami (1992). As he writes “it is unlikely that any two people will have the same concept of 
anything, since it is unlikely that they have the same beliefs associated with the term which expresses that concept. 
This is the level on which theories of meaning do their work: they specify the contexts and the term-meanings of an 
agent along the lines of this [...] method. [...] [T]he concepts are very fine-grained and they are hardly ever shared by 
people.” (Bilgrami 1992: 11). Davidson 1986/2005 draws pessimistic conclusions as to relation between 
communication and convention: “We must give up the idea of a clearly deﬁned shared structure which language-
users acquire and then apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention in any important sense is 
involved in language; or, as I think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to 
conventions.” (Davidson 1986/2005: 265)
45
circumstances of the conversation: for example malapropisms, or non-literal uses. It may be that, 
deep down, this distinction doesn't make sense at all; however, distinguishing between uses that are 
semantically kosher and uses that are not, but are still admissible in another, more pragmatic and 
for-the-sake-of-conversation  sense,  would  be  at  least  a  way  of  remaining  faithful  to  common 
sense11. 
This distinction is particularly important for our purposes, because it helps one to make an at least 
intuitive  case  for  the  claim  that  semantic  under-determinacy  doesn't  depend  on  meaning 
indeterminacy. Intuitively,  when a speaker uses a sentence like “The leaves are green”,  or “It's 
raining”, even though the sentence fails to describe a state of affairs in the world such that it would 
make that utterance true, nevertheless the intuition is maintained that the speaker is using those 
words  for what they mean, i.e. the intuition is maintained that the speaker is conforming to the 
semantic conventions that govern the use of words such as “to rain” and “green”. If the use is 
judged  semantically  correct,  then  meaning  is  (sufficiently)  determined.  But  if  meaning  is 
(sufficiently)  determined,  then  it  is  not  meaning  indeterminacy  that  causes  semantic  under-
determinacy. Ultimately, then, at least at an intuitive level, it seems that the under-determinacy of 
these sentences does not depend on the instability of meaning itself, i.e. on meaning indeterminacy.
In sum, I believe one should not give too much credit to Answer 1, for two reasons: firstly, meaning 
indeterminacy with no further qualification easily leads to the view that meaning is determined by 
the beliefs and intentions of speakers, thus obscuring the difference between semantic correctness 
and  pragmatic  correctness.  Secondly,  usages  of  semantically  under-determined  expressions  are 
generally judged semantically correct, i.e. they are usages of the words for what those words mean. 
If there can be a judgment of semantic correctness, then meaning is sufficiently determined, and 
meaning indeterminacy is not what determines semantic under-determinacy.
6.2. A Failure to Determine Content-in-Context
Let us now turn to Answer 2, which appears to be far less radical. Indeed, it admits that meaning is 
not indeterminate  in itself. What suffers from indeterminacy is the  content-in-context of a certain 
sentence or expression,  something which is  definitely compatible  with the expression having a 
stable meaning. So, for example, according to this view, “green” does have a determined, standing 
meaning. However, for any utterance of “The leaves are green”, the meaning of the sentence simply 
determines the content <that the leaves are green>.  This, for the proponent of semantic under-
determinacy, isn't enough for characterising which particular state of affairs makes the utterance 
true or false; hence, the meaning of the sentence (though stable) doesn't determine the utterance's 
truth-conditions.
This  way  of  characterising  semantic  under-determinacy,  though  it  appears  to  be  much  more 
plausible  than  the  one suggested by  Answer 1,  makes  those expressions  that,  by the lights  of 
11 Incidentally, tracing a distinction between uses that are “semantically correct” and uses that are merely 
“pragmatically acceptable” could be regarded also as a way of opposing a holistic approach to meaning. This is 
because—as far as I can see—the idea that meaning depends on the speaker's beliefs and intentions, coupled with 
the thesis of meaning holism, gives rise to the idea of meaning indeterminacy. Very sketchily, meaning holism holds 
that in order to know the meaning of a word/sentence, one has to know language as a whole, in the sense of knowing 
the meaning of every other word/sentence in the language. If different speakers of the same language L have 
different beliefs concerning the meaning of words/sentences, this will entail that a single word/sentence in L can 
have different meanings according to different speakers (who determine different "translation manuals"), the 
consequence being that there is no objective fact of the matter as to what the meaning of that word/sentence is. 
Among the proponents of meaning holism are Quine (1953), Brandom (1994), Davidson (1967a), Block (1995), 
Field (1977). Against holism, Michael Dumment proposes a position called molecularism (see Dummett 1991, 
chapter 10). The molecularist position has it that in order to know the meaning of a word/sentence of L, one has to 
know the meaning of some other words/sentences of a relevant fragment of L, but needs not know the meaning of 
all the words/sentences of L. The distinction between “semantically correct” uses and uses that are merely 
“pragmatically acceptable” may interestingly relate with a molecularist insight on meaning. Thanks to Annalisa 
Coliva for pointing this out to me. 
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Answer 2,  are  semantically  under-determined,  very  similar  to  indexical  expressions.  Take  for 
example a word like “I”: It has a determined, context-independent meaning (which Kaplan called 
“character”). This character is merely a function that maps the context of utterance onto the speaker 
in  that  context,  and  therefore  cannot  be  said  to  contribute  the  truth-conditions  of  utterances 
containing occurrences of “I”. So, one could say that the meaning of, for instance, “I wear glasses” 
doesn't determine the truth-conditions of its utterances, because, unless a context is provided, the 
meaning of the sentence yields too poor a content in each context. This characterisation of the way 
“I” is semantically under-determined parallels the previous characterisation about “green”: But is 
this parallel accurate? As we have seen, there are arguments available that show that indexicality 
and semantic under-determinacy are associated with different semantic results. Searle (1980) and 
Travis (1997), for example, both offer reasons in support of the distinction between semantic under-
determinacy and indexicality, as illustrated in section 4. 
Capitalising in part  from Travis'  and Searle's  results,  in this section I would like to suggest an 
argument in the form of a reductio, in order to defend the distinction between the semantic under-
determinacy and the indexicality of certain terms. Since we already know what indexicality is, it  
will  be convenient  to assume that a certain,  allegedly semantically  under-determined word, say 
“green”,  is in fact indexical.  This will  make life easier to us,  since we already know what the 
implications of being an indexical are and, on this basis, we will be able to highlight that these 
implications do not obtain in the case at interest. The needed premisses of the reductio are: (1) the 
premise to the effect that some designated expression, say “green”, is indexical, in that for example 
it features an extra covert argument in its logical form (the predicate's structure being green(x, y)); 
(2)  a  premise  concerning  a  general  feature  of  indexicality—that  we  will  call  the  Indexicality 
Assumption:  
[The Indexicality  Assumption]  Indexicals  (are  designed to)  work  in  such  a  way that,  once  the 
reference of an indexical term i is fixed in a context  k, then  i expresses a determinate content, in 
every circumstance of evaluation.
The Indexicality Assumption may be viewed as stemming from the idea that indexicals are devices 
for contextual reference-assignment that are designed for being “determinately saturated”. That is, 
indexicals are designed in such a way that, once an indexical expression  i is assigned a referent 
according to the value taken by a certain parameter in a certain context k, the under-specification of 
the expression is ipso facto resolved in all possible circumstances of evaluation, in the sense that its 
content becomes as specific as it may be, even in any further circumstance c in which the utterance 
may be reconsidered. For example, “I” is construed in such a way that, once the reference of “I” in 
“I  wear  glasses”  has  been assigned  in  a  context  k,  the  resulting  content  being  <that  x  wears  
glasses>,  the  content-in-context  of  the  pronoun “I”  is  as  specific  as  it  may be,  no  matter  the 
circumstances cj…ci in which the original utterance may get reconsidered. 
I  take  the  Indexicality  Assumption  to  hold  at  least  for  pure indexicals  such  as  “I”,  “today”, 
“tomorrow”, i.e. for indexicals whose referent is fixed independently of the speaker's intentions. It  
may be pointed out that some “spurious” indexicals such as “here” or “now” do not comply with the 
Indexicality Assumption: in fact, since the referent of these expressions is partly determined by the 
speaker's intentions, fixing the referent of e.g. “here” as being location x in context k may not make 
the expression's content fully determined, for in other circumstances the speaker could have uttered 
“here” while referring to a wider location  x'. Though I agree with this remark, I believe that the 
Indexicality Assumption still  stands,  for the following reasons: (i)  the fact  that  the Indexicality 
Assumption doesn't apply in cases like “here” and “now” may be due to contingent facts about use 
of these words, which “interfere” with the way the term is designed to work semantically. It should 
not  be  forgotten  that  the  Indexicality  Assumption  is  not  only  a  descriptive  claim,  but  also  a 
normative claim, telling us what indexical expressions are  designed to do—rather than what they 
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merely  actually  do;  (ii)  moreover,  it  seems  to  me  indisputable  that,  independently  of  putative 
exceptions like “here” or “now”, the Indexicality Assumption captures the workings of at least some 
expressions which are widely recognised as indexicals and indeed as pure ones, like “I”. So it seems 
that the Indexicality Assumption really captures a core feature of indexicality.
As  opposed  to  what  happens  with  (pure)  indexicals,  one  might  point  out  that  the  contextual 
completion  of  semantically  under-determined  sentences  does  not  make  their  content-in-context 
determinate “once and for all”. Let me illustrate: If a semantically under-determined expression e 
gets  supplemented  with  extra  content  in  a  certain  context  k,  it  is  not  obvious  that  the 
underspecification  of  the expression is  resolved for  all  the circumstances  cj … ci in  which  the 
original utterance could be reconsidered. For instance, suppose that the content of “It's raining” is 
supplemented in context k1 so as to result in <it's raining in Paris>. In some other circumstance c2, 
the following question could arise: is it raining in Paris if it is raining only in the center of the city?  
In circumstance c3, one could wonder: is it raining in Paris if it is raining over many scattered spots  
of the town? I envision that the content <that it's raining in Paris> that “It's raining” expresses in 
k1 (via contextual enrichment) may turn out as not responding to the demands of greater precision 
that may arise in circumstances  c2  and  c3.  That is,  the content expressed by “It's raining” in  k1, 
modulo contextual supplementation, does not make the sentence's content determinate for all other 
circumstances c2, c3...cn in which a higher standard of precision is required. After all, isn't it the case 
that the speaker who uttered “It's  raining” in  k1 might  have uttered the same sentence in other 
situations, meaning a wide range of contents—some of them richer in details, some other poorer—
across these different circumstances? In a sense,  then,  given a certain contextual enrichment in 
context  k,  the  semantic  under-determinacy  of  an  expression  could  be  resolved  in  a  certain 
circumstance  ck, but it could be “reiterated” in other circumstances  cj … ci. Let me call this the 
Reiteration Effect. It is on the basis of these considerations that I believe that the following is true of 
semantically under determined sentences:
[Reiteration Effect] Once a semantically under-determined expression e has been completed in the 
circumstances  ck (relative  to  a  context  k),  e may  not  express  a  determinate  content  in  all 
circumstances of evaluation.12
Let the premise number (3) of our  reductio be a statement of the  [Reiteration Effect] claim. This 
ultimately results in the following argument, here presented schematically:
(1) A term like “green” is indexical; 
(2) [The Indexicality Assumption] Indexicals (are designed to) work in such a way that, 
once the reference of an indexical term i is fixed in a context  k, then i expresses a 
determinate content, in every circumstance of evaluation.
(3) [Reiteration Effect] Once a  semantically  under-determined expression  e has been 
completed in  the circumstances  ck (relative to  a  context  k),  e may not  express a 
determinate content in all  circumstances of evaluation;
12 It may be pointed out that the Reiteration Effect is intrinsically problematic. Contextual enrichment delivers a 
content which may provide insufficient material for stating the truth-conditions of an utterance, because new ways 
of enriching that very content may arise. Ultimately then, no instance of enrichment can produce an evaluable 
content, because that content could be enriched indefinitely more and more. Let me clarify that this is an expected 
result: the fact that under-determinacy can be reiterated is precisely what makes semantic under-determinacy such a 
big problem for language as a means of communication. However, the Reiteration Effect is a potential problem, 
which doesn't actually threaten language users in concrete situations. This is because the intentions of the speaker 
can set an upper limit to the possible enrichments an utterance's content can undergo. This upper limit I take to be 
established by the speakers' intentions, which in turn depend on the interests, aims, expectations that are operative in 
the conversation. The fact that speakers' intentions can contain the impact of the Reiteration Effect is admittedly not 
a way of resolving the problem, but merely a way of taming it for the sake of successful communication. 
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(4) Suppose  the  indexicality  of  “green”  were  resolved in  context  k,  so  that  “green” 
expressed the property <being green on the outer surface>; 
(5) The under-specificity of “green” may have been resolved in the circumstances of 
evaluation ck (relative to context k), but not in other circumstances of evaluation cj...  
ci.
(6) But this contradicts the [Indexicality Assumption];
(7) Hence, (1) is false: a term like “green” is not an indexical.
As one can appreciate, the thrust of the argument is given by the fact that the defectiveness of 
semantically under-determined expressions gives rise to what I have called a Reiteration Effect: no 
matter how much one makes the predicate “being green” more precise  via (alleged) indexicality 
resolution in a context k; in other circumstances of evaluation, it may continue to be indeterminate 
which property the predicate expresses. This “reiteration” of the predicate's under-specificity goes 
against the  [Indexicality Assumption], which (as far as I understand) captures a necessary trait of 
indexicality, i.e. the fact that the indeterminacy proper of an indexical term ceases—or at least it is 
expected  to  cease—for  all  circumstances  of  evaluation,  once  its  referent  has  been  fixed  in  a 
context13.  This  licenses  the  inference  to  (7),  i.e.  the negation  of  premise  (1),  to  the effect  that 
“green” is not an indexical.
As helpful as inference (1)-(7) might be, it doesn't take much to see that it is good only as far as it  
goes. For, even though, thanks to (1)-(7), the proponent of semantic under-determinacy can make 
sense of the distinction between semantically under-determined and indexical expressions, (1)-(7) 
only points at an effect of semantic under-determinacy (the Reiteration Effect), not at its cause. In 
other words, the argument set forth in (1)-(7) merely displays a manifestation of what semantic 
under-determinacy is, and not its source. But, as I stated at the beginning of section 6, my aim is to 
provide an answer to the Demarcation Problem by distinguishing semantic under-determinacy from 
other phenomena on the basis of what  gives rise to it—and not on the basis of what effects it is 
associated  with.  The  reason is  that  it  seems  that  such  a  way  of  confronting  the  Demarcation 
Problem would provide a deeper response—to the extent that distinguishing phenomena by their 
causes seems more satisfactory from a theoretical point of view than distinguishing them on the 
basis of the effects or implications they are associated with. In what follows, I shall take a step in 
the direction of saying in virtue of what a semantically under-determined sentence is such: this will 
ultimately allow me to give a principled answer to the Demarcation Problem—as well as to display 
other significant theoretical benefits.
7. Under-articulated Sentences
One could start by drawing the following picture: our utterances often employ sentences that are 
under-articulated. For example, common speakers do not generally bother fully to articulate the 
salient location in their weather reports. This may be for all sorts of reasons: not articulating the 
13 It could be pointed out that even indexicals such as “here”, “now” and demonstratives such as “this” and “that” are 
subject to the Reiteration Effect. This is undeniably true. Suppose that the referent of “here” in “It rains here” is 
fixed in context k, so that the content of the utterance in k is <that it's raining in Paris>. In different circumstances 
cj, it could be asked whether that utterance of “It's raining here” could be true if it rains also in the suburban area 
surrounding the city of Paris. The k-relative content <that it's raining in Paris> doesn't help to establish this. This 
yields that “It's raining here” may turn out as under-determined even after indexicality resolution, if considered in 
different circumstances. I take it that this phenomenon doesn't falsify the [Indexicality Assumption]: independently 
of whether uses of indexicals are subject to under-determinacy, it still remains true that indexicals can be regarded as 
being designed so as to receive an absolutely determinate content for every circumstance. Moreover, it is sufficient 
that the [Indexicality Assumption] is made true by one example of indexical term. The expression “I” happens to be 
particularly suitable to this end, perhaps because its semantics is that of a “pure” indexical (see Kaplan 1989, Perry 
2001). Thanks to Annalisa Coliva for discussion on this point.
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location may save time, or articulating it would sound too unusual and would raise the suspicion in 
the hearer that the speaker intends to communicate something more. Think for example about Alan 
and Beth, who are walking together down the Rambla. At some point, rain begins to fall, but Beth 
doesn't notice. Alan then informs her by uttering “It's raining”. No further articulation is supposedly 
required in order for Beth to understand what Alan said, as well as for her to learn whether it is true 
or false.  She just needs to check out whether drops of rain are falling from the sky above her. 
Communication through the use of an under-articulated sentence has been successful in this case. 
Had Alan uttered “It's raining in Barcelona”, Beth would probably have found it odder; she could 
have wondered whether Alan was picking up any discussion that they may have had previously, or 
she  could  think  that,  since  Alan  explicitly  mentioned  Barcelona  without  there  being  a  reason, 
something more is at stake than simply the plain remark that it's raining: maybe Alan is trying to 
stress that in Barcelona it's raining, as opposed as what is happening in some other place. All sorts 
of hypotheses could be elicited in Beth's mind by Alan's remark to the effect that it's raining in 
Barcelona; on the other hand, the simple remark that it's raining would surely not get such a variety 
of  reactions,  and Alan would indeed be justified in choosing to  utter  “It's  raining” in  order  to 
achieve his communicative aim.
There need be no calculation of the costs and benefits of what an utterance of a more elaborated 
sentence may imply. Speakers may just choose to be brief, if their audience already knows what 
they are talking about. Take for example Alan, who is in a bio-chemistry lab with Beth, choosing 
samples of green leaves in order to start analysing them. At some point, Alan comes across one of 
Pia's painted leaves. He recognises it as a Japanese maple leaf, and therefore concludes that it must 
be red underneath the paint. Showing the leaf to Beth, he utters “This leaf is not green. You'd better 
throw  it  in  the  garbage”.  Provided  that  Beth  knows  what  Alan  is  talking  about,  no  further 
articulation is needed in order for communication to succeed. 
In both examples, speakers employ a sentence which leaves some element unspoken: in the first 
case, the location of the rain; in the second case, the way of being green of the leaf. Given what 
remains unspoken, the sentence's meaning doesn't determine the truth-conditions of its utterances, 
for the simple reason that it doesn't articulate enough linguistic material to that end. What remains 
unarticulated is some element that,  had it been articulated, would have allowed the sentence to 
express the (intended) truth-condition of its utterance in some more exhaustive way. So, at least 
when we use  sentences like “The leaves are green” or “It's raining”, we may say that the meaning 
of these sentences doesn't give the truth-conditions of their utterances, for the sentence articulates 
too little material. 
As the reader  may have already realised,  the  picture  I  am adopting is  not,  at  least  so far,  too 
different from that put forth by Quine and Sellars, as a way to deal with the issue of incomplete 
definite descriptions.  i.e. definite descriptions which are not literally uniquely satisfied,  but that 
nevertheless are used and understood as though they were uniquely satisfied (e.g. “the table”, “the 
horse”, “the house”). Quine says:
Everyday use of descriptions […] is often elliptical, essential parts of the condition 
“...x...” being left understood; thus we may say simply “the yellow house” […] when 
what is to be understood is rather “the yellow house in the third block of Lee Street, 
Tulsa” (Quine 1940: p. 146)
Similarly Sellars, considering the sentence “The table is large” writes that 
a given utterance of it is elliptical and states what would be nonelliptically stated, for 
example, by “The table over here is large”. (Sellars 1954: 200). 
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What does happen in those cases in which we use definite descriptions, as Quine and Sellars claim, 
“elliptically”? Here the account is in sync with the idea I have been outlining so far: when in our 
conversational  setting  enough  elements  are  shared  and,  therefore,  taken  for  granted  by  the 
conversational participants, speakers tend to be brief. Quine and Sellars' talk of “elliptical use” of a 
sentence thus captures the idea that speakers tend to be brief, and leave things unspoken. However, I 
believe that the expression “elliptical use”, though effective for rhetorical purposes, should be pin-
down more rigorously. Firstly,  I believe that one should try to be clearer about what exactly is 
“elliptical”,  in  an  elliptical  use.  Usually,  linguistic  objects  and  not  acts  are  elliptical.  So  the 
expression  “elliptical  use”  is  correct  only  insofar  as  it  is  a  shorthand for  “use  of  an  elliptical 
linguistic expression”. Secondly, ellipsis is a very precise phenomenon, which may be regarded as 
differing  in  significant  respects  from  the  notion  we  are  currently  trying  to  capture.  Elliptical 
expressions typically “leave out” material which has already been articulated (in speech or writing). 
The sentences at focus here count as at  least  un-typical cases of ellipsis, in that they leave out 
elements which need not be antecedently articulated, but merely need be already salient “in the 
minds” of the conversation participants, so to speak (the rain location, the respect in which the leaf 
is green). For this reason, I would prefer not to use the term “ellipsis” to indicate this phenomenon,  
and I would opt for the more generic “under-articulation”. My proposal is that of re-framing the 
idea of “elliptical use” in terms of use of under-articulated expressions. 
At  this  point,  though,  the  notion  of  “under-articulation”  stands  in  need  of  a  rigorous 
characterisation;  because  of  course,  there  is  little  sense  in  the  claim that  sentences  are  under-
articulated  tout court—indeed, there is little sense in saying that, for any relevant predicate  φ, an 
object o is under-φed tout court. Take for example the sentence “This country is under-developed”: 
one can only evaluate the utterance if there is a comparison class, hence only if the country in 
question is less developed with respect to another country (or group of countries); the conditions for 
the possession of the property of under-development must include a comparison class. The same 
holds  for  under-articulation.  In  order  for  a  sentence  to  be  under-articulated,  it  must  be  under-
articulated with respect to something else: in the present case, I surmise, another sentence. 
I propose to regard the under-articulation of a certain sentence s as depending on a triadic relation 
between s, the (intended) truth-conditions of its utterance u, and a sentence s'. A sentence s will be 
under-articulated iff, when an utterance  u of  s is performed, another sentence  s' could have been 
uttered, which articulates more linguistic material and has the same (intended) truth-conditions as u. 
For example if, talking about Paris, Eva utters “It's raining” while meaning <that it's raining in  
Paris>,  we may say that  the  sentence  that  she  utters  is  under-articulated  iff  Eva,  in  the  same 
context,  could  have  used  the  sentence  “It's  raining  in  Paris”,  which  articulates  more  linguistic 
material  and  expresses  the  same  intended  content,  and  hence  truth-conditions,  of  her  actual 
utterance of “It's raining” as performed while talking about the weather in Paris.
Now the definition, as it is, may sound as a triviality: every sentence is trivially under-articulated in 
this sense, because for any sentence s, a more articulated sentence s' with the same truth-conditions 
as  any utterance  u of  s could have been uttered.  For  example,  “It's  raining” is  trivially  under-
articulated to the extent that one could have uttered “It's raining and it's raining”, or “It's raining and 
2+2=4” or “Oh my gosh, it's raining”. All these sentences are more articulated than the simple “It's 
raining” and express the same truth-conditions of any utterance of this sentence: the first sentence 
does that in virtue of being the result of the conjunction of “It's raining” with itself; the second 
sentence does that in virtue of being the conjunction of “It's raining” with a necessary truth; and the 
third sentence does that in virtue of the fact that “Oh my God” has no truth-conditional role at all, 
and thus leaves the sentence's truth-conditions unaltered.
The definition of under-articulation I have just given may therefore appear too broad, and the notion 
uninteresting.  The problem prompts me to call  attention on a detail  of the definition of under-
articulation just  provided;  appreciating this  detail  will  make for a principled way of ruling out 
uninteresting cases of under-articulation such as those listed above, as opposed to interesting cases. 
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What  the  definition  states  is  that,  in  order  for  a  sentence  s to  be  under-articulated,  the  more 
articulated  sentence  s' should  be  such  that  it  linguistically  articulates  some  truth-conditional  
aspects that were left out by the type-sentence s, even though they were part of the intended truth-
conditions of the particular utterance, u, currently considered. In other words, the more articulated 
sentence  s' should  add some previously unexpressed truth-conditional information  with respect to 
the truth-conditions of the type-sentence s, in conformity with what the intended truth-conditions of 
the particular utterance u under consideration are. 
This  entails,  for  example,  that  the  sentence  “It's  raining  and  it's  raining”  doesn't  count  as  an 
interesting articulation of e.g. Eva's utterance of “It's raining”, performed so as to mean <that it's  
raining  in  Paris>.  That utterance  is  true  iff  it's  raining  in  Paris;  therefore,  articulating  Eva's 
originally uttered sentence “It's raining” entails putting into words the unexpressed propositional 
element <in Paris>. Conjoining a sentence with itself adds no truth-conditional information that is 
not already contained in the original type-sentence; it doesn't put into words what was left unspoken 
by  the  original  utterance.  Similarly,  “Oh  my god,  it's  raining”  doesn't  count  as  an  interesting 
articulation of “It's raining”, because the expression “Oh my God” has no truth-conditional import, 
and therefore leaves the truth-conditions of the original sentence unchanged. 
Different considerations hold for “It's raining and 2+2=4”: strictly speaking, the sentence qualifies 
as an articulation of “It's raining” in my sense, because conjoining it with “2+2=4” does add some 
extra truth-conditional information to the truth-conditions of the original sentence. The problem is: 
is  there  any utterance  u of  s which could have these truth-conditions? Or,  better:  is  there  any 
speaker who could intend an utterance of “It's raining” to be true iff it's raining and 2+2=4? This 
doesn't  seem  in  principle  inconceivable,  however  my  intuition  is  that  a  context  in  which  an 
utterance  u of “It's raining” were true iff it's raining and 2+2=4 is rather far-fetched. Generally, 
utterances of “It's raining” are such that they leave out some piece of truth-conditional information 
concerning  specific  aspects  of  the  raining-event  described,  as  e.g.  the  location  of  raining,  the 
substance involved in the raining (water, frogs...) etc. What is left out is usually a potential adjunct 
for the sentence, such that it could be articulated as: “It's raining in Paris” or “It's raining frogs”. 
From a cognitive point of view, dropped adjuncts like “in Paris” or “frogs” are easily available to 
the hearer who wishes to identify the more articulated sentence s' that the speaker would have used 
in other circumstances. From these considerations it  follows that,  even though “It's raining and 
2+2=4” is allowed as an articulation of “It's raining”, a speaker who expected from a hearer to 
identify  the  former  sentence  would  be  “demanding  too  much”  from his  audience's  inferential 
abilities (for similar concerns on the accessibility of the contents of under-articulated sentences, see 
Stanley 2002).
To sum up, in this section I have drawn attention to the phenomenon of under-articulation: it is a 
fact about our use of language that, when enough information is shared between a speaker and her  
audience, the speaker may choose to leave part of what she means unspoken. In such a case, the 
sentence that she uses is, in my view, under-articulated. A sentence s is under-articulated iff, for an 
utterance u of s, a more articulated sentence s' could have been used in the place of s to express the 
same content as that intended by the speaker who performed u.
8. Under-articulation as the Source of Semantic Under-determinacy
Having introduced and characterised the notion of under-articulation, we may now move to the key 
stage of the chapter. In this section, I will defend the claim that the semantic under-determinacy of  
sentences like “It's raining”, “The leaves are green”, “Jill is ready” etc. is explainable in terms (and 
only in terms) of under-articulation. This claim will prove helpful in several respects, as we will see 
in what follows. First of all, though, we need to relate back to the question that was asked in section 
6, namely “What is the source of semantic under-determinacy?”. This question I deem worth asking 
because it seems that a deeper understanding of semantic under-determinacy could be gained by 
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looking at what phenomenon could lie at the origin of it. As a way of answering this source-related 
question, I will therefore consider the following Answer 3: 
Answer 3
[The Under-Articulation Claim] The meaning of a sentence  s  under-determines the content and 
truth conditions of its utterance u, because and only because s is under-articulated.
After having drawn attention on Answer 3, I wish to emphasise the fact that the semantic under-
determinacy of sentences like “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, etc. can be explained by employing the 
notion of under-articulation only. Take for example the sentence “It's raining”, of which it was said 
that  it  is  (at  least  most  of  the  times)  semantically  under-determined.  One  may  argue  that  the 
meaning of  this  sentence  under-determines  the  truth-conditions  of  its  utterances,  solely  for  the 
reason that it doesn't put into words all that would make its utterances true or false. For instance, 
suppose Eva utters “It's raining” while meaning <that it's raining in Paris>. The reason why the 
sentence that she uses is under-determined may be just that it is under-articulated with respect to a 
longer sentence, like “It's raining in Paris”, which could have been used in order to express that 
content. The same goes for “The leaves are green”: one could explain the fact that the sentence is 
under-determined by appealing to the idea that the speaker who, by uttering it, meant  <that the  
leaves are green on the outer surface>, could simply have used the more extended sentence “The 
leaves are green on the outer surface” in order to express that same content and truth-conditions. In 
general, my claim is that it is possible to explain the fact that a certain sentence s is semantically 
under-determined by appealing exclusively to the idea that s is under-articulated.
The  causal-explanatory  claim  made  by  Answer  3 is  not  to  be  conflated  with  the  following 
“Emergentist” claim:
[Emergentist Claim] Every case of under-determinacy is a case of under-articulation.
The [Emergentist Claim] is too weak for my purposes, for, although it states something true in my 
perspective,  namely  that  all  cases  of  under-determinacy  are  also  cases  of  under-articulation,  it 
doesn't capture the causal-explanatory relation between under-articulation and under-determinacy. 
That this relation obtains is important, because it marks the fact that it is not by mere chance that  
every case of semantic under-determinacy is  a  case of under-articulation: there is  a connection 
between the two phenomena which could be described as causal in some sense, to the extent that 
under-articulation,  i.e.  lack  of  linguistic  material,  gives  rise  to  semantic  under-determinacy,  i.e. 
failure to provide the (intended) content in context and truth-conditions. Most importantly, though, 
the Under-articulation Claim should not be conflated with what may be called a “Reductive” Claim:
[Reductive Claim] Under-determinacy obtains if, and only if, under-articulation obtains.
This  claim,  besides  failing  to  capture  the  causal  link  between  under-articulation  and  under-
determinacy, makes too strong a statement concerning the relation between the set of what is under-
determined and the set of what is under-articulated. On the one hand, the left-to-right direction of 
the biconditional is true, for it just states that every case of under-determinacy is a case of under-
articulation: as I just said, I maintain that, though I endorse also a causal statement. On the other 
hand, the right-to-left direction of the biconditional I think doesn't hold, for not every case of under-
articulation is also a case of under-determinacy of meaning. Even if, in (probably) the majority of 
cases, under-articulated sentences do not express any determinate truth-condition, there may well be 
cases of under-articulation in which there is no intuition as to semantic under-determinacy. Let me 
clarify this point by making some examples.
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An example  is  given  by  indexical  expressions.  Indexical  expressions  could  be  seen  as  under-
articulated,  in that  instead of them, the speaker  could have uttered a  longer  and more detailed 
definite description, or a proper name. For example, “I” is clearly under-articulated in this sense: 
suppose I utter “I am tired”. The sentence is under-articulated to the extent that I could have used 
the sentence “The speaker of this utterance is tired” as well as “Delia is tired” in order to express 
the same truth-conditions as the original utterance. Leaving aside the semantic under-determinacy 
of “tired”, the problem is that it doesn't seem that “I” suffers from semantic under-determinacy: the 
expression invariably has the same, fully determined character in every context and, moreover, once 
its reference is fixed in context, no residual under-specification is left, neither in the circumstances 
of  evaluation  of  the  context,  nor  in  any other  circumstance  of  evaluation.  After  all,  as  it  was 
underlined in  section 6.2,  “I”  responds to  the [Indexicality  Assumption],  which  contradicts  the 
claim about the  [Reiteration Effect]. So, from the case of indexicals we may learn that not every 
case of under-articulation is a case of under-determinacy.
A further example is offered by Recanati's (2002a) weatherman case: suppose that rain has become 
very rare and rain detectors have been placed all over the territory. A monitoring station collects the 
records of every detecting device, and an alarm rings whenever rain is being detected. When the 
weatherman in charge of the monitoring room hears the alarm,  he can utter  “It's  raining”.  His 
utterance may seem under-articulated, since he could have uttered “It's raining somewhere” or “It's 
raining in the area”. However, in this case there is no intuition of semantic under-determinacy, since 
the sentence is true iff  an event of raining is taking place tout court (in the intended region of 
space); that is, the sentence expresses an evaluable proposition even though no specific place is 
provided for the rain. So here again we seem to have a case of under-articulation to which no under-
determinacy corresponds. 
To sum up the content of this section: I have suggested that it is possible to explain every case of  
semantic under-determinacy as a case of linguistic under-articulation, along the lines of Answer 3. 
Whenever a speaker utters a sentence s whose semantic content under-determines what the speaker 
means  with  that  utterance  (and  the  related  truth-conditions),  it  is  possible  to  explain  this 
phenomenon with the idea  that  the sentence  s at  issue just  is  under-articulated  with respect  to 
another sentence s' which the speaker could have uttered in its place to say what he meant with his 
actual  utterance.  In  other  words,  Answer 3 could  be  adopted  as  an  account  of  the  source  of 
semantic  under-determinacy.  Answer 3 should  not  be  conflated  with  the [Emergentist  Claim], 
which just states that every case of under-determinacy is a case of under-articulation, but it doesn't 
capture the causal connection between the two; nor should it be conflated with the  [Reductionist  
Claim], which implies a commitment to the idea that every case of under-articulation is also a case 
of semantic under-determinacy—something which is not generally the case.
9. The Explanatory Advantages of Under-articulation
Let  us  survey  the  advantages  that  an  under-articulation  account  would  offer.  First  of  all,  a 
comparative advantage: recall the meaning indeterminacy view associated with Answer 1 and the 
indexicality  view  associated  with  Answer  2:  one  can  say  that,  if  compared  with  these  two 
competing views, an answer based on the idea that semantic under-determinacy is caused by under-
articulation like Answer 3 has the following benefits: first of all, it allows to maintain that meaning 
under-determines  truth-conditions,  but  not  because  meaning  itself is  indeterminate;  in  fact,  the 
meaning of sentences may be perfectly determinate; it's only that we use “too few words” to state 
what we mean. Secondly, the view allows to say that meaning under-determines truth-conditions, 
but such a failure is due to the simple fact that the sentence contains too few words to spell out the 
intended truth-conditions of its utterance, and not to the fact that it contains any indexical element 
beyond the acknowledged set. Other non-comparative advantages are the following:
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(1) A Response to the Demarcation Problem. The under-articulation view helps the theorist to set 
apart semantic under-determinacy from other phenomena of semantic defectiveness, thus providing 
an answer to the  Demarcation Problem. As already said, the under-articulation view (as stated in 
Answer 3) is not about a definition of semantic under-determinacy, but rather it is a view about 
what is  sufficient as a  cause/explanation  of semantic under-determinacy. Consideration of what 
suffices  to  cause/explain  semantic  under-determinacy  allows  us  to  identify  a  feature  which 
distinguishes semantic under-determinacy from other cases of semantic defectiveness. This feature 
consists in under-determinacy being explainable in terms of under-articulation only. This suffices in 
order to account for semantic under-determinacy as opposed to those phenomena like ambiguity, 
vagueness, indexicality, for it seems that all these phenomena are not explainable solely in terms of 
under-articulation. Indeed all of these phenomena seem to have their source in something more than 
simple shortage of linguistic material. For instance, it is not simply because of under-articulation 
that ambiguous words are such: ambiguous words are such because the same lexical item can be 
associated  with  different  semantic  properties.  Nor  is  under-articulation  the  (sole)  cause  of 
vagueness: the root of vagueness seems to lie in the fact that the meanings of the words we use 
(“bald”, “tall”, “red”) are not perfectly defined as to their application. Finally and most importantly, 
indexicality  too  isn't  exhaustively  explained  by  resorting  to  just  under-articulation:  indexical 
expressions are such not just because they substitute longer expressions, such as proper names or 
definite descriptions (“I” stands in place of “the speaker”, “here” stands in place of “the location of 
the speaking”), but also because words can be used as devices for reference as a function of context; 
that is, language users can exploit meaning as a way of obtaining different contents in different 
contexts.  In  contrast,  it  seems  that  semantic  under-determinacy  is  sufficiently  or  exhaustively 
explained  by  means  of  the  under-articulation  hypothesis  only.  Separate  consideration  will  be 
reserved for ellipsis, which will be the subject of the next section.
(2) Explaining the Reiteration Effect. Another important advantage of the Under-Articulation View 
is that it offers the resources to explain, at a very basic explanatory level, the Reiteration Effect. We 
saw in section 6.2 that, thanks to an argument like (1)-(7), we were able to distinguish the semantic 
results  associated  with  semantic  under-determinacy  from those  associated  with  indexicality  by 
appealing to what I called a Reiteration Effect. The Reiteration Effect tells us that semantic under-
determinacy may not be resolved “in all the possible circumstances of evaluation” because the same 
sentence s could have been used in different circumstances c1, c2, c3 … cn to express different, more 
specific or richer, contents. This contrasted with the  Indexicality Assumption,  which stated that, 
once an indexical element has been assigned a reference in a context of utterance, it is not supposed 
to generate further under-specificity in circumstances of evaluation other than those related to the 
context of utterance.
If we adopt an account in terms of under-articulation, the explanation for why semantic under-
determinacy may “reiterate” across different circumstance is simple: a single sentence s gives rise to 
the  reiteration  of  semantic  under-determinacy  to  the  extent  that  it  may  under-articulate  many 
sentences s',  s'',  s'''  … sn,  each more articulated than the other,  each of which could have been 
uttered in a different circumstance c1, c2, c3 … cn, to express each a different—more or less specific
—content. So for example, one can say that the sentence 
(4) The leaves are green
may give rise to a reiteration of semantic under-determinacy across different circumstances because 
it may be under-articulated with respect to the sentence
(4a) The leaves are green on the outer surface
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but also with respect to the longer sentences 
(4b) The leaves are green on the outer surface under normal light;
(4c) The leaves are green on the outer surface under normal light at 1 pm.
whose contents may have been intended by the speaker with an utterance of (4) in a range of 
different circumstances c1, c2, c3 … cn. 
(3)  Explaining  Context  Shifting  Cases. Last,  but  not  the  least,  the  under-articulation  account 
explains the phenomenon that authors in the debate have considered as most indicative of semantic 
under-determinacy:  the  phenomenon  of  contextual  shifts  of  truth-value  exhibited  by  “Context 
Shifting” cases (see section 4). Remember the Pia case: while talking to the photographer friend, 
Pia utters “The leaves are green” and says something true; while talking to the botanist friend, Pia 
utters  “The  leaves  are  green”  and  says  something  false.  Why  this  shift  in  truth-value?  The 
explanation, according to the Under-articulation proponent, is that the sentence Pia uses is under-
articulated  with  respect  to  two different  sentences  that  she  could  have  uttered  in  each distinct  
occasion,  which would have semantically expressed two different contents and truth-conditions. 
The first occurrence of the sentence is under-articulated with respect to a sentence like “The leaves 
are  green  on  the  outer  surface”,  which  is  true  in  the  context  of  the  conversation  with  the 
photographer friend; the second occurrence of the sentence is under-articulated with respect to a 
sentence like “The leaves are naturally green”, which is false in the context of the conversation with 
the botanist friend. (Note that I am not claiming that these two more articulated sentences would 
have made the truth-conditions of Pia's utterances fully determinate. In order to claim this, one 
would have to ascertain how fine-grained the proposition Pia intended to express is. But this is not 
the enterprise I am now pursuing. Here my purpose is simply to give a  conceptualisation of the 
phenomenon of semantic under-determinacy with respect to Pia's use of “The leaves are green”—
not to solve or “dissolve” this under-determinacy).
To sum up, the Under-Articulation view has more than one advantage. Firstly, it is free of some 
uncomfortable assumptions, such as the assumption of meaning indeterminacy. Secondly, it allows 
to  respond to the  Demarcation  Problem by tracing an  intelligible  distinction between semantic 
under-determinacy and indexicality (as well as ambiguity, vagueness, etc.),  the distinction being 
that  semantic  under-determinacy  is  explainable  in  terms  of  under-articulation  only,  while  
ambiguity, vagueness, indexicality are not. The Under-Articulation view also allows to explain, at a 
very basic explanatory level, the so called “Reiteration Effect”. Finally, it gives a basic and simple 
explanation of “Context Shifting” cases.
10. The Ellipsis Objection
At this  point,  the opponent  of  the under-articulation view could grant  all  the arguments so far 
developed  but  advance  the  following  reserve:  given  all  I  have  said  about  semantic  under-
determinacy, the result is just that I am claiming that semantic under-determinacy is explainable in 
terms of a form of  ellipsis. If this is true, however, then I haven't gone very far: all I have been 
doing is, after all, domesticating semantic under-determinacy, because I have related it to an already 
familiar phenomenon.
A response  to  this  objection  requires  making  a  distinction.  Under-articulation  surely  has  some 
features  in  common with ellipsis:  both  of  them are  about  linguistic  material  that  is  “left  out”.  
Anyhow, there are important (even though subtle enough) differences between the two phenomena. 
Ellipsis I take to be a purely syntactic phenomenon, which is invoked by linguists in order to make 
sense of the grammaticality of certain sentences. On the other hand, I take under-articulation to be a 
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semantic-conceptual phenomenon. To see the difference between the two, suppose the following 
dialogue takes place:
(6) Alan: “Who baked the cake?”
Beth: “Jill”
The response given by Beth is not a sentence at all, however in this context it sounds as a good way  
of answering the question posed by Alan. The explanation for this is that the non-sentential item 
uttered by Beth is  elliptical:  at  the overt  level,  the verb phrase has been deleted, however it is 
retrievable in one of the previously articulated sentences. In this case, it's easy to find the previously 
articulated item: it's the interrogative sentence “Who baked the cake?”. The verb phrase “baked the 
cake” is  superficially  absent  in  Beth's  utterance of  “Jill”,  even though an  interpretation of  this 
utterance requires to see the non-sentential item as completed exactly by such a verb phrase, at least 
at the covert level. By considering this example, we are already able to identify one of the essential 
marks of ellipsis as a syntactic phenomenon: for a certain sentence (or non-sentential  linguistic 
item) to be syntactically elliptical, it has to leave out some material which is  already present in  
some previously articulated sentence. In other words, when an expression is elliptical, it is because 
the linguistic context can provide the linguistic material that the expression leaves unspoken.14
This feature is not shared by cases of under-articulation. For an under-articulated sentence could be 
uttered  even  though  no  previous  sentence  has  been  uttered  before:  that  is,  under-articulated 
sentences can occur in a discourse-initial position. Suppose Beth and Alan have been discussing 
extensively the day before whether Jill is prepared for her Spanish exam. The day after, Beth and 
Alan meet again. Beth asks Alan “So is Jill really ready?”. As one can see, as long as both Beth and 
Alan  already  know what  the  topic  of  the  conversation  is,  the  sentence  “Jill  is  ready”  can  be 
felicitously used to start their conversation (consider that what has been articulated in the previous 
conversation may not provide the syntactic material for completing the sentence). Under-articulated 
sentences can then occur discourse-initially if by “discourse-initially” we mean at the beginning of a 
discourse or conversation within an already shared background of presuppositions. No previous 
sentence needs to  be articulated within the same conversation:  it  is  sufficient  that the speakers 
presuppose certain propositions. 
Given  these  considerations,  we  may  legitimately  conclude  that  explaining  semantic  under-
determinacy in terms of sentential under-articulation doesn't amount to explaining it in terms of 
ellipsis; what I have been doing is not domesticating semantic under-determinacy, i.e. relating it to 
an already familiar phenomenon in natural language. Quite the contrary: by explaining semantic 
under-determinacy in terms of under-articulation I have committed to the idea that semantic under-
determinacy arises merely because of the way speakers  employ language (they tend to be brief 
whenever enough is presupposed in the conversation), and not because of any mechanism grounded 
in language in any deeper semantic/syntactic sense.
14 Neale (2004) traces the distinction between syntactic ellipsis and under-articulation (which he calls “utterance 
ellipsis”) in the following way: syntactic ellipsis is a genuinely linguistic phenomenon while under-articulation is 
merely a way of using language. Syntactic ellipsis is the deletion of one or more sentential components, which can 
be easily recovered in the material antecedently articulated, thereby allowing the reconstruction of the non-elliptical 
sentence via a “copy-paste” process. Uttering a syntactically elliptical sentence implies engaging in an elliptical use.  
However, the reverse doesn't necessarily happen. This is because one can have mere ellipsis of use: for example, one 
might use elliptically the sentence “The table is large”, in the sense that one could have used some longer sentence, 
However, the sentence “The table is large” is not syntactically elliptical at all. Under-articulation is here the 
equivalent of Neale's ellipsis of use. As Neale admits, his insights are essentially in the footsteps of Quine (1940) 
and Sellars (1954). 
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced and discussed semantic under-determinacy, i.e. the idea to the 
effect that the meaning (linguistic content) of a sentence s fails to determine the truth-conditions of 
any utterance of  s. After having historically framed the problem, I have structured the chapter as 
follows:
• I have drawn attention onto what I have called the  Demarcation Problem, which may be 
summarised by the question “Is there a feature that sets apart semantic under-determinacy 
from  other  familiar  phenomena  of  semantic  defectiveness  like  ambiguity,  indexicality, 
vagueness, ellipsis?”.
• I  have  presented  and  discussed  the  Context-Shifting  Argument  (CSA),  which  is  the 
argument  usually  advocated  by  proponents  of  semantic  under-determinacy  in  order  to 
establish their thesis. I have then emphasised these authors' efforts to distinguish semantic 
under-determinacy  from  other  phenomena  of  under-determinacy  such  as  ambiguity, 
indexicality,  vagueness, ellipsis, thus pursuing what I called a  no-domestication policy.  I 
have stressed that the no-domestication policy doesn't give us the means to deal with the 
Demarcation Problem;
• As a first  step towards  answering  the  Demarcation Problem,  I  have asked the question 
“What is the source of semantic under-determinacy?”. According to Answer 1, the meaning 
of  a  sentence doesn't  determine its  utterances'  truth-conditions because meaning  itself is 
indeterminate. According to Answer 2, meaning is not indeterminate in itself, but it is still 
too poor or unspecific in order to provide the content-in-context of utterances;
• I have attacked  Answer 1 by arguing that, unless further qualifications are provided, it is 
incompatible with the intuitive and valuable distinction between  semantic correctness and 
pragmatic  correctness.  It  seems  that,  whenever  a  speaker  uses  a  semantically  under-
determined sentence, she is using that sentence for what it means. The under-determinacy is 
not caused by an unstable meaning, but by an incomplete, stable meaning;
• I  have  also  criticised  Answer  2,  on  the  account  that  its  formulation  doesn't  allow  to 
distinguish between semantic under-determinacy and indexicality. Moreover, an argument 
like the one in (1)-(7), purported to set the two phenomena apart, only draws attention on an 
effect of semantic under-determinacy, which I call the Reiteration Effect. What we need is, 
however, a cause (explanation) for such an effect;
• I have suggested to think of semantic under-determinacy as caused (explained) by sentential  
under-articulation. It is just a matter of fact that, in appropriate circumstances, speakers do 
not care about using sentences that fully articulate the truth-conditions of their utterances 
(e.g. “It's raining”). Under-articulation thus obtains in all those cases in which, when an 
utterance  u of a sentence  s is performed, a sentence  s'  could have been used instead of  s, 
such that (i) s' articulates more linguistic material than s; (ii) it has the same (intended) truth-
conditions as the particular utterance u of s currently under consideration;
• The main explanatory advantage of the under-articulation approach is that it  provides an 
answer to the Demarcation Problem: what sets apart semantic under-determinacy from other 
phenomena of semantic defectiveness such as ambiguity, vagueness and indexicality is that 
semantic under-determinacy is  explainable in terms of under-articulation only. The main 
difference between semantic under-determinacy and ellipsis is that felicitous use of elliptical 
sentences needs that some material is previously articulated, while this is not the case for 
semantically under-determined expressions;
• Moreover, the under-articulation account (a) explains the “Reiteration Effect” at a very basic 
explanatory level, by saying that under-determinacy reiterates to the extent that a certain 
sentence s is under-articulated with respect to a range of more articulated sentence s', s'' … 
sn  which could have been used in different circumstances  c1,  c2...  cn to articulate each a 
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different—more or less rich—content; (b) explains the context-shifting effect: a sentence s is 
true in context c1 and false in context c2 because it under-articulates two different sentences 





Semantic Under-determinacy, Comprehension and Radical Contextualism
In the previous chapter, the issue of semantic under-determinacy was introduced and explored in its 
most fundamental aspects. The chapter's central aim was to answer the Demarcation Problem, i.e. to 
positively  characterise  semantic  under-determinacy  as  opposed  to  ambiguity,  indexicality, 
vagueness, and ellipsis. I argued that semantic under-determinacy is explainable solely in terms of  
under-articulation (where under-articulation interestingly differs from ellipsis). This feature sets 
apart  semantic  under-determinacy  from  other  phenomena  of  semantic  defectiveness,  such  as 
ambiguity,  vagueness  and  most  importantly,  indexicality.  All  these  phenomena  appear  as  not 
explainable by an appeal  to linguistic  under-articulation only—all of them have their  source in 
something  different  than  simple  shortage  of  linguistic  material.  For  instance,  it  is  not  simply 
because of under-articulation that ambiguous words are such; nor is under-articulation the (sole) 
cause of vagueness; finally and most importantly, indexicality too isn't exhaustively explained by 
resorting  to  just  under-articulation.  In  contrast,  it  seems  that  semantic  under-determinacy  is 
sufficiently or exhaustively explained by means of the under-articulation hypothesis only.
In  Chapter  1,  I  maintained  that  a  response  to  the  Demarcation  Problem was  called  for  as  a 
preliminary step towards a treatment of semantic under-determinacy. Once this preliminary step has 
been taken, moving to the next stage requires turning to a perhaps even more challenging project, 
which is that of explaining  how, in general, communication is possible despite semantic under-
determinacy.  The  rest  of  the  thesis  is  devoted  to  discussing  answers  previously  given  to  this 
question, with the purpose to assess them and to finally put forward an independent answer. In the 
present chapter I will explore one of the most radical answers that can be provided for this problem. 
Other answers will be assessed in Chapters 3 and 4; an independent proposal will be advanced in 
Chapter 5.
1. The Comprehension Problem and the Contextualist Answer
Observing that language is subject to semantic under-determinacy cannot but make the following 
question pressing: how is it that, despite the under-determinacy exhibited by what is encoded in 
sentences, utterances manage to be understood and evaluated, and communication manages to turn 
out (at least generally) successful?  The problem is stated by considering the point of view of the 
potential listener of one of the sentences that have been surveyed so far. What is to be explained is 
the general mechanism by which the listener of an utterance of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The 
leaves are green” etc. manages to understand what the utterer means. Since the issue specifically 
concerns the comprehension of under-determined utterances, it could be formulated as follows:
[The  Comprehension  Problem] What  is  the  general  mechanism  by  which  the  listener  of  a 
semantically under-determined sentence s understands what the speaker means by uttering s?
A variety of answers is compatible with the Comprehension Problem. In the following chapters, I 
will  consider  different  versions  of  an  approach  according  to  which  the  right  answer  to  the 
Comprehension Problem is  that  context  determines some important aspects  of the semantics of 
expressions.  This  is  a  broadly  conceived  “Contextualist”  answer,  and  it  could  be  captured  as 
follows:
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[The Contextualist Answer] The context in which a sentence  s is used determines aspects of the 
semantics of the utterance u of s.
There is more than one way in which the Contextualist Answer may be read, for there is more than 
one semantic aspect which could be affected by elements of the context. (1) The first aspect which 
could be affected by context is the linguistic meaning of an expression. With regard to this semantic 
aspect, the Contextualist Answer is to be read as stating  that there is a relation of determination 
between the linguistic meaning of the expressions that we use and the particular context in which 
we happen to use them; that is to say, context affects meaning itself. (2) The second aspect that 
could be amenable to contextual effects  is  the  content-in-context of  an utterance.  The resulting 
reading of the Contextualist Answer will be that context operates on sentences endowed with a 
stable  conventional  meaning,  which  nevertheless  are  assigned  a  different  content  as  context 
changes.  There  are  two  ways  of  understanding  this  reading:  (2.1)  The  expression's  meaning, 
although stable, determines a sub-propositional item which is subsequently enriched in context by 
pragmatic  processes  that  operate  independently  of  the semantics  of  language.  So,  for  example, 
according to some theorists, the sentence “The leaves are green” determines a sub-propositional 
item,  which  gets  enriched pragmatically  (i.e.  in  a  linguistically  unconstrained way) in  order  to 
deliver a truth-evaluable item. In this conception, the relation between the context of utterance and 
the semantics of the expression consists in the fact that context freely enriches the expression's sub-
propositional content. (2.2) The expression's meaning is stable, but it consists of a function from a 
context of utterance to a content. So for example, according to some theorists, the word “know” 
denotes a function from a context of utterance to a knowledge-relation (see DeRose 1992, Cohen 
2000).  Other  expressions,  e.g.  indexicals,  clearly refer  to different objects  in different contexts. 
Their meaning is thus such that it denotes a function from the context of utterance to a content: For 
example, “I” means invariantly “the speaker” but, if uttered by Alice it refers to Alice, while if 
uttered by Beth it refers to Beth, etc. In this “functional” conception of the semantics of certain 
expressions, the role of the context is that of providing a value for the function, and hence the  
relation between context and semantic value will be a relation of “functional saturation”. (3) The 
last possible reading of the Contextualist Answer focusses on that semantic aspect of an expression 
known as its  extension.  The extension of a predicate is a set of individuals: so, for example, the 
extension of  “bachelor”  is  the set  of  all  the individuals  that  are  bachelors.  The extension  of  a 
sentence is a truth-value: for example, the extension of “Charles is a bachelor” is the truth if Charles 
is  a  bachelor  and falsity  otherwise.  As  soon as  extensions  become in  focus,  the  Contextualist 
Answer can be interpreted as saying that there is a relation of determination between the extension 
of the expressions that we use and the particular context in which we happen to use them, i.e. that 
extension is sensitive to the variation of certain contextual features.
In the present chapter, I will briefly deal with reading (1), which I shall dismiss as incompatible 
with a truth-conditional semantics. I will then move on to reading (2.1), which I shall consider more 
extensively,  and against  which  I  will  argue  that  it  brings  to  a  merely  partial  view of  the  way 
speakers understand language in context. I will turn to reading (2.2) in Chapter 3 and to reading (3) 
in Chapter 4. 
2. Extreme Contextualism
Reading (1) of the Contextualist Answer clearly espouses a view of semantic under-determinacy as 
a feature of the meaning of words and sentences. For, if what is semantically under-determined is 
meaning itself, then in order for utterances of sentences to be true or false, there will have to be 
some interaction  between  meaning and  context,  in  the  sense  that  context  shall  have  a  role  in 
determining  what  words  and  sentences  linguistically  mean.  The  resulting  adaptation  of  the 
Contextualist Answer corresponds to what I shall call The Extreme Contextualist Answer
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[The Extreme Contextualist Answer] Relevantly different uses of an expression  e can determine 
relevantly different meanings for e.
However, as it stands, the Extreme Contextualist Answer does need some qualification. Having it 
that  meaning depends on use in  this  way cannot  mean allowing every use of  a  word to  mean 
whatever the speaker wishes to mean. Embracing the Extreme Contextualist Answer with no further 
qualification is compatible with an endorsement of the claim that meaning is not subject to any form 
of constraint, such that it allows building up a stable semantics for the language in question. What 
interests me here is, however, the possibility to maintain that words and complex expressions in a 
language have a stable semantics, even though this semantics may under-determine the content of 
the  utterances  made  by  speakers  in  concrete  contexts.  I  will,  therefore,  disregard  the  Extreme 
Contextualist  Answer  as  not  enough interesting  for  the  purposes  of  an  investigation  about  the 
semantics of a language. 
3. Radical Contextualism
Let us then move on to reading (2.1) of the Contextualist Answer, which is less extreme for it has it  
that, notwithstanding their having a stable linguistic meaning, utterances of some expressions—as 
such—do  not  strictly  speaking  “say”  anything.  Context  then  freely  (i.e.  independently  of  any 
linguistic constraints) operates on the content of these sentences. The corresponding adaptation of 
reading (2.1) could be called a “Radical Contextualist Answer”:
[Radical Contextualist Answer] An expression e has a determinate linguistic meaning, however free 
(i.e. linguistically unconstrained) pragmatic processes determine “what is said” by the speaker with 
an utterance of e in relevantly different contexts. 
In light of this claim, one may want to distinguish between two senses of “what is said”. On the one 
hand, an expression says something in virtue of the semantic properties it possesses by convention: 
this  is  the  sense  of  “what  is  said”  coined  by  Grice  (1967/1989).  Proponents  of  the  Radical 
Contextualist Answer obviously have to grant that expressions in English say  something in this 
Gricean sense. On the other hand, an expression says something if its content determines a complete 
proposition, i.e. an evaluable content, in context. As we have seen in Chapter 1, theorists such as 
Travis (1985/2008) and Recanati (1989) contend that expressions such as “The leaves are green”, 
“It's  raining”  say  nothing in  this  second  sense,  i.e.  they  do not  express  any truth-condition  in 
context.
According to Radical Contextualism, what the sentence says in the traditional, Gricean sense is 
regarded as indispensable, for it provides minimal semantic directions. However, it is often hardly 
of relevance for the reconstruction of utterance truth-conditions. The meaning that is encoded in 
sentences is nothing but a schema or template, which provides very general and unspecific semantic 
information, but ultimately doesn't express any truth-evaluable content. It is at this point that the 
role of pragmatic processes becomes valuable, for it helps the hearer to determine “what is said” by 
the speaker in the second sense—i.e. to determine a proposition which is evaluable in context. The 
processes that serve this task are usually called processes of “free enrichment”, to mark the fact that 
they supplement conventional semantic content with additional propositional material in a way that 
is “free” from linguistic constraints. Processes of free enrichment will be the subject of the next 
section.
4. Processes of Free Enrichment
One of the mostly advertised benefits of Radical Contextualism is that it seems to deal pretty well  
with the problem of semantic under-determinacy. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 1998), Carston 
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(2002) and Recanati, (2004) are among the Radical Contextualists that put a stress on the problem 
and take a substantial step in order to overcome it. This step consists in positing pragmatic effects 
affecting what sentences say in context. But what is the nature of such processes, and how do they 
set  themselves apart from other pragmatic processes that are commonly thought of as perfectly 
integrated in natural language semantics?
We said that, according to Radical Contextualism, what makes “what is said” by a speaker with an 
utterance u of a sentence s richer and more specific than “what is said” by s in virtue of meaning 
alone is the effect of  pragmatic processes  which exploit information drawn from the context of 
utterance. At first glance, this is reminiscent of what in formal semantics has been described as the 
phenomenon of  indexicality, i.e. the semantic exploiting of the context of an utterance aimed at 
picking out the reference of certain expressions—like “I”, “here”, “this”. Since Bar-Hillel (1954), 
Montague (1974), Davidson (1967a) Kaplan (1989), Evans (1982) and Perry (1993), indexicality 
has been recognised as a legitimate module of the semantics of natural language: it just happens that 
the  content  of  expressions  like  “I”,  “you”,  “now”,  “that”  needs  to  be  “anchored”  to  the 
extralinguistic context in which these expressions are used, for various reasons that pertain to the 
efficiency and economy of the language tool for the sake of successful communication. So a resort 
to the context of utterance in order to fix the content (namely the denotations) of some expressions 
was already provided by natural language semanticists before Radical Contextualism showed up. 
What is then the originality of the Radical Contextualist suggestion? 
Here  the  Radical  Contextualist  project  importantly  diverges  from  the  project  of  modelling 
indexicality within the semantics of natural languages. For the mechanisms underlying indexicality 
are fundamentally  constrained by linguistic forms.  For each instance of indexicality there is  an 
element, which is articulated at the linguistic (lexical or syntactic) level, which calls for saturation, 
i.e. to which a referent has to be assigned. The point of Radical Contextualism is precisely to claim 
that there are  processes which exploit  the context  which,  however,  go beyond the paradigm of 
indexicality,  in  that  they  do  not  respond  to  linguistic  constraints  but  are  triggered  by  purely  
pragmatic demands. As Recanati writes:
Various pragmatic processes come into play in the very determination of what is 
said; not merely saturation—the contextual assignment of values to indexicals and 
free variables in the logical form of the utterance—but also free enrichment and 
other processes which are  not linguistically triggered but are pragmatic through  
and through. (Recanati 2004: 21, my emphasis)
A similar remark is expressed by Robyn Carston:
[T]here is no level of linguistic representation of [… a] sentence in which there are 
variables (or silent indexicals or empty constituent slots) which indicate that the 
contextual values must be assigned in order to determine the full truth-conditional 
content. […] An adequate account of how these meaning-constituents become part 
of the proposition expressed by the utterance […] is formulated entirely in terms of 
pragmatic mechanisms. (Carston 2004: 818)
All these non-linguistically-driven processes can be equated with what Radical Contextualists call 
the phenomenon of free enrichment. Free enrichment is an umbrella-term, that covers a variety of 
processes  in  which  context  freely  (i.e.  free  from linguistic  constraints)  affects  the  meaning  of 
sentences so as to finally return some richer, more specific, or in any case more fleshed-out content 
for the utterances of such sentences. It  should be noted that the commitment to free pragmatic 
processes is what fundamentally sets apart reading (2.1) from the claim contained in reading (2.2): 
while in reading (2.2) meaning is equated with a function from context to content, whose role is that 
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of constraining the effects of context on what a certain utterance says, in reading (2.1) the role of 
context and of the related pragmatic effects is thought of as free from linguistic strictures. In light of 
this, one may wonder what the propositional elements are that are supplied by such a range of free, 
unconstrained processes, as well as how free enrichment functions precisely. 
[Unarticulated Constituents].  The first category of elements that are provided by processes of 
free-enrichment is composed by so-called  unarticulated constituents. The notion of unarticulated 
constituent was first introduced by Perry, who made it vivid through the following example: 
It is a rainy Saturday morning in Palo Alto. I have plans for tennis. But my younger 
son looks out the window and says, “It is raining”. I go back to sleep.
What my son said was true, because it was raining in Palo Alto. There were all sorts 
of places where it wasn't raining: it doesn't just rain or not, it rains in some places  
while not raining in others. In order to assign a truth value to my son's statement, as 
I just did, I needed a place. But no component of his statement stood for a place. 
The verb “raining” supplies  the relation  rains (t,  p)—a dyadic relation between 
times and places, as we have just noted. The tensed auxiliary “is” supplies a time, 
the time at which the statement was made. “It” doesn't supply anything, but is just 
syntactic filler. So Palo Alto is a constituent of the content of my son's remark,  
which no component of his statement designated; it is an unarticulated constituent. 
(Perry 1986: 138)
What Perry in this passage calls “unarticulated constituent” is a propositional component that does 
not correspond to any articulated component of the sentence, either at the superficial, overt level or 
at the deep, covert one. That is, at no level of the syntax of “It's raining”, whether superficial or 
deep15, is there an element that stands for the location—Palo Alto—which that particular statement 
of “It's raining” concerns. (This of course doesn't rule out that the verb itself “raining” encodes, at 
least at the lexical level, a relation between times and places rains (t, p)). 
Perry's notion of unarticulated constituent is key for Radical Contextualists, who subscribe to the 
view that context supplies propositional components in linguistically unconstrained ways. For these 
theorists, unarticulated constituents are brought into the proposition in ways that do not respond to 
linguistic strictures: in the case reported above, for example, the locational element <Palo Alto> is 
supplied  by  the  hearer  just  in  order  for  the  utterance  of  “It's  raining”  to  be  evaluable  and as 
informative and relevant as possible given the purposes of the current communicative exchange.
By  means  of  which  processes  are  unarticulated  constituents  incorporated  into  the  proposition 
expressed? In what follows, I will focus on two accounts of how this might be accomplished. The 
first one, due to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 1998), puts a stress on the cognitive processes by 
which a certain content gets pragmatically enriched, which the authors characterise as following a 
“path of least effort”. The second account, due to Recanati (2002a) (but traceable to  McConnell-
Ginet (1982)), emphasises the way pragmatics may trigger important transformations at the syntactic 
level.
[The  Path  of  Least  Effort  Approach] In  Sperber  and  Wilson's  framework,  sentences  like  “It's 
raining”  correspond  to  mental  representations  whose  structure  admits  of  a  certain  range  of 
expansions  or,  as  they  say,  “developments”.  Supplying  an  unarticulated  constituent  ultimately 
means  developing  this  mentally  represented  “conceptual  structure”  in  the  ways  that  are  more 
appropriate,  given  the  context  of  utterance.  The  psychological  process  which  underlies  this 
15 Perry is very explicit about the fact that the unarticulatedness of the constituent pertains both the sentence's 
superficial and deep syntax. As he maintains, “we do not need first to find an expression, hidden in the ̔deep 
structure ̕ or somewhere else, and then do the semantics of the statement augmented by the hidden expression.” 
(Perry 1986: 143).
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“development of conceptual structure” responds to what Sperber and Wilson call a “principle of 
optimal  relevance”.  What this  principle entails  in  practice is  that  the subject who witnesses an 
utterance of, e.g., “It's raining”, engages in a search for the most cognitively fruitful interpretation 
of it, at the least cognitive effort. The strategy that Sperber and Wilson presume to be followed by 
competent  interpreters  is  the  so-called  “path  of  least  effort”:  basically,  the  hearer  chooses  the 
interpretation that most quickly comes to mind, which best satisfies the current expectations of 
relevance. Here is how the authors describe the process:
The  hearer  takes  the  conceptual  structure  constructed  by  linguistic  decoding; 
following a path of least effort,  he enriches this at the explicit level […], until the 
resulting interpretation meets his expectations of relevance; at which point, he stops. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1998: 192)
In  Sperber  and Wilson's  view,  the  “path  of  least  effort”  consists  in  a  non-demonstrative,  sub-
personally run  inference, which leads the hearer to identify the proposition that best satisfies the 
requirement  for  optimality  of  relevance.  Let  us  consider,  as  a  basic  example,  the  following 
exchange:
(1) A: “What's the weather in Paris?”
      B: “It's raining”
 
Now B's utterance is such that it doesn't articulate the place where the rain is falling. Therefore, B's  
utterance can appear to A as a proper answer to her question only if A engages in an extra piece of 
reasoning (even a tacit or sub-personal one) in which she exploits the decoded linguistic meaning of 
B's utterance as a premise (or input) and, through a finite number of steps, finally arrives at the 
propositional content that best fits with A's expectations of relevance and B's presumed intentions. 
The reasoning could be reconstructed thus:
(1) B uttered the sentence “It's raining”; 
(2) If B's utterance is about Paris, then it is optimally relevant. 
(3) Since A made a question about the weather in Paris, the answer must be about Paris, too;
(4) If B's utterance had not been about Paris, B would have let A know explicitly;
(5) B's utterance is about Paris;
(6) B's utterance is optimally relevant;
(7) Hence, the content expressed by the utterance is that it is raining in Paris.
One  can  see  how,  through  a  finite  number  of  inferential  passages,  B  arrives  at  an  enriched 
reconstruction  of  the  content  of  A's  utterance.  In  this  process,  the  conceptual  structure  of  the 
predicate “raining” is thought of as being enriched by turning it into the more complex conceptual 
structure  raining_in_x,  where  x occupies  a  “free slot”  in  the  conceptual  structure,  dedicated  to 
locations. If the variable x is filled in with the locational element <Paris>, the final upshot is that 
the content of A's utterance is understood in context as being that it's raining in Paris, rather than 
simply that it's raining. Sperber and Wilson are committed to the view that this process responds, at 
the cognitive level, to a “least-effort” strategy, which demands to the hearer that he retrieves the 
most relevant interpretation at the lowest cognitive cost.
[The  Variadic  Function  Approach] The  second  account  of  how  unarticulated  constituents  are 
supplied  is  more  concerned  with  the  issue  of  how  we  can  reconcile  a  compositional,  hence 
syntactically controlled, account of free-enrichment with the idea that the process in question is 
purely pragmatically driven. The solution consists in positing that pragmatic processes are able to  
modify  the  syntactic  structure  of  expressions.  Recanati  (2002a)  takes  it  that  unarticulated 
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constituents are introduced in the proposition via a modification of the logical form of the sentence's 
occurrence. In order to achieve this result, he posits an operator named Variadic Function  which, 
provided the presence of a syntactic or even contextually relevant predicate-modifier, takes as input 
a certain predicate  R(x)  and gives as output a predicate whose logical form is increased (but also 
decreased, if appropriate) by one argument place, as e.g. the two-place predicate R(x, y). So suppose 
that the verb in question is “to rain”. Recanati holds that, in absence of any syntactic modifier like 
“in Paris” or of any contextually salient location, the verb expresses the monadic predicate rain(t), 
designating a property of times. However, if an explicit modifier is made to precede the predicate, 
or if the predicate is used while making a specific location salient, the logical form of the predicate 
acquires an extra argument-place. As an effect of the variadic function, it goes from being the one-
place relation to times rain(t ) to being a two-place relation rain(t, l) between times and locations. In 
addition to this, given that either the sentence or the context already contains the element suitable to 
saturate  the  newly  acquired  argument-place,  the  process  gives  as  output  not  just  the  “bare” 
expanded logical form  rain(t,  l) but the very same form with the novel argument-place  already 
filled-in. As Recanati writes:
[…  W]e  can  say  'It  is  raining'  without  providing  a  location  for  the  rain,  whether 
linguistically or even contextually. [...] But if we  do provide a location, either through 
the adjunction of  a  prepositional  phrase or  by purely contextual  means,  we thereby 
generate a new relation, in which there is an empty slot, an argument role which the  
location fills. Since there is an argument place for the location in the output relation 
(though not in the input relation), the location finds its way into the proposition and 
coheres with the other constituents. (Recanati 2002a: 322)
Consider another example: “Jill is ready”; suppose that an utterance of this sentence is intended by 
the speaker to be true if, and only if, Jill is ready to take the exam. The interpretation of the word 
“ready” then requires that the predicate being ready is turned via variadic function into a different 
one, namely the predicate being ready_for, which contains an argument-place to be filled in with 
the propositional element <the exam>. The ultimate result is that the content-in-context that the 
utterance of “Jill is ready” expresses is the richer content  that Jill is ready to take the exam.  Of 
course, had the relevant purpose of Jill been different, what the occurrence of “ready” would have 
said in that context would have been different, too. 
To sum up, I have introduced the notion of “unarticulated constituent”, which is a component of the 
proposition expressed by an utterance u of a sentence s, to which no articulated (syntactic, lexical) 
elements in the sentence s correspond (neither at the level of superficial or at the level of deep 
syntax).  Sperber  and  Wilson  regard  unarticulated  constituents  as  the  result  of  a  process  of 
“development of conceptual  structure” which follows a  strategy from the least  cognitive effort. 
Recanati  is  more worried about how pragmatic demands may modify the syntactic structure of 
expressions, so as to preserve compositionality, and therefore resorts to an explanation in terms of 
what he calls “Variadic functions”. 
[Ad-hoc Meanings]. The second category of elements coming as a product  of free-enrichment 
includes what we may call  ad-hoc meanings: an ad-hoc meaning is constructed out of some core 
semantic traits, by adding traits that are purely contextually derived. Work on ad-hoc meanings is 
intimately related to work on the formation of concepts, which was carried out mainly by cognitive 
psychologist Larry Barsalou (1983): very sketchily, Barsalou realised that humans are able to form 
categories  which  organise  the  world  according  to  very  contingent,  temporary  and  particular 
purposes: for instance, the category “things to eat on a diet”; the category of “noises coming from 
the neighbours' house”; the category of “things that can be used as hammers”, etc. In so doing, 
subjects create concepts that are “ad-hoc”, i.e. which fit contingent situations and the related tasks 
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to be carried out, such as eating low-calories food, recognising annoying noises, nailing objects to 
the wall. Inspired by Barsalou's work, Sperber & Wilson (1998: 194-96) and Carston (2002: 143-
52) have characterised instances of free-enrichment as cases of “ad-hoc” meaning formation, i.e. of 
cases of formation of meanings which suit contextual purposes. Let us see how.
In their view, an utterance of a word invokes a concept, which goes into the mental representation 
associated with the sentence uttered. In the case of semantically under-determined expressions, the 
concept invoked and, hence, the whole sentence's representation, is too poor (or too rich, in some 
special cases) in order for it to capture what the utterer is saying. This means that the concept at  
issue needs to be adjusted with respect to what is relevant in the context—it needs to be made “ad-
hoc”; the word's meaning, the proposition expressed, as well as the utterance's truth-conditions are 
then affected accordingly. The difference between ad-hoc meaning formation and supplementation 
of unarticulated constituents is that, while in the case of unarticulated constituents a development of 
conceptual form is required in order to make room for an extra constituent, in the case of ad-hoc 
meanings no room for extra-constituents needs to be prepared, for enrichment involves the semantic  
traits of a word, rather than its structural ones. 
The mental process corresponding to  ad-hoc concept formation is, again, an  inference aimed at 
making utterances in their particular context of utterance optimally relevant, i.e. conveying as much 
cognitively useful information as possible, at the least cognitive cost. Consider, for example, the 
following exchange:
(2) A: “How about going to the movies?”
      B: “I'm tired”
Here the answer counts as relevant only if B's being tired is a reason for not going to the cinema. So 
the hearer needs to run an inferential reasoning aimed at picking the right sense of “tired”. Once 
such sense is  retrieved, and the right truth conditions for (10b) are worked out,  the hearer can 
therefore move on to inferring what B is implicating, namely that B is not feeling like going to the 
movies (the derivation of implicatures was something that we covered in Chapter 1). The inference 
gone through by A might be as follows:
(1) B has uttered “I am tired”; 
(2) In the context of this utterance, B's utterance is optimally relevant only if B is saying that he 
is tired to an extent that prevents him from going to the movies;
(3) If what B is saying was not that he is tired to an extent that prevents him from going to the 
movies, B would have let me know;
(4) What B is saying is that he is tired to an extent that prevents him from going to the movies;
(5) B's utterance is optimally relevant;
(6) Hence, the content expressed by the utterance is that B is tired to an extent that prevents him 
from going to the movies.
What is important in the relevance-theoretic framework is that contextual enrichment modifies the 
meaning  of  the  sentence  by  modifying  the  very  concept  associated  with  a  word  by  a  mental 
representation. Thus, in view of the contextual data available, the hearer will presumably recognise 
that the concept corresponding to the word “tired” is not the simple concept TIRED, but a more fine-
grained  concept  TIRED*.  Thus,  according  to  relevance  theorists,  the  mental/  conceptual 
representation of the meaning-in-context expressed by “I am tired” will be 
(10b') tired*(B)
Corresponding to a more specific proposition like 
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(10b'') B is tired to an extent that prevents him from going to the movies;
Once the hearer has identified (10b'') as what the speaker means, she can proceed to calculate what 
the speaker is implicating—namely, that he doesn't want to go to the cinema.
To sum up, so far I have illustrated two ways in which a process of pragmatic enrichment may help 
with the problem of semantic under-determinacy: providing unarticulated constituents and creating 
ad-hoc meanings.  The underlying strategy is the same in both cases: have sentential content-in-
context enriched so that the expressed content amounts to a complete, evaluable proposition, while 
at the same time eluding the constraints posed by indexicality. 
5. “Deep” and “Shallow” Semantic Under-determinacy
Before moving on, let me put forward some qualifications aimed at restricting the scope of the 
present investigation, so as to avoid future misunderstanding as much as possible. I wish to trace a 
distinction between genuine semantic under-determinacy and a kind of under-determinacy which is 
merely pragmatic. So far we have characterised semantic under-determinacy as a failure on the part 
of linguistic meaning (in context) to determine a truth-condition, which implies that a gap obtains 
between what the sentence literally says (in context) and what an utterance of that same sentence 
means—according to the speaker's intentions.
In a first range of cases, the reason for this gap between what is strictly-speaking said and what is 
meant by the utterance is that the meaning of the sentence at issue delivers an altogether incomplete 
proposition. The gap therefore obtains between a non-propositional semantic item on the one hand 
and a genuinely propositional item on the other. The cases of “The leaves are green”, “Jill is ready” 
and “It's  raining”  are  paradigmatic  in  this  sense.  Neither  of  these  sentences  expresses  a  truth-
condition in ordinary cases, and thus a gap opens between what these sentences say and what a 
speaker may manage to say by using these sentences in a context. This is what I will call “deep” 
semantic under-determinacy.
In  a  second  range  of  cases,  even  though  the  meaning  of  the  sentence  delivers  a  complete 
proposition with complete truth-conditions, the proposition literally expressed is not what speakers 
usually  express by  using  that  sentence.  A gap  opens  between  a  propositional literal  sentence 
meaning on the one hand and an equally propositional, even though more “appropriate” utterance 
content.  Take  for  example  an  utterance  of  the  sentence  “Jack  and  Jill  got  married”.  Strictly 
speaking, this sentence is true if, and only if, Jack got married and Jill got married. This is however 
not what is generally meant and understood: in general, when this sentence is uttered in a particular 
context, the intended (and grasped) content is that Jack and Jill  got married  to each other (see 
Carston 1988). Or, take an utterance of “It will take time to get there”. Literally, the sentence says 
that it will take a certain amount of time to get to some destination, and it is true iff it will take a  
certain amount of time to get to that destination. However, this would be a triviality, not worth 
stating in normal circumstances. The content that is usually intended and that usually gets grasped is 
instead that it  will take  more time than expected in order to get to the destination (see Carston 
2002). Finally, consider an utterance of “I have had breakfast”. Strictly and literally, the sentence is 
true iff the speaker had breakfast at least once in his life. However, if I utter such a sentence at ten 
o'clock, in response to a friend's offer of a sandwich, this is not the content that I am most likely to 
express. What I rather express, and what my hearer understands, is the richer proposition to the 
effect that I have had breakfast that very morning (see Recanati 2004).
As far as I can see, only cases of “deep” under-determinacy exemplify the right way of conceiving 
semantic under-determinacy for the purposes of the present work, i.e. as lack of determinacy  of 
meaning (in context) with respect to  utterance truth-conditions. Even though cases in the second 
group,  too,  exhibit  some form of under-determinacy,  I  think that,  in  virtue of  the fact  that  the 
sentences in question do express evaluable propositions, the under-determinacy at issue does not 
deserve  to  be  called  “semantic”.  It  is  probably  a  pragmatic under-determinacy,  i.e.  under-
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determinacy of what would be usually appropriate to express in a certain occasion with an utterance 
of  that  sentence.  I  will  therefore  disregard  cases  belonging  to  the  second  group,  and  focus 
exclusively on the first group.
Radical Contextualism has it that processes of enrichment operate on both these groups of cases; 
however, it is in the case of “deeply” semantically under-determined sentences that the crucial role 
of pragmatics with respect to semantics becomes apparent. This is because processes of enrichment 
need to  be carried out  in  order for utterances of these expressions to express a truth-evaluable 
content in the first place. As Carston says, semantically under-determined expressions
require a pragmatic process of completion before they can be judged as true or false 
descriptions of a state of affairs. (Carston 1999: 105)
What is at stake, here, and what is attained with the help of pragmatics, is the possibility that these  
sentences express a truth-evaluable content, and not just a content which is relevant, informative, 
conversationally helpful. It's at this point that pragmatics appears, at least in the view of authors 
such as Carston and others, as truly indispensable for the semantics of these expressions, and that 
we can start talking about Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. 
In other words, I believe that the sense of “semantic under-determinacy” relevant for the purposes 
of this research should be restricted to deep semantic under-determinacy, which is a failure on the 
part of linguistic meaning (in context) to determine utterance content as a consequence of its failure 
to determine an evaluable content at all. Cases in which linguistic meaning (in context) fails to 
determine utterance content which are due to the fact that the semantic content is a full-fledged 
proposition, though not the proposition which the speaker intends—which may be called “shallow” 
cases of semantic under-determinacy—will not be in the focus of the present research. The project I 
am after  is  eminently  that  of  investigating  how communication  is  possible  whenever  meaning 
under-determinacy is deep, i.e. it is such that it defeats evaluation.
6. Radical Contextualism and Comprehension
Let  us  now  introduce  the  issue  of  comprehension.  As  previously  stated,  the  [Comprehension 
Problem] can be summarised as the question:  how, in general, do hearers manage to understand  
utterances of semantically under-determined sentences? 
In what follows, I shall assume that comprehension is nothing more than knowledge of the truth-
conditions of an utterance. Knowledge of truth-conditions doesn't mean merely knowledge of a T-
sentence. There is more to understanding an utterance of “Snow is white” than simply being able to 
derive  the  sentence  “'Snow  is  white'  is  true  iff  snow  is  white”.  I  take  it  that  a  subject  who 
competently derives and therefore comes to know the truth-conditions of an utterance of “Snow is 
white” also knows how the world should be in order for the utterance to be true.16 This means that 
understanding an utterance involves  not  just  “blindly”  applying the rules  of  a  formal  semantic 
system, but also having this system interact with one's knowledge of how the world is, broadly 
speaking.
Furthermore, I take it as indisputable that, if there is no (determinate) truth-condition, there can be 
no knowledge of truth-conditions. Thus, if an utterance of “It's raining” expresses no (determinate) 
truth-condition, one can have no knowledge of this utterance's truth-condition, and the same applies 
for any utterance of “Jill is ready” and “The leaves are green”. But we defined comprehension as 
knowledge of an utterance's truth-conditions. This entails that, if there is no (determinate) truth-
condition expressed, there is no comprehension of the utterance at issue. 
Now let us go back to Carston's point that semantically under-determined sentences need pragmatic 
enrichment in order to express a truth-condition, and therefore be evaluated as true or false. In light 
16 For a debate on the notion of comprehension as related to a truth-conditional theory of meaning see Davidson (1967, 
1976), Foster (1976), McDowell (1980), Rumfitt (2005), Longworth (2008).
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of these considerations, the upshot is that, if no enrichment is carried out, then no truth-condition is 
expressed by an utterance, and no comprehension (i.e. knowledge of its truth-condition) is possible. 
But what kind of notion of “comprehension” is this? Radical Contextualists cannot be working with 
any notion of comprehension: what they seem to have in mind is a notion of comprehension that 
amounts to knowledge of the truth-conditions of an utterance of a sentence in the particular context 
in which the utterance is performed—given the speaker's intentions, the operative presuppositions, 
the salient objects in context, etc. Let us call this notion RC-Comprehension. 
[RC-Comprehension] Knowledge of the truth-conditions of an utterance in the particular context in 
which it is performed.
With this notion of comprehension at hand it is certainly true that, if no enrichment can be carried 
out, then there can be no comprehension of an utterance of the sentence “It's raining”, for there can 
be no knowledge of the truth-conditions that that utterance has in the particular context in which it 
is performed, with the particular intentions of the speaker and conversational setting that pertains to 
that very utterance.
Let us delve a little more into this issue. What appears as crucial for attaining RC-Comprehension 
of an utterance is, I take it, the exercise of the hearer's pragmatic-inferential capacities in order to 
figure out what the speaker means while using a certain linguistic expression in a particular context. 
The exercise of these pragmatic-inferential capacities is aimed not at linguistic de-coding, but at 
making  the  content  of  the  speaker's  utterance  as  “cognitively  useful”  as  possible  in  particular 
contexts. Processes such as the interpretive inferences envisaged by Carston and Sperber & Wilson, 
and described in  section 4, take as a premise the semantic content of the sentence and work out 
what the speaker meant by searching for the most cognitively useful interpretation at the lowest 
computational cost. This is accomplished by means of inferential, largely abductive strategies. So 
the role of meaning is confined to that of providing the premisses for what are, after all, genuine 
inferential procedures directed at gaining comprehension of a certain linguistic act. As these authors 
themselves claim:
While  still  assuming  that  the  code  model  provides  the  framework  for  a  general 
theory of communication,  and hence for a theory of verbal communication,  most 
pragmatists have described comprehension as an inferential  process. (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/1995: 12)
The derivation of the proposition explicitly communicated is dependent on pragmatic 
inference,  not  merely  in  determining  intended  referents  and  intended  senses  of 
ambiguous  expressions,  but  in  supplying  unarticulated  constituents  and adjusting 
encoded conceptual content (enriching and/or loosening it). (Carston 1999: 86)
Pragmatic-inferential processes aimed at comprehension of what the speaker is saying with a certain 
utterance have a crucial feature, which is so obvious that it goes almost unnoticed: The inferential 
abilities  which  take  contextual  information  into  consideration  have  to  be  exercised  within 
particular contexts of utterance. It would be pointless to run these inferential abilities without being 
acquainted with a context, for the point of running them is exactly establishing what the speaker 
intends to say—something which requires being familiar with the context in which he is speaking. 
For example, it  would be pointless for a hearer to exercise her pragmatic-inferential abilities in 
order to establish what a speaker is saying with an utterance of “It's raining” without resorting to the 
particular context in which the speaker is performing the utterances. This task requires the presence 
of a particular context which supplies the ingredients to be supplemented to the expressed content—
for instance, the location of the rain. 
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From this it follows, quite obviously, that  if no such particular context is accessible, the hearer 
cannot figure out the intended truth-conditions expressed by the utterance at interest and no RC-
comprehension of that utterance can take place. This is because, if the hearer is not familiar with the 
context in  which a certain utterance is  performed, she cannot  fruitfully exercise the pragmatic-
inferential abilities which would enable her to know the truth conditions of the utterance in that 
particular context, and hence she won't attain RC-Comprehension.17
Let us summarise the results of the present section. The notion of comprehension that apparently 
lies behind Radical Contextualism was labelled as RC-comprehension, i.e. knowledge of the truth-
conditions of an utterance in the particular context in which it is performed. Inferential-pragmatic 
abilities lie at  the root of RC-Comprehension, and they most fruitfully unfold within particular 
contexts, for the the aim of such processes is determining what the speaker intends to say in that  
particular context of utterance. From this it follows that, if no particular context is accessible to the 
hearer, no inferential-pragmatic abilities can be successfully exercised, thus preventing the hearer to 
understand what the speaker means in the particular context in which he performs the utterance. 
Ultimately then, in absence of a particular context, the hearer can attain no RC-comprehension of 
an utterance (of a semantically under-determined expression).
7. Intuitive Comprehension
Whether or not RC-Comprehension is a viable notion (I think it is), there is nevertheless a sense of 
comprehension according to which we do understand an utterance of “It's raining” even if we have 
no access to the particular context in which the utterance is taking place—for example because we 
ignore which particular location the speaker is talking about. This is because, I claim, hearers are 
able to figure out the truth-conditions that any utterance of a sentence would have in any arbitrary 
context. I shall call this Intuitive Comprehension:
[Intuitive Comprehension] Knowledge of the truth-conditions of any utterance of a sentence in any 
arbitrary context.
Having an intuitive comprehension of an occurrence of e.g. “It's raining” implies that we know that 
any utterance of such a sentence is true in any context iff it's raining somewhere or other. Similarly, 
there is a sense of comprehension in which we perfectly understand an utterance of “Jill is ready” 
even if we don't know which particular activity is under discussion. Our intuitive understanding 
consists in the fact that, upon hearing an utterance of “Jill is ready”, we thereby know that any 
utterance of this sentence is true in any context iff Jill is ready for some purpose or activity. In 
general, I shall say that intuitive comprehension is grasp of the truth-conditions that any arbitrary 
17 As an aside, it is also acknowledged by authors in the debate on the methodology of semantics of natural language 
that, in the comprehension of untutored speakers, general or abstract sentence properties and particular, context-
dependent, utterance properties are going to be tightly intertwined. Untutored speakers' reports as to what a certain 
utterance “says” or “means” are thus going to be “contaminated” by considerations pertaining to the utterance's 
significance in a particular context. As Cappelen and Lepore observe: “the actual use of locutions like ’means that’ 
(and ’said that’ […]) reveals no ’pure’ semantic intuitions about these uses. Intuitions about when such reports are 
true, it seems, are always cut with non-semantic material: often they are about what a speaker said, sometimes about 
what he meant, sometimes attempts to explain what was said, sometimes they provide lexical or syntactic or 
pragmatic information, almost invariably they are a mix of several of these” (Cappelen and Lepore 1997: 290). All 
this obviously raises question as to whether interrogation of reports from untutored speakers is good methodology 
for the sake of setting forth a semantic theory of a more or less big fragment of natural language. See e.g. Devitt 
(forthcoming) for the idea that intuitions of experts are more reliable than those of common speakers as indicators of 
the structure of a semantic competence.
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utterance of a (semantically under-determined) sentence has in any arbitrary context.18 19
Is there an independent motivation, besides the considerations pertaining to the present discussion, 
for taking the notion of intuitive comprehension seriously? As far as I can see, independently of the 
issue of semantic under-determinacy one could grant it that there is a sense of understanding on the 
basis of which we are able, independently of our comprehension of an utterance in a particular 
context, to know in general what it is for any arbitrary utterance of that sentence to be true in an 
arbitrary context. This difference between understanding a particular utterance and understanding 
any arbitrary utterance is apparent with respect to e.g. definite descriptions: independently of the 
referent  that  one  can  understand  a  particular  utterance  of  “the  teacher  of  Alex”  to  have  in  a 
particular context, one is able to understand any arbitrary utterance of “the teacher of Alex” as 
meaning “the unique x such that x is the teacher of Alex”. Intuitive comprehension seems to have a 
place  in  our  semantic  intuitions  even  independently  of  the  question  of  our  comprehension  of 
semantically under-determined expressions.
What would a  Radical Contextualist say about Intuitive Comprehension? Nothing encouraging, I 
suspect.  We  already  saw  that,  when  no  access  to  contextual  information  is  possible,  Radical 
Contextualism predicts, rather obviously, that there will be no RC-comprehension, for there will be 
no  chance  to  run  any  pragmatic  inference—which  is  required  for  that  kind  of  understanding. 
However, as far as I can see, Radical Contextualism also predicts that there won't be any intuitive 
comprehension either. Let us see why. 
Semantically  under-determined sentences  do not  yield  any truth-conditions  for  their  utterances. 
Intuitive  understanding  requires  access  to  a  truth-conditional  content,  namely  in  the  form  of 
knowledge of the truth-conditions of any arbitrary utterance in any arbitrary context. If there is no 
particular context available, it will be pointless to run any pragmatic inferences in order to discover 
the content and truth-conditions intended by the speaker. So the hearer has to stay content with the 
sentence's  conventional  semantic  content  (in  context).  However,  conventional  semantic  content 
doesn't give the truth-conditions of  any utterance whatsoever. So the hearer who doesn't have an 
access  to  the  utterance's  context  will  not  be in  a  position to  know the truth-conditions  of  any 
arbitrary  utterance  in  any  arbitrary  context,  thereby  being  unable  to  intuitively  understand  the 
sentence's occurrence. 
Suppose now that the hearer were not in any particular context, but that he were able to locate the 
utterance in a default context, in which the sentence expresses at least a default content. In this case, 
RC-Comprehension would still be possible. However, if even no default context were available, the 
hearer would be doomed to neither RC-understand nor intuitively understand what the semantically 
under-determined sentence says. Following the characterisation of intuitive understanding we have 
given, we get it that outside of a particular or of a default context, the hearer won't be able to know 
what the truth-conditions of any arbitrary utterance of that sentence in any arbitrary context are. 
Let us make some examples. Take an utterance of “It's raining”. If a particular context is available 
in which Tokyo is salient as a location for the rain, the utterance will be RC-understood as being 
18 Some may equate intuitive comprehension with linguistic comprehension, i.e. comprehension of an utterance of a 
sentence which proceeds from one's competence about linguistic meaning. If linguistic competence enables one to 
know the truth-conditions that any utterance of “It's raining” expresses no matter the context in which is used, then I 
am happy to equate intuitive comprehension with linguistic comprehension. Note that, in any case, this context-
independent kind of comprehension is to be distinguished from the deliverances of a formal semantic system. I take 
it that doing the compositional semantics of “It's raining” simply delivers a sentence like “'It's raining' is true iff it's 
raining”. Being able to derive such a sentence is not the same as knowing, in a context-independent way, in what 
conditions any utterance of “It's raining” is true or false. 
19 The intuitiveness here is due not only to the fact that such comprehension is conscious, i.e. that the intuition is a 
mental episode which is present to the subject's consciousness, but also to the fact that it involves interrogating one's 
competence as to utterance-interpretation. Note that here I am not using the term “intuition” in the non-epistemic 
sense in which some theorists used it, for example as “opinion” (Lewis 1983), “intellectual seeming” (Bealer 1998), 
or “inclination to believe” (Sosa 2000). Here intuition is an epistemic notion to the extent that it involves knowledge 
of the truth-conditions of an arbitrary utterance of a sentence in an arbitrary context.
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true iff  it's  raining in Tokyo. If there is no such context, the hearer may still provide a  default 
context for the utterance: for example, he may presume that most of the times, when one utters “It's  
raining” one means that it's raining in the place of the utterance. He may therefore RC-understand 
the utterance as being true iff it's raining in the place of the utterance—say Paris. However, if no 
such default  context  were available  for any reason,  there would be no “starting point”  for any 
interpretive  pragmatic  inference.  The  hearer  should  stay  content  with  the  sentence's  semantic 
content (in context), namely <that it's raining>. However, this doesn't provide the content of any 
utterance whatsoever. As a consequence, there would be no intuitive understanding either, for the 
sentence “It's raining” just semantically expresses the sub-propositional content that it's raining, 
which doesn't express any truth-conditional content in any context.  Another example could be the 
following: take an utterance of “Sam cut the cake”. If a particular context is available in which Sam 
is cutting the cake with a chainsaw, the utterance will be RC-understood as being true iff Sam cuts 
the cake with a chainsaw. Suppose, now, no context were available: comprehension of the sentence 
may still involve fixing some default features of the contexts in which utterances of “Sam cut the 
cake”  are  usually  true,  e.g.  that  Sam  is  using  a  knife.  By  providing  a  default  context,  RC-
comprehension is guaranteed. But suppose that there was no reason to select such a default context.  
Absent any context, no pragmatic inference can get started in the context. The hearer has to stay 
content with the sentence's content-in-context  <that Sam cut the cake>. This doesn't provide him 
with  the  content  of  any  utterance  whatsoever.  The  hearer  then  won't  have  any  intuitive 
understanding, because the simple semantic  content of “Sam cut the cake” doesn't  express any 
truth-condition in any context.
To sum up, in this section I have tried to show how, in the Radical Contextualist framework, claims 
(1)-(4) entail (5).
(1) The meaning (in context) of semantically under-determined sentences doesn't determine any 
utterance truth-conditions;
(2) Intuitive understanding is knowledge of the truth-conditions of any arbitrary utterance of a 
sentence in any arbitrary context;
(3) If no context is available, no pragmatic inference can be run, and the hearer has to stay 
content with the meaning (in context) of the semantically under-determined sentence.
(4) If (1), then the meaning of a semantically under-determined sentence fails to determine the 
truth-conditions of any arbitrary utterance in any arbitrary context;
(5) If  no  context  is  available,  there  is  no  intuitive  comprehension of  a  semantically  under-
determined  sentence,  because  it  fails  to  determine  the  truth-conditions  of  any  arbitrary 
utterance in any arbitrary context.
8. Intuitive Comprehension out of a Context
In this section, I will challenge claim (5), according to which out of a particular context (and in 
absence  of  a  default  context)  there  can  be  no  intuitive  comprehension  of  an  utterance  of  a 
semantically under-determined sentence. I will  argue that language users do have such intuitive 
comprehension with respect to semantically under-determined sentences. A little experiment, call it 
The Eavesdropper experiment, is going to illustrate the kind of case I would like to make. 
[The Eavesdropper Experiment]
Suppose you overhear someone shouting “Jill is ready” from the next room, but you 
do not know who uttered that and what state of affairs the utterance is intended to 
describe. Now suppose you try and answer the following two questions:
 
(i) Do I know, independently of the context, in which case the utterance would be true?
(ii) Do I know, independently of the context, whether the sentence is true or false? 
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The answer to (i) is plausibly going to be positive. First of all, you plausibly have understood what  
has  been said by  the  sentence,  as  long as  you sufficiently  master  a  semantics  for  the  English 
language,  in the sense that you master  a  compositional,  syntax-driven machinery,  which would 
allow  you to derive the biconditional “'Jill is ready' is true iff Jill is ready”. But this is not all for  
intuitive  understanding.  Besides  having  such  a  “mechanically”  derived  comprehension  of  the 
sentence, you can also claim to know more: you know what has to be the case in the world in order 
for any utterance of that sentence to be true—namely, it has to be the case that Jill is ready for some 
purpose, or activity. This, I surmise, is because you plausibly know that correct use of any utterance 
of “X is ready” is such only if X is ready for some purpose. In virtue of your being familiar with  
what amounts as a correct use of the predicate “being ready”, you may know that any arbitrary 
utterance of that sentence is going to be true in any context just in case Jill  is ready  for some 
purpose in the circumstances in which the utterance was issued.
Let us now turn to question (ii). The answer is plausibly going to be negative. For, you have no idea  
whether that sentence, uttered by the unknown person for unknown reasons, aiming to describe an 
unknown state of affairs, is true or false. In other words, you have no elements to know whether 
there is any state of affairs in which an utterance of that sentence is true.
The answers to the previous questions seem fairly uncontroversial. Are they uncontroversial for the 
Radical Contextualist, too? Let's consider first the answer to question (ii). Here the prediction of the 
Radical  Contextualist  parallels  the  intuitive  one,  and  it  would  be  surprising  if  it  didn't. 
Independently of whether one is a Radical Contextualist, it is simply reasonable to suppose (and it 
would  be  crazy  to  deny)  that,  unless  one  is  provided  with  the  relevant data  concerning  the 
circumstances in which the utterance takes place, one is not going to be in a position to judge  
whether a overheard (or over-read) occurrence of a sentence like “Jill is ready” is true or false20. 
Let's now focus on the answer to question (i). Here is where the intuitive response diverges from the 
one that ensues from Radical Contextualism, for the Radical Contextualist would predict that the 
answer to question (i) is  negative. Why would it be so? Because, if one takes seriously the claim 
that  intuitive  understanding  is  knowledge  of  the  truth-conditions  that  arbitrary  utterances  of  a 
certain sentence have,  then hearers will  be predicted not to intuitively understand utterances of 
semantically  under-determined  sentences  out  of  a  context,  because  these  determine  no  truth-
condition for their utterances. But but this just seems false. Even out of a context, a speaker knows 
what it takes to make utterances of “Jill is ready” true: namely, that Jill be ready for something (a 
purpose,  an  activity).  The  same  holds  for  “It's  raining”:  even  in  absence  of  any  contextual 
information, the hearer knows that usually utterances of that sentence are true iff it's raining in some 
place or other21. Even in the case of some more weird-sounding sentence like “Sam cut the sand”, 
there is an intuitive understanding of the conditions in which utterances of this sentence would be 
true, namely iff Sam cuts the sand in some way or other. 
The Radical Contextualist may be skeptical about this way of describing intuitive comprehension. A 
critical observation that he could advance is the following: there is no such thing as an intuitive 
understanding of e.g. “Jill is ready”. Speakers merely think they have this intuitive, non-context-
specific understanding, but what is really going on is that they implicitly provide a default or “made  
up” context in which the utterance may be said true or false. 
This kind of skepticism seems at least unwarranted: why should we think that there is no such thing 
as  intuitive  understanding?  It  seems  reasonable  that  our  understanding  of  semantically  under-
determined sentences out of their contexts is guided by considerations as general as possible, in 
absence  of  any  particular  contextual  clues:  these  general  considerations  may  well  be 
semantic/conceptual in nature, i.e. they could very plausibly involve reflection on what counts as 
20 Of course, there are exceptions: e.g. math sentences, tautologies, contradictions.
21 Here there is probably a restriction on the existential quantification; so, for example, what the hearer understands is 
not simply that it's raining somewhere, but that it's raining somewhere in the area salient to the speaker. 
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the correct use of a predicate like “to rain”, “being ready” etc.  On the contrary,  it  would seem 
unreasonable for us to reconstruct a default or rather a completely made-up context, if we had no 
good reasons to do that. So in this case, the Radical Contextualist owes us an explanation of how it 
can be the case that, in general, it's preferable to see comprehension out of a context as involving 
the reconstruction of a default or made-up context rather than the consideration of general facts 
about the correct application of the predicates employed by the speaker.
9. Comprehension and Conceptual Competence
As we have seen from the previous section, speakers can have intuitive comprehension out of a 
context,  despite  the  negative prediction  issued by the Radical  Contextualist.  I  contend that  the 
reason why there can be an intuitive comprehension of an utterance of “It's raining” or “Jill is 
ready” or “The leaves are green” or “Sam cut the sand” is that the speaker can rely on what we will  
call  conceptual  constraints over  the  notions  of  raining,  of  being  ready,  of  being  green and of 
cutting.  What  are  conceptual  constraints?  Conceptual  constraints  are ways  of  structuring  and 
organising thought about certain specific matters. We can think of a conceptual constraint as a rule 
that specifies what has to be the case in order for the use of a certain concept to be correct. For 
example, a conceptual constraint on correct uses of the concept TO RAIN has it that the concept is 
correctly applied only if it rains at a location. A conceptual constraint on uses of the concept of 
BEING READY is the one to the effect that an application of the concept of readiness is correct only if 
the  readiness  is  related  to  some  activity.  A conceptual  constraint  on  CUTTING is  such  that  an 
application of this concept is correct only if the cutting is effected in some way, or with some 
method of cutting. A conceptual constraint on  BEING GREEN is such that a use of the concept of 
being  green  is  correct  just  in  case  the  greenness  is  greenness  in  some  respect.  Conceptual 
constraints may be regarded as giving very general and fundamental directions about what counts as 
a correct application of a concept, which is to say that they give directions as to how thought and 
other cognitive tasks concerning specific matters should be conducted.
Is  there  any  difference  between  conceptual  constraints  and  semantic constraints?  Of  course, 
conceptual  constraints  are  constraints  on thought,  while  semantic  constraints  are  constraints  on 
meaning. Concepts are certainly related to meanings: knowing the meaning of a term, e.g. “rain”, 
entails mastering the related concept RAIN. On the assumption that hearers of “It's raining”, “Jill is 
ready”,  “The  leaves  are  green”,  etc.  are  also  competent  language-users,  conceptual  constraints 
certainly coincide with semantic constraints for them. Note in passing that, in the present case, the 
notion of “semantics” can't be used any more to refer to a formal, syntax-driven compositional 
machinery. If we want conceptual constraints to be also semantic constraints, we have to broaden 
our notion of semantics: in this conception, semantics provides the truth-conditions for utterances of 
the sentences of a language L, but it does so in a way which is not only syntactically constrained, 
for it is also constrained by rules that govern correct use of words/concepts (see especially section 6 
of Chapter 5 on this). The ensuing relation between semantics, syntax and the conceptual domain 
could be represented as follows:
Semantics (determines truth-conditions of 
utterances of sentences in L)    responds to 
Syntactic constraints
Conceptual (semantic) constraints 
Though conceptual constraints de facto coincide with semantic ones for competent language-users, 
I will nevertheless tend to privilege talk about conceptual constraints. This is because I believe that 
there is a sense in which conceptual constraints are more stable than semantic constraints. Let me 
explain this claim. The greater stability of conceptual constraints can be seen by considering that 
mastering a concept doesn't necessarily entail that one knows the meaning of the term which, by 
hypothesis, is “associated” with that concept in a certain language. There are at least two cases in 
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which this obtains. The simplest (but trivial) case is the one in which one doesn't know the term to 
begin with: That is, one could be competent about the concept F but fail to know the term e which, 
in language  L, is associated with  F. More complex (and interesting) cases could be imagined, in 
which one is competent about concept F, knows the term e which is associated with F in L, but is 
not competent about the meaning of  e. For instance, philologists, who presumably are competent 
about the ordinary concept of hospitality, may yet have false beliefs about the meaning of the word 
“xenia”  in  ancient  greek,  which  (let  us  suppose)  may  have  been  associated  with  exactly  the 
contemporary, ordinary concept of hospitality which they master. Not only this. The greater stability 
of conceptual competence as opposed to semantic competence also arises from considering cases in 
which a subject gains comprehension of a certain word w in a language L which, by hypothesis, is 
associated with concept F, thanks to precisely her mastery of  F. For instance, the subject could 
observe the contexts in which  w occurs (the sentences it is used in, the occasions in which it is 
employed),  relate  these  contexts  to  those in  which  the  concept  F is  correctly  used,  and hence 
justifiedly conclude that w has a certain meaning which is relevantly related with F.
What  follows  from these  remarks  is  that  concepts  (and conceptual  constraints)  are  not  tied  to 
language the way semantic constraints are. They are more general devices of thought-organisation, 
which can be possessed independently of one's semantic competence about an arbitrary language L. 
These considerations suggest that conceptual constraints are more stable than semantic constraints, 
and thus provide a motivation for adopting a view of the comprehension of semantically under-
determined sentences which relates it with competence on conceptual (rather than purely semantic) 
constraints. It goes without saying that, as I already stressed, for all those hearers who are also 
competent language-users, conceptual constraints just  coincide with semantic constraints. In what 
follows, though, I will nevertheless privilege talk in terms of conceptual constraints, and I only 
occasionally switch to talk of semantic constraints. 
Mastering  and  applying  conceptual  constraints  depends  on  whether  a  subject  is  a  competent 
concept-user. Whether or not one is a competent concept-user depends on whether one is enough 
trained, i.e. on how experienced one is with uses of the concept at issue. Experience in this respect 
is  acquired through the repeated use of concepts  within a  community,  which implies  gradually 
adjusting one's competence to that of the other members of the community, by proceeding through 
errors,  corrections  and  reinforcement  of  correct  uses.  Being  conceptually  competent  means 
complying to the rules of a shared cognitive system, i.e. it implies conforming the structure of one's 
thought and reasoning about certain matters to the one that the rest of the community shares and 
currently employs. We may say that conceptual constraints arise from the fact that subjects who 
share  an  environment,  be  it  natural,  cultural,  social  or  linguistic,  generally  wind  up sharing  a 
standard cognitive format for thought on a range of different matters, whose function is that of 
favouring inter-subjective coordination, or subjective coordination with the world. In other words, 
conceptual constraints are ways of structuring and organising thought about certain matters which 
promote and facilitate coordination at various levels—the coordination of an individual with her 
environment,  with  other  subjects  and so  on.  As for  the  relation  of  conceptual  constraints  with 
language, it take it that conceptual constraints are shared by those speakers who are also competent 
language-users, in virtue of the fact that mastering the meaning of an expression entails mastering 
the concept which is also associated with it. 
What is the relationship between conceptual constraints and utterance comprehension, in particular 
intuitive  utterance  comprehension  of  semantically  under-determined  sentences?  The  idea,  in  a 
nutshell  is  that  conceptual  constraints  help  gain  intuitive  comprehension  of  utterances  of  
semantically under-determined sentences: Suppose that an utterance of “It's raining” is performed, 
and the hearer has no access to any feature of the related context. To the extent that the hearer is 
aware of the conceptual (semantic) constraint that to rain is to rain at a location, she is able to figure 
out the intuitive truth-conditions of a semantically under-determined occurrence of “It's raining”, 
even out of a context, i.e. she is able to know that an utterance of that sentence is true in any  
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arbitrary context iff it's raining somewhere. Analogously, to the extent that the hearer is aware of the 
conceptual (semantic) constraint to the effect that being ready is invariably being ready for some 
purpose/activity,  she is able to figure out the intuitive truth-conditions of a semantically under-
determined occurrence of “Jill is ready” even out of a context, i.e. she is able to know that an  
utterance of this sentence is true in any arbitrary context iff Jill is ready for some activity. The same 
remarks apply for “green” and “to cut”.
Note that, once conceptual constraints enter the scene, intuitive comprehension immediately stands 
out as inferential but at the same time non-context-specific. It is inferential, because inference is still 
required in order for the hearer to figure out that an occurrence of “It's raining” is true just in case 
it's raining somewhere (in the area salient to the speaker). The hearer who employs the conceptual 
constraints related to the concept RAIN may run an inference of the following form in order to 
obtain the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance of “It's raining”. Having acknowledged that the 
speaker uttered “It's raining”, the hearer may continue as follows:
(1) Rain necessarily takes place at a location;
(2) All uses of “It's raining” must be true iff it's raining somewhere;
(3) There is no reason to suppose that this use of “It's raining” differs from the others;
(4) So this utterance is true iff it's raining somewhere.
This  inference  interestingly  differs  from the  procedures  envisaged  by  Carston  and  Sperber  & 
Wilson (reviewed in  section 4).  First  of  all,  those may be regarded as  having the  structure  of 
inferences  to  the  best  explanation:  they  start  with  some linguistic  inputs  and employ  heuristic 
strategies  guided  by the  least  effort  principle,  in  order  to  recover  the  intended  content.  These 
inferences involve the exercise of rather complex cognitive abilities—such as the ability of  “mind 
reading”—and notions—such as the notions of relevance, of information etc. Successfully running 
these inferences requires applying strategies that involve a fair amount of creativity on the part of 
the hearer, together with an inclination to explain, rather than mechanically decode.  Nothing like 
this is the case with relation to the (1)-(4) inference above, which starts with a linguistic input,  
employs generalisations  based on conceptual  (semantic)  constraints  and eventually  concludes—
absent  any  reason  to  think  otherwise—with  a  prediction  about  the  content  expressed.  Clearly 
running this kind of inference requires much less creativity and is not purported to explain anything. 
This inference may be gone through in a mechanical way, since the application itself of conceptual 
(semantic) constraints is supposed to be a mechanical task, an operation which may be seen as 
belonging  to  a  subject's  deeply  entrenched  cognitive  (and  discoursive)  habits,  in  virtue  of  her 
sharing a standard cognitive and discoursive format on these matters. 
Intuitive understanding is also clearly non context-specific. No specific context is needed by the 
hearer in order to figure out the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance of “Jill is ready” or “It 's 
raining”. This is precisely because intuitive understanding exploits features of the concepts READY 
and RAIN that are  cross-contextual, i.e. that apply no matter the context, because they pertain to 
general features of these concepts (as well as of the related predicates) that are known in virtue of 
one's conceptual competence and one's sharing a standard format for thought and discourse on these 
matters with other members of the same natural, cultural, social, linguistic group.
10. The Significance of Conceptual Constraints
All these considerations cast a new light on Radical Contextualism and its notion of pragmatic 
enrichment. As we have seen, enrichment processes are inferential, context-specific processes. With 
the notion of conceptual constraints, however, we seem to have uncovered a more basic level of 
understanding, which is still inferential, yet definitely non-context-specific, in that it exploits cross-
contextual information that is drawn from one's having one's thought (and discourse) about matters 
such as raining, being ready, being green structured according to a certain standard format. We have 
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seen how conceptual constraints help intuitive understanding, i.e. knowledge of the truth-conditions 
of an utterance in any arbitrary context. However, conceptual constraints could be at work even in 
our comprehension of utterances as performed in particular contexts. I shall explore this idea in the 
present section.
The idea I would like to defend is that, when sentences like “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The 
leaves are green” or “Sam cut the cake” are at issue, it is reasonable to suppose that not only our 
intuitive comprehension, but also our comprehension of utterances in particular contexts relies on 
the non-context-specific capacities that underlie conceptual competence. If this is the case, then we 
have a model of how comprehension of these sentences works which envisions some  very basic  
constraints on pragmatic processes of enrichment.
Suppose a speaker utters “It's raining”, meaning that it's raining in Paris. Here is how the hearer  
could exploit her own conceptual (semantic) competence in order to work out the content of this 
utterance. First of all, the hearer needs to presuppose that the speaker is a competent user of at least 
the concept  TO RAIN (if not of the predicate “to rain” as well).  Secondly, the hearer needs to be 
aware that it is a conceptual constraint on every correct use of the notion of raining (and of the 
related predicate) that rain falls at some location: since the present utterance of “It's raining” is 
supposed to be a correct use of the concept TO RAIN (and supposedly, of the predicate “to rain” too), 
then the utterance must be true iff it's raining at some location x. At this point, the hearer knows that 
what the speaker has said is that it's raining at some location x. And, what is more, she has achieved 
this piece of knowledge only by applying the constraint to the effect that rain has to fall somewhere 
to the truth-conditions of an utterance of “It's raining”. Of course, the story cannot end here. The 
hearer so far just knows that what the speaker is saying is true iff it's raining at some location  x 
(salient to the speaker). Now, if that is possible, he needs to figure out where the rain is falling, i.e. 
he needs to provide a value for the x. 
Here conceptual constraints cannot be of any help: the hearer must resort to speculation about the 
speakers' intentions. It is at this point that pragmatic-inferential reasoning has to become involved: 
at the level of fixing the reference to the particular place the speaker is talking about. What the 
hearer has achieved so far is a conceptual structure such as It's raining in some x; the next step is to 
provide a value for the location variable figuring in the conceptual structure. Here the hearer could 
engage  in  a  pragmatic  inference  about  reference  to  which  location  would  make  the  speaker's 
contribution optimally relevant,  or  cooperative and so on.  But  note that  engaging in  pragmatic 
inference  at this point, only for reference-fixing, is not particularly exciting. Fixing this element 
only entails establishing some background factor, which helps one to take only one of the many 
steps  in  the interpretive process—the other  steps  all  being pre-determined and guided by one's 
mastery  of  the  relevant  conceptual  (semantic)  constraints.  Enrichment  processes  appear  as 
constrained  by  one's  conceptual  (semantic)  competences,  and  pragmatic  processes  turn  out  as 
subordinated to the proper carrying out of these conceptually (semantically) constrained inferences.
We have seen an example of how conceptual (semantic) constraints may guide the reconstruction of 
the content of utterances of semantically under-determined sentences even in particular contexts. If 
things really work like this, what role is left for allegedly “free”, pragmatically driven processes of 
enrichment? How much of  pure pragmatics (as e.g. considerations of relevance, informativeness, 
perspicuousness,  clarity,  cooperation)  do  we  put  in  our  understanding  of  utterances  of  certain 
sentences, and how much do we rely on pre-determined constraints22? The considerations advanced 
22 “Pure” pragmatic processes seem to be involved in the cases of “shallow” semantic under-determinacy. Consider 
how Radical Contextualism conceives the way hearers reconstruct the content of an utterance of, for instance, “It 
will take time to get there”: here the aim seems to be that of making the utterance's content as relevant and 
informative as possible—not of compensating come semantic defectiveness. The same applies for the way hearers 
may be thought to interpret utterances of “I've had breakfast”, “Jack and Jill got married”, “You are not going to 
die”: in all these cases, the interpretive process is not guided by a demand for a semantically complete, evaluable 
content, but rather by a demand for a content which is most relevant, informative, perspicuous given the current 
aims of the conversation. Thus, the conceptual constraints view differs from Radical Contextualism in that it 
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in  the  previous  sections  suggest  that  the  role  of  purely  pragmatic  inference  may  have  to  be 
reconsidered for the group of semantically under-determined sentences we have been investigating. 
In figuring out the truth-conditions of utterances of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are 
green”,  “Sam cut  the  cake”  it  seems  reasonable  to  conceive  that  language  users  rely  on  pre-
determined conceptual (semantic) constraints which in turn guide and pose limitations to pragmatic 
inferences concerning conversational cooperation, relevance and the intentions of conversants. For 
every use of “ready”, “rain”, “green”, “cut”, it is reasonable to countenance a related  conceptual  
(discoursive) template, on which the hearer relies in construing the utterance's truth-conditions in 
the particular context in which the utterance is performed. Inferential, context-specific pragmatic 
processes may indeed play a role, however their role might be just that of “filling in” these pre-
determined templates. 
The resulting picture is by all means an alternative account of how utterance content is worked out 
by  a  hearer,  where  pragmatic-inferential  processes  play  a  much  more  modest  role,  and  non-
pragmatic,  conceptual  (semantic)  factors  do most  of  the  job.  An additional  difference  between 
Radical Contextualism and the present account becomes apparent if we switch for a moment to a 
conception of propositions as structured entities containing ordered n-uples of items of various sorts
—e.g. individuals, properties. In the Radical Contextualist's framework, processes of enrichment 
introduce items in the proposition directly,  with no mediation,  only with the help of inferential 
mechanisms.  In  the  present  account,  processes  of  enrichment  don't  introduce  items  in  the 
proposition directly, because a slot (albeit a conceptual/semantic one) for these items must be pre-
determined  at  a  conceptual  (semantic)  level  of  representation.  The  location  of  the  rain  in  the 
proposition  expressed  by  an  utterance  of  “It's  raining”  performed  while  talking  about  Paris  is 
introduced in the proposition as the value of an un-filled position in the conceptual (semantic) 
structure  associated  with  the  utterance;  the  process  of  enrichment  is  therefore  mediated by 
conceptual/semantic constraints. This may at first sight seem in sync with Sperber and Wilson's idea 
of “development of conceptual structure” and also with Recanati's idea of “expanding a sentence's 
syntactic structure” via variadic functions. Note, however, that what I am pointing at is something 
which in Sperber and Wilson's and Recanati's account goes almost unnoticed: namely, the fact that 
the “development” or “expansion” itself of the sentence's logical/conceptual form is structured, or  
constrained.  Saying that conceptual structures are developed or expanded is not yet saying that 
these  conceptual  structures  are  developed  according  to  certain  precise  and  pre-determined  
conceptual/semantic constraints.
The advantages of adopting an account in terms of conceptual constraints  are essentially three. 
Firstly, compositionality is rescued  at least at the level of the conceptual/semantic representation 
associated with semantically under-determined sentences. Utterances of sentences like “It's raining” 
have been thought of as expressing contents which include elements that are not articulated by any 
component of the sentence (see Perry 1986), thus violating the principle of compositionality, which 
states that the content (in context) of a sentence is determined by the content (in context) of its 
components.  We may,  however,  regard conceptual  constraints  as  determining a  further  level  of 
“conceptual representation” in which compositionality is not violated. The picture could be outlined 
as follows: uses of the semantically under-determined sentence “It's raining” trigger a conceptual 
representation  whose  form is  It  is  raining  at  some  x,  where  the  locational  position x may  be 
assigned a value in context. Since the location that enters at the propositional level is the value of a  
variable which is present in the conceptual/semantic structure, compositionality is rescued to the 
extent that the content (in context) of the sentence is determined by the content (in context) of the 
components of the conceptual/semantic representation associated with an utterance of that sentence. 
The second advantage  consists  in  the  fact  that  an  approach in  terms  of  conceptual  constraints 
accounts for utterance comprehension without portraying hearers as effecting any kind of pragmatic 
envisages processes of contextual enrichment which are guided primarily by conceptual/semantic demands rather 
than by purely pragmatic demands for relevance, informativeness, etc.
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inference,  involving  creative  and  explanation-oriented  strategies,  thus  avoiding  an  over-
intellectualisation of processes of utterance comprehension. It is not obvious that, when interpreting 
an  utterance  of  “It's  raining”,  hearers  need to  engage in  any inferential  reasoning as  to  which 
content would be more relevant, or about the communicative intentions of the speaker (see Recanati 
2002 on this point). The processes hearers may go through could be much more “mechanical” than 
those envisaged by Truth-conditional Pragmatists. In the present account, following a conceptual 
constraint is indeed a “mechanical” matter which derives from one's conforming oneself to a pre-
determined  standard.  What  is  regained  in  the  present  account  is  therefore  the  idea  that 
comprehension of certain utterances  is  a rather effortless matter,  which requires no particularly 
creative or sophisticated tasks from hearers apart from abiding by pre-established patterns of use.
The third advantage lies  in  the fact  that  the conceptual  constraints  view doesn't  aspire  to  be a 
syntactic theory, i.e. a theory that says something about the real, perhaps hidden syntactic structure 
of some expressions in the language,  like so-called “Indexicalist” accounts à la Stanley (2000) 
(which I briefly canvassed in the  Introduction and in  section 1 of this  chapter). The evidence 
coming from intuitive  comprehension (i.e.  knowledge of  truth-conditions  in  arbitrary  contexts) 
doesn't in any way license the postulation of syntactically realised, even though aphonic elements in 
the deep syntax of sentences.  By contrast,  it  licenses a view in which the richer proposition is 
determined via the conceptual/semantic structures associated with the sentence's meaning. In other 
words, in the the conceptual constraints account processes of enrichment are not traceable to any 
element in the logical form of sentences, even though they are traceable to constraints posed by the 
correct use of concepts/predicates.
11. The Conceptual Constraints View and Formal Semantics
Is  the conceptual constraints  view compatible  with a Davidson-style program of constructing a 
truth-conditional  semantics  for  natural  language?  To  adopt  a  picture  in  which  utterance  truth-
conditions of semantically under-determined sentences depend on the speakers' conceptual/semantic 
competence  doesn't  imply  abandoning  a  Davidsonian  account  of  a  theory  of  meaning.  Truth-
conditions can always be assigned compositionally to e.g. “Jill is ready” by a Tarski-style theory of 
meaning. What the present proposal adds to the level of a formal, compositional semantics is a level 
of purely  conceptual/semantic constraints on interpretation.  In other words,  a truth-conditional, 
compositional and recursive semantics can be preserved, because it is only by means of such a 
system that we can maintain idea that sentences express contents on the basis of what they strictly 
speaking  mean.  However,  formal  semantics  may  deliver  outputs  which  do  not  entirely  fit  the 
standard  cognitive  format  through  which  thought  and  discourse  about  the  relevant  matters  is 
organised. That is, the results of the compositional semantics of linguistic items may fall short of 
meeting certain requirements imposed by cognitive/discoursive structures. This is where conceptual 
(semantic) constraints become helpful: their role is precisely that of adapting the deliverances of 
formal semantics to standard ways of organising thought, reasoning and discourse.
These considerations suggest the following picture. On the one hand, a formal semantic system 
matches an utterance of “It's raining” with its truth-conditions by deriving a T-sentence like “'It's 
raining' is true iff it's raining”. However, familiarity with the concept TO RAIN and with the standard 
cognitive format associated with it  allows the language-user to know that, since rain invariably 
happens to fall somewhere, uses of “It's raining” are true just in case it is raining  somewhere. In 
general,  one  may  envision  a  very  “minimal”  level  of  linguistic  competence  consisting  in the 
capacity to derive  trivial T-sentences like “'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white”, in virtue of 
one's (tacit or dispositional23) knowledge of a formal semantic theory's axioms. This may not be 
23 There is a debate on what knowledge of a semantic theory consists in. Dummett's (1976) leading idea is that the 
ability underlying the use of language is tacit knowledge of propositions. The tacit character of language mastery 
has never been questioned, even though the idea that it consists in propositional attitudes has been criticised. For 
Evans (1981), tacit semantic knowledge is not a propositional attitude, but it is the possession of dispositions to 
issue judgments concerning truth, reference and satisfaction; for Davies (1987), tacit knowledge is possession of 
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sufficient in order to know how the world should be in order for utterances of that sentence to be 
true. What plays a role in enabling language-users to know what should be the case in order for 
utterances of  (at  least  a  certain  group  of)  sentences  to  be  true  is  what  I  shall  call 
conceptual/semantic competence. In this sense, conceptual competence could be regarded as the 
capacity to derive  non-trivial T-sentences such as “An utterance of 'Jill is ready' is true iff Jill is 
ready  for  some  activity”.  This  distinction  seems  to  be  acknowledged  by  Dummett,  who 
distinguishes between a theory of reference and a theory of sense. 
The  theory  of  sense  specifies  what  is  involved  in  attributing  to  a  speaker  a 
knowledge of the theory of reference. When the theory of reference takes the form of 
a theory of truth [e.g. a Tarski-style theory], this is necessary whenever an axiom of 
T-sentence assumes a trivial form, and therefore fails to display in what the speaker's 
implicit knowledge of it consists. (Dummett 1976: 127)
On the one hand, the theory of reference assigns a T-sentence to every well-formed sentence of the 
language, and could thereby be seen as describing the “minimal” level of linguistic competence; on 
the other hand, the theory of sense tells us what it is to know the truth-conditions of a sentence of 
the language, and could thereby be seen as describing what it is to know the truth-conditions of 
some sentences  also in virtue of the exercise of one's conceptual/semantic competence. The two 
theories and the related competences do not seem to interfere with each other, so there seems to be 
no incompatibility between a project that pursues a description of the former and a project engaged 
in investigation of the latter, as long as their task is that of capturing different aspects of linguistic  
competence and, ultimately, two different levels of content.
12. Implementing Conceptual Constraints?
Throughout the chapter, I have assumed that the conceptual constraints view is intelligible as an 
autonomous  proposal.  It  could  however  be  objected  that  conceptual  constraints  are  really 
mysterious  entities,  which  neither  belong  to  the  linguistico-semantic  realm,  nor  belong  to  the 
pragmatic  realm.  It  would  thus  be  an  interesting  issue  to  explore, whether  the  conceptual  
constraints view should be reduced to any other theory which makes clearer assumptions as to the 
representational  level  at  which  it  operates.  We  have  already  ruled  out,  throughout  the  present 
chapter, that the application of conceptual constraints corresponds to any purely pragmatic process 
of the kind postulated by proponents of Truth-Conditional Pragmatics such as Carston and Sperber 
&  Wilson.  What  remains  to  be  explored  is  whether  conceptual  constraints  can  find  any 
representation at either a semantic, or a syntactic, or even a sub-syntactic level. In this section, I  
shall simply gesture at three ways in which conceptual constraints could be represented, reserving 
extended discussion of these three alternatives for the next chapters.
The first possible account sees conceptual constraints as hidden indexical elements. As a matter of 
fact, this account would correspond to the view put forward by Stanley 2000 and Stanley & Szabó 
2000, according to which contextual effects on content must find a representation in logical form: 
the account would therefore reduce conceptual constraints to  syntactic entities. For example, the 
conceptual constraint to the effect that rain has to fall at some place or other shall be represented at 
the level of the logical form of the predicate “to rain” as an extra argument place. The real logical  
form of “to rain” thus becomes rain(x, y), where the locational variable y signals the presence of the 
constraint. The same goes for the predicate “being ready”. The conceptual constraint to the effect 
that being ready is invariably being ready for some activity is represented at the level of logical 
form as an extra argument-place, so that the real logical form of “being ready” is ready(x, y), where 
the y variable ranging on purposes or activities is a mark of the conceptual constraint. Finally, the 
explanatory states, whose causal structure is reflected by the derivational structure of semantic axioms and theorems 
(for an overview, see Miller 1997).
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conceptual constraint that being green is being green in some respect is represented as an extra 
argument slot in the logical form of the predicate “being green” in such a way that the real logical 
form of the predicate becomes green(x, y). I will be concerned with the hidden indexicals view in 
Chapter 3.
A second possible semantic account of conceptual constraints doesn't regard them as present at the 
level of logical form or syntax, but at the  lexical level. The structure of lexical entries is to be 
thought  about  in  terms  of  their  thematic  structure.  A thematic  structure  is  a  general  way  of 
conceiving the terms of the relation introduced by a certain linguistic expression, according to very 
broad  categories  such  as  the  agent/patient  category.  For  example,  the  verb  “kiss”  expresses  a 
relation that requires two different roles: that of the person who kisses and that of the person who is  
kissed.  The kisser takes the thematic role AGENT, while the kissee takes the role THEME (or 
PATIENT). If the lexical entries of the expressions subject to conceptual constraints can be seen as 
having a thematic structure, whose thematic roles may correspond to the constraints at issue, then it  
is possible to carve up conceptual constraints as thematic roles. The representation of conceptual 
constraints would thus take place at a subsyntactic level, as opposed to the syntactic level, to which 
e.g.  hidden  indexicals  belong.  Take  for  example  the  verb  “to  rain”:  is  it  possible  to  turn  the 
conceptual constraint to the effect that rain has to fall at some location into a thematic role? Here is 
how Taylor illustrates this possibility:
Take the verb ‘to rain’ as an example. The view […] supposes that the verb ‘to rain’ has 
a  lexically  specified  argument  place  which  is  theta-marked  THEME and  that  this 
argument  place takes  places  as  values.  This is  a way of saying that  the subatomic 
structure of the verb ‘to rain’ explicitly marks rainings as a kind of change that places 
undergo. Now from the point of view of sentence level syntax such lexically specified 
parameters  are  what  I  call  subconstituents  rather  than  constituents.  Though 
subconstituents need not be expressed as sentence-level constituents, they make their 
presence felt  by “demanding” to be assigned a contextually supplied value.  (Taylor 
2001: 53).
Once again the lexical proposal will be considered in Chapter 3, as a potential competitor of the 
hidden indexicals view.
The  third  possible  account  may  regard  conceptual  constraints  as  affecting  the  truth-value of 
sentences, rather than their syntactic or subsyntactic structure. This account would correspond to a 
form of Relativism about the truth-value of sentences like “It's raining” or “Jill is ready” or “The 
leaves are green”, along the lines of the solution proposed by e.g. Lasersohn (2005), Kölbel (2002), 
Egan (forthcoming). The Relativist strategy consists in positing that the circumstances of evaluation 
of a certain sentence do not consist simply of a possible world parameter w, but of a couple <w, e> 
including a possible world parameter w and an extra parameter e. The nature of this extra parameter 
may  well  depend  on  conceptual  considerations:  for  example,  when  one  is  dealing  with  the 
semantics  of  personal  taste  predicates  such as  “tasty”,  one may want  to  see  the  truth-value  of 
sentences like “This is tasty” as relative to a couple <w, s> composed by a possible world w and a 
taste-standard s. When one is concerned with the semantics of epistemic modals like “might” and 
“must”, the truth-value of a sentence like “The treasure might be here” is going to be made relative 
to a couple <w, e> of a possible world w and an epistemic state e. In light of these facts, how then 
could a relativistic account of conceptual constraints look like? The account could go as follows: 
since the conceptual constraint that regulates correct uses of the concept “to rain” requires that 
every instance of a rain-event takes place at a location, then the truth of an utterance of “It's raining” 
is going to be made relative to a possible world  w and a location  l. The truth-conditions of an 
utterance of “It's raining” are thus going to be spelled out as being that an utterance of “It's raining” 
is true at <w, l> iff it's raining at w, l. Similarly, in virtue of the conceptual constraints that regulate 
83
correct uses of the concept “being ready”, the truth of an utterance of “Jill is ready” is going to be 
relative to a possible world w and a relevant activity a. And finally, since the conceptual constraints 
on use of the predicate “being green” dictate that every instance of greenness be an instance of 
greenness in some respect, then the truth of a sentence like “The leaves are green” will be relative to 
a couple consisting of a possible world  w and a respect  r.  The related truth-conditional clauses 
would state that, for instance, an utterance of “Jill is ready” is true at <w, a> iff Jill is ready at w, a; 
and that an utterance of “The leaves are green” is true at <w, r> iff the leaves are green at w, r. The 
relative truth proposal will be examined in Chapter 4.
The previous ones were clearly just rough sketches of the potential theoretical accounts one might 
be willing to explore, the single positions mentioned being the object of a detailed evaluation in the 
chapters to follow. My aim for the present moment was just to give a flavour of how conceptual 
constraints may be implemented at  some level of one's semantic theory—either at  the syntactic 
level, or at the lexical level, or at the level of evaluation—where all these implementations try to 
escape  the  characterisation  of  conceptual  constraints  as  operating  at  some  arguably  vaguely 
conceived “conceptual/semantic level”. It may turn out that none of these accounts is viable, after  
all. As a matter of fact, in the end one may prefer an account in which conceptual constraints find 
no articulation at any level of representation—whether syntactic, subsyntactic or at the level of the 
index of the circumstances of evaluation. In the chapters to follows, I will try to argue that none of 
these ways of reducing conceptual constraints is really preferable to an account in which conceptual 
constraints operate at an autonomous level. A detailed outline of my proposal will be reserved for 
Chapter 5.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have been dealing mainly with Radical Contextualism (RC), i.e. the view that 
linguistically unconstrained pragmatic effects operate on a sentence's content-in-context.
• First,  I  have  presented  (RC)'s  leading  theses  and  I  have  illustrated  how  pragmatic 
processes can affect sentential meaning in context, via supplementation of the sentence's 
content with unarticulated constituents and ad-hoc concepts;
• Radical Contextualism employs a special notion of RC-comprehension, which amounts 
to  knowledge of the truth-conditions of a particular utterance in a particular context. I 
have  shown that  Radical  Contextualism predicts  that,  without  the  possibility  to  run 
pragmatic inferences aimed at content-enrichment, there shall be no RC-comprehension 
of utterances of semantically under-determined sentences;
• I  have  then  introduced the  notion  of  intuitive  comprehension,  which  corresponds  to 
knowledge of the truth-conditions of any utterance in any arbitrary context;
• Radical Contextualism has as its consequence that, if no context is available, there can 
be  no  intuitive  comprehension of  semantically  under-determined  sentences  because, 
outside of a context, no pragmatic inference can be fruitfully run, and the hearer has to 
stay content with the sentence's meaning-in-context. Since this doesn't determine any 
truth-condition whatsoever for its utterances, there can be no comprehension of what any 
utterance of that sentence in any context expresses;
• Contrary to the Radical Contextualist's predictions, I stress the fact that, even outside of 
contexts,  speakers  do  have an  intuitive  comprehension of  utterances  of  semantically 
under-determined sentences. For example, speakers may know outside of a context that 
an utterance of “Jill is ready” is true in any arbitrary context iff Jill is ready for some 
activity; they may know outside of a context that an utterance of “It's raining” is true in 
any arbitrary context iff it's raining in some place or other and so on;
• In have proposed to regard the intuitive comprehension of utterances as depending on 
conceptual competence, i.e. familiarity with what counts as correct and incorrect uses of 
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a concept. Conceptual competence arises from a speaker's participating to a practice of 
concept  use,  which in turn leads subjects  to  acquire  a standard cognitive format  for 
thought on specific matters. Conceptual competence imposes conceptual constraints on 
thought and discourse. For competent language-users, conceptual constraints  de facto 
coincide with semantic constraints. These constraints guide utterance comprehension of 
semantically  under-determined  sentences.  For  example,  the  conceptual/semantic 
constraint  according to which rain necessarily  falls  at  a  location helps the hearer  to 
understand an utterance of “It's raining” as being true iff it's raining somewhere. 
• Not only do conceptual constraints  help hearers to gain intuitive comprehension, i.e. 
comprehension of what any utterance of a sentence would say in any context. I argue 
that conceptual constraints also guide comprehension within a particular context. Thanks 
to conceptual constraints, the hearer  expands the conceptual/semantic structure of the 
sentence (e.g. going from <it's raining> to  <it's raining in x>) and fills in the newly 
opened semantic/conceptual  gaps  with contextual  information  (e.g.  going from  <it's  
raining in x> to <it's raining in Paris>).
• The conceptual constraints proposal is set apart from Radical Contextualism in that it 
envisages processes of enrichment which are  guided primarily by conceptual/semantic  
demands and not by purely pragmatic demands of relevance, informativeness, etc.
• The conceptual constraints proposal is also compatible with a Davidson-style project of 
constructing a formal semantics for natural language. The proposal adds to the level of 
formal, compositional semantic interpretation a level of interpretation which proceeds 
from  the  language-user's  conceptual/semantic  competences  coming  from  a  standard 
cognitive/discoursive format. 
• I have sketched some prospects concerning how to implement conceptual constraints 
into a formal semantic theory: the first prospective account makes use of the notion of 
hidden indexical; the second account takes advantage of the idea of thematic structure; 
the third account sees conceptual constraints as relativisations on truth-value. I shall be 




Indexical Contextualism and Conceptual Constraints
In the previous chapter, I introduced the problem of how comprehension of semantically under-
determined  sentences  is  possible.  The  problem,  stated  in  section  2.1 as  the  [Comprehension 
Problem],  concerns  the general  mechanism by means of which hearers  manage to comprehend 
utterances of semantically under-determined sentences. In  Chapter 2, I engaged in a criticism of 
Radical Contextualism: in my view, Radical Contextualism has a too strong notion of utterance 
comprehension, in that it envisages utterance comprehension as accomplished only in a particular 
context. Yet the theory fails to capture a notion of utterance comprehension in any arbitrary context, 
which  I  called  Intuitive  Comprehension.  The  intuitive  comprehension  of  semantically  under-
determined  expressions  doesn't  require  any  particular  context  to  be  accessible  to  the  hearer. 
Language users usually understand utterances of “It's raining” and “The leaves are green” perfectly 
well, even when they are not acquainted with any context of utterance. The explanation I suggested 
for this is that hearers are guided by what I called conceptual constraints (which are, for competent 
language users, also semantic constraints). Conceptual constraints are ways of structuring thought 
about  certain  matters,  such  as  episodes  of  rain,  states  of  readiness.  Employing  conceptual 
constraints  in the interpretation of utterances means adjusting the content of that utterance to a 
standard format which holds for thought and discourse with respect to that matter. I defended the 
idea that even processes of “enrichment” which take place within a specific context are guided by 
conceptual/semantic constraints,  instead of being pragmatic through and through. That there are 
processes  which  are  conceptually/semantically  constrained  marks  a  distinction  with  Radical 
Contextualism, for which enrichment processes are pragmatic in nature.
The claim that conceptual constraints play a role in the comprehension of utterances in specific 
contexts  immediately  elicits  a  question  as  to  what  the  status of  these  conceptual  constraints 
precisely  is.  As  I  just  suggested,  conceptual  constraints  are  to  be  characterised  as  ways  of 
cognitively organising information and hence, thought and discourse about the world. A claim like 
this however risks sounding too simplistic and commonsensical, or even mysterious. 
In order to give a less mysterious status to what I have called conceptual/semantic constraints, one 
may  prefer  to  talk  about  syntactic constraints. Appealing  to  syntactic  constraints  may  seem to 
guarantee a more “compact” explanation of how utterance comprehension is possible in cases of 
under-determinacy,  for  syntactic  constraints  undoubtedly  fall  under  the  domain  of  linguistic 
competence;  comprehension of  utterances  of  semantically  under-determined sentences  could  be 
explained only by appealing to the structure of the hearer's linguistic competence—rather than by 
appealing to the hearer's linguistic plus conceptual/semantic competence. More than one author in 
the  last  decade  has  put  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  alleged  role  of  syntactic  constraints  in  the 
comprehension of semantically under-determined sentences like “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The 
leaves are green” etc. (see Stanley 2000, Stanley & Szabó 2000, King & Stanley 2005), and their  
reasons to do so had definitely to  do with maintaining an explanation of  so called “pragmatic 
effects” which could be related with linguistico-syntactic factors. In this chapter, I shall therefore 
explore the possibility that what I have introduced as conceptual constraints are really syntactic 
constraints on interpretation. 
With respect to the nature of conceptual constraints, one could therefore go in the direction of an 
Indexicalist  proposal,  cashing out  conceptual  constraints  as  hidden unsaturated elements in  the  
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logical  form of  expressions:  for  example,  the conceptual  constraint  on locations  in “to rain” is 
implemented as a hidden argument-place in the logical form of the predicate, so that “to rain” has 
the logical form rain(t, l), where t is a time variable and l is a location variable. In this chapter, I 
will  firstly  present  two  versions  of  the  position  (section  2);  subsequently,  I  will  take  into 
consideration the  evidence that has been displayed in favour of it (section 3). My aim will be to 
show the weaknesses of the arguments that have been used to purportedly prove that an Indexicalist 
account is the only viable one, at least for certain classes of predicates (sections 4-9). I will then 
outline an alternative proposal which, if it is plausible, contributes to further undermining the case 
provided by Indexicalists (sections 10-11).
1. Overview
The Indexicalist approach gives rise to a precise semantic theory, called Indexical Contextualism 
(see MacFarlane 2009 and Recanati 2006 for use of this terminology). In section 1 of Chapter 2 I 
indicated  Indexical  Contextualism  as  the  view  that  an  expression's  meaning  is  stable,  but  it 
determines a function from a context of utterance to a content. This is precisely what is expected to 
happen  once  we  start  to  regard  e.g.  “to  rain”  as  containing  a  hidden  indexical.  An  Indexical 
Contextualist  will  say  that  “to  rain”  has  a  stable  meaning,  corresponding  to  a  function  from 
locations  to  properties.  For  every  context  in  which  “to  rain”  is  uttered,  the  function  maps the 
contextually salient location l to the property of raining-in-l. Thus if “It's raining” is uttered in Paris, 
while  talking  about  the  weather  in  Paris,  the  function  associated  with  “to  rain”  maps  the 
contextually salient location, Paris, to the property of raining-in-Paris; the content of the utterance 
will  thus  be that  it's  raining  in  Paris.  Similarly,  if  “green”  is  regarded  as  covertly  indexical, 
containing a hidden variable for ways or “respects” of being green, then for every occurrence of 
“green” in a context,  the function associated with the predicate will  map a contextually salient 
respect  r of being green onto a property of  being-green-in-respect-r.  So for example,  when Pia 
utters “The leaves are green” in a context in which being green on the outer surface is salient, the 
function  associated  with  “green”  will  map  the  salient  “on-the-outer-surface”  respect  onto  the 
property of  being-green-on-the-outer-surface, thus making the content of Pia's utterance  that the  
leaves are green on the outer surface.
Indexical Contextualism has been chosen as an option to represent the semantic profile of a wide 
array of expressions, for many different reasons. Thus for instance, the semantics of a term like 
“know” has been modelled along the lines of indexicals, (see Cohen 2000, DeRose 1995), in order 
to  explain skeptical paradoxes.  So,  for instance,  an assertion of “S knows that  p” in context  c 
expresses, for these theorists, the content  <that S knows that p by the epistemic standards of c>. 
Moving to a different context c' may have the effect of changing the operative epistemic standards
—by raising them, for example. This entails that the content of an assertion of the form “S knows 
that p” becomes <that S knows that p by the epistemic standards of c'>. Since considering skeptical 
options (such as the brains in a vat hypothesis) is taken to raise the epistemic standards, common 
assertions like “I know I have hands” become false at the context in which the skeptical scenario is 
being  considered.  This,  however,  doesn't  prevent  that,  in  non-skeptical  contexts,  claims  of 
knowledge are still true and felicitously assertible.
Moral terms like “good”, “ought” (see Harman 1978) as well as predicates of personal taste like 
“delicious” or  “disgusting”  (see  Glanzberg  2007,  Cappelen  and Hawthorne  2009,  De Sa 2008, 
Sundell 2011) have been treated like indexicals too, in order to account for the fact that the truth of 
moral or taste judgments depends on the inclinations of the speaker (or of a group which is salient  
to the speaker). So for instance, the content expressed by a statement of “Slavery is morally wrong” 
in context c is <that slavery is morally wrong by the moral standard of c>. The content expressed 
by an utterance of “Apple pie is delicious” in context  c' is  <that apple pie is delicious by the  
gustatory standards of c'>. Changes of context can determine changes of content and—obviously—
also of truth-value.
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Quantifiers like “all”, “some”, “the”, as well as gradable adjectives (see Stanley 2000), nouns and 
noun phrases (Stanley and Szabó 2000) and adjectives in  general  (Szabó 2001, Rothschild and 
Segal  2009)  have  been given an  Indexical  Contextualist  semantics  in  order  to  account  for  the 
apparent context-sensitivity of their use. So for instance, an utterance of “Every one was accepted to 
the conference” in context c expresses the content <that every one in the salient domain of c was  
accepted to the conference>.  An utterance of “Every student failed” in context  c' expresses the 
content  <that  every  student-in-the-c'-domain  failed>.  An  utterance  of  “Naomi  is  rich”  in  c'' 
expresses the content <that Naomi is rich by the standards of c''>. An utterance of “The leaves are 
green” in context c''' expresses the content <that the leaves are green in the respect salient in c'''>.
What would an Indexical Contextualist option offer to the proponent of conceptual constraints, as 
opposed to Radical Contextualism? It may be observed that Indexical Contextualism doesn't give 
rise to the wrong prediction that—as I argued in Chapter 2—followed from Radical Contextualism, 
according to which we do not have an Intuitive Comprehension of semantically under-determined 
sentences out of a context. For if a sentence like “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green” or “Olivia is  
tall” is indexical, then that means that the involved expressions have a standing linguistic meaning, 
which is identifiable whether the expression is interpreted “in” or “out” of a context. Intuitively 
understanding these sentences will require only the exercise of the speaker's linguistic competence. 
Surely, understanding an utterance of such sentences as performed within a particular context will 
require more than mere intuitive understanding: the hearer  shall  have to look at  the context  of 
utterance, searching for what, in context, would satisfy the indexical character of the expression. 
But after all, this is compatible with the expressions at issue being indexical. Language users are not 
able to understand what, in a particular context, utterances of “I am the king of the world” or of “It's 
freezing in here” express, if they have no idea of what the referents of “I” and “here” are. Yet they 
may intuitively understand the same utterances, independently of the context, precisely insofar as 
they  master  those  expressions  linguistically.  So  Indexical  Contextualism,  unlike  Radical 
Contextualism, doesn't predict that a token-sentence of “It's raining”, heard out of its context of 
utterance, won't be intuitively understood by a competent language user, even though it maintains 
that  comprehension  of  utterances  within  particular  contexts  require  more  than  intuitive 
comprehension. It seems that comparatively with Radical Contextualism, Indexical Contextualism 
may  offer  an  account  which  is  more  in  line  with  our  pre-theoretic  views  about  utterance-
understanding.  But  is  Indexical  Contextualism the right  theory to endorse for  the proponent  of 
conceptual constraints? First of all, we need to explore in closer detail how Indexical Contextualism 
is motivated, how it is supposed to work and what (syntactic) evidence we have to endorse it. That's  
what I will be concerned with in the following few sections.
2. Two Ways of Rescuing Compositionality
We saw in  the  previous  chapters  that  several  authors  argued that  meaning  (in  context)  under-
determines  truth-conditions;  that  is,  that  what  a  certain  sentence  conventionally  says  (modulo 
ambiguity resolution and reference-assignment to indexicals and demonstratives) is insufficient to 
specify the truth-conditions of any utterance of it, in a way which seems to have nothing to do with 
either ambiguity,  vagueness or context-dependence (indexicality).  This undermines the idea that 
semantics  is  concerned with truth-conditions:  if  the meaning of a  sentence (in  context)  doesn't 
express  its  utterances'  truth-conditions,  then  this  means  that  semantics  delivers  non-truth-
conditional objects, which Bach (1994a) has called “propositional radicals”. 
But these arguments do not only threaten the truth-conditional nature of semantics. They threaten 
also  its  compositional character.  A semantics  for  utterances  of  sentences  in  a  language  L is 
compositional iff it has it that the content and truth-conditions of an utterance u of a sentence s are 
determined by the contents (in context, where appropriate) of  s's components and their syntactic 
arrangement. Here the notion of “determination” is crucial: it doesn't simply imply that the content 
and truth-conditions of an utterance depend on the content-in-context of its components, for this 
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would allow for the utterance's content to depend also on other factors. Determination is a stricter 
relation: it is such that the content and truth-conditions of an utterance must depend exclusively on 
the content-in-context of its components. Only compositionality accompanied by this strict notion 
of determination can serve the two main purposes that it has usually been taken to serve: to explain 
how speakers learn language (learnability) as well as how they understand sentences that they never 
heard before (novelty) (see Pagin&Westerstahl, 2010). 
Semantic under-determinacy entails the failure of compositionality for utterance content, since if an 
utterance's truth-conditional content is not exclusively determined by the content (in context, where 
appropriate)  of  its  components  and  their  syntactic  arrangement,  this  means  that  such  truth-
conditional content will have to be determined also by other elements—perhaps mechanisms of 
pragmatics completion or enrichment. 
More than one author has come to question the principle of compositionality on these grounds, if 
not for the whole language, at least for a class of expressions: if these authors are right, language—
or at least substantial fragments of it—is not compositional. For example, Lahav (1989) contends 
that adjectives such as “red”, “sharp”, “good” do not behave compositionally. Lahav draws attention 
on the fact that the semantic contribution, i.e. applicability condition, of adjectives is not determined 
once and for all for every occurrence of the words, but it is rather dependent on the noun with which 
they  are  combined.  For  example,  when “red” is  part  of  the  compound “red  pen”,  its  semantic 
contribution seems to differ from its semantic contribution within the compound “red bird”. This is 
because the conditions in which “red” applies are different when what is at issue is pens rather than 
birds. For a pen to be red (in normal circumstances), it doesn't need to be red all over: it's enough  
that it contains a red ink, such that it allows its user to trace red signs on a piece of paper. This 
conditions obviously differ from the conditions at which a bird is red, i.e. that the bird's feathers be 
red (even though not its beak and its legs). These considerations lead Lahav to the conclusion that  
the  semantic  functioning  of  adjectives  is  much  more  complicated  than  that  described  by  a 
compositional semantics, because it has to make room for a large degree of contextual variation in  
their applicability conditions. Since any way of complicating their semantics would either push the 
problem one step further or postulate implausible semantic notions (endless ambiguity, “primitive” 
redness), this compels Lahav to abandon the idea that adjectives are ever compositional.
Compositional adjectives, even if they are such, can no longer be accounted for in a 
straightforward  way,  as  simple,  isolable,  semantic  building  blocks  […].  […] 
[A]djectives should be construed as having a non-compositional semantics. (Lahav 
1989: 278).
In response to this attack, more than one solution has been proposed, in order to preserve the idea 
that the semantics of adjectives is compositional. Some theorists have recently proposed that colour 
predicates like “green” and “red” are simply ambiguous (see Kennedy and McNally 2010). Others 
have  opted  for  an  “indexical  way  out”:  for  these  theorists,  rescuing  the  compositionality  idea 
requires accommodating some parameter for the contextual variation of the expression's content 
into the syntactic structure of the expression itself. In this section, I will focus on two “Indexicalist” 
proposals, dealing specifically with adjectives.
A first proposal is put forth by Szabó (2001). Szabó first considers Travis' “green leaves” example.  
In Travis' example (see Chapter 1), two utterances of the same sentence (“The leaves are green”), 
performed in the same worldly circumstances,  have two different  truth-values,  but  none of the 
sentence's constituents appears as obviously context-dependent. Travis then speculates that, even 
though no context-sensitivity is exhibited by the sentence, nevertheless the sentences express two 
different contents in different contexts. According to Szabó, this conclusion undermines what he 
calls the “Context Thesis”, according to which 
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The content of an expression depends on context only insofar as the contents of its 
constituents do (Szabó 2001: 122).
Since the content of “The leaves are green” changes across the two contexts, even though none of  
its constituents' content does, the Context Thesis is refuted. Szabó goes on and says that, since the 
Context Thesis derives from the Principle of Compositionality, then Travis' argument, by providing 
a counterexample to the former, counts as a refutation of the latter. 
Szabó's  way  of restoring  the  Context  Thesis  and,  consequently,  an  orthodox  compositional 
semantics for utterances of expressions like “The leaves are green” consists in arguing that “green” 
is  an  incomplete  predicate.  The  word  “green”  doesn't  correspond  to  the  monadic  predicate 
GREEN(X), but to a two-place relation GREEN(C,P), in which C stands for a comparison class and P 
stands for a part in which the object is green. Szabó then suggests that
the context-dependency that appears in Travis’s example is of a relatively easily 
characterizable kind: it is a matter of different contextually specified values for the 
variable P. (Szabó 2001: 138) 
That is, the content (and truth value) of the first utterance of “The leaves are green” is determined 
by fixing the value of the P-variable as something like <on the external surface>, while the content 
(and truth-value) of the second utterance is determined by fixing the value of P as being something 
like  <under the paint>.  By means of this  formal modification of the syntactic structure of the 
predicate “green”, one can explain the fact that the sentence “The leaves are green” has different 
contents and truth-values in different occasions of utterance by saying that the word “green” is 
context-dependent  in the way of a (broadly construed) indexical.  The context-sensitivity of the 
sentence is explained by the context-sensitivity of a constituent of the sentence (the word “green”), 
in  such  a  way  that  the  Context  Thesis  is  upheld  and  a  standard  compositional  approach  for 
utterances of “The leaves are green” is thereby rescued.
Szabó's  approach  has  been  criticised  recently  by  Rothschild  and  Segal  (2009).  These  authors 
suggest an approach in which “red” (or “green”) is not associated with a couple of variables in 
logical form, but it is simply indexed with respect to the context of utterance. As the authors claim:
our semantics differs from Szabó's in that rather than positing indexical variables in 
the  syntax  introduced  along  with  the  predicate  ‘red’ we  treat  ‘red’ itself  as  an 
indexical. (482)
Their proposal thus manages to
posit a relatively simple syntax, with only a little more structure than meets the eye. 
In this respect our proposal is more economical than Szabó's, who posits two hidden 
variables.  Our  proposal  is  as  simple  as  a  theory  that  posits  just  a  single  hidden 
variable referring to the context of utterance and serving as a catch-all covering a 
very wide range of contextual variations. (474)
According to their account, out of a context, an adjective like “red” has just a generic intension redg, 
corresponding to “red in some way or other”, while it acquires a specific intension in each particular 
context. So, in the context cj where “The pen is red” is uttered, the contribution of the word “red” to 
the content of the utterance is a more specific intension redj; while in a context ch where “The parrot 
is red” is uttered, the contribution of “red” will be a ch-specific intension redh. The proposal is, by 
explicit  admission  of  the  authors,  the  formal-semantics  version  of  the  Radical  Contextualist's 
version of “ad hoc” or “pragmatically enriched” meanings: 
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It is worth noting that our analysis is similar to another, more pragmatic treatment, 
of  ‘red’.  On  this  treatment,  ‘red’ has  a  constant,  context-independent  semantic 
value, which value gets enriched in a given context of utterance (see for instance, 
Recanati24 [...]). The newly enriched value then combines compositionally with the 
rest of the elements in the sentence in the usual way. This theory, unlike ours, gives 
a genuine role to pragmatic  enrichment  (rather than indexical resolution)  in  the 
determination of meaning. On the other hand, the pragmatic enrichment plays the 
same formal role as the indexical resolution does in our […] theory, so there is little 
difference in the basic structure of the accounts. (473)
It is not entirely obvious that Rothschild and Segal's proposal marks an improvement over Szabó's 
theory. The reason resides in the rather loose constraints posed on context by the indexical element 
posited in their account. Unlike Szabó's indexical element, whose task is that of selecting a precise 
contextual feature such as the part P and the comparison class C, Rothschild ans Segal's “catch-all” 
indexical element seems too generic: what aspect of the context is it supposed to focus on? There 
seems to be no answer available except for: any aspect that is salient to the speaker who performs 
the utterance. However, this way of conceiving of an indexical element seems to overlook the fact  
that indexicality doesn't perfectly coincide with contextual saliency, but it rather puts constraints on  
contextual saliency. Even if we consider indexicals whose reference is fixed by means of saliency 
criteria such as “this” and “that”, we may observe that each of these expressions constrains saliency 
considerations in its own way. “This” constrains saliency considerations by restricting individuation 
of the salient object with respect to the set of objects that are  close enough (both physically and 
metaphorically, I suspect) to the speaker, while “that” directs saliency consideration towards objects 
that  are  far from the  speaker  (again,  both  physically  and  metaphorically).  In  other  words,  the 
semantics  of  these  expressions  guides—even  though  in  a  loose  way—the  saliency-based 
individuation of their referent. This doesn't happen with the “catch-all” parameter postulated by 
Rothschild and Segal, which looks like a place-holder for whatever aspect of the context may prove 
relevant. The following question then arises: is the economy in terms of postulated parameters a 
genuine gain, if contrasted with the loss of specificity of the single index proposed by the authors?
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the two proposals are prima facie on the same 
level as far as the costs and benefits that they supply. I shall therefore consider them as substantially 
equivalent versions of the same formal template, which is based on the idea that the semantics of 
certain expressions is best cashed out in terms of the presence, in their logical form, of elements 
that syntactically pin-down the context-dependence of their content. The motivation behind both 
proposals  is,  invariably,  to  rescue  the  compositionality  of  utterances  of  a  certain  group  of 
expressions, whose compositional nature has been put into question. In the next section, I will delve 
more into the issue of what evidence there exists for opting for an Indexicalist solution.
3. The Evidence
So far I have been concerned with the underlying motivation in favour of an “Indexicalist way out” 
24 Curiously enough, Recanati himself, who is a leading proponent of pragmatic enrichment, recently made a proposal 
aimed at reconciling pragmatic enrichment and compositionality whose outline is very much in the same vein as 
Rothschild and Segal's proposal, which he terms as a “Modulation Account” (see Recanati 2010, but also Pagin and 
Pelletier 2007 for a similar account). As he holds: “Even though free pragmatic processes are allowed to enter into 
the determination of  truth-conditional content, still [...], they come into the picture as part of the compositional 
machinery. Semantic interpretation remains grammar-driven even if, in the course of semantic interpretation, 
pragmatics is appealed to not only to assign contextual values to indexicals and free variables but also to freely 
modulate the senses of the constituents in a top-down manner. Semantic interpretation is still a matter of determining 
the sense of the whole as a function of the (possibly modulated) senses of the parts and the way they are put 
together.” (22) 
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of  the  problem  of  semantic  under-determinacy  and  pragmatic  intrusion:  rescuing  the 
compositionality of utterance content. I have also sketched two (at bottom equivalent) proposals 
aimed at making the semantics of adjectives like “red” similar to indexicals, in order to preserve the 
idea that they are compositional. But what is the evidence that allows such a move? Are there any 
evidential and argumentative grounds for embracing an Indexicalist position? In this respect, the 
most accurate survey of the evidence for Indexical Contextualism has been put forward in Jason 
Stanley's  “Context  and  Logical  Form”.  In  this  paper,  Stanley  intends  to  show  that “all  truth-
conditional effects of extra-linguistic context can be traced to logical form” (Stanley 2000: 391). 
His  critical  aim is  the  unarticulated  constituents  account  inspired  by  Perry  (1986),  which  was 
covered in section 4 of Chapter 2, according to which context provides content with elements that 
have no correlate in the sentence's syntax (or logical form). 
Stanley can be regarded as engaged in an attempt to both to save compositionality and to rescue the 
idea that semantics is still concerned with truth-conditions, rather than with non-truth-conditional 
entities  such  as  “propositional  radicals”,  that  pragmatic  mechanisms  merely  flesh-out  via  the 
provision of unarticulated constituents. In order to do this, and since “claims of unobvious context-
dependence must […] be accompanied by arguments for the existence of a corresponding formative 
in the logical form of the relevant constructions” (401), Stanley tries to bring independent syntactic 
evidence for the view that sentences like “It's raining”, “Olivia is tall” etc. are really indexical, and 
so they express genuine truth-conditional contents.
Stanley's  first  step  is  that  of  acknowledging  the  fact  that  sentences  allegedly  containing 
unarticulated constituents are subject to bound readings, in which “the interpretation of the alleged 
unarticulated constituent is controlled by an operator in the sentence” (411). Bound readings are 
purely semantic phenomena; nonetheless, Stanley endorses what he calls the Binding Assumption to 
the effect that, whenever there is a semantic binding, then there is also a syntactic binding: that is, 
“semantic binding and syntactic binding coincide” (412). This leads the way to Stanley's conclusion 
to the effect that, whenever there is a bound reading, then the allegedly  unarticulated constituent 
must be articulated, in virtue of the fact that binding as a semantic phenomenon must co-occur with 
binding as a syntactic relation, where syntactic items are articulated by definition.
Let us report Stanley's examples. His initial focus is on “It's raining”. According to the unarticulated 
constituents analysis, a simple occurrence of “It's raining” has the logical form “It is raining (t)”. 
However, this logical form doesn't correctly represent the content of an utterance of “It's raining”, in 
that what utterances of this sentence usually express is  that it is raining at a certain time  t at a  
certain location l. Here, theorists such as Perry contend that the location figures in the expressed 
content as an unarticulated constituent. An utterance of “It's raining” will thus be true iff it is raining 
at a certain time t in a certain location l, where l is an unarticulated constituent of the (structured) 
proposition expressed by the utterance. Stanley thinks that this analysis is incorrect. For consider 
the following sentence
(1) Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains.
The proposition expressed by this sentence is very plausibly that every time John lights a cigarette,  
it rains in the location l where John lights the cigarette. The proposition exhibits a semantic binding 
in the sense that the quantified phrase “Every time John lights a cigarette” seems to introduce a 
restriction upon the space-time locations at which it rains—viz. the restriction that these be the 
space-time locations in which John is lighting a cigarette. Since there is a semantic binding, then 
there must be a syntactic binding, i.e.  the operator introduced by “every time …” must bind a 
variable l ranging over locations (besides obviously binding a variable t ranging over times). But if 
the location l is an unarticulated constituent, then it cannot be bound, since (as it follows from the 
previously  endorsed  Binding  Assumption)  binding  operators  only  bind  elements  which  are 
articulated in the syntax. 
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The result would be that an analysis in terms of unarticulated constituents would only predict an 
unbound reading of (1), namely the reading that every time John lights a cigarette, it rains in some  
contextually salient location l. Since the the bound reading is also an available reading for (1), but 
an unarticulated constituent analysis doesn't capture it, Stanley concludes that an account in terms 
of variables in logical form is preferable, since it maintains the possibility for both the bound and 
the unbound reading. Stanley thus illustrates the advantage:
The problem with the unarticulated constituent analysis is that it only predicts one 
of  the  two  available  readings  for  [(1)].  In  contrast,  an  account  involving  the 
postulation of a location variable predicts both readings. For variables can either be 
bound or free. An account involving variables, therefore, predicts there to be two 
readings of [(1)], one in which the value of the relevant variable is supplied by 
context [...] and one in which it is bound [...]. (417)
To sum up, Stanley argues that an analysis that postulates a variable l for locations in the logical 
form of (1) allows to capture both the readings that are available for (1): (i) the reading that every 
time John lights a cigarette, it rains in the location l where John lights the cigarette , in which the 
“every-time” operator binds the variable l; (ii) the reading that every time John lights a cigarette, it  
rains in a salient location l,  in which the variable  l  is  left  free.  This is a reason, according to 
Stanley, to adopt a view according to which sentences like “It's raining” contain a hidden variable in 
logical form.
The argument  could be replicated also for other  expressions,  for which an account  in terms of 
unarticulated constituents has been (or could be) provided. Besides “It's raining”, Stanley focusses 
also on comparative adjectives (“tall” or “small”), quantifiers (“all”, “some”); and relational terms 
such as “home”, “local”, “enemy”; in principle, his arguments can be extended to all those cases in 
which an unarticulated constituent theorist could propose his treatment (hence potentially also to 
terms like “green” or “ready”). Let us see some of the further examples Stanley presents. 
The next class of expressions that Stanley surveys in order to defend his Indexicalist approach is 
that of comparative adjectives. Sentences such as “Snowball is small” can change their truth value 
according to what class of comparison is salient. Suppose that Snowball is an over-size cat. If the 
current class of comparison is elephants, then it is true that Snowball, being a cat, is small; however, 
if the class of comparison were other cats, it is false that Snowball, as an over-sized exemplar, is  
small. Theorists such as Bach (1994a), or Heim and Kratzer (1998) explain this shift in truth-value 
by saying that the content expressed by each different utterance of “Snowball is small” is different, 
in that it contains two different unarticulated constituents: in the first case, it contains the set of 
elephants as the unarticulated comparison class; in the second case, it contains the set of cats. If this 
explanation is right, then the semantic rule associated with “small” would have to be such that the 
denotation of “small” is the class of all things that are small with respect to the  contextually salient  
comparison class s. Stanley contends that this kind of analysis can't be right. Take the following 
sentence:
(2) Most species have members that are small.
There are two readings that this sentence can take. As you may notice, the first reading is a bound 
reading, while the second is a free reading:
(3) Most species p have members that are small with respect to p;
(4) Most species p have members that are small with respect to a contextually salient comparison 
class s.
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As a matter of fact, the first reading is not predicted by the unarticulated constituents theorists. That 
is because (by the Binding Assumption) bound readings require articulated variables to be bound by 
quantifiers;  unarticulated constituents clearly cannot be bound. So there is no chance that, if the 
comparison class is unarticulated, a comparison class-variable s is bound by the quantifier “Every 
species”. However, since the first reading should be acknowledged as available just like the second, 
and  since  the  unarticulated  constituents  account  can't  provide  this  reading,  it  follows  that  the 
account is  defective.  An account that regards “small” as containing a hidden comparison class- 
variable in logical form, such that it can be bound or left free, is preferable, because it predicts both 
readings. 
The same argument can be repeated for quantifiers. It has been argued that utterances of quantified 
sentences often express propositions in which the quantification is restricted to a salient domain. 
This may be explained, for example, by saying that context provides a property that restricts the 
quantification. Thus:
(5) Every bottle is in the fridge
may express the proposition  that every bottle in the house is in the fridge, where the property of 
being in the house restricts the domain of quantification of the quantified phrase “Every bottle”. 
Some might think that quantifier restrictors are unarticulated constituents, because there need be no 
variable in logical form whose value is the restricting property. However, if this were true, bound 
readings could again not be predicted. For example, the following sentence
(6) In most of John’s classes, he fails exactly three students
Sentence (6) has two available readings, the first bound, the second free:
(7) In most of John’s classes x, he fails exactly three students in x;
(8) In most of John’s classes x, he fails exactly three students in a contextually salient domain d.
The first bound reading is undoubtedly more plausible than the second unbound one, which barely 
makes  sense.  However,  this  is  exactly  the  reading  that  is  left  out  by  the  predictions  of  the 
unarticulated constituents view: for if the domain of quantification is not represented by a variable 
at the level of logical form, it cannot be bound by a quantifier. In light of these results, Stanley 
concludes again that the Indexicalist account is preferable, in that it  predicts the desired bound 
reading. The same considerations have been provided by Stanley concerning relational terms such 
as  “home”  or  “enemy”,  while  Stanley  and  Szabó  (2000)  argue  for  an  Indexicalist  semantics 
concerning the logical form of nouns and noun phrases.
To summarise, in this section I have presented Stanley's main argument in favour of an Indexicalist 
approach, which has been called by some “The Binding Argument”. In the following sections, I 
shall survey the main objections with which the argument has been attacked.
4. Objection 1: Inconclusiveness
The structure of Stanley's argument is the following: first, consider some complex constructions 
such as “Everywhere I go, it rains”; second, make sure that these complex constructions exhibit a 
bound reading, i.e.  a reading in which the value of a location variable is controlled by another 
element,  like  a  quantifier  over  locations.  The  Binding  Assumption tells  us  that,  since  there  is 
semantic  binding,  then  there  must  be  syntactic  binding,  for  no  binding  operator  binds  an 
unarticulated element. So, the conclusion goes, there must be an articulated variable in the logical 
form of “Everywhere I go, it rains”. So far so good. Stanley though, takes a further step, claiming 
that there must be a variable in the logical form of the un-embedded sentence “It's raining” too (see 
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Stanley 2000: 416).
The conclusion that un-embedded occurrences of the predicate “to rain” contain a location variable 
is, however, unwarranted, at least if we follow the explicit structure of Stanley's argument. In order 
to establish it, Stanley would need an extra premise. This premise presumably remains implicit in 
the way he runs his argument. Let us see how this extra premise, if made explicit, would interact 
with the other premises in the argument. The “missing” premise is in boldface in the following 
reconstruction:
1. In “Wherever I go, it rains” there is a semantic binding;
2. In order to have semantic binding, we have to postulate that there is a hidden variable in the 
embedded sentence “... it rains” (due to the Binding Assumption);
3. If  there  is  a  bound variable  in  “...  it  rains”,  it  means  that  this  variable  is  in  the 
predicate's logical form even when the expression occurs un-embedded;
4. There is a bound variable in the embedded “... it rains”;
5. So there is a hidden locational variable in the un-embedded “It's raining”
Premise  (3)  states  that  if  there  is  (reason  to  postulate)  a  location  variable  in  the  embedded 
occurrence of “… it rains”, then there must be a variable also in un-embedded occurrences of “It's 
raining”.  But  is  this  necessary?  What  is  the  motivation  for  this  assumption?  A rather  obvious 
motivation would be uniformity, i.e. the idea according to which a certain theoretical posit should 
hold for all relevantly similar cases, and not only for a restricted set of them. Uniformity is clearly a 
virtue of a syntactic theory, in that it protects the theory from the risk of being ad hoc. If, therefore, 
a variable in the logical form of “...it rains” has to be postulated when the expression is embedded, 
then by uniformity one should suppose that a variable has always been there, even though there was 
no operator to bind it, for all occurrences of “to rain”, whether embedded or not, should count as 
relevantly similar. If that weren't so, the postulation of the variable in the logical form of the un-
embedded clause “It's raining” may be regarded as an ad hoc move. But how motivated is the claim 
that an embedded and an un-embedded occurrence of “to rain” are relevantly similar?
There is  an obvious respect in which the two occurrences are  relevantly similar:  they are both 
occurrences of the predicate “to rain” (disregard for the moment differences in tense). However, is 
this consideration strong enough? I argue that it may be overridden by considerations concerning 
the linguistic context in which the two occurrences take place. These considerations may undermine 
the thought that the two occurrences are relevantly similar, and thus block the extension of the 
hidden variable account to un-embedded occurrences of “to rain”.
A first  consideration  may be to  the  effect  that  a  construction  like  “Everywhere  I  go,  it  rains” 
exhibits a bound reading, but only because the explicit quantification over locations “Everywhere” 
causes the logical form of the embedded clause “... it rains” to be increased by one argument-place. 
This argument-place is occupied by a variable that gets bound by the quantifier itself.  As Martì 
observes (but see also Recanati (2002a), Carston (2002) , Bach (2000)), it may be the case that, in 
“Everywhere I go, it rains”
the quantifier takes it rains as its argument and gives back ‘For every l. . .it rains in l’ 
(i.e., the quantifier introduces the place of rain, fills this role with a variable, and 
binds it). (Martì 2006: 161)
This would explain why a variable is to be posited in the logical form of the complex sentence 
“Everywhere I go, it rains”; however, nothing would follow from this about the logical form of the 
simple sentence “It's raining”. Since no operator is present in the simple sentence, whose role may 
be that of introducing (and at the same time binding) the location variable, the case would not be 
relevantly similar to the previous one. The move of extending the hidden variable- account would 
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not therefore be grounded by considerations of uniformity, on the account that an occurrence of “to 
rain” as embedded by an operator like “everywhere” and an occurrence of “to rain” as un-embedded 
do not count as relevantly similar in the present case. 
A second consideration, even more radical than the earlier one, consists in noting that, even in the 
complex sentence “Everywhere I go, it rains”, no binding occurs. This is because the phrase “Every 
where I go” is not a variable-introducing operator, but a simple “modifier” or “adjunct”, which 
specifies the conditions at which the rain event described by the clause “... it rains” occurs. Since 
modifiers do not alter the adicity of the predicates they modify, this means that there is no good 
syntactic reason to postulate a hidden variable in the logical form of “Everywhere I go, it rains”. 
But then,  a fortiori, there is no good syntactic reason to postulate a hidden variable in the logical 
form of the simple “It's raining” (see Collins (2007)).
The  considerations  raised  above  are  of  significance  to  the  extent  that  they  cast  doubt  on  the 
correctness of the passage, which is rather smooth in Stanley's reflections, from postulation of a 
hidden  variable  for  the  embedded  “...  it  rains”  to  postulation  of  a  hidden  variable  in  the  un-
embedded “It's  raining”.  The  passage  is  licensed  by  the  “implicit”  premise [3],  which  I  have 
emphasised  in  the  reconstruction  of  Stanley's  argument.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  premise  [3] is 
unwarranted, for the uniformity considerations that apparently underlie it can be undermined by 
considerations regarding linguistic context, like the ones I have exposed. Ultimately, then, Stanley's 
argument is  inconclusive.  The claim that a simple,  un-embedded occurrence of “to rain” has a 
hidden argument in logical form, which lies at the heart of his strategy of “tracing all pragmatic 
effects to logical form”, doesn't cogently follow from Stanley's argument, because it relies on an 
unwarranted (implicit) premise.
5. Objection 2 – Overgeneration
Overgeneration arguments play with the fact that bound readings such as that exhibited in (1) are 
very frequent in language interpretation. If this is so, the argument goes, then this should lead the 
theorist to postulate hidden indexicality in each of these cases. This would entail generating further 
hidden variables, which would make the expressions involved context-sensitive in a way which, 
however, goes counter to our intuitions. Generation of hidden positions is therefore over-generation, 
to the extent that the further variables appear to be not required at the intuitive level. 
Arguments from overgeneration have been advanced by more than one author in the literature (see 
Cappelen and Lepore 2002, 2005, Recanati 2002a, Breheney 2003, Hall 2008), but it is important to 
distinguish between a “good” and “bad” version of the argument. Let us review both typologies.
Good arguments from overgeneration start with a genuine bound reading and conclude that, if the 
semantics is correct, we have to postulate more hidden syntax. This entails generating new hidden 
positions, thus acknowledging a dimension of context-sensitivity which runs against our intuitions. 
An example may be the following:
(9) Everywhere she goes, Mary dances;
In (9), it is plausible to suppose that—as far as the semantics goes—the embedded clause contains a 
variable x which is bound by the quantifier “everywhere”, the resulting interpretation being <that  
for every place x where she goes, Mary dances in x>: indeed this seems to be required in order to 
make sense of the truth-conditions of the sentence. By the Binding Assumption, this would also 
require postulating a hidden variable in the  deep syntax of the embedded clause “Mary dances”. 
This means recognising that the logical form of the verb “to dance” has an extra argument place for 
locations, its structure being dance(x, y) rather than simply dance(x). However, it doesn't seem that 
the predicate “to dance” is location-sensitive. The Indexicalist owes an explanation of why we have 
to admit a dimension of context dependency which goes against our semantic intuitions.
The argument may be regarded as a good one insofar as (9) involves a genuine example of semantic 
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binding. This can be tested in various ways: a first test consists in assigning different values to the  
bound variable, checking if the truth-conditions of the embedded clause change accordingly: it is 
quite easy to ascertain that it is so, for the truth conditions of the embedded phrase do change across 
“If Mary goes to Paris, she dances in Paris” and “If Mary goes to London, she dances in London” 
(see Cohen and Rickless 2007). A second test, proposed by Sennett (2008), has it that (9) is an 
instance of semantic binding just in case it is possible to felicitously deny the binding interpretation. 
Indeed, it seems felicitous to reply to an utterance of (9) with the following: “No she doesn't—she 
dances  just  in some places”.  Another  test  proposed by Pagin  (2005)  consists  in  evaluating  the 
semantic  acceptability  of bound readings which contain an explicitly  bound element,  such as a 
pronoun (“it”, “there”)), in place of an element which is only implicitly bound (a covert variable x). 
In the case of (9), it seems entirely semantically acceptable to state “Everywhere she goes, Mary 
dances there”.
“Bad” arguments from overgeneration start with something which is not obviously a bound reading 
and reach the same conclusion as the “good” arguments. However, since the reading which they 
exploit is not a genuine binding (or it is dubious that it is), then the whole argument is unsound. 
Examples of “bad” versions of the binding  argument may be the following:
(10) In some way or other, the policeman stopped the car;
(11) Wherever I go, 2+2 = 4;
Recanati (2002a) brings (10) as an example of bound reading. However, Pagin (2005) questions the 
fact that a genuine semantic binding is in place. The reason is that, once the alleged implicit bound 
variable is turned into an explicit pronoun (of the same kind as “it”, “there”, “that”), as in “In some 
way or other, the policeman stopped the car  in that way” the sentence is semantically odd, in the 
sense that the semantic binding is not immediately evident, nor it is required in order to make sense 
of the sentence's truth-conditions. Turning to (11), Cappelen and Lepore (2002, 2005) hold that 
applying the binding argument here results in postulating a hidden variable in the logical form of 
the  sentence  “2+2=4”,  which  sounds  utterly  counterintuitive.  Several  authors,  however,  have 
questioned their assumption that (11) is an instance of bound reading. Pagin (2005) argues that, 
since “Wherever I go, 2+2 = 4” and the isolated sentence “2+2 = 4” cannot differ in truth-value, 
there is no semantic clue from which one can derive a location-dependence (i.e. a semantic binding) 
in (11). Similarly, Cohen and Rickless (2007) hold that it is implausible to suppose that the logical 
form of (11) is as follows
(12) Whatever place x I go, 2+2 = 4 in x;
The reason is that, if the hidden variable in (12) is assigned a value, different variable assignments 
do  not  produce  a  change in  truth-conditions  for  the  embedded phrase.  Notably,  the  embedded 
sentence “2+2 = 4” has the same truth-conditions in “If I go to Paris, 2+2 = 4 in Paris” and in “If I 
go to London, 2+2 = 4 in London”. These considerations tell us that there is no evidence that (11) 
should be interpreted as containing a binding relation at the semantic level. One should therefore 
refrain from drawing any conclusions as to the presence of a hidden variable at the level of syntax, 
which would allegedly result in a reductio of Stanley's binding argument.
To sum up, over-generation arguments are a threat for the Indexicalist only if they start from a 
genuine  case  of  semantic  binding.  In  these  “good” cases,  the  proponent  of  the  overgeneration 
challenge presses the Indexicalist to explain why his strategy demands that extra syntactic positions 
be countenanced, and hence that a new dimension of context-sensitivity should be admitted, even 
though no intuition of context-dependence strikes ordinary speakers25.
25 Further references relevant to the discussion as to the legitimacy of alleged over-generation objections, are Stanley 
2005, Cappelen and Hawthorne 2007, Zeman 2011.
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6. Objection 3 – Indexicals, in what sense?
The Indexicalist position is based on the assumption that the elements that are articulated in the 
expressions' deep syntax function in a way relevantly similar to already recognised indexicals. With 
respect to some basic features of indexicals, this is very easy to see: on the assumption that a mark 
of indexicality is the fact that a certain expression varies its semantic value according to context, the 
indexical element  x which is allegedly present in e.g. the logical form of “green” is such that it 
acquires  a  different  semantic  value  in  different  contexts,  thereby  denoting  a  different  property 
green1, green2, … greenn in different contexts. This comparison is very straightforward and, at least 
in this respect, it equates genuine indexicals with the hidden indexicals postulated by Stanley. But 
what about what someone may indicate as other essential features of recognised indexicals? Do the 
hidden  indexicals  postulated  by  Stanley  and  others  live  up  to  the  comparison  with  recognised 
indexicals even with respect to these other features?
Neale  (2007)  points  out  that  another  essential  mark  of  indexicality  is  perspective.  Words  like 
“here”/“this”  and  “there”/“that”  express  a  proximal  and  distal spatial perspective  respectively; 
“now”  and  “then”  express  a  proximal  and  distal  temporal perspective  respectively.  Using  an 
indexical like “I” signals what Neale calls  the “perfectly proximal perspective” from which the 
speaker  may be  performing a  certain  predication—namely  the  self  perspective;  while  using  an 
indexical like “you” marks a “second-order perfectly proximal” perspective from which a certain 
predication could be effected—which we could cash out as “the most proximal perspective after the 
self perspective”.
With respect to the aphonic,  i.e.  non-phonetically realised,  indexicals posited by Stanley,  Neale 
wonders if they can be described as having such a perspectival character, too. Take for example the 
aphonic indexical on location, call it loc, which Stanley postulates as figuring in the logical form of 
“to rain”. Its function is that of referring to different objects in different contexts: but does it do so 
in a perspectival way? Neale observes that the perspective involved cannot be the same as that 
expressed by “here” or “there”: for suppose I am in Paris, talking on the phone with Carlos, who is 
in the same room with Juan. Juan asks Carlos to ask me what the weather is in Paris. I utter “It's  
raining”; Carlos in turn utters “It's raining” to Juan. The hidden indexical loc cannot be equivalent 
to “here”, otherwise Carlos could not have repeated my utterance the way he did; nor can it be 
equivalent  to  “there”,  for  this  would  make  my  utterance  absurd.  So  loc lacks  an  intrinsic 
perspectival character. Is then loc synonymous with some definite description or proper name, like 
“Paris” or “where Delia is”? Obviously not, because the sentence “It's raining” could have been 
used to say that it's raining in some place other than Paris, as well as in some place other than where 
I am at a certain moment.
Neale then summarises Stanley's theoretical claim as follows: Stanley wants loc to be an indexical, 
which is though aphonic and aperspectival. The only function performed by loc is that of referring 
to whatever location is salient at any stage of the conversation. But then, what is the communicative 
utility of such an item? Suppose loc had a phonic counterpart, call it loke. Anybody who wished to 
say that it's raining in some particular place—whether the place of the utterance or any other salient 
place—could utter “It's raining loke”. But then, do we really need the contribution of loke in order 
to explain the fact that the proposition expressed by “It's raining” is about a certain particular place? 
Couldn't  we  just  say,  for  example,  that  “to  rain”  lexically incorporates  locations  as  playing  a 
constant role in the interpretation of any occurrence of “rain”? This would be enough to explain 
why an occurrence of “It's raining” demands provision of a place, in order to express a proposition 
(see Neale 2007 and Taylor 2001 for this suggestion). Here is another reason to regard  loke  as 
syntactically superfluous: suppose that someone utters “It's raining here in Paris”. If one is talking 
about Paris and one is indeed in Paris, then by uttering “here” and “in Paris” one is referring to the  
same place, even though with two different “modes of presentation”: “here” presents Paris as the 
place of the utterance, while “in Paris” presents the place of the utterance as being Paris. Suppose 
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one now added to the previous sentence an occurrence of  loke: “It's raining  loke here in Paris”. 
What is the contribution of loke to the information conveyed by the utterance? Neale's answer is: 
none. There would be no informational loss if one dropped the occurrence of loke, because loke has 
no communicative role: it  just refers to whatever one wishes it to refer. From a methodological 
point of view, then, there is no good enough reason to recognise loke as expression with a bona fide 
role on one's syntax. As Neale points out
ceteris paribus, we should posit such things, as far as is possible, only when there are 
strong  empirical  reasons  for  doing  so,  when  doing  so  appears  empirically 
unavoidable  or  narrows other  options.  If  we are  going to  posit  expressions  with 
phonic  properties  but  no  communicative  utility  [like  e.g.  loke],  this  should  be 
because we have been led to them by strong empirical considerations, not simply 
because the idea of such expressions is not itself incoherent. (Neale 2007: 67)
Now remember that, in Stanley's discussion, no such thing as a phonic location parameter is at 
stake, for all that Stanley discusses is the presence of an aphonic locational parameter, loc. So let's 
go back to loc: since loc has no phonic realisation and no communicative role, is there any reason 
for positing it besides that its presence is not incoherent with the rest of our syntactic posits? It 
seems that Stanley should provide such reasons, for otherwise one could observe, as Neale does:
The idea of expressions with phonic properties but no communicative utility is not 
hard to get one’s mind around26. Nor is the idea of expressions with communicative 
utility  but  no  phonic  properties27.  But  the  idea  of  expressions  with  neither 
communicative utility nor phonic properties? The idea is strained. (Neale 2007: 67)
There  are  two  other  characteristic  features  of  indexicals,  highlighted  by  Cappelen  and  Lepore 
(2002),  which  Stanley's  indexicals  seem to  lack.  The  first  one  is  that  indexicals  can  enter  in  
anaphoric relations: that is, their reference can be picked up by a pronominal element that occurs 
after  them in  a  sentence.  For  example,  consider  an  utterance  of  “That  is  a  duck and  it is  my 
favourite animal”. Here the pronoun “it” is anaphoric for “that”. Now Cappelen and Lepore surmise 
that, if hidden indexicals are genuine indexicals, they will be able to generate anaphoric relations, 
too. Consider a sentence like “It's raining”. The real structure of the sentence is, by hypothesis, such 
that it contains a variable for locations. If this is the case, then the indexical element l should be able 
to generate anaphoric readings. But this is not the case. The sentence “It's raining and it is a big 
location” has no anaphoric reading, even though Stanley's theory predicts so. So the Indexicalist 
view fails to satisfy the prediction that hidden indexicals, just like overt indexicals, should be able 
to generate anaphoras.
The second characteristic feature of indexicals is that they give rise to a priori knowable truths. For 
example, the sentence “I am the person who is uttering this sentence” is going to be a priori true. 
The character of “I” is such that it imposes on any occurrence of “I” the requirement that its referent 
be the speaker of the utterance: Only knowledge of the word's character is required in order to 
derive that the sentence “I am the person who is speaking” is true (indeed, logically true). Now 
Cappelen and Lepore surmise that, if hidden indexicals are indexicals, then they will give rise to a 
priori truths, too. They therefore consider an occurrence of “Everyone”: According to Stanley and 
Stanley and Szabó (2000), quantifier expressions contain a hidden indexical ranging over domains, 
so that the real logical form of the phrase is “Everyone in domain D”, where D is to be saturated 
with a contextually salient domain. If things are like Stanley and Szabó claim, then the following 
sentence should be a priori true: “Everyone is in the contextually salient domain”. This sentence 
26 Think for example of the “it” in “It's raining”. It has no communicative role, but it has phonic realisation.
27 Think for example of the aphonic PRO element in “Susan wanted PRO to sing”.
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should be known as true only in virtue of the fact that “everyone” is associated with an element 
ranging on contextually salient domains. However, this sentence is not an a priori truth, because it 
doesn't seem part of the meaning of “everyone” that it (even implicitly) points at any contextually 
salient domain. If this is the case, then Stanley and Szabó should at least “defend their departure” 
(Cappelen & Lepore 2002: 279) from the predictions released by the paradigm account  on the 
semantics of genuine indexicals.
7. Objection 4 – Wrong Methodology
A very important issue is  whether Stanley is complying with the correct methodology that one 
should adopt while investigating syntax. Stanley is pretty clear that the view he is advocating should 
apply to the logical form of sentences, where by logical form Stanley means the “real structure” that 
belongs to these sentences. His investigation is aimed not at a  revision,  effected in semi-formal 
English, of sentences of informal natural language, but rather at the  discovery of what the true 
structure  of  certain  linguistic  constructions  is.  In  other  words,  Stanley  is  not  looking  for  a 
regimentation of certain linguistic constructions for the purpose of avoiding ambiguity and pursuing 
clarity and rigour; rather, he is looking for a  description of the underlying structural features of 
sentences such that it can explain a certain range of phenomena. 
In light of these methodological commitments, some theorists have wondered whether Stanley's 
conclusions are  entirely motivated.  The reason is  that  Stanley's  postulation of hidden indexical 
elements in the logical form of e.g. “It's raining” stems from semantic considerations. However, is it  
methodologically  correct  to  postulate  syntactic  elements  just  because this  yields  certain  correct 
semantic results? 
According  to  Stanley,  the  following is  a  methodologically  sound principle:  a  syntactic  item is 
correctly postulated whenever the presence of that item explains a behaviour which would remain 
unexplained in case that item was absent (see Stanley 2002: 152). In order for this methodological 
statement to be correct by the lights of the syntactician, it however has to be ascertained whether the 
behaviour to be explained is a semantic or syntactic behaviour. Explaining a syntactic behaviour (or 
misbehaviour) by postulating some hidden syntactic element seems an optimal way of applying 
Stanley's methodological statement. Let us review a virtuous way of applying this methodology. 
The example involves the motivation that has lead theorists to postulate the existence of what is  
known as a “PRO-element”.
To briefly introduce the notion of PRO: a PRO element is an unpronounced item which is typically 
postulated in order to explain the grammaticality of certain linguistic forms. The clearest example 
of a well-motivated appeal to PRO is provided by those forms which feature an infinitive clause. 
Consider the sentence “John wanted to sing”. The superficial syntactic structure of the sentence 
delivers  a  non-well-formed  formula.  That  is  because  the  infinitival  clause  “to  sing”,  which  is 
embedded under the main clause “John wants” doesn't exhibit a NP-VP structure, in that it only 
contains  a  verb-phrase  node  <to  sing> which  has  no  noun-phrase  as  its  antecedent.  This  is 
problematic,  because  a  failure  to  specify  an  antecedent  for  the  verb-phrase  <to  sing> implies 
disregarding the thematic (or theta-) structure of the verb  to sing, which necessarily requires an 
“agent” that does the singing. How is the theta-structure of the verb upheld, and hence the good 
formation of the sentence restored? Here syntacticians have resorted to the postulation of a hidden 
pronominal element PRO. The “real” structure of  the sentence is therefore: <John wanted PRO to  
sing>, where the PRO element is a silent pronominal which inherits the reference of the proper 
name “John”, which is in subject position in the upper-level structure of the sentence. Here the 
methodology is virtuously applied, given that both the  explanans and the  explanandum belong to 
the  domain  of  syntax:  since  infinitival  clauses  show a  deviant  syntactic  behaviour,  a  syntactic 
element is invoked to explain such a phenomenon.
After  having  made  this  detour  into  syntax,  and  namely  into  an  example  of  well-grounded 
postulation of a syntactic element, let us now turn to the issue whether Stanley's hidden pronominal 
101
elements are justified by the lights of syntactic methodology. On this issue, more than one author 
has advanced serious, if not fatal worries against Stanley's strategy. 
Once again Neale (2007) argues that Stanley overstates his case. In an example like “Everywhere I 
go, it rains”, there are  obviously semantic or interpretive reasons to believe that the rain-location 
varies with the location in which the speaker goes. But this all, Neale emphasises, has to do with 
how we read or interpret the sentence, not with an account of the sentence's syntax.
Stanley claims to have syntactic evidence for the claim that [“Everywhere I went, it  
rained]’s LF contains an aphonic variable loc bound by ‘everywhere I went’. But in 
fact the evidence offered is purely interpretive: the mere existence of the undisputed, 
relativized interpretation of [the sentence]! Surely no one is going to argue with the 
well-known interpretive fact that [that sentence] has a relativized interpretation. The 
question is whether anything of syntactic significance follows immediately from this. 
Stanley assumes without argument that it does. (Neale 2007: 73)
Neale's point is that Stanley fails to distinguish between (i) relativisation, which is an interpretive 
aspect of sentences, such as that which obtains every time the values of a variable vary with those 
of a binding operator (e.g. a quantifier), and (ii) binding, which responds to syntactic motivations, 
e.g. well-formedness, coherence with other syntactic phenomena etc. The two aspects may come 
together,  but  they do not need to.  On the one hand,  variable-binding is  not  sufficient  to  get  a 
relativised  reading,  because  we  can  have  cases  of  bound  variables  which  do  not  determine 
relativised readings. For example, in “Ringo loves himself”, we can say that “himself” is bound by 
the proper name “Ringo”; but the reading is not relativised, in the sense that there is no co-variation 
of the variable with respect to the values of any other element—in fact, we have a case of co-
reference  between  the  proper  name  “Ringo”  and  the  pronoun  “himself”.  On  the  other  hand, 
variable-binding  is  not  necessary  for  relativisation,  in  the  sense  that  one  can  have  relativised 
readings without having bound variables. An example of relativisation without syntactic binding is 
found in donkey anaphora, in which the relativised element (a pronoun, a variable) is in another 
sentence altogether with respect to the quantifier, and hence falls outside its scope, with the result 
that the quantifier  cannot bind it.  An example could be the sentence “John bought exactly one 
donkey and Paul fed it” (see Neale 2007: 73-8).
A criticism similar to the one moved by Neale is raised by Pupa and Troseth (2011). In their view, 
Stanley fails to comply with the syntactician's methodology, in that he offers no reasons, beyond the 
interpretive ones, to think that sentences contain aphonic elements. As opposed to this, orthodox 
syntactic  analysis  proceeds  mainly  from  (i)  well-formedness  considerations;  (ii)  distributional 
considerations, i.e. two elements are said to be syntactically incompatible if they compete for the 
same structural position; (iii) cross-linguistic considerations: for example, if a certain element is 
phonetically empty in a certain language, but it is phonetically realised in another language, that is a 
reason for postulating it. Stanley's arguments seem to fly in the face of this methodology. Here is 
how the authors express their concerns:
From a syntactic perspective, we find the binding argument peculiar. It never invokes 
any well-formedness  considerations  at  all.  And while  the  syntactic  analysis  of  a 
sentence  may  ultimately  have  interpretational  effects,  one  shouldn’t  resolve 
interpretational puzzles by positing syntactic constituents without developing a well-
formedness argument in their favour. The binding argument, however, makes no such 
gestures.  As  such,  it’s  difficult  to  imagine  the  binding  argument  grounding  any 
syntactic thesis. This we note as a theoretical challenge for the binding argument. 
(Pupa and Troseth 2011: 194).
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Pupa and Troseth also echo Neale's objection from the conflation of relativisation and binding when 
they point out that semantic binding and syntactic binding need not coincide: that is, the fact that the 
semantic value of an element like a pronoun or variable is controlled by an operator like a quantifier 
may  not  imply  any form of  syntactic  connection  between the  elements.  Take for  example  the 
sentence “In most of Jennifer's classes, she fails exactly three Frenchmen”. Stanley and  Szabó 
(2000) argue that its logical form should be such that the noun “Frenchmen” contains an aphonic 
domain restrictor  <g>, which is controlled by the upper quantified phrase “In most of Jennifer's 
classes”. The result is
(13) In most of Jennifer's1 classes x, she1 fails exactly three Frenchmen<in x>
The problem with this way of cashing out the sentence's logical form is that the quantifier phrase 
“most of Jennifer's classes” cannot bind the restrictor <g> in “Frenchmen” because, as the authors 
observe,  “g is a sub-syntactic element. Accordingly, it is not the type of element that can be c-
commanded. If ‘most’ does not c-command  g, it cannot bind  g.” (Pupa and Troseth 2011: 194). 
There are other cases in which we have a semantic binding without a syntactic binding. Take for 
example the sentence 
(14) Some manager didn’t manage to deceive every shareholder in the company
In (14), a bound reading is easy to obtain to the extent that it is easy to read “Some manager” as 
being some manager in the company. Does this mean that the quantified phrase “every shareholder 
in  the  company”  binds  an  aphonic  domain  restrictor  <g> associated  with  “some  manager”? 
According to syntax, this is impossible because “restrictions on syntactic movement prohibit the 
lower DP ‘every shareholder in the company’ from taking a scope position higher than the negation 
‘didn’t’. Since the lower DP cannot, in virtue of the interaction between syntactic movement and 
negation  placement,  out-scope  ‘didn’t’,  and  thereby  out-scope  ‘some  manager’,  semantic  and 
syntactic binding cannot coincide on threat of ungrammaticality.” (Pupa and Troseth 2011: 194-5). 
In other words, since the the determiner-phrase (DP) “every shareholder in the company” is located 
in a lower hierarchical position than the DP “some manager”, and since it cannot be raised so as to 
become hierarchically higher than it, it cannot bind it.
Further considerations, which yield to a demotion of Stanley's strategy in general, are forcefully put 
forward by Collins (2007). Collins focusses on Stanley's key cases of quantifier domain restriction 
(see Stanley 2000). In short, Stanley takes it that a quantified phrase such as “every question” in the 
sentence “Every student answered every question” must contain a hidden variable in its  logical 
form, thus having the form <every question(x)>; if this were not so, the fact that the domain of the 
second quantified phrase (“every question”) is bound to the domain of the upper-level quantified 
phrase “Every student” cannot be explained. 
Collins wonders what kind of syntactic relation could realise the semantic binding between the first 
and the second quantifier. He offers some answers, which he shows to all be inadequate. A first 
potential syntactic relation could be c-command, (where a node α c-commands another node β in a 
parse-tree if α and β are not hierarchically related, i.e. they do not “dominate” each other, and the 
first branching that dominates α also dominates β). However, c-command already obtains anyway 
between “every student” and “every question”, and it in no way reveals whether any bound variable 
is  there  to  be c-commanded as  well.  A second potential  syntactic  relation  could  be  adjunction 
(where adjunction is a relation that obtains between a node α and a node β when node β is combined 
with node α without this causing any change in the category of α, for instance the phrase category).  
This however, is not plausible either, because adjuncts are generally phrases, and it is difficult to see 
covert  variables  as  equivalent  to  phrases.  Moreover,  adjuncts  are  essentially  optional—their 
specification is not demanded at the level of theta-structure—so their nature is deeply different from 
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the  nature  of  the  alleged  hidden  variables,  which  occupy  positions  that  are  to  be  filled  in  a 
mandatory way. 
Drawing  from  these  considerations,  Collins  concludes  that  the  bound  readings  which  should 
provide evidence of the articulation of hidden variables in logical form are not supported by any 
serious syntactic relation. Syntax offers too little support to Stanley's binding argument, for it's not 
clear which syntactic relation should realise the semantic relation of binding which Stanley notes. 
As Collins has it, the implicit premise that syntax can be derived from semantic considerations is 
not adequately supported:
Overall, Stanley’s argument here, as far as I can see, is premised upon the silent 
assumption  that  the  nature  of  syntax  should  be  read  off  our  stable  semantic 
intuitions. The specific issue of binding is a red herring in so far as the examples 
offered do not in fact exhibit syntactic binding […]; rather, it is particular readings 
that purport to exhibit binding; and even if the readings are correct, nothing would 
ipso  facto  follow as  regards  syntax  save  for  the  c-command  relation,  which  is 
already in place.
To sum up, the concern raised by Neale, Pupa & Troseth and Collins is about the methodological  
orthodoxy of Stanley's arguments. These authors do not question either the logic or the dialectic of 
Stanley's defence; they simply wonder whether the whole project is enough supported by syntactic 
arguments, and after a thorough analysis, they conclude it isn't.
8. Zero-Readings
In this section, I would like to call attention on a phenomenon that I shall call “Zero Reading”. I  
shall describe the phenomenon, make some examples and finally argue that a Stanley-style solution 
cannot  capture  it.  This  will  count  as  a  fault  for  all  those  accounts  inspired  by  Indexical 
Contextualism, and shall prompt us to search for an alternative solution. 
First of all, some simple facts about the way we talk about rain, being ready, being green. Not every 
time we talk about rain do we talk about a place where it rains. Sometimes we are just interested in 
rain  as  a phenomenon  of  rain-falling.  Analogously,  not  every  time  we  talk  about  someone  or 
something being ready do we talk about  a  purpose for  which someone or something is  ready: 
sometimes we may just be interested in  the state of being ready. Similarly, not every talk about 
something being green is  talk about  a way, or part  in which something is  green.  It  seems that 
speakers may also be interested in the simple state of being green. Note that this doesn't imply that, 
when we are engaged in this  kind of talk,  we somehow believe or presuppose that rain-falling 
events do not occur at a place and a time; or that states of being ready are not states of being ready 
for some activity; or that states of being green do not hold in certain respects, or part. I think we can 
safely say that our concept of rain-falling events continues to be one in which these episodes happen 
at a location and a time, and analogous considerations apply to states of being ready and being 
green. Hence, the structure of our concepts of rain events, readiness and greenness does not change, 
even though it seems that in talk we can “bracket”, or “leave in the background” aspects of these 
events and states such as locations, purposes, parts; we can temporarily treat expressions like “to 
rain”,  “being  ready”,  “being  green”  as  if,  at  the  syntactic-linguistic  level,  they  were  monadic 
predicates, even though at the conceptual/semantic level they are clearly more complex.
I shall call a zero-reading of “It's raining”, “X is ready”, “X is green” a reading of an utterance of 
these sentences in which the predicates “to rain”, “being ready” and “being green” are felicitously 
used with a monadic syntactic structure. Here are some examples:
(15) Whenever the temperature and humidity in the air reach a certain level, it rains28;
28 See also Cappelen and Hawthorne 2007 for a similar example.
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(16) When it rains, caution in driving is advised.
(17) I hate it when it rains!
All these sentences speak about episodes of rain-falling as if they were self-contained, self-standing 
events.  In  order  to  see  this,  one  could  try  to  substitute  every  occurrence  of  “it  rains”  with  a 
construction involving the phrase “an event of rain takes/took place”. Thus, sentence (15) states that 
whenever the temperature and humidity in the air reach a certain level, an event of rain takes place. 
Here locational aspects play a role at the truth-conditional level—after all, that an event of raining 
takes place necessarily presupposes that there is a location—but this role need not correspond to 
anything at the syntactic-linguistic level. Sentence (16) is also paraphrasable in the following way: 
whenever an event of rain-falling takes place, caution in driving is advised. Here again locational 
aspects play a role at the truth-conditional level, even though they need not be articulated at the 
level of syntax. Finally, imagine a child who exclaims (17), after being told that his favourite fun 
park, where the whole family was planning to go, is currently under a horrible storm. The child's 
utterance could be read as a disapproval of events of rain in general, to the extent that they prevent 
him from engaging in  entertaining  activities.  Again,  the  fact  that  every  event  of  raining  has  a 
locational aspect is part of the truth-conditions, but it needs play no role at the linguistic-syntactic  
level.
Zero-readings can be extended also to other predicates, such as “ready”:
(18) Whenever she is prepared for an activity, Jill is ready;
(19) John being on time usually depends on Jill's being ready;
I take sentences (18)-(19) to all have occurrences of the predicate “being ready” which are to be 
taken as occurrences of a monadic predicate. Like in the previous cases, we could easily see this by 
substituting every occurrence of “is ready” or “being ready” with the phrase “being in a state of 
readiness”. Thus, sentence (18) states that if Jill is prepared for any activity, then she is in a state of  
readiness.  That  readiness  is  readiness  with respect  to  an activity  is  certainly part  of  the  truth-
conditions, however, the predicate needs not be dyadic in its structure in order for such an aspect to 
be part of what makes an utterance of this sentence true or false. Consider now an utterance of (19): 
it can be viewed as stating that John's being on time usually depends on Jill's being in a state of  
readiness. The relation to an activity certainly plays a truth-conditional role, though nothing follows 
from this concerning the syntactic structure of the predicate. 
Finally, consider the following group of cases involving the predicate “being green”:
(20) Whenever something or some salient part of it looks like this, it is green;
(21) When number X appears on the display, then you are looking at something green;
Both uses of the expression “green” should be such that they speak about the state of being green, 
or the possession of the property of being green. Again both sentences could be paraphrased by 
substituting  occurrences  of  “is  green”  with  phrases  like  “being  in  a  state  of  greenness”  or 
“possessing  the  property  of  being  green”.  Imagine  that  the  speaker  is  teaching  to  a  child  the 
meaning of “green” by ostension. By pointing at a green patch, the speaker utters (20): the content 
of his utterance could be to the effect that whenever something or some salient part of it looks like 
the patch demonstrated, it has the property of being green. Similarly, suppose that a speaker utters 
(21) while illustrating the functioning of a wave-length detecting device to a colour-blind person. 
The content of the utterance could be rephrased as being to the effect that, whenever the device 
gives  wave-length  X as  a  response,  the  person is  looking at  something which  is  in  a  state  of 
greenness. Again the metaphysical fact that greenness is greenness in some respect, or part, is part 
of the truth-conditions but it needs not be articulated at the syntactic level. 
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In this section, I have introduced the phenomenon of Zero Readings, i.e. readings in which we 
speak about raining, being ready, being green etc. while using the relevant predicates as monadic 
and not polyadic.  In the next section I  shall  be concerned with the issue of what  treatment an 
Indexical Contextualist should reserve for these readings.
 
9. Indexicalism on Zero Readings
How should the Indexicalist deal with Zero Readings? Remember that the Indexicalist claims that 
“to rain”, “being ready”, “being green” contain an argument-place in logical form for locations, 
activities and parts respectively. In none of the (15)-(21) examples there is a way of filling in that 
argument-place. This implies that the argument position ultimately remains vacant. This entails that, 
for example, once we assign the correct logical form to sentence (15), it should turn out that it is 
really an open sentence, as in (15'). And the same holds when we write down properly the syntactic 
structure  of  (18)  and  (20):  what  we  discover  is  that,  since  these  sentences  contain  an  extra 
argument-place in logical form, their logical form is really that of open sentences, as one can see in 
(18') and (20'). 
(15') Whenever the temperature and humidity in the air reach a certain level, it rains(x);
(18') Whenever she is prepared for an activity, Jill is ready(x);
(20') Whenever something or some salient part of it looks like this, it is green(x);
Typically, open sentences are true or false only with respect to an assignment of values to the free 
variables that occur in them. The variables that occupy the relevant argument-places therefore need 
to be assigned a value; the argument positions cannot stay vacant or unsaturated, on pains of the 
sentences not expressing any evaluable content. The Indexicalist is therefore bound to the claim that 
(15), (18) and (20), as they stand, are unevaluable until a value is assigned to the free (covert) 
variables that occupy argument positions in their logical form. This strikes me as simply not true: 
each of these sentences expresses an intelligible, evaluable content. 
The  Indexicalist  could  offer  the  following  explanation  of  why  (15),  (18)  and  (20)  express 
intelligible and evaluable contents.  There are two possibilities:  Either the variables are “freely” 
assigned a specific value contextually, or they get bound by a quantifier. Take for example sentence 
(15). The Indexicalist could say that the sentence either receives a “free” reading like that in (15a), 
where the unconstrained location variable gets assigned a value in context (e.g. Paris), or a “bound” 
reading like the one in (15b), in which the quantifier “whenever” binds a locational variable in the 
embedded clause “...it rains”:
(15a) Whenever the temperature and humidity in the air reach a certain level, it rains in Paris;
(15b) For every time t and every place l in which the temperature and humidity in the air reach a 
certain level, it rains at t in l.
(15a) strikes me as utterly mistaken as a way of spelling out a supposed zero-reading. As far as 
(15b) is  concerned, my inclination is  to say that  it  is  fine,  but  this  doesn't  nonetheless put  the 
Indexicalist in a better position. This is because bound readings like (15b) are available even if one 
doesn't believe that “to rain” has a complex syntactic structure  rain(x, y). For example, one may 
believe that a variadic function expands the adicity of “to rain” in appropriate contexts, such as 
quantified ones;  even a proponent  of  the event-analysis  could devise such a  bound reading,  as 
Cappelen and Hawthorne (2007) show (see the following section for more details). What is central 
to the objection I am currently making is that Indexicalism cannot rule out a reading like (15a), on 
the account that the he believes that “to rain” has a dyadic syntactic structure rain(x, y). This implies 
that the option is available to read (15) as an open sentence, which in turn entails that (15a) remains 
at the semanticist's disposal. Moreover, even if the Indexicalist can avoid (15a) by offering a bound 
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reading like (15b),  still  he cannot  explain the fact  that  zero-readings  seem to involve monadic 
predicates by saying that the predicates at issue are  indeed monadic. As opposed to this, the non-
Indexicalist can avoid regarding (15) as an open sentence, thereby avoiding also reading (15a), in 
virtue of the fact that, in her view, “to rain” has a monadic structure rain(x). Envisaging “to rain” as 
having a monadic structure blocks the reading of (15) as an open sentence, and hence blocks (15a). 
Moreover,  it  allows the theorist  to explain the fact that zero-readings seem to involve monadic 
predicates with the claim that they do, after all, involve monadic predicates.
The same moves would apply to examples (18) and (20). Let us examine (18) first. Here again the 
Indexicalist has to explain that, despite the fact that the sentence is not strictly speaking evaluable—
since it has the logical form of an open sentence—utterances of it express intelligible and truth-
evaluable contents.  There would be two ways of explaining this  fact:  either the variable  x that 
occupies the argument-place for activities gets a “free” assignment, according to which activity is 
salient in context (for instance, the activity of skiing); or the variable x gets bound by the quantifier 
“whenever”. The resulting readings are displayed in (18a) and (18b):
(18a) Whenever she is prepared for an activity, Jill is ready for skiing;
(18b) For every activity x she is ready for, Jill is ready for x;
Once again, (18a) looks just wrong as a way of making sense of a zero-reading, while (18b) looks 
fine. However, note that one can interpret (18b) as displaying a bound reading even if one doesn't 
believe  that  “being  ready”  has  a  complex  syntactic  structure  like  ready(x,  y).  One  could,  for 
example, explain it by saying that the presence of the quantifier increases the predicate's adicity; 
even  an  event-semanticist  could  obtain  the  bound reading (see  the  following  section  for  more 
details). So reading (18b) may be correct as a way of making sense of the fact that (18) is perfectly 
evaluable, but it is not exclusively available to the Indexicalist. What is important for the objection 
is that a reading like (18a) is in principle available for the proponent of Indexicalism: this seems to 
be the case, for Indexicalism has it that “being ready” has a dyadic syntactic structure ready(x, y), 
an assumption which cannot in principle block a reading of (18) as an open sentence, and therefore 
cannot block reading (18a). By contrast, a non-Indexicalist view, which has it that “being ready” has 
the monadic structure ready(x), can avoid reading (18) as an open sentence, and therefore can avoid 
reading (18a). A further advantage is that the Indexicalist, who maintains that “to rain” has a dyadic 
structure, can't explain the fact that zero-readings seem to involve monadic predicates with the idea 
that the predicates are indeed monadic, while such a straightforward explanation is available to the 
non-Indexicalist.
The same remarks hold for (20)-(21). The Indexicalist is forced to say that (20) has the logical form 
displayed in (20'), and therefore that it amounts to an open sentence whose evaluation is impossible 
until the free variable associated with “green” is assigned a value. This clashes with the fact that the 
sentence expresses an entirely evaluable content. The explanation that the Indexicalist could invoke 
would be analogous to the one put forth with relation to (15) and (18). Either the variable gets a 
“free” assignment, in accordance with the particular way of being green that is salient in context, 
the result being something like (20a); or the variable gets bound by a quantifier, the result being 
(20b):
(20a) Whenever something or some salient part of it looks like this, it is green on the outer surface;
(20b) For every object x, for every part y which looks like this, x is green with respect to y.
Once again, it seems that (20a) doesn't capture the zero-reading of (20). (20b) seems fine, but again 
note that the bound reading exhibited by (20b) is available at the interpretive level even if one 
doesn't assign the predicate “being green” a complex structure like  green(x, y).  For instance, one 
could explain the bound reading via the effect of a variadic function which increases the adicity of  
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the predicate; one could even adopt an event analysis in which the respect variable y gets bound, yet 
it doesn't occupy an argument-place position, but rather an adjunct-position (more on this in the 
following section). What is truly problematic for the Indexicalist is the fact that (20a) is available, 
which seems to be the case given that Indexicalism regards the predicate “being green” as having a 
dyadic  syntactic  structure  green(x,  y).  This  causes  the  Indexicaist  to  interpret  (20)  as  an  open 
sentence, thus allowing for a reading like (20a). By contrast, the non-Indexicalist view claims that  
“being green” has a simple monadic structure green(x). This blocks the reading of (20) as an open 
sentence and, ultimately, blocks also reading (20a). Furthermore, the non-Indexicalist has a direct 
explanation for zero readings—namely that they seem to involve monadic predicates because they, 
as a matter of fact, do involve monadic predicates; the Indexicalist, by contrast doesn't have access 
to this explanation.
A qualification is called for: of course I don't want to deny that “free assignment” readings (15a), 
(18a)  and  (20a)  are  possible and  indeed  perfectly  admissible readings  of  (15)-(18)-(20),  in 
appropriate occasions. One can imagine a scenario in which a speaker utters any of these sentences 
in order to communicate exactly what (15a), (18a), (20a) express. Note, however, that (15a), (18a), 
(20a) too are available also to the non-Indexicalist. For example, one could account for them by 
invoking the effect of variadic functions, which increase the predicates' adicity whenever a potential 
argument-filler (Paris, skiing, etc.) is salient. Be that as it may, the problem is that (15a), (18a), 
(20a) are inadequate as far as spelling out zero-readings is concerned. My objection that they are 
troubling for the proponent of Indexicalism is therefore relative to the adequacy of (15a), (18a), 
(20a)  as ways of rendering zero-readings, not as ways of rendering  merely possible readings for 
(15), (18), (20) in contexts where this is appropriate.
The final result is that the Indexicalist account cannot capture zero readings, even if these readings 
appear as available in natural language. The reason is that, in the Indexicalist's view, predicates such 
as “to rain”, “being ready”, “being green” are all associated with extra argument-places in logical 
form. This makes it that sentences like (15)-(21) turn out as open sentences, something which goes 
counter to our intuitions. The Indexicalist could try to explain zero readings by resorting to bound 
readings like the ones in (15b), (18b) and (20b). These readings, however, are available also to the 
non-Indexicalist. Ultimately what should trouble the Indexicalist is the fact that readings in which 
the alleged free variable is assigned a value contextually are always available to his view—like 
(15a), (18a) and (20a). These readings cannot be ruled out by the Indexicalist, while they can be 
ruled out by the theorist who believes that “to rain”, “being ready”, “being green” exhibit a monadic 
structure. Ultimately then, if zero-readings stem from our seeming use of “to rain”, “being ready”, 
etc. as monadic predicates, a non-Indexicalist can explain these readings with the idea that we are 
indeed using monadic predicates rain(x),  ready(x), etc. The Indexicalist, on the other hand, has to 
resort to bound readings in order to explain the fact that we seem to use monadic predicates—when 
in fact, in his view, we are using dyadic predicates rain(x, y), ready(x, y), etc.
10. Davidson-Inspired Accounts
In this section, I'll sketch how a Davidson-style analysis in terms of events allows to capture zero-
readings. I'll also argue that, if such an analysis manages to accommodate also bound readings, then 
the overall account is to be preferred to a Stanley-style approach. First, though, I shall spend some 
words of introduction to the fundamentals of a Davidsonian event-semantics. 
In his famous paper “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”, Donald Davidson puts forward an 
analysis of action sentences in terms of events. His starting point is that of accounting for two 
problems associated with this kind of sentences. The first problem may be called the  polyadicity  
problem, and it concerns the fact that, in describing an action, an indefinite number of details could 
be added by making either adverbs or prepositional phrases follow an action verb. For example, one 
can go from sentence (22) to sentences (23) and (24) by simply attaching the words “slowly” and 
“at midnight” to the sentence:
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(22) John buttered the toast;
(23) John buttered the toast slowly;
(24) John buttered the toast slowly at midnight.
The fact that one can get sentences (23) and (24) from (22) may lead one to think that one is  
introducing a new action verb with an  increased adicity every time one specifies a detail of the 
action by means of either an adverb (“slowly”) or a prepositional phrase (“at midnight”). This, 
however, can't be right for many reasons (see Davidson 1967: 83-4). The second problem, which we 
may call the equivalence problem, corresponds to the need to license the derivation of different but 
logically equivalent descriptions of the same action. It seems desirable to license inferences of the 
following form: if it is the case that I drove my spaceship to the Morning Star, and the Morning Star  
is the Evening Star, then it is the case that I drove my spaceship to the Evening Star. 
Davidson's basic idea is that verbs of action are predicates of events. So for example, the verb “to  
kick” is thought of as having logical form kick(e), and its denotation is the set of events that are 
kicking-events. This conception imposes a change in the way the logical form of action sentences is 
represented. The change consists in conceiving action sentences as taking the form of  existential  
quantifications over events. Thus, in Davidson's analysis, the logical form of “Shem kicked Shaun” 
is the following:
(25) (Ex)(kicked (Shem, Shaun, x))
To be read as “There is an event x such that x is a kicking of Shaun by Shem”. This solution allows 
the  theorist  to  solve  both  the  polyadicity  and  the  equivalence  problem.  With  relation  to  the 
polyadicity problem, it allows to say that the expanded sentences obtained from the addition of 
adverbial  expressions,  like  (23)  and  (24),  do  not  involve  the  introduction  of  a  new verb  with 
increased adicity.  This  follows from the fact  that,  in  Davidson's  framework, the addition of an 
adverbial expression is tantamount to the introduction of a new conjunct and not to the creation of a 
new slot in argument structure. This can be seen once one re-analyses a sentence like (24), whose 
logical form now becomes
(24') (Ex) buttered(John, the toast, x) & slow(x) & at midnight(x).
To be read as: “There is an event x such that x is a buttering of the toast by John and x is slow and x 
is  at  midnight”,  where  adverbial  modifiers  such  as  “slowly”  and  “at  midnight”  are  treated  as 
conjuncts.  This  analysis  proves  definitely  more  perspicuous;  one  remarkable  feature  is  that  it 
explains the fact that (24) entails (23) and (22) simply by appealing to conjunction elimination. This 
explanation connects to the solution to the polyadicity problem, in that it  allows one to regard 
complex action sentences such as (22)-(24) not as introducing new verbs with higher adicity, but as 
containing the same verb with the same adicity, only followed by an extra conjunct. With relation to 
the  equivalence  problem,  the  account  licences  inferences  like  the  Morning  Star/Evening  Star 
inference simply in virtue of the substitutivity of coreferential terms. 
As one may expect, the event analysis can be applied also to sentences that do not contain action 
predicates. As Davidson himself writes:
In general,  what kinds of predicates do have event-places? Without pursuing this 
question  very  far,  I  think  it  is  evident  that  if  action  predicates  do,  many  other 
predicates that have little relation to action do. (Davidson 1967: 93) 
Action  verbs  generally  suggest  both  agency  and intentionality,  i.e.  they  suggest  that  the  event 
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corresponding to the action was brought about by an “author” and that the author had the intention 
to perform the action. Verbs that have nothing or little to do with action are verbs that describe 
exactly “events” in the sense of “happenings” (“The bottle fell from the shelf”) but also states (“The 
room is dark”) and processes (“The pot is heating”)29. An event analysis can be applied to all of 
these groups of verbs, as in Parsons's 1990 Events in the Semantics of English, which provides a 
development and refinement of Davidson's semantics. 
We spoke of zero-readings of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready” and “The leaves are green” as involving 
the rather informal notions of  events of rain-falling,  states of readiness,  states of greenness. This 
terminology was helpful because it allowed one to see how language users speak about rainings, 
readiness and greenness as if they involved monadic predicates denoting monadic properties. This 
informal  terminology  can  now be  made  to  fit  into  the  formal  framework  of  event-analysis.  I 
therefore propose to adopt an event-analysis for those verbs which can generate zero-readings; these 
readings shall be rendered as existential quantifications over an event-variable. So for example, 
zero-readings of “It rains” shall receive the logical form in (26), to be read as “There is an event x 
such that x is a rain-falling”; zero-readings of “Jill is ready” shall receive the logical form in (27), to 
be read as “There is an event x such that x is a being ready of Jill”; and zero-readings of “The leaves 
are green” shall receive the logical form in (28), to be read as “There is an event x such that x is a 
being green of the leaves”:
(26) Ex (rain-falling, x);
(27) Ex (Jill, ready, x);
(28) Ex (green, the leaves, x);
(The representations in (26)-(28) follow the Davidsonian proposal for the sake of simplicity, but of 
course one could choose a more fine-grained representation such as Parson's, in which thematic 
roles (such as “AGENT”, “THEME”, “EXPERIENCER” etc.) are written as separate conjuncts). 
What is of interest for present purposes is that the essential feature of the Davidsonian account, i.e.  
the idea of quantification over an event-variable, is exactly what is needed in order to account for 
zero-readings. Other authors such as Cappelen and Lepore (2002), Cappelen and Hawthorne (2007) 
and Recanati (2010) already adopted an event analysis for sentences such as “It's raining”, in order 
to account for a range of interpretive phenomena that Indexicalism has trouble in capturing. I am 
very  much sympathetic  to  the  strategy adopted  by  these authors,  and I  am therefore  happy to 
embrace the same analysis; the significance of this move for the purposes of this investigation will 
appear more clearly in section 11, where I shall draw a methodological moral which will hopefully 
cast new light on the event-semantics framework and will strengthen the motivation for adopting it.
At this point, the challenge for anyone who opts for an event-analysis is to guarantee that it not only 
explains those phenomena, such as zero-readings, that Indexicalism cannot capture, but also that it 
offers the same benefits originally advertised by the proponents of Indexicalism. Since an account 
for the phenomenon of binding was among the advantages originally afforded by this theory, the 
question becomes: can an event-analysis explain binding? Authors such as Cappelen and Hawthorne 
(2007) have accepted this challenge. Very roughly, Cappelen and Hawthorne's solution consists in 
analysing sentences like (29) as having the logical form in (30):
(29) Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains;
(30) For every time t of John's lighting a cigarette, there is an event e of rain-fallingf(t) occurring at t' 
and t' = t.
29 There are at least two categories that one may place under the general heading of “mere happenings”. On the basis 
of Vendler (1957), one could distinguish between accomplishments, i.e. events that require a previous stage of 
elaboration and have a culmination (making a cake, washing the car) and achievements, i.e. events that are 
instantaneous (reaching the summit, arriving, delivering).
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The bound reading is explained in the following way: the temporal quantification expressed by the 
phrase “Every time John lights a cigarette” acts as a domain-restrictor for the existential quantifier 
“there is an event of rain-falling”. As one can see, the existential quantification in (29) is restricted 
through a function f(t) from the times t of cigarette-lighting to the events e of rain-falling. Binding 
as a semantic phenomenon is therefore turned, at the level of semantic analysis, into a phenomenon 
of restriction of domain of quantification. Cappelen and Hawthorne advocate more than one reason 
for recommending this analysis of binding, as contrasted with Stanley's Indexicalist approach.
An aspect in which Cappelen and Hawthorne's account does better than Stanley's is the existentially 
quantified versions of (29), like for example “Whenever someone lights a cigarette, it rains”. In 
order for the bound reading to obtain here, a variable should be bound not only by the temporal 
quantifier “whenever”, but also by the quantifier over individuals “someone”. This cannot be done 
in  Stanley's  account,  for  the  verb  “to  rain”  is  only  associated  with  a  temporal  variable  t.  On 
Cappelen and Hawthorne's account, however, the problem is easily solved, because there is a way 
of representing individuals  via variables in the sentence's  semantic  analysis.  The result  is  (31), 
where use of variables for individuals is in boldface: 
(31) For all times t, for all events e, for all people p, if e is a smoking by p at t, there is an event at t 
that is a raining f(e).
Consider now the following example:
(32) Whenever the river overflows, there is panic.
Here we want a bound reading to tell us that for all the times t the river overflows, there is panic at t 
in the place where the river overflows. We also want the binding to track the fact that the river can 
overflow in more than one place at the same time, and so that there can be panic in more than one 
place. This cannot be done if, following Stanley, we postulate a function from times t when the river 
overflows to the place where the over-flowing happens at t, because there would be no way for the 
function to “bring us” to different places: what we need is a way of quantifying over episodes of 
over-flowing, such that (32) can be made true by more than one overflowing at the same time t (at 
different places). Cappelen and Hawthorne's account delivers (33):
(33) For all times t and all events e, if e is an overflowing of the river at t, there is an event that is a 
panicking f(e) at t.
Where f(e) is precisely the function we wanted from events of overflowing (and the related places) 
to events of panicking.
In this section we have seen the potential advantages of an event-analysis of predicates such as “to 
rain”; this kind of analysis (a) captures zero-readings, i.e. readings in which predicates such as “to 
rain”,  “being  ready”,  “being  green”  seem  to  be  treated  as  monadic;  and  (b)  explains  the 
phenomenon of binding at least as well as (if not better than) Indexicalism. What remains to be 
ascertained, in light of the methodological concerns raised in section 7 of this chapter, is whether an 
event-analysis can be considered a bona fide syntactic theory, or if it is to play any different role.
11. Philosophical Analysis or Empirical Hypothesis? 
Although I do agree with its proponents that an event-analysis may be superior to an Indexicalist 
hypothesis, I do have some remarks as to what these authors take themselves to do and as to what 
they are ultimately “allowed” to do, philosophically speaking. It could be argued that, in light of the 
objections raised by Neale, Collins and Pupa and Troseth, if it is true that the Indexicalist's proposal 
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cannot be taken seriously as a syntactic option, and if a Davidson-style account is put forth as an 
alternative to Indexicalism, then it cannot be taken seriously as a syntactic account either. The best 
it can achieve is offering a logico-philosophical analysis of a range of phenomena that have to do 
with how language users interpret certain sentences.  My aim in this section is to scrutinise the 
consequences of this line of argument.
To start with, we need to distinguish between two different enterprises one can engage in, while 
trying to explain, capture, clarify or simply make sense of a semantic phenomenon: on the one 
hand, one can choose to engage in the task of providing a logico-philosophical analysis  of the 
phenomenon.  This may imply using the resources  of  a formal  language in  order  to  isolate  the 
structure of a certain range of linguistic constructions and eventually clear up the confusion and 
ambiguity generated by natural language. If the problem is, for example, a confusion concerning the 
truth-value of sentences like “The king of France is bald”, then the Russellian theory of descriptions 
is an example of how one can employ the resources of a formal language like that of first-order 
logic with predicate calculus in order to give a determinate answer to the question. 
Another road one could take is that of working out a theory of syntax for a certain portion of natural 
language.  The  enterprise  here  is  radically  different  in  that  it  implies  delivering  an  empirical  
hypothesis as to what the real structure is of a certain kind of linguistic construction; any claim in 
this field needs therefore further justification, based on observable, related syntactic phenomena that 
can act  as evidence.  Suppose,  for example,  we need to  explain the ambiguity of the following 
sentence:
(34) Visiting relatives can be boring.
Here we know that there is a lexical ambiguity, in that the word “visiting” can be interpreted both as 
the continuous form of the verb “to visit” and as an adjectival modifier. This, however, cannot be all 
there is to the ambiguity of (34); (34) is not entirely analogous to a typical case of lexical ambiguity 
like “John went  to  the bank”.  The reason is  that,  depending on the  interpretation  of  the word 
“visiting”, the role of the word “relatives” in the sentence changes. If “visiting” is to be read as the 
present continuous of “visit”, then the word “relatives” results the object of the predicate to visit; if 
“visiting” is to be read as an adjective, the word “relatives” no longer satisfies this role, but simply 
acts as the modified subject of the whole sentence. This connection between the interpretation of the 
lexical items and the structure of the sentence is not what makes the word “bank” ambiguous, for 
interpreting the word “bank” as “river side” or “financial institution” leaves the structure of the 
sentence altogether unmodified. We therefore need to account for the ambiguity of the sentence in 
terms different from the lexical ones. Here a genuine syntactic assumption is called for, in the sense 
that a new syntactic category besides the lexical one has to be countenanced in order to correctly 
describe  the  ambiguity  at  interest.  The  category  of  “phrase”  becomes  useful  here:  Using  the 
“phrase” category allows to correctly locate the ambiguity at the level of the complex “visiting 
relatives”, rather than at the level of the simple word “visiting”, and therefore allows to accurately 
set apart the structures of the two distinct sentences that could be expressed by an occurrence of 
(34). We can spell out the structure of the sentence under the first reading as in (34a), while in the 
case of the second reading, the structure can be represented as in (34b):
(34a) [[[Visiting]VP [relatives]NP]NP [can be boring]VP]S
(34b) [[[Visiting]AP [relatives]NP]NP [can be boring]VP]S
The  differences  between  the  first  and  the  second  reading  concern  the  structure  of  the  phrase 
“Visiting relatives”, and not just the lexical category of the word “visiting”. In (34a), the occurrence 
of “visiting” constitutes a verb phrase and since the verb “to visit” is transitive, the occurrence of 
“relatives” fulfils the object role; in (34b), the occurrence of “visiting” constitutes an adjectival 
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phrase and, an adjective being a modifier, it calls for a modifiee—in this case, the occurrence of 
“relatives”. Postulating phrases is a substantial syntactic move, which needs further justification on 
purely syntactic grounds (see Chomsky 1957, Radford 1981, 1988). For the present purposes, the 
example is just aimed at giving an illustration of what it means to take a syntactic route in order to 
explain a semantic phenomenon. 
Stanley himself in his “Context and Logical Form” somewhat indirectly mentions the difference 
between a purely logico-philosophical and syntactic task, by distinguishing two different senses of 
the notion of “logical form”:
[T]here is certainly no one uniform use of the expression “logical form”. But there 
are two distinguishable senses underlying its many differing usages. [...] Perhaps the 
most prevalent tradition of usage of the expression “logical form” in philosophy is to 
express what one might call the revisionary conception of logical form. According to 
the revisionary conception, natural language is defective in some fundamental way. 
Appeals to logical form are appeals to a kind of linguistic representation which is 
intended to replace natural language for the purposes of scientific or mathematical 
investigation. Different purposes may then give rise to different regimentations of 
natural language. [...] According to the second tradition of usage, which one might 
call  the  descriptive conception of  logical  form, the logical  form of  a  sentence is 
something like the ‘real structure’ of that sentence (e.g., Harman (1972)). On this 
approach, we may discover that the ’real’ structure of a natural language sentence is 
in fact quite distinct from its surface grammatical form. Talk of logical form in this 
sense  involves  attributing  hidden  complexity  to  sentences  of  natural  language, 
complexity which is ultimately revealed by empirical inquiry. (Stanley 2000: 391-2)
As I understand Stanley, the notion of revisionary conception of logical form can be related to what 
I have called a logico-philosophical analysis, while the notion of descriptive conception of logical 
form can be related to the task of working out an empirical hypothesis as to the real syntax that 
underlies certain linguistic expressions.  It  is important to emphasise that,  in his article,  Stanley 
pursues exactly the second, descriptive sense of “logical form” in trying to give an account of the 
way pragmatic effects are traceable to logical form. As he himself writes:
To say that all context-dependence is traceable to logical form in a revisionary sense 
of  “logical  form”  might  be  taken  to  be  the  trivial  claim  that,  for  purposes  of 
interpretation, one should replace natural language by a notation in which all context-
dependence is  made explicit  in the favored notation.  It  is not in this sense that I 
intend the thesis. [...] It is in [the descriptive] sense that I intend the thesis that all  
context-dependence is traceable to logical form. What I shall defend is the claim that 
all  truth-conditional  context-dependence  results  from  fixing  the  values  of 
contextually sensitive elements  in the real structure  of natural language sentences. 
(Stanley 2000: 391-2, my italics).
Stanley's  arguments  and,  in  general,  the  arguments  offered  by  proponents  of  Indexicalism are 
therefore to be understood as supporting claims at the level of syntactic theory. However, a certain 
number of theorists (Neale, Collins and Pupa and Troseth) objected that these arguments fail to give 
the appropriate support that any thesis in the theory of syntax calls for: the arguments set forth by 
these authors were surveyed in section 7 of the present chapter. Now, one may wonder whether the 
same objections could be raised against the event-based accounts advocated by Cappelen & Lepore, 
Cappelen & Hawthorne and Recanati. I suspect that these approaches would fare no better than 
Indexicalism, if their methodological pedigree was tested by a syntactician: just like Indexicalism, 
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Davidsonian approaches posit entities such as hidden event-variables in order to explain a number 
of logical and semantic relations. This, as we have seen, is methodologically insufficient in order to 
license any claim as to the real syntactic structure of sentences. The upshot is that opponents of 
Indexicalism, just like Indexicalism itself, cannot aspire at providing a respectable syntactic claim. 
This conclusion has immediate effects on the value of using an event-analysis in order to capture 
bound  readings.  The  event-analysis  seems  to  offer  nothing  more  than  a  perspicuous  truth-
conditional representation of what is going on in cases of binding, but it can offer no  syntactic  
analysis in the technical sense.
This should not be surprising: After all, this is what event-analyses are meant to do in general. As 
Terence Parsons suggests in the following passage, event-analyses have a clarificatory rather than 
empirical scope:
I  seek a  theory  that  describes  the  semantics  of  sentences  of  English,  that  is,  the 
relations between words of our language and things in the world. One convenient 
way of accomplishing this is to find a way to associate “logical forms” with English 
sentences. These “forms” will be sentences of a formal language that has already 
received  a  clear  semantic  treatment.  The  semantics  of  the  English  sentences  in 
question will then be that of their associated logical forms. This intermediate route 
from the English to its semantics—via logical forms—is for the sake of convenience 
only.  The semantics  of  the  formal  language I  use  (mostly  the  ordinary  predicate 
calculus) is already widely known, and so I can presuppose a great deal of familiar 
work in formal semantics. (Parsons 1990: 11).
It appears evident to me that Parsons is here using a “revisionary” notion of logical form, as Stanley 
would call it. Sentences in the predicate calculus are used as “proxies” for the display of the truth-
conditions of sentences in the natural language; their role is that of making the truth-conditions of 
these natural language sentences as accessible as possible to the theorist. As helpful as this can be, it 
seems evident to me that it doesn't and it cannot lead to any substantial syntactic, empirical claim.  
This  implies  that,  even  with  relation  to  binding,  the  event-analysis  responds  to  a  need  for 
clarification  of  the  phenomenon,  but  it  doesn't  ultimately  support  any  claim as  to  how things 
actually stand with respect to the real underlying syntax of the language. The conclusion is that, just 
like the Indexicalist's proposal, the Davidsonian proposal in terms of event-semantics does not and 
cannot probably aspire to be a genuine syntactic theory. 
These  considerations  may  trigger  the  following  question:  Is  an  explanation  in  terms  of  event-
semantics then what Stanley addresses as “the trivial claim that, for purposes of interpretation, one 
should replace natural language by a notation in which all context-dependence is made explicit in 
the favored notation.”? Have proponents of the event-analysis made just a minor discovery, with no 
empirical  value? I  do not  think so.  I  think  that  one can regard  the  accomplishments  of  event-
analysis  as  at  least  revealing  something  at  the  empirical  level,  namely  with  respect  to  the 
conceptual resources that are employed in the interpretation of sentences like “Everywhere I go, it 
rains”.
My insight is that an event-analysis, even though it doesn't straightforwardly open the way to any 
syntactic  claim,  tells  something  of  empirical  relevance  about  how we  interpret  predicates  and 
sentences by making explicit the way we organise the concepts that are invoked by any use of these 
linguistic items. Every time we use the predicate “rain”, the correct use of the concept RAIN that we 
thereby invoke is such that it requires that every event of raining is located at a certain time and in a  
certain location; that is, the concept of RAIN is associated with conceptual constraints concerning 
which restrictions have to be observed in order for the use of the concept to count as correct. One 
can  therefore  view  spatio-temporal  aspects  as  already  “packed  into”  the  notion  of  event  that 
underlies our talk of rainings. These aspects do not determine “argument-places” or “slots” in the 
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logical  form  of  the  predicate  “to  rain”;  they  do  not  reveal  any  syntactic  structure;  they  are 
constitutive of the concept of  RAIN, and operate at a purely conceptual level. Nothing, however, 
stands in the way of associating these conceptual constraints with linguistic representations in a 
formal language like that of predicate calculus. This can be done for the sake of convenience, clarity 
and perspicuity.  One can therefore cash out talk of rain as involving quantification over event-
variables, therefore obtaining sentences like (26). Once one introduces event-variables, it becomes 
apparent that this method of representation allows also to make sense of bound readings, as in (30),  
(31),  (33).  The tools  of  event-semantics  allow the  theorist  to  regard  expressions  characterising 
events as interacting with expressions that quantify over times and locations. The only assumption 
needed  is  that  the  quantifier  expressions  bind  time-variables  t and  location-variables l that 
determine functions from these ts and ls to events occurring at (or relevantly related to) these ts and 
ls. This assumption is exactly what is presupposed by Cappelen & Hawthorne's treatment of binding 
in the event-analysis framework (see section 10).
An event-analysis should not, therefore be dismissed as “trivial”, because devoid of any empirical 
relevance; in fact, it can be treated as an empirical hypothesis, even though not one concerning 
syntax. Event-analyses suggest empirical hypotheses concerning the way we employ concepts, and 
they do that by shedding light on conceptual relations, as for example relations between a rain event 
with  its  temporal/spatial  aspects  and  other  events  with  other  temporal/spatial  aspects,  as  in 
“Everywhere I  go,  it  rains”.  An explanation of binding within the event-analysis  may therefore 
commit the theorist to substantial empirical hypotheses, even though not in the same area in which 
the  Indexicalist  is  working.  The  event-analysis  still  qualifies  as  a  relevant  alternative  to 
Indexicalism if one accepts the methodological points made by Neale  at alia, and agrees that no 
respectable  syntactic theory  is  forthcoming  from  purely  interpretive  considerations  like  those 
concerning binding. The relevance of an event-analysis lies in its potentially illuminating aspects of 
our conceptual (and, for competent language users, also semantic) competence, i.e. aspects of our 
capacity to organise thought (and discourse) about certain matters. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I focussed on the issue whether conceptual constraints could be regarded as hidden 
positions in logical form, on the model provided by Indexical Contextualism. By arguing against 
Indexical Contextualism itself, my aim was to indirectly show that this account is not a good way of 
cashing out conceptual constraints. Throughout the chapter I proceeded in the following way:
• I introduced two examples of Indexical Contextualism, one due to Szabó, the other due to 
Rothschild and Segal. My view was that the differences between these two versions of the 
theory are marginal, to such an extent that they can be considered as mere variants of the 
same formal tool;
• I then moved to the evidence that has been offered as a ground for Indexicalism, which 
consists of a series of examples involving the phenomenon of binding, i.e. of co-variation of 
the  values  of  a  variable  with  the  values  introduced  by  a  quantifier-operator.  The 
conclusiveness of the evidence hangs on the assumption (called “Binding Assumption”) that 
every case of semantic binding coincides with a case of syntactic binding;
• I surveyed four objections that have been levelled against the argument from binding. The 
first  objection points at  the inconclusiveness of the binding strategy: the argument from 
binding  fails  to  establish  the  strong  conclusion  that  un-embedded occurrences  of  “It's 
raining”  carry  a  hidden  argument  position  for  rain-location,  and  only  establishes—if  it 
establishes anything—the weaker and less exciting conclusion to the effect that  embedded 
occurrences of “It's raining” contain such a hidden position;
• The second objection charges the binding strategy of overgeneration: since bound readings 
can be reproduced indefinitely, this entails (via the Binding Assumption) that an indefinite 
number  of  hidden  indexical  positions  can  be  posited.  This  entails  sanctioning  new 
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dimensions of context-dependence for the expressions at issue, which may go against our 
semantic  intuitions.  Overgeneration  challenges  are  threatening  for  the  Indexicalist  only 
insofar as they take as their point of departure genuine cases of semantic binding;
• The third objection has to do with the fact that the alleged hidden indexicals do not share 
some of the basic features of genuine, non-hidden indexicals, such as perspectivality, giving 
rise to a priori truths and taking part to anaphoric relations;
• The fourth objection is a methodological point: the binding argument reaches conclusions 
about  syntax  by  making  considerations  about  semantics.  This  is  not  what  orthodox 
methodology in syntax prescribes. As a result, Indexicalism cannot be approved as a fully 
respectable syntactic theory;
• My argument against Indexicalism starts from consideration of the phenomenon of  zero-
readings, i.e. readings of e.g. “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green” in which 
the predicates “to rain”, “being ready” and “being green” are felicitously used as monadic;
• I  argue  that  Indexicalism  cannot  capture  zero-readings.  Given  that,  according  to  the 
Indexicalist, the predicates mentioned above all include a hidden argument-place in logical 
form, it follows that sentences that give rise to zero-readings are all  open sentences, i.e. 
sentences that are unevaluable, absent an assignment for variables. But sentences associated 
with zero-readings are not unevaluable—they are perfectly intelligible and evaluable. The 
Indexicalist can explain this fact only by supposing that either the variables receive a “free” 
contextual assignment of values or that they get bound by a quantifier. The first explanation 
is  fully  inadequate  as  an account  of  zero-readings;  the  second seems fine,  but  it  is  not 
available exclusively to the Indexicalist. Even an non-Indexicalist could have the resources 
to work out the bound reading. The real problem for the Indexicalist is that he cannot rule 
out  the  other  reading—the  one  in  terms  of  open  sentences,  something  which  can  be 
successfully done by the theorist who envisages predicates like “to rain”, “being ready” etc. 
as exhibiting a monadic syntactic structure. Ultimately then, the non-Indexicalist can explain 
the fact that zero-readings seem to involve monadic predicates with the idea that they  do 
involve  monadic  predicates;  this  explanation  is,  quite  obviously,  not  available  to  the 
Indexicalist (who assigns a more complex structure to these predicates).
• I illustrate how a Davidsonisn event-semantics is exactly what we need in order to account 
for zero-readings. Event-analyses also can accommodate bound readings, as Cappelen and 
Lepore (2007) show;
• It could be objected that, if Indexicalism cannot be taken seriously as a syntactic option, 
neither  can  the  event-analysis.  Proponents  of  Davidsonian  accounts  should  therefore  be 
content with having provided a mere logico-philosophical analysis of binding. I argue that 
this  is  not true.  Even if  event-analyses do not allow any syntactic claim,  they may still 
commit  their  proponents  to  claims  regarding the  structure of  our  conceptual  (semantic)  
competence. Adopting an event-analysis is not simply a way of achieving clarity through the 
use of formal notation; it can be endorsed as a way of making empirical claims as to how we 
organise concepts in thought and discourse.
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Chapter 4
Conceptual Constraints and Relative Truth
Let  us  take  stock.  In  Chapter  1, I  defended  the  view  that  semantic  under-determinacy  is 
distinguished from other phenomena of semantic under-specification by the fact that the former, 
unlike  the  latter,  is  explainable  in  terms  of  just  under-articulation.  After  having  faced  this 
foundational issue, in Chapter 2 I moved to the problem of how communication is possible, despite 
the semantic under-determinacy of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green”, etc. There I 
introduced  the  idea  that  comprehension  of  utterances  of  such  sentences  is  guided  by 
conceptual/semantic constraints rather than by purely pragmatic demands. In Chapter 3, I focussed 
on  the  possibility  of  regarding  conceptual  constraints  as  hidden  indexical  elements,  therefore 
examining  a  view  known  as  Indexical  Contextualism.  My  arguments  focussed  mainly  on  the 
motivations that have been offered to support an Indexical Contextualist solution, and in particular 
on whether Stanley's “Binding Argument” is genuinely compelling. I went through a number of 
reasons that theorists offered to emphasise that Stanley's argument is not entirely successful, and 
raised two points of my own. The first point has to do with the fact that Stanley's argument from 
binding seems to be driven by considerations of  uniformity whose application is contentious, and 
which give rise to the unwarranted background assumption to the effect that, if a certain syntactic 
pattern is to be postulated in sentence S as embedded within operator Q, then that same syntactic 
pattern  has  to  be  postulated  in  sentence  S  when unembedded.  The  second point  relied  on  the 
acknowledgment of so-called zero readings, as e.g. readings in which “It's raining” is regarded as a 
monadic predicate. I argued that the approach defended by Stanley would issue wrong predictions 
as  to  the  truth-conditions  of  zero-readings.  I  subsequently  adopted  an  event  analysis of  zero 
readings.  Incidentally,  by  adopting  this  analysis  theorists  have  been  able  to  re-frame  binding 
phenomena in a way that doesn't lead to Indexical Contextualism. I have argued that adoption of an 
event analysis doesn't force one to any syntactic commitment as to convert syntactic positions, even 
though it still has an empirical import: Event analyses may prove fruitful in order to represent the 
structure of conceptual/semantic constraints. 
However, discarding Indexical Contextualism does not establish a conceptual constraints approach 
in  a  conclusive  way.  The  theorist  who  is  keen  on  reducing  conceptual  constraints  to  already 
acknowledged components of a formal semantic system may flag the possibility that conceptual 
constraints may receive yet another formal representation. On the account I will scrutinise in this 
chapter,  conceptual  constraints  are  to  be represented as  parameters  to  which  the  truth-value of 
under-articulated sentences is made relative. So for example, the conceptual constraint according to 
which rain has to fall somewhere is to be represented as a locational parameter l  in the sentence's 
circumstances of evaluation. The constraint operates in such a way that, for every utterance of “It's 
raining”, the  truth-value (and not the content) of such an utterance is going to be relative to the 
value taken by the l-parameter in the relevant circumstances of evaluation. 
Accounts in terms of relative truth for more or less restricted classes of sentences have been already 
developed in several areas of research in semantics and philosophy, mostly in very recent years. In 
what follows, I'll consider the different components that make up a proposal that one may want to 
call “Relativist”, and I shall test their adequacy to provide an account of the role of conceptual 
constraints in utterance comprehension.
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1. The Basic Move: Extra Parameters
In this section, I shall introduce the “basic move” that characterises a semantics typically called 
Relativist.  As  we  will  see  throughout  the  chapter,  this  “basic  move”  characterises  not  only 
Relativism in its most proper formulation; it also underlies a form of Contextualism that is usually 
called “Non-Indexical”. It is important to present the basic move, Relativism and Non-Indexical 
Contextualism  separately,  so  as  to  avoid  any  conflation  between  the  theories  and  the  formal 
framework that  lies  behind them. Though they share the basic  move,  Relativism and Indexical 
Contextualism have significantly different implications, and should not therefore be taken as two 
mere variants of the same theoretical configuration. 
The background apparatus for the “basic move” is the picture of semantics adopted by theorists 
since the work of Kaplan (1989), Lewis (1980) and Stalnaker (1970), which can be thought of as 
providing a  two-tiered semantic  machinery.  At  a  first  stage,  the  semantics  takes  as  its  input  a 
sentence  s together with the context  c in which it is uttered: the input may be represented as a 
couple  <s, c>.  The  <s, c> couple is mapped onto the content that  s expresses in  c. Content is 
usually formally cashed out as an  intension30, i.e. a function from circumstances of evaluation to 
extensions. At the second stage, the intension maps the utterance's circumstances of evaluation onto 
an extension, i.e. the the truth-value that the utterance has in those circumstances.
It is important to distinguish, within this framework, the notions of  context of utterance and of 
circumstance of evaluation. The role of a context of utterance is that of determining the content of 
all those expressions which do not have a fixed content across utterances. These are the so-called 
indexical  expressions,  whose content  typically  varies  according to  how a certain  feature  of the 
context  of  utterance varies.  Thus,  the content  of  “here” varies  with the  place  of  utterance,  the 
content of “now” varies with the time of utterance, the content of “I” varies with the utterer and so 
on. A context could be represented as an n-tuple of coordinates  <u, t, p> each standing for one 
feature: u for the utterer, t for the time, p for the place and so on. On the other hand, a circumstance 
of evaluation has the role of determining a situation in which the truth-value of the utterance can be 
fixed. A circumstance of evaluation will consist of a set of parameters, though the question may 
arise as to what parameters may be included in a circumstance of evaluation. In general, whether a 
parameter is part of the circumstances of evaluation depends on whether there is an intensional 
operator  which  can  affect  evaluation.  Let  me  illustrate.  Suppose  that  an  expression  such  as 
“Possibly” embeds a sentence such as “Pigs fly”. This expression behaves as a sentential operator: it 
takes a sentence s and forms a more complex sentence of the form “Possibly, s”. More importantly, 
this is an intensional operator insofar as it takes sentence s and “looks” at the truth-value of s at a 
possible world wi (accessible from the actual world @). In other words, the operator determines a 
function from circumstances of evaluation in which the world-parameter  w has been shifted to a 
possible world  wi  (accessible from the actual world @), to truth values. An analogous reasoning 
applies to temporal and locative expressions such as “in the past”, “somewhere”, and so on. These 
expressions all take a sentence s and “look” at the truth-value of  s at some time ti (preceding the 
time of utterance tu) or at some location li (different from or identical with the location of utterance 
lu). In doing this, they determine functions from circumstances of evaluation whose parameters may 
have been “shifted” to a time ti or a location li, to extensions.
Which formal representation should be given of a circumstance of evaluation? A circumstance of 
evaluation is standardly represented as an n-tuple of coordinates, and it usually includes only a 
possible world-coordinate, the corresponding index being written as <w>; more parameters may be 
added, for example temporal parameters  t and locational parameters  l, but this depends on one's 
30 It is not clear whether the content of a sentence s in a context c is also a proposition. Kaplan (1989) believes that 
contents are propositions in the sense of “what is said” in a context of utterance. Stalnaker (1970) also believes that 
contents are propositions in the sense of being the objects of our attitudes. By contrast, Lewis (1980) argues that 
contents cannot be propositions (what is said, the objects of our attitudes) because propositions do not behave 
compositionally. That's the reason why Lewis' semantics, though it envisages the level of context, it doesn't envisage 
a level of the content-in-context.
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view concerning the corresponding intensional operators. 
Monadic truth for an utterance of a declarative sentence s in a context c can be spelled out with the 
help of the notion of truth at the index of the context, in this way: a sentence s uttered in a context c 
is true tout court iff it is true at the index of the circumstances of evaluation i of the context c. If the 
index of the circumstances of evaluation includes just a possible world parameter w, a sentence s in 
a context c will be true tout court iff it is true at the world of the context wc.
The fundamental traits of the underlying semantics having been outlined, the “basic” move that 
Relativists and Non-Indexical Contextualists share is quite easy to pin down: it consists in positing 
extra parameters in the circumstances of evaluation of the sentence at interest—in addition to the  
possible-world parameter w—with respect to which truth-value is made to vary.
An example of  ante litteram relativist approach is  Temporalism (see Prior 1968, Kaplan 1989). 
According to Temporalism, the truth-value of a sentence like “Carl is showering” is relative not 
only to a possible world  w,  but also to a time  t.  This implies that the proposition  that Carl is  
showering is invariant in content across times, though it can be true or false depending on the value 
of the time-parameter in the circumstances of evaluation. For example, the proposition may be true 
at time t1 iff Carl is showering at <w, t1> and false at t2 iff Carl is not showering at <w, t2>.
The  model  exemplified  by  Temporalism has  been  replicated  in  giving  the  semantics  of  other 
expressions in various areas of discourse. In general, the standard move is that of adding an extra 
coordinate  in  the  circumstances  of  evaluation,  corresponding  to  the  feature  of  context  truth  is 
supposed to be relative to. Thus for example, Lasersohn (2005) argues that the truth of utterances of 
sentences containing predicates of personal taste like “tasty” and “delicious” is to be relativised to a 
world-time-individual triple <w, t, i> rather than to a world-time couple <w, t>. This, according to 
the author, is a fully legitimate modification of the Kaplanian system:
Kaplan treated the contents of sentences as (characteristic functions of) sets of time-
world pairs. Contexts were assumed to provide a time and world, and a sentence N 
was defined as true in a context c iff the time and world of c were in the content of 
N. [...] What I would like to suggest is simply this: Instead of treating the content of 
a sentence as a set of time-world pairs, we should treat it as a set of time-world-
individual triples. We assume that the context will provide an individual to be used 
in evaluating the sentences for truth and falsity, just as it provides a time and world; 
hence a sentence may be true relative to John but false relative to Mary. (Lasersohn 
2005: 662-3)
An  extra-parameter  approach  has  been  adopted  to  deal  with  epistemic  modals,  too.  Egan, 
Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005) argue for the postulation of truth relative to centered worlds, i.e. 
to  triples  <w, t,  i> of  a  world,  a  time and an individual  in  order  to  account  for  the following 
phenomenon related with the use of epistemic “might” (and “must). Suppose that Moriarty asserts 
“Holmes might  be in Paris”;  Watson is  in London, listening to Moriarty while unseen. Watson 
knows Holmes is not in Paris. He can concede that Moriarty spoke truly with his utterance, and yet 
this would not entail for him that, since Holmes might be in Paris, he (Watson) doesn't know that 
Holmes is not in Paris. An extra-coordinate approach to the truth of epistemically modal statements 
allows the theorist to say that, since the truth-predicate is relative to <w, t, i>, i.e. the ascription of 
truth to a certain assertion is always performed with respect to an centered world, from the fact that 
Watson acknowledges that Moriarty spoke truly, it doesn't follow that he spoke truly with respect to 
a Watson-centered world; so the acknowledgement of the appropriateness of Moriarty's assertion 
doesn't threaten Watson's knowledge of Holmes' whereabouts, because such acknowledgement is, 
so to speak, relative only to a Moriarty-centered world.  Similar treatments of epistemic modals, 
based essentially on the addition of one or more parameters in the index of the circumstances of 
evaluation, can be found in Egan (2007) and von Fintel and Gillies (2008).
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Kompa  (2002)  gestures  at  a  treatment  in  terms  of  extra-parameters  for  epistemic  verbs  like 
“knows”: as she argues, “know” is to be regarded as context-sensitive, though not as indexical in 
the same way as “here” (contrary to what Epistemic Contextualists such as Unger (1984, 1986), 
DeRose (1992, 1995) and Cohen (1986, 1987) claim). What changes from context to context is not 
the  content  of  the  word  “know”;  i.e.,  it  is  not  the  case  that  a  different  knowledge-relation  is 
expressed  in  each  different  context.  Rather,  the  interests,  purposes  and  goals  of  the  speaker 
determine a standard of knowledge which affects the truth-value of knowledge ascriptions. Kompa's 
informal  considerations  receive a formal organization by MacFarlane (2005b).  The first  step in 
MacFarlane's strategy is that of positing an extra epistemic parameter  e in the circumstances of 
evaluation, with respect to which the truth of assertions of the form “A knows that P” varies. Only 
after having done the “basic move” he claims that a knowledge attribution “A knows that P” is true 
iff A knows that P at the world wu of the context of utterance and at the epistemic standard ea of a 
special context, which he calls “context of assessment”, i.e. a context in which the proposition as 
uttered at wu is evaluated.
The extra-parameters move has been adopted in order to cope with semantically under-determined 
expressions as well,  such as “green” or “ready”.  At the root of the strategy lies a general idea  
(defended e.g.  by  Predelli  2005a,  b)  about  the  relation  between semantically  under-determined 
expressions and context, a very straightforward development of which is certainly the postulation of 
extra-parameters. On the one hand, traditional semantic systems such as those designed by Kaplan 
and Lewis are concerned with assigning functions from “points of evaluation” to truth-values to 
pairs <s, c> consisting of a clause s (or interpreted logical form) and an index of the context c (a list 
of parameters: agent, time, location). Provided absence of indexicality, different utterances of the 
same sentence certainly have the same intension. Nevertheless, variability of truth-value despite 
sameness of intension seems possible. In Travis' notorious green leaves example, the sentence “The 
leaves are green” is uttered by Pia in two different occasions within the same context: on the first  
occasion,  while talking with with a photographer,  in  the second occasion,  while  talking with a 
botanist. The two utterances have intuitively different truth-values, though obviously being assigned 
the same intension by the semantics.  What could cause the different evaluations? According to 
Predelli, the conversants' interests and standards determine different “applications” of the intension, 
that is to say that they determine different sets of circumstances in which the utterance might be  
true/false (see 2005a: 366). This implies that Pia's utterance is true in the first occasion because the 
photography-related interests that are operative in the conversation determine circumstances which 
are such as to make the sentence “The leaves are green” true. Pia's utterance is however false in the 
second occasion because, given the botanist's interests and standards, the circumstances determined 
by such interests are such as to make the sentence “The leaves are green” false. Predelli's idea is 
that of maintaining the traditionally accepted Kaplan-style semantics while allowing that the same 
proposition be evaluated at different circumstances, whose configuration and composition is shaped 
by the conversants' interests and standards. As one may realise, the idea that the conversationalists' 
interests,  goals  and presuppositions determine different  circumstances  is  altogether  neutral  with 
respect to the structure one may want give to the index of the circumstances at the formal level. 
Predelli  remains  uncommittal  in  this  sense:  he  is  happy  to  still  regard  these  circumstances  as 
“possible worlds”, if by “possible world” one merely means a “point of evaluation”. Instead of 
using possible worlds, one may as well use world-time pairs, or even situations in the sense of 
Barwise and Perry (1983): for example,  authors such as Corazza & Dokic (2007, 2010) Barba 
(2007) and, to a certain extent, Gauker (2010) take this latter option. The technical details are not 
important as the general underlying idea. What matters to us is that the semantics of expressions 
such as “green” or “ready” might be formulated by tinkering with the parameters included in the 
circumstances of  evaluation of  a Kaplan-Lewis-Stalnaker  machinery—something which appears 
feasible at first sight.
Indeed, the path is short between devising a solution such as that set forth in broad outline by 
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Predelli  and adopting  extra-parameters  in  the  circumstances  of  evaluation.  MacFarlane  (2007a, 
2009) suggests  such a  strategy,  therefore  explicitly  opting  for  the  “basic  move”,  i.e.  therefore 
explicitly  sanctioning  a  strategy  in  terms  of  extra-parameters  in  the  semantic  treatment  of 
semantically  under-determined  expressions.  As  he  writes,  in  order  to  account  for  the  truth 
conditions of e.g. “The leaves are green” or “Chiara is tall”, we can change the way we think of 
circumstances of evaluation. 
Possible  worlds  will  presumably  be  one  component  of  our  circumstances  of 
evaluation (otherwise,  what will  our modal  operators shift?)  but nothing stops us 
from introducing other components as well. […] So let's think of a circumstance of 
evaluation as  an ordered pair  consisting of  a  world and a  “counts-as” parameter, 
which  we can  model  as  a  function  from properties  to  extensions  (function  from 
worlds to extensions). The “counts” as parameter is so called because it fixes what 
things have to be like in order to count as having the property of tallness (or any 
other property) at a circumstance of evaluation. (MacFarlane 2007a: 246)
MacFarlane's way of cashing out the circumstances of evaluation for utterances of “The leaves are 
green”, “Chiara is tall”, etc. is thus in line with the “basic move”, insofar as it regards the truth-
value of these sentences in a context as being relative not only to a possible world w, but also to a 
“counts-as” parameter c, i.e. to a standard which determines, for each occasion, what falls and does 
not  fall  in  the  extension  of  a  relevant  predicate  (“green”,  “tall”),  thus  affecting  the  overall 
utterance's evaluation.
Thus far, we have simply reviewed the various cases in which the basic move has been opted for,  
without mentioning whether this is or not problematic. Though the authors that subscribe to it are 
confident  that  the  move  is  not  particularly  problematic  (prima  facie,  it  doesn't  lead  to  any 
contradictory nor counterintuitive results), some have worried that it's not sufficiently motivated. 
The reason is that, as I mentioned previously, the addition of extra parameters has been justified by 
its original proponents (e.g. Kaplan and Lewis) with the presence of operators which are capable of 
shifting the value of these parameters. As Kaplan and Lewis explicitly write:
A circumstance will usually include a possible state or history of the world, a time, 
and perhaps other features as well. The amount of information we require from a 
circumstance is linked to the degree of specificity of contents, and thus to the kinds 
of operators in the language. (Kaplan 1989: 502)
Often the truth (-in-English) of a sentence in a context depends on the truth of some 
related sentence when some feature of the original context is shifted. “There have 
been dogs”  is  true  now iff  “There  are  dogs”  is  true  at  some time  before  now. 
“Somewhere  the  sun  is  shining”  is  true  here  iff  “The  sun  is  shining”  is  true 
somewhere. “Aunts must be women” is true at our world iff “Aunts are women” is 
true at all worlds. “Strictly speaking, France is not hexagonal” is true even under 
low  standards  of  precision  iff  “France  is  not  hexagonal”  is  true  under  stricter 
standards. [...] I emphasized that context-dependence was multifarious, but perhaps 
the shifty kind of context-dependence is less so. The list of shiftable features of 
context may be quite short. I have suggested that the list should include time, place, 
world, and (some aspects of) standards of precision. I am not sure what more should 
be added. (Lewis 1980: 27)
As Lewis and Kaplan grant in the above passages, the justification for adding a world-coordinate in 
the circumstances of evaluation is provided by the presence of what, in formal terms, is called 
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modal operators, like “possibly” and “necessarily” (but also the modal “must” and “might”). These 
operators are described as “shifting” the world of evaluation. This allows for the assessment of 
sentences  like  “Possibly  p”  and  “Necessarily  p”.  The  semantics  of  these  sentences  standardly 
requires that one “checks” whether p holds at worlds w1, w2, … wn accessible to @ (where @ could 
belong to this set too). Since there is a strong  prima facie analogy between modality and tense, 
Temporalism has been built  up on analogous grounds. The addition of a time-coordinate in the 
circumstances of evaluation has been justified by the presence of temporal operators, like “It was 
the case that” and “It will be the case that”. These operators are described as “shifting” times, thus 
making it possible to evaluate sentences such as “It will be the case that p” and “It was the case that 
p”. Roughly, the assessment of such sentences requires that one “shifts” the time of evaluation from 
tn to tn+m, in the case of future operators, or from tn to tn-m, in the case of past operators, and checks 
whether  p holds at those times. Similar considerations hold for locational parameters, which are 
allegedly justified by operators such as “somewhere”, and for standards of precision parameters, 
which are allegedly justified by the presence of expressions like “strictly speaking”.
Now a question may arise  whether  the presence of operators is  the only way of justifying the 
addition of extra-parameters. Are the cases of modality and tense paradigmatic? If they are, then 
anyone who wants to accomplish the basic extra-parameter move in an “orthodox” way should be 
able  to  justify  the  addition  of  an extra-parameter  by displaying some operator  in  the  language 
capable of shifting the value of that parameter. The problem is that not all the recent proponents of 
the basic move can do that, or at least it is questionable that they can do that. For example, with 
respect to undertaking the basic move on “know”, Stanley (2005a) points out that, if we wish to 
countenance an epistemic standards parameter in the circumstances of evaluation, there must be an 
operator in our language that is purported to shifting it; but in the case of knowledge predicates, 
there seems to be no such operator31; it would be odd for the Relativist to maintain that knowledge 
ascriptions are true relative to an epistemic parameter while at the same time acknowledging that 
there are no epistemic operators; for this reason it would be wrong for the Relativist to postulate  
such an epistemic parameter in the first place. The postulation of extra-parameters in this area of 
discourse would turn out as blatantly unjustified and hence not completely respectable as a semantic 
theory of “know”. One can see that the structure of the argument is general enough in order for it to 
be extended to other versions of the basic move—e.g. the introduction of an epistemic parameter e 
for epistemic modals, of an individual parameter i, or a counts-as-parameter c. I shall leave this task 
to the reader. 
It is not my interest at this point of the chapter to assess whether the various versions of the basic 
move are grounded enough on considerations as to the presence of operators that may “shift” the 
features that these parameters represent. I will just assume, for the sake of my arguments against  
Relativism and Non-Indexical Contextualism, that the basic move is motivated or at least there are 
prospects  for motivating it.  In  the rest  of  this  chapter,  my attention will  mainly be devoted to 
assessing, on the basis of other kinds of arguments, whether conceptual constraints can be traced to 
31 The Relativist who wishes to point at such epistemic operators may be tempted to refer to the work of Ludlow 
(2005). In the paper, Ludlow defends a contextualist position about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions by 
noting that there are felicitous utterances of, for instance, “She doesn't know that p, by the standards of chemistry”. 
Here the expression “by the standards of chemistry” is supposed to make the epistemic standards for “know” 
explicit. If this is so, then this suggests that there's room for such epistemic standards at the level of the truth-
conditions of knowledge ascriptions, even when speakers do not explicitly articulate them. The Relativist could take 
advantage of Ludlow's results and claim that expressions such as “by the standards of chemistry”, “according to 
John” etc. ought to be regarded as epistemic operators. Stanley (2005a: 164) opposes this move (whether or not 
advanced by the Relativist), and argues that these expressions do not have any special epistemic import, though they 
can be felicitously appended to knowledge ascriptions, thus forming sentences like “Mary knows that p, by the 
standards of chemistry”, or “According to John, Mary knows that p”. This is easily demonstrated by the fact that the 
same expressions can be appended to sentences that do not contain any epistemic terminology, and therefore cannot 
be used to make knowledge ascriptions. For example: “By the standards of chemistry, what is in the Hudson river is 
not water”; “According to John, the bus will arrive soon”. 
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anything similar to the extra-parameters introduced via the basic move.
2. Extra Parameters and Conceptual Constraints 
I take conceptual constraints to be ways of structuring and organising thought and discourse on 
determinate matters;  as I argued in  Chapter 2,  there is reason to believe that these conceptual 
(semantic) constraints guide us in our understanding of utterances of semantically under-determined 
expressions. Since the notion of conceptual constraint does not presuppose any particular formal 
framework, towards the end of the second chapter I speculated that there could be more than one 
way to represent  conceptual  constraints  within  different  formal  semantic  theories.  After  having 
explored and discarded the idea that conceptual constraints may be hidden indexical elements (see 
Chapter 3), the idea that we are currently exploring is whether conceptual constraints can be seen 
as parameters of evaluation. In this section, I will be mainly concerned with providing examples of 
how this particular implementation of conceptual constraints can be accomplished.
Let us consider an occurrence of “It's  raining”.  Conceptual constraints  on the concept  of  RAIN 
dictate that every instance of a sentence that contains the predicate “to rain” be true iff the raining is 
occurring at a location. This truth-conditional result ensues, I argue, from one's exercise of one's 
conceptual/semantic competence on the concept RAIN (and the predicate “to rain”), which is such 
that it dictates that the standard format for thought and discourse about matters of rain necessarily 
contemplates a locational aspect. Since, in the framework at issue, constraints have to operate on the 
truth-value of sentences, this entails that one's application of conceptual constraints makes it that the 
truth-value of the sentence “It's raining” will be relative to a locational parameter  l, that is, any 
occurrence of the sentence “It's raining” will have the following truth-conditions:
(1) “It's raining” is true <w, l> iff it's raining at w, l.
Let us now consider the sentence “Jill is ready”. In light of the conceptual/semantic constraints that 
govern the use of the concept BEING READY (and the predicate “being ready”), any competent user 
of this sentence may be in a position to determine that instances of sentences like “X is ready” are 
true  iff  X is  ready for  a  certain  purpose,  or  activity.  This  truth-conditional  result  is  putatively 
obtained  by means  of  one's  exercise  of  one's  competences  on  the  readiness  concept/predicate, 
insofar  as  the  standard  cognitive/discoursive  format  on  the  notion  of  being  ready  requires 
necessarily a purpose- or activity- element. Since in the framework currently explored, conceptual 
constraints  must  correspond  to  parameters  of  evaluation,  this  entails  that,  by  applying  one's 
conceptual/semantic competences, one will be able to determine that any occurrence of the sentence 
“Jill  is  ready” will  have its  truth-value relativised to  a purpose-parameter  p. The related truth-
conditions will be expressed as follows:
(2) “Jill is ready” is true <w, p> iff Jill is ready at w, p.
Let us now consider “The leaves are green”. Correct uses of the concept of BEING GREEN (and the 
related predicate “being green”)  should comply to the constraint that greenness is attributed to an 
object X under a certain respect. Application of such a constraint by a competent concept/word-user 
is expected to imply that every instance of “X is green” will be true iff X is green in a certain  
respect. In the framework under consideration, the constraint has to operate on truth-value; this 
entails that instances of “X is green” will have a truth value relative to a respect r, in the following 
way:
(3) “The leaves are green” is true <w, r> iff the leaves are green w, r.
We have made some examples of how an extra-parameters strategy could be used to implement the 
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idea that conceptual (semantic) constraints seem to guide comprehension of semantically under-
determined  sentences.  Is  this  strategy  also  advantageous?  The  benefits  of  seeing  conceptual 
(semantic) constraints as parameters on the determination of truth-value may be more than one.
First  of  all,  the extra-parameters  move as  a  way of  representing  conceptual  constraints  doesn't 
commit the semanticist to any thesis concerning additional covert elements in the sentence's syntax. 
As we saw in  Chapter 3, Indexical Contextualism cannot but be committed to the existence of 
positions marked at the level of deep syntax or logical form. The main reproaches directed at the 
Indexical Contextualist were that the positing of such positions in logical form is not completely 
motivated by the lights of the syntactician's methodology. As opposed to Indexical Contextualism, 
an account based on extra parameters is not threatened by this kind of criticism, for the claim that 
truth is relative to extra-parameters only affects the structure of the T-sentences associated with 
sentences of the natural language: its commitments are therefore not at a syntactic level, but at a 
metalinguistic level. All one has to commit to is that we switch from T-sentences in which, like in 
(4),  truth  is  relative  to  just  w,  to  T-sentences  in  which,  like  in  (5),  truth  is  relative  to  more 
parameters than just w:
(4) “It's raining” is true at w iff it's raining at w.
(5) “It's raining” is true at w and l iff it's raining at w and l.
This change may not be free of costs as well; however for the present purposes it's enough to note 
that a revision of the meta-language in which the truth-conditions of semantically under-determined 
sentences  are  expressed  doesn't  bring  with  it  any  unwarranted  commitment  to  extra  syntactic 
structures at the level of the object language.
Second of all, the extra parameters move is compatible with a semantic picture in which intuitive 
comprehension  of  an  utterance  of  a  semantically  under-determined  sentence  is  possible,  even 
though there is no particular context from which to extract the elements that are missing from the 
sentence's truth-conditions.  This is  what proved impossible in a framework like that of Radical 
Contextualism  (see  Chapter  2),  in  which,  unless  a  particular  context  is  available,  intuitive 
comprehension of a semantically under-determined expression was predicted as impossible. It is 
worth noting that, in an extra-parameters framework, the intuitive comprehension of a semantically 
under-determined sentence just depends on the speaker's mastery of (a) a compositional semantics 
for English; and (b) the conceptual/semantic apparatus associated with such a language. What the 
speaker needs to do is (a') associate the correct linguistic meaning to occurrences of the sentence 
and (b') master the related conceptual/semantic aspects enough in order to know that the truth of a  
sentence containing these-and-these terms is relative to these-and-these parameters. No knowledge 
of any particular context is required in order for the speaker to intuitively grasp the truth-conditions 
of an utterance of a semantically under-determined sentence. So for example, if the proponent of the 
extra-parameters move is right, in order for the speaker to intuitively grasp the truth-conditions of 
“It's raining”, it would be sufficient that the speaker knows the content conventionally expressed by 
the  sentence  (<that  it's  raining>)  and  sufficiently  masters  the  concept  RAIN (and  the  related 
predicate) in order to know that any occurrence of “It's raining” is true or false only with respect to 
a circumstance which includes a location l.  These two factors are sufficient in order to gain an 
intuitive knowledge of the truth-conditions of an utterance of “It's raining” even out of a context, 
i.e. knowledge of the conditions in which any arbitrary utterance of the sentence would be true or 
false. Analogous considerations apply for “being ready” and “being green”.
In this section I have illustrated how what I call conceptual (semantic) constraints can be integrated 
into  a  Kaplan-Lewis-Stalnaker  system by  cashing  them out  as  parameters  in  the  index  of  the 
circumstances of evaluation. The view would have it that that conceptual (semantic) constraints 
determine the structure of the index of the circumstances of evaluation by providing a specific 
parameter. For instance, conceptual (semantic) constraints on “to rain” determine that an utterance 
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of “It's  raining” is  true  at  <w, l> iff  it's  raining  at  w, l—where  l is  a  location-parameter.  The 
advantages  of  such  a  view  are  the  following:  (i)  it  avoids  commitments  to  covert  elements 
articulated at the level of syntax; (ii) it allows for intuitive comprehension (i.e. of comprehension of 
what the utterance says in any arbitrary context).
3. Non-Indexical Contextualism vs. Radical Relativism
As I already mentioned, what I have called the “basic move”, consisting in the addition of an extra-
parameter  (or  more  extra-parameters)  in  the  index  of  the  circumstances  of  evaluation  can  be 
developed in  two ways,  one  determining a  position  called  Relativism,  the  other  determining a 
position called Non-Indexical Contextualism. The two accounts share the extra-parameters insight, 
and  they  depart  with  respect  to  the  question  of  what fixes  the  value of  the  postulated  extra-
parameter(s). Each account is suited to explaining different phenomena and to be contrasted with 
different  rival  accounts.  In  this  section,  I  will  present  both  Relativism  and  Non-Indexical 
Contextualism, by highlighting their differences in basic claims and implications.
The first account I shall present on is known as Non-Indexical Contextualism (but also as Moderate  
Relativism). Its central statements are:
[Extra-parameters] 
The truth of certain sentences is relative to an extra parameter in the circumstances of evaluation;
[Context of Utterance] 
The value of the extra parameter is systematically fixed by the context of utterance. 
This  theoretical  position  plays  a  role  in  several  debates32.  In  order  to  get  clear  about  the 
potentialities of the view, we shall therefore briefly survey the contributions that the position makes 
to the debates in which it is defended.
The notion of “Non-Indexical Contextualism” was elaborated originally (by MacFarlane 2007a, 
2009) within a debate about the nature of the context-sensitivity of some expressions, as e.g. “red”, 
“tall”, “ready”. The view was meant as an alternative to both Indexical Contextualism and sheer 
Invariantism  about  the  semantics  of  these  expressions,  in  that  it  would  highlight  a  way  for 
expressions to depend on context—as an Indexical Contextualist would want—by at the same time 
expressing  the  same  content  in  every  context—as  an  Invariantist  would  want.  Non-Indexical 
Contextualism is a position that escapes the usual objections against Indexical Contextualism, and 
that explains the same range of data as Invariantism. Not only that: as a matter of fact, it is also the 
only position that arguments typically taken to support Indexical Contextualism really manage to 
support. These points are clearly illustrated by MacFarlane. 
One  typical  argument  that  is  levelled  against  Indexical  Contextualism by Invariantists  (as  e.g. 
Cappelen and Lepore 2005, Hawthorne 2004) concerns the fact that,  at  least  when it  comes to 
expressions such as “tall”, “ready”, “know”, we can make perfectly accurate homophonic reports of 
the utterances of other speakers, even when we are in a context that differs relevantly from the one 
of the original utterance as to one or more truth-conditionally salient elements. So for example, 
suppose that A utters “The cake is ready” in context C1, meaning that it is ready to be eaten. B 
reports A's utterance in a context C2 in which the cake's being ready to be thrown in someone's face 
32 In the following sections, I shall only talk about two of the debates in which the position plays a role, even though 
actually there is a third field in which Non-Indexical Contextualism has been adopted, in the intersection between 
semantics proper and the philosophy of mind. So for example, Recanati (2007) adopts a form of Non-Indexical 
Contextualism (or Moderate Relativism, in his terminology) in order to capture some essential features of the 
content of de se thoughts, i.e. thoughts concerning the perspective of the self. The debate in which this position is 
defended is only marginally related to the question of semantic under-determinacy and context dependence, and I 
shall therefore not devote too much attention to it here (for basic reference see Lewis 1979, Perry 1977, 1979, 
Castañeda 1999, Evans 1982).
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is  discussed,  by  uttering  “A said  that  the  cake  us  ready”.  Still,  even  though  the  context  has 
relevantly changed, the content of the reported sentence is not influenced: The report made by B 
when she utters “A said that the cake is ready” says something true about what A said. This means 
that  the  predicate  “ready”  doesn't  exhibit  any  context  sensitivity  that  one  could  equate  with 
indexicality. Notice that this cannot happen whenever we are homophonically reporting a sentence 
which contains an indexical, like for example “I”. In (6), the report made by B is clearly inaccurate 
in  that,  as context changes relevantly (in C2 the speaker is  B, not A),  B's  report  comes to say 
something false concerning what A said:
(6) In C1, A: “I'm ready”
      In C2, B: “A said that I am ready”
As  MacFarlane  observes,  the  Invariantist's  argument  undercuts  only  the  Indexical  version  of 
Contextualism,  and  it  leaves  the  Non-Indexical  variety  untouched.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Non-
Indexical  Contextualism can explain  why B's  report  of  “The cake  is  ready” is  successful.  The 
explanation is that, since it's not the content of the sentence “The cake is ready” that varies with 
context, but it's rather its truth-value, a difference in salient elements in the context of the report  
cannot have any effect on the sentence's content. The sentence “The cake is ready” has therefore the 
same content both in A's original utterance and in B's report: This is enough to explain the accuracy 
of B's report, i.e. the fact that B manages to say something true about what A said.
MacFarlane also observes that the main argument that has been put forward in order to support 
Indexical Contextualism in the end just supports Non-Indexical Contextualism. This argument is 
known as the Context-Shifting Argument (I myself covered it in Chapter 1). The structure of the 
argument is the following: one is invited to consider two utterances of the same sentence s in two 
different contexts C1 and C2. Intuitively, it seems that, in C1, s says something true and, in C2, s says 
something false. Proponents of Indexical Contextualism argue that if the two utterances differ in 
truth-value, they must differ in content too. Hence, the sentences must contain an indexical element. 
MacFarlane  argues  that  this  conclusion  can  be  established  only  if  the  proponent  of  Indexical 
Contextualism can prove that the two utterances take place in the same circumstances. However, it 
is  very  likely  that  the  circumstances  of  the  two  utterances  differ,  and  the  Non-Indexical 
Contextualist  has the means to represent this  change by construing the index of the utterance's 
circumstances of evaluation as containing an extra-parameter, which gets a different value in C1 and 
C2.  In  light  of  these  considerations,  and in  absence of  any demonstration  from the  part  of  the 
Indexical  Contextualist  that  the  circumstances  of  the  two  utterances  do  not  differ,  the  only 
conclusion that follows from the Context-Shifting Argument is that the two utterances of  s have 
different truth-values because truth-value depends on the different circumstances of evaluation of C1 
and C2 respectively. Both sentences, however, express the same content across the two utterances, 
and therefore cannot contain any covert indexical element.
Non-Indexical  Contextualism also  plays  a  role  in  a  parallel  debate,  focussed  on the  notion  of 
faultless disagreement (Wright (2001, 2006), Kölbel (2002, 2004a, b)). (The fact that, in this debate, 
Non-Indexical Contextualism is often called “Relativism” should not mislead us, for the central 
claims of this view are still [Extra-parameters] conjoined with [Context of Utterance]). The debate 
on faultless disagreement revolves around the following problem: people often disagree on matters 
of taste, or on morality, or aesthetics; since taste, morality and aesthetics are amenable to subjective 
preferences  or  inclinations,  disputes  in  this  area  have  been  called  disputes  of inclination.  For 
example, the following are typical examples of disputes of inclinations:
(7) A: “Guacamole is tasty”
     B: “No, you are wrong. Guacamole is not tasty”
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(8)  A: “Eating meat is right”
      B: “I disagree. Eating meat is not right”
(9) A: “The Taj Mahal is beautiful”
      B: “Not at all. The Taj Mahal is not beautiful”
Now what is peculiar about disputes of inclination like those in (7)-(9) is that, on the one hand, they 
seem  to  involve  genuine  contradictions:  after  all,  the  speakers  involved  in  the  disputes  use 
expressions like “No”, “Not at all”, “You are wrong”, “I disagree”. However, it also seems that none 
of the speakers needs to be making a mistake, i.e. it seems that neither of the speakers is at fault 
about how things are. The disagreements that take place in this area of discourse are therefore called 
faultless disagreements. 
Words expressing properties depending on subjective inclinations (“tasty”, “right”, “beautiful”) all 
give rise to examples of faultless disagreement. It is therefore a desideratum for any theory aiming 
at describing the semantics of these expressions that it captures both the element of contradiction 
and  the  element  of  faultlessness  that  characterise  disagreement  in  this  area  of  discourse,  thus 
explaining the notion of faultless disagreement (or alternatively, explaining it away).
One  option  that,  at  first  sight,  captures  well  the  faultless  nature  of  utterances  in  disputes  of 
inclination,  is  Indexical  Contextualism (for a proposal that  has been identified as going in this 
direction, see e.g Harman 1978). The Indexical Contextualist just needs to say something like this: 
predicates like “tasty”, “right”, “beautiful” are all associated with an extra argument-slot in logical 
form corresponding to a standard of evaluation (either a taste-standard, or a moral-code-standard, or 
an aesthetic-canon standard). This makes it that, for every utterance of e.g. “Guacamole is tasty”, 
the content-in-context of the sentence is relativised to a standard of evaluation—perhaps that of the 
speaker, the resulting contents being, for instance, that guacamole is tasty by the standards of A, or 
that guacamole is tasty by the standards of B. Indexical Contextualism can therefore say that A and 
B are faultless, as long as it is true that guacamole is tasty by the standards of A as well as that  
guacamole is tasty by the standards of B. The problem is that Indexical Contextualism cannot say 
that the two speakers A and B are asserting contradictory contents,  for the proposition that A's 
assertion expresses, namely  that guacamole is tasty by the standards of A  is  entirely compatible 
with the  proposition asserted by B, that guacamole is tasty by the standards of B. What is going on 
between A and B is very similar to what would obtain if A said “I wear glasses” and B denied it by 
saying “I don't wear glasses”: even though they superficially contradict each other, at the level of 
the proposition expressed one can see that they are really just  saying two different  things  (see 
Wright 2001, Kölbel 2004, Lasersohn 2005)33. 
In  addition  to  this,  Indexical  Contextualism  brings  to  a  distorted  conception  of  the  topic  of 
conversations in the areas of discourse covered by its treatment. Moving to the field of morality, for 
example, the subject matter of a discussion over whether it is right or wrong to eat meat would not  
be,  according to Indexical Contextualism, the issue of eating meat,  but it  would rather be each 
speaker's moral code. However, we do not generally take speakers who are engaged in a discussion 
33 Indexical Contextualism can be amended so as to be able to account for the contradiction element. The trick consists 
in dropping the idea that the content of, e.g., “tasty” is fixed by the standards of taste of each individual speaker. 
Some theorists have suggested a version of Indexical Contextualism according to which the content of “tasty” varies 
relative to the standards of a collective entity, such as the conversationalists' group, or their community of reference 
(Glanzberg 2007, Sundell 2011). This looks like a viable proposal, even though doubts may be raised as to the 
conversational dynamics it gives rise to (see Lasersohn 2005, Sundell 2011). Alternatively, the Indexical 
Contextualist may preserve the idea that the content of each utterance of “tasty” is speaker-dependent; to rescue 
disagreement he has to posit that the parties involved in the dispute are presupposing a common standard (see Lopez 
de Sa 2008,). Concerning this proposal, it's not clear whether it accounts for real disagreement or merely for the 
appearance of disagreement which the conversationalists determine in their situation (see e.g. Coliva and Moruzzi, 
MS); moreover, it doesn't seem that the speakers involved in a taste dispute necessarily presuppose that they have 
the same taste-standards (see Baker 2012).
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on  morals  to  really  be  talking  about  their  own  moral  codes:  it  seems  that  there's  a  common 
conversation topic they are focussing on (whether eating meat is or is not right) and they express 
their judgements about (see Kölbel 2004b).
Non-Indexical Contextualism seems to solve the difficulties that afflict Indexical Contextualism. 
First, it makes sense of the intuition that there is a contradiction between the contents asserted by A 
and B for, according to Non-Indexical Contextualism, the proposition that A asserts and B denies is 
the same (namely,  that guacamole is tasty). A and B are not asserting two distinct contents; their 
exchange focuses on the very same proposition, that Guacamole is tasty, and contradiction arises to 
the  extent  that  A  accepts  it  while  B  accepts  the  negation  of  it.  Secondly,  Non-Indexical 
Contextualism doesn't distort conversation topics. Since the content-in-context of sentences is not 
specific  as  to  any standard  of  evaluation,  this  entails  that  when people  are  discussing  taste  or 
morals, the topic of each conversant's assertion is not his or her own taste-standards or moral-code-
standards, but it is rather the very issue being under discussion, e.g. the rightness of eating meat.
Despite the seeming superiority of Non-Indexical Contextualism over the Indexical account, some 
theorists have argued that the benefits offered by Non-Indexical Contextualism do not ultimately 
help  capture  the  contradiction  element  that  characterises  faultless  disagreement.  MacFarlane 
illustrates this point in his MacFarlane (2007b: 25). His reasoning goes as follows: even though the 
truth of what A says (that guacamole is tasty) entails the falsity of what B says (that guacamole is  
not tasty) in any circumstance of evaluation, nevertheless Non-Indexical Contextualism states that 
the contents asserted by the two speakers are to be evaluated at the circumstances of each speaker's 
context of utterance. We may say that, if the speakers are both sincere, the content <that guacamole 
is  tasty> is  true  at  A's  context  (which  contains  A's  taste-standards),  while  the  content  <that  
guacamole is not tasty> is true at B's context (which contains B's taste-standards). But then, since 
each content is true at each speaker's circumstance of evaluation, there is no contradiction, and 
hence no disagreement.
A similar point holds, according to MacFarlane, with respect to the phenomenon of retraction (see 
MacFarlane MS, chs. 1, 5). Performing a retraction means, informally, rejecting an assertion that 
one has made previously. For example, if at t1 I believe that Carl is married with Paula, I may assert 
“Paula is Carl's wife”. Suppose however that, at  t2, I learn that Carl is only engaged with Paula. 
Then I may be inclined to reject my previous assertion on the account that it was false to say that 
Paula  is  Carl's  wife  because  Paula  is  just  Carl's  fiancée.  Performing a retraction thus  involves 
reassessing one's previous claim—for example, reassessing at  t2 my claim at  t1 to the effect that 
Paula is Carl's wife. Retraction poses a problem for Non-Indexical Contextualism, in the following 
sense: if, as Non-Indexical Contextualism has it, the truth of our utterances is fixed at the very 
context of our utterances, then it becomes impossible to re-assess the correctness of a previous act 
of assertion, for the correctness of that act is fixed once and for all at the context in which the  
assertion was originally made. Retraction would then be impossible, in that we could not re-assess 
our previous utterances: their truth-value would be unchangeable, because fixed once and for all by 
the circumstances of the context of utterance.
The distinctive claim of Non-Indexical Contextualism, to the effect that the truth of utterances is 
fixed at the circumstances of evaluation of the context of utterance, thus entails serious limitations 
in  capturing  phenomena  such  as  disagreement  in  matters  of  inclination  and  retraction.  These 
limitations  are  what  motivated  some  authors  to  elaborate  a  refined  version  of  Non-Indexical 
Contextualism, which for many deserves the name of Relativism. The second theory that stems 
from the extra-parameters approach that I will now describe is what is usually called just Relativism 
(or Radical Relativism). Its core claims are:
[Extra Parameters]
The truth of certain sentences is relative to an extra parameter in the circumstances of evaluation;
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[Context of Assessment]
The value of the extra parameter is fixed by the so-called “context of assessment”, which is to be 
kept apart from and is wholly independent of the context of utterance. 
The evident novelty introduced (Radical) Relativism is the notion of “context of assessment”. What 
is a context of assessment? Metaphysically speaking, a context of assessment is just like a context 
of utterance: it may be thought of as a set of parameters corresponding to various features, as for 
instance the individual  who is  doing the assessment,  the place,  time, taste-standards,  etc34.  The 
difference between a context of utterance and a context of assessment is in their role. In a context of 
utterance, a proposition is put forward through an act of speaking; in a context of assessment the 
assertion of a proposition is  simply assessed as true or false. This distinction between context of 
utterance and context of assessment entails that one and the same speech act can be evaluated in an 
indefinite number of contexts of assessment. The context of assessment determined by the context  
of utterance will for sure have a central role in common assertive practices, however this role is not 
acting as a constraint on the correctness and incorrectness of assertions any longer:  For in this 
framework  it  is  legitimate  to  assess  a  certain  assertion  from  a  context  of  assessment  that  is 
completely unrelated to the context of utterance. 
This gives good prospects for capturing both disagreement and retraction in the cases at interest. For 
suppose that A and B are disagreeing over whether guacamole is tasty. A asserts “Guacamole is 
tasty” and B asserts “Guacamole is not tasty”. Now, the truth value of A's and B's assertions is not 
established by their contexts of utterance, but by a context of assessment. This entails that, from A's  
context of assessment, B's assertion is false iff A's is true, while from B's context of assessment, A's 
assertion is false iff B's is true. In other words, disagreement is rescued to the extent that, for any 
context of assessment ca, A's and B's assertions cannot both be true (and therefore cannot be both 
accurately performed) at that context of assessment ca.
The same holds for retraction. Suppose ten years ago I asserted “Guacamole is tasty”. After ten 
years, my taste has changed and I now believe that guacamole is not tasty. Therefore, I may want to 
retract my assertion by saying that it  is false, or incorrect. Given that the truth of my previous 
assertion is not fixed “once and for all” at the context cu in which it was performed, but it is rather 
fixed at a context of assessment ca, I can surely reconsider my previous assertion and re-assess it in 
the light of the new context of assessment I now occupy. This allows me to say that my former 
assertion is incorrect, rather than to say that, even though my former assertion was correct then, it 
would be incorrect now. 
To sum up, in this section I have illustrated two different ways in which the extra-parameters move 
could be developed, called respectively Non-Indexical Contextualism and (Radical) Relativism. The 
two accounts share the common “basic move” consisting in the postulation of extra parameters in 
the circumstances of evaluation, though they depart in their respective views concerning what fixes 
the  value  of  such parameters.  Non-Indexical  Contextualism has  it  that  the  value  of  any extra-
parameters is fixed by the (index of the) context of utterance; on the other hand, Relativism has it 
that the value of the extra-parameters is fixed by the features of the so-called context of assessment. 
Each view is suited to accounting for different facts and has different implications. The purpose of 
this section was that of presenting each theory's most salient aspects and consequences in broad 
outline.  In  the  next  sections,  I'll  consider  the  idea  of  cashing  out  conceptual  constraints  as 
parameters in the index of the circumstances of evaluation—in the way of Relativism (section 4) 
and of Non-Indexical Contextualism (section 5) respectively.
34 This is true only if we mean by “metaphysical similarity” similarity as to the “basic components” of which a context 
of assessment is made of (individuals, locations, times... ). In this respect, a context of assessment and a context of 
utterance are metaphysically alike. This however may obscure the fact that contexts of assessment may consist of 
combinations of features that make them metaphysically very different from contexts of utterance. For example, a 
context of assessment may contain the actual world, but a time in which the speaker of the context of utterance 
doesn't exist at all (thanks to Marco Santambrogio for having made this apparent to me).
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4. Conceptual Constraints and Relativism: a Motivated Move?
As mentioned  in  section  3,  one  of  the  main  motivations  that  have  been  offered  in  favour  of 
Relativism, for example by MacFarlane in many of his writings, is that this theory is particularly 
well-suited to capture the fact that two speakers involved in a dispute over what is tasty, beautiful or 
right are really disagreeing (despite the fact that each of them is in some sense issuing a claim 
which is correct on the basis of subjective considerations). Arguments in favour of Relativism also 
draw  on  the  notion  of  retraction,  whose  structure  is  once  again  allegedly  well  captured  by 
MacFarlane's theory. In this section, my aim is that of dwelling a little bit more on the Relativist's  
motivations. This is meant to connect back with the issue of conceptual constraints by means of the 
following question: are the Relativist's motivations relevant for the theorist who wishes to give an 
account of conceptual constraints in terms of relative truth? In other words,  supposing that the  
theorist  aims  at  cashing  out  conceptual  constraints  in  relativistic  terms,  would  the  move  be  
motivated?
Let me begin by considering in closer detail the motivations offered by the Relativist when it comes 
to defend Relativism on the account that it captures disagreement on such matters as taste, ethics 
and  aesthetics.  First  of  all,  what  is  a  disagreement?  There  is  a  very  immediate  notion  of 
disagreement that the theorist has available when trying to figure out an answer to this question – 
whether  or  not  in  the  area  of  personal  taste.  MacFarlane  (2007b)  calls  it  the  “Simple  View”, 
according to which:
(D1) A disagreement obtains just in case there is a proposition p such that A accepts that p and B 
rejects that p. 
or equivalently:
(D2) Disagreement obtains just in case A accepts p and B accepts q, whose truth implies not-p.
Formulations (D1) and (D2) both imply that A's acceptance and B's rejection of p (or A's acceptance 
of p and B's acceptance of q) are such that neither of the two parties could accept what the other 
accepts without becoming incoherent, or changing her mind on the matter: this is what MacFarlane 
(MS) calls “doxastic non-cotenability”. 
The Simple View on disagreement is exclusively focussed on disagreement as depending on an 
incompatibility  between  the  contents  accepted  by  the  parties  in  the  dispute,  or  at  most  on  an 
incompatibility between attitudes (acceptance and rejection) which take as their object a common 
content. If one has already subscribed to the basic framework that underlies Relativism, however, it 
takes  little  reflection  to  realise  that  the  incompatibility  between  contents,  as  well  as  the 
incompatibility between attitudes which take as object the same content, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for disagreement (see MacFarlane 2007b, MS).
Suppose there are tensed propositions, i.e. propositions that are neutral with respect to times. Then 
the sameness of proposition accepted and rejected doesn't suffice for disagreement. Suppose that 
Mary accepts <John is eating a sandwich> at 2 pm and Claire rejects <John is eating a sandwich> 
at 3 pm. The tensed propositions that Mary and Clare respectively accept and reject are the same, 
though the situation doesn't qualify as a disagreement because the acceptance and rejection concern 
two different times (2 pm and 3 pm respectively). Of course, the point holds the same even if we 
represent the disagreement as Mary's acceptance of <John is eating a sandwich> at 2 pm coupled 
with Claire's acceptance of the contradictory sentence  <John is not eating a sandwich> at 3 pm. 
The two acceptances take contradictory tensed propositions as objects, but disagreement doesn't 
obtain because the acceptances concern different circumstances (2 pm and 3 pm respectively).
Moreover,  sameness  of proposition accepted and rejected is  not  even necessary:  suppose Mary 
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accepts <John is eating a sandwich> at 2 pm and Claire accepts <Nobody was eating a sandwich  
one hour ago> at 3 pm. On the assumption that the propositions are time-neutral, it turns out that 
the contents of the acceptance and rejection are different and even compatible (one could entertain 
both  of  them  at  the  same  time),  though  the  situation  constitutes  a  disagreement,  because  the 
acceptance and rejection concern the same time—viz. 2 pm. 
Note that these considerations hold independently of whether one believes in tensed propositions. 
To demonstrate this, MacFarlane imagines the following case, in which the same classic proposition 
is  accepted  and  rejected  in  two  different  worlds,  and  yet  the  situation  doesn't  amount  to  a 
disagreement (but see also Richard 2011 for a very similar example and considerations):
Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and June, her counterpart 
in another possible world. Jane asserts that Mars has two moons, and June denies this 
very proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any real way. Jane’s assertion concerns 
our world, while June’s concerns hers. If June lives in a world where Mars has three 
moons, her denial may be just as correct as Jane’s assertion. (MacFarlane 2007b: 23).
These remarks lean themselves to the view that whether two parties are in disagreement is not 
always a matter of whether they are accepting and rejecting the same proposition, but rather of 
whether the circumstances in which they are holding an attitude each with respect to some content 
are such that the correctness of the attitude of the first party at the first circumstance turns out as 
incompatible with the correctness of the attitude of the second party at the second circumstance, and 
vice-versa. 
In  order  to  characterise  disagreement  more  precisely,  MacFarlane  (2007b,  MS)  introduces  the 
notion of  accuracy: an assertion is accurate iff its content is true at the relevant circumstance of 
evaluation (which in many cases is the circumstance of the context of use). Disagreement then can 
be  pinpointed  as  an  incompatibility  (or  “preclusion”)  of  accuracy  between  two  acceptances 
performed  concerning  certain  circumstances  of  evaluation.  MacFarlane  terms  the  kind  of 
disagreement exemplified as “preclusion of joint accuracy”. The ensuing definition is as follows:
(D3) A disagreement obtains whenever A accepts that p and B rejects that p and A's acceptance and 
B's rejection cannot be both accurate.
MacFarlane  then  moves  from  disagreement  about  objective  matters  to  disagreement  about 
subjective matters.  In  the  subjective  area,  which  includes  taste,  ethics  and  aesthetics,  his 
characterisation  of  disagreement  works  only  if  it  is  combined  with  the  additional  Relativist 
assumption that the preclusion of joint accuracy obtains relative to a context of assessment. So, on 
the assumption that Mary's assertion of “Ice cream is tasty” is true iff ice cream is tasty in the world 
wu of the utterance and at the standard sa of the assessor and that, analogously, Claire's assertion of 
“Ice cream is not tasty” is true iff ice cream is not tasty in the world wu of the utterance and at the 
standard sa of the assessor, then Mary and Claire are in disagreement insofar as Mary's and Claire's 
assertions cannot both be accurate with respect to the same (standard of a) context of assessment sa. 
This way of describing the disagreement is taken to allow the Relativist to capture disagreement on 
disputes of inclination—as  already explained also in section 335. 
To summarise, MacFarlane's strategy consists in, firstly, defending a conception of disagreement as 
the one stated in (D3) and, secondly, in accounting for disagreement on matters of inclination by 
35 (D3) can be ameliorated—as MacFarlane himself recognises—so as to encompass cases in which A and B accept 
different contents, and yet the accuracies of their acceptances preclude each other. An improvement on (D3) is 
worked out by Rieppel (2011), who provides the following characterisation of disagreement: “A and B are in 
disagreement iff the fulfilment of the accuracy condition of A's acceptance guarantees the fulfilment of the 
inaccuracy condition of B's rejection, or vice versa.” (Rieppel 2011: 251). As one can note, there's no mention in 
Rieppel's formulation of the fact that A and B are entertaining a common content p, contrary to what obtains in (D3). 
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combining (D3) with his notion of accuracy as relative to contexts of assessment. This second move 
in the strategy will prove important for our purposes: As we will see, MacFarlane's postulation of 
contexts  of  assessment  is  a  legitimate  move  only  if  there's  already  the  presumption  that  the 
semantics of the expressions at interest is sensitive to  “perspectival” matters (e.g. tastes, moral 
codes, etc.).  If this presumption is not in place—as I will argue to be the case with conceptual  
constraints—the strategy seems ultimately unmotivated. 
The second leading motivation on which I would like to dwell corresponds to the Relativist's point 
to the effect that Relativism helps make sense of  retraction in some key areas of discourse. As 
mentioned in  section 3,  retracting  means,  informally,  rejecting  an  assertion  that  one has  made 
previously (on the basis of some relevant reasons). The phenomenon of retraction is interesting for 
the Relativist as soon as one enters areas of discourse that are typically addressed as subjective. 
Here the phenomenon of retraction can help the Relativist to sharply trace the difference between 
context of utterance and context of assessment. Let us see how. 
In general, a subject S asserts what S believes is true in the context occupied by S while performing 
the utterance. This means that, most of the times, the context  ca in which the subject assesses her 
own belief is the same as the context cu in which she performs the utterance36. This fact about how 
we conduct our practices of assertion is unfavourable for the Relativist, because it doesn't make the 
difference between cu and ca fully apparent. However, MacFarlane (MS) believes that there is one 
practice whose normative structure clearly displays the difference between cu and ca: retraction.
According to MacFarlane, the rule for retraction is the following:
[Retraction] 
A subject S in context c2 ought to retract an assertion (not yet retracted) made in context c1 if that 
assertion is not true as performed in c1 and assessed from c2.
The norm mentions two contexts:  c1 is the context in which the assertion is performed;  c2 is the 
context in which the assertion is assessed. If there are examples of retraction that comply with this 
rule, i.e. if in linguistic practices speakers behave in a manner which can be regarded as responding 
to this rule, then the Relativist has made a strong case in favour of his view. Prima facie, it seems 
that retractions about taste can be made to fit within this template. For example, if at t1 I utter “Fish 
sticks are tasty” on the basis of my taste at  t1, and then at  t2 I change my taste, I can felicitously 
retract my previous assertion by claiming: “I was wrong. Fish sticks are not tasty”. In doing this, it 
seems  that  I  am  assessing  my  previous  utterance  from  a  different  point  of  view—which  in 
MacFarlane's framework is nothing but a “context of assessment”. If this account of retraction on 
matters of taste is correct, then the Relativist has made a case for his theory. Once again, note that  
the phenomenon of retraction can provide support for the relativist only if retraction is cashed out in 
terms of contexts of assessment. This is possible in an area of discourse in which the presumption is 
already very strong that the truth of assertions in that area will be relative to “perspectival” aspects
—e.g. tastes, aesthetic and moral standards. If this presumption falls apart, however—and I will 
argue that this is the case with conceptual constraints—an argument that draws on retraction doesn't 
really provide a motivation for embracing Relativism.
After having presented how the Relativist motivates her view by appealing to the way it captures 
disagreement and retraction in “subjective” areas of discourse, let us turn to the question whether 
anything like Relativism is ever needed in order to account for the role of conceptual constraints in 
determining the truth-conditions of an utterance of “It's raining”, but also “Jill is ready”, “Lisa is 
tall”, “The leaves are green” etc. As mentioned in section 2, the basic move that would underlie any 
36 This is not always the case. There may be cases of “allocentric” assertion, in which the speaker asserts what she 
believes is true (or would be true) on another context of assessment. (see Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007). But 
this happens in exceptional cases—e.g. when the putative assessor cannot speak for herself, as it happens with 
young children, or pets. 
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relativistic  approach  to  the  semantics  of  these  sentences  would  imply  countenancing an  extra-
parameter in the circumstances of evaluation for each of these sentences. As an operative proposal, I 
envisaged the truth-conditions of the previously mentioned sentences as being relativised to  an 
extra-parameter besides the possible-world parameter, in the following way:
(10) “It's raining” is true <w, l> iff it's raining at w, l.
(11) “Jill is ready” is true <w, p> iff Jill is ready at w, p.
(12) “Lisa is tall” is true <w, s> iff Lisa is tall at w, s.
(13) “The leaves are green” is true <w, r> iff the leaves are green at w, r.
where  l is a location parameter,  p is a purpose-parameter,  s could be regarded as a standard-of-
height parameter, while r could be viewed as a parameter ranging over “respects”. Note that I could 
have avoided the postulation of multiple kinds of parameters ranging each over a different feature 
by adding a single, catch-all “counts-as” parameter, like in MacFarlane (2007a, 2009). Since the 
outline of the details is not crucially important for our purposes, for the present moment let us stick 
to this variety of coordinates in the circumstances of evaluation. The question to be faced is the 
following: is it sensible to adopt a full-blown Relativist strategy, and therefore posit that the truth of 
utterances of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, etc. is true relative to a context of assessment?
The point I wish to make is that there is little use, from a purely theoretical point of view, for the  
notion of context of assessment on this occasion. In order to see this, it is convenient to make a 
conceptual  distinction  between  what  I  shall  call  “perspectivality”  and  “feature-sensitivity”. 
Perspectivality may be defined as relativity of truth to ways of looking at the world that cannot be 
reduced to aspects of reality itself: frames of reference, moral, aesthetic or taste stances, evidential 
bases, standards of precision and so on. “Feature-sensitivity”  may be defined as relativity of truth 
to aspects of the world: I submit that these aspects include at least times and locations, but probably 
also comparison classes, contrast classes, schedules, parts, practical interests and stakes37 38. This 
distinction is worth mentioning in that it helps to make clear that, arguably, there is an important 
difference  between  the  truth-relativity  of  “It's  raining”  and  its  semantically  under-determined 
cognates—in which we are presently interested in—and the truth-relativity of the sentences the 
Relativist is concerned with, like “Ice cream is tasty”: the former is feature-sensitive, while the 
latter is perspectival. The truth of “Ice cream is tasty” is perspectival in that it is relative to a way of 
looking at the world—namely a gustatory stance, or standard. The truth of “It's raining” is feature-
sensitive in that it is relative to an aspect of the world—namely a location. Analogously, the truth of  
“Jill is ready” is relative only in the sense that it  depends on a feature of the world, namely a  
purpose or activity; while the truth of “The leaves are green” is relative in the sense that it depends 
on a respect of being green—which is an aspect of the world and  not a way of looking at  the 
world39.  Interestingly,  there is  a  sense in  which  even the truth  of  “Ice cream is  tasty” may be 
37 I consider practical interests and stakes as “aspects of the world” because, even though they concern subjects, they 
are nevertheless ways of “cutting up reality”. Practical interests and stakes only produce “focal effects” on features 
of the world—they do not constitute points of view irreducible to any aspect to the world.
38 Note that the difference between perspectivality and feature-sensitivity cuts across the difference between an extra-
parameters setup and a more traditional, e.g. hidden indexical setup. The feature-sensitivity of an expression in itself 
doesn't suggest that an approach in terms of hidden indexicality would be the best option to capture the semantics of 
such an expression. One could envisage an extra-coordinate in the circumstances of evaluation for feature-sensitive 
terms, as temporalist do with times and e.g. Lewis (1980) does with times and locations. Vice-versa, the 
perspectivality of the truth of a certain sentence in itself doesn't imply that an extra-parameter approach would be 
the best semantic option; additional considerations are needed to build up a case for this idea, mainly regarding the 
way speakers appear to use the expressions at issue, the semantic predictions they give rise to, etc. So the distinction 
between perspectivality and feature-sensitivity does not map onto a distinction between an “extra-parameters” 
approaches as opposed to a more traditional, single-parameter approach based on hidden indexicality.
39 The case of “green” may be confusing, but we shouldn't be led astray by the fact of using an expression like 
“respect of being green”. Being such only on the outer surface is definitely a “respect” in which an object can be 
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regarded as feature-sensitive: for example, it may be viewed as relative to individuals at times, or to 
standards set by some objective aspect of the world (experts, biological facts, etc.).
I contend that arguments from disagreement and retraction may establish Relativism in the way 
canvassed  by  MacFarlane  only  when  so-called  contexts  of  assessment  are  determined  by 
perspectival aspects;  when  contexts  of  assessment  are  determined  by  features  of  the  world 
(locations, times and so on) the Relativist's arguments are powerless. Since conceptual constraints 
determine aspects that could make truth at most feature-sensitive, adopting Relativism in order to 
account for conceptual constraints would be unmotivated. Let us see why this is so in greater detail.
In MacFarlane's account, the Relativist set-up in terms of contexts of assessment is particularly well 
suited to account for—among others—disagreements in the personal taste area. So if A asserts “Ice 
cream is tasty” and B asserts “Ice cream is not tasty”, by the Relativist's lights the two parties are 
having a disagreement insofar as the accuracy of the assertion of the one is incompatible with the 
accuracy of assertion of the other in the same context of assessment. However, one could object, 
every factual disagreement is also such that there are two claims involved, which are incompatible 
with respect to one and the same context of assessment. For example, if A claims “Two plus two 
equals four” and B claims “Two plus two doesn't equal four”, they certainly are in a disagreement 
insofar as the accuracy of A's claim is incompatible with the accuracy of B's claim with respect to  
the same context of assessment. However, this by itself doesn't open the way to Relativism. In order 
to establish Relativism, what is needed is the idea that there are many contexts of assessment, that 
all of them are legitimate, or on a par; and this idea is admissible only in a few cases, as e.g. in the  
case of taste, ethics, epistemic modality, future contingency..., that is in all those cases in which 
there's a previous, strong inclination in favour of a perspectival view of truth in the relevant area of 
discourse.
The intuition is, however, that the kind of truth-relativity that conceptual constraints give rise to is 
not  perspectival,  but  rather  feature-sensitive,  i.e.  it  is  relativity of truth to aspects  of the world 
(locations, times, comparison classes, parts, etc.). This turns out as incompatible with the idea that 
we've  seen  as  underlying  the  case  in  favour  of  Relativism,  i.e.  that  the  multiple  contexts  of  
assessment are all on a par. Let us see how this might become apparent. Suppose A, speaking about 
Paris, asserts “It's raining” while B, also talking about Paris, asserts  “It's not raining”.  There is 
obviously an incompatibility between the accuracy of A's and B's respective assertions within the 
same context of assessment: not both of them can be accurate as statements concerning the weather 
in Paris. The problem is that there's no room here for advancing a Relativist account for this kind of 
disagreement, because clearly, even though A and B occupy two different “contexts of assessment”, 
not  both  of  them are  equally  legitimate.  Suppose  it's  raining  in  Paris,  so  that  A's  assertion  is 
accurate. This entails that B's assertion is inaccurate from A's context of assessment, but not only 
that: B's assertion is inaccurate from all possible contexts of assessment. That is because, pace the 
postulation of contexts of assessments, the accuracy of A's assertion is absolute and not relative. So, 
no favourable conclusion for Relativism is to be expected from cases of disagreement involving 
feature-sensitivity  of  truth.  If  the  application  of  conceptual  constraints  gives  rise  to  feature-
sensitivity then, Relativism is not a good account for conceptual constraints. Adopting Relativism 
with respect to the semantics of sentences such as “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are 
green” and so on would be ultimately unmotivated.
Similar  concerns  apply  with  respect  to  the  Relativist's  case  from  retraction.  Let  us  make  an 
example. Suppose that, on the basis of my evidence at t1, I (believe and) assert “It's raining” while 
speaking about Paris. Shortly afterwards, at  t2, I discover that what I thought was rain was really 
water falling from some above apartment.  As a consequence,  I take my assertion back, since I 
said green, and it is doubtless an aspect of the world. Being such under normal light conditions is another “respect” 
in which an object can be described as green, and it is once again an aspect of the world. No doubt a sentence like 
“This is green” could be true even with respect to a perspectival aspect, such as a subject's phenomenal experience. 
However, my concern is here that of emphasising the fact that a “respect” is not to be equated with a “perspective”.
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discover that, though it was supported by some evidence (and hence in a sense legitimate), my 
assertion at t1 was nevertheless false. What is important here is that my assertion has always been 
false, even though I believed (perhaps justifiedly) that it was true. The world was arranged in such a 
way that the sentence “It's raining” as used to speak about Paris at t1 was simply falsified by facts. 
The alleged “context of assessment” in which I perform the retraction is simply the context in which 
I discover that my assertion has always been absolutely false. In this case, however, the fact that I 
occupy a context of assessment from which I reject a previous assertion doesn't speak in favour of 
Relativism. It would speak in favour of Relativism if my assertion at t1 was true with respect to t1, 
while false with respect to  t2. But this is simply not the case. Since the locational aspects of the 
truth-conditions of my utterance of “It's raining” is a feature of the world and not a perspective, an 
argument from retraction which employs as example a retraction of an utterance of “It's raining” 
does not bring any support to Relativism. Thus, if cashing out conceptual constraints as parameters 
of  evaluation  for  sentences  like  “It's  raining”  gives  rise  to  feature-sensitivity,  then  Relativism 
shouldn't be adopted as an account of the semantics of these expressions.
The same reasoning applies to “Jill is ready”, “Lisa is tall”, “The leaves are green” etc. Let me 
briefly discuss the case of a sentence like “The leaves are green”, about which one may object that 
its  truth  is  not  after  all  feature-sensitive—for  it  depends  on  “respects”  of  being  green  or, 
equivalently, on what “counts as” green according to the speaker's interests, where these notions 
strongly suggest a perspectival aspect. Suppose that Pia utters “The leaves are green” in context c1, 
where being green on the outer surface is enough for something to count as green. It seems that 
“being green on the outer surface” is an aspect of the world (an objective property),  and not a 
perspective. Suppose that Lia disagrees with Pia, and hence asserts “The leaves are not green”, 
because she sees their surface differently. Now what settles the question between Pia and Lia is an 
objective aspect of the world—whether the leaves are or not green on the outer surface. There is no 
room for a relativistic account of disagreement in this case, because “respects” of being green (or 
ways of “counting as” green) do not determine perspectival aspects, rather they determine genuinely 
objective aspects. (Note in passing that sentences like “The leaves are green” can be evaluated also 
relative to perspectival aspects—such as perceptual experiences. So suppose Pia uttered “The leaves 
are green” in  c2, where “looking green on the outer surface” is enough to count as green. This is 
definitely a perspectival aspect.  Could one construe an argument from disagreement to support 
Relativism on “green”? I doubt it, since if Lia uttered “The leaves are not green” on the basis of her 
perceptual  experience,  she  would  be  right  in  her  own  perspective,  and  there  would  be  no 
disagreement. A relativist argument from disagreement about “green” could not even get off the 
ground.)
To summarise, in this section I have set forth an argument which obeys to the following general 
schema:
1. Relativism is (allegedly) established by arguments from disagreement and retraction;
2. These arguments make Relativism motivated only if there is already a strong inclination to 
presume that truth in these areas of discourse is perspectival;
3. Conceptual constraints give rise to a view of truth as at best feature-sensitive;
4. As a consequence of this, there is no strong inclination to believe that the area of discourse 
in which the question of conceptual constraints emerges is one where truth is perspectival;
5. So Relativism would be unmotivated as an account of conceptual constraints.
After having ruled out Relativism as an account of conceptual constraints, what alternatives do we 
have left  on the table? What distinguishes Relativism from Non-Indexical Contextualism is the 
postulation of contexts of assessment; given that the device of contexts of assessment was found 
defective  for  the  purpose  of  laying  down  an  account  of  conceptual  constraints,  a  plausible 
alternative for the theorist would be to just drop contexts of assessment while still sticking to a 
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framework  which  countenances  truth  as  relative  to  extra-parameters.  This  could  bring  one  to 
embrace Non-Indexical  Contextualism,  which postulates  extra-parameters but  merely states that 
their value should be fixed at the context of utterance. In the next section, I shall deal with whether 
Non-Indexical Contextualism is enough motivated as well as an account for conceptual constraints.
5. Conceptual Constraints: Is Non-Indexical Contextualism an Option?
None of the formal semantics representations of conceptual constraints that we have covered so far, 
namely  Indexical  Contextualism  (in  Chapter  3),  and  Relativism  (in  section  4 of  the  present 
chapter), seem to be good candidates for representing conceptual constraints. 
As I  have argued, the choice of  Relativism isn't  motivated enough in order  to  account  for  the 
conceptual constraints that seem to govern comprehension and evaluation of “It's raining”, “Jill is 
ready”, “The leaves are green” and so on. The reason is that Relativism seems to be appropriate as a 
semantic account of all those expressions whose truth is “perspectival”, i.e. whose truth depends (or 
at least there's a strong intuition that it depends) on ways of looking at the world which cannot be  
reduced to any objective aspect of reality; these “ways of looking at the world” are multiple and all 
legitimate, and can give rise to equally accurate evaluations. Sure enough, the evaluation of an 
assertion of “It's raining” or “The leaves are green” might as well depend on perspectival aspects, as 
e.g. the standard of precision the speaker is currently adopting. But note that this perspectival aspect 
is not what is at issue in the characterisation of how conceptual constraints may make truth relative.  
In order to characterise the way conceptual constraints may determine truth-relativity, I spoke of 
“feature-sensitivity”,  i.e.  relativity  of  truth  to  aspects  of  the  world,  as  e.g.  locations,  times, 
comparison classes, parts. These “aspects of the world” are objective and subject-independent, and 
they determine the truth-value of an utterance in an eternal, stable way. It may be that predicates 
like “rain”, “being ready”, etc. are sensitive to both perspectival elements and to features of the 
world; this however, only implies that the same expressions show more than one type of semantic 
context-sensitivity  (for  a  version of  the  idea  of  a  double context-dependency in semantics,  see 
Lasersohn 2011). What interests  us is that peculiar kind of context sensitivity which makes the 
semantics of these expressions sensitive to elements whose specification determines how the world 
should be in order for the expression to have a truth-value, as opposed to how the world should be 
from some point of view.
Given  the  putative  greater  appropriateness  of  the  notion  of  feature-sensitivity  to  describe  how 
conceptual constraints might operate on the (technical) notion of truth in order to overcome the 
specific problem we are trying to solve, namely that of semantic under-determinacy, it seems worth 
exploring the hypothesis that the best option for the theorist who wishes to cash out conceptual 
constraints as evaluation parameters would be to adopt Non-Indexical Contextualism as opposed to 
Relativism as Assessment Sensitivity.
The question that becomes pressing at this stage is therefore the following: are there good reasons to 
adopt Non-Indexical Contextualism as an account of conceptual constraints? 
To  begin  with,  considerations  of  elegance  and  parsimony may  be  invoked.  Non-Indexical 
Contextualism, it may be said, regards expressions such as “to rain”, “being ready”, “being green” 
as being invariant, non-relational and non-indexical, thus allowing the theorist to explain intuitions 
in a host of cases. Here are some examples.
• Speech Reports: Holding that “ready” is a non-relational, non-indexical expression allows us 
to see why, if A asserts “X is ready” in context c1, B can easily and accurately report A's 
assertion by uttering “A said that X is ready” in context c2. The reason is precisely that the 
report is accurate because the reported predicate “ready” in c2 is the same as the predicate 
“ready” used in c1;
• Same-sayings: Non-Indexical Contextualism has a straightforward explanation for why one 
has the intuition that, if A utters “X is ready” in c1 and B utters “X is ready” in c2, A and B 
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“said the same thing”. A and B literally said the same thing in that they used the very same 
monadic, invariant predicate;
(As an aside, note that curiously enough (and as we mentioned in  section 3) these are the same 
advantages advertised by proponents of Invariantism, such as the Minimalists Cappelen and Lepore 
(2005)  and Borg  (2004),  to  support  their  own position.  Just  like  Non-Indexical  Contextualists, 
Invariantists claim that predicates like “ready” are monadic, so that intuitions on speech reports and 
same-sayings are accounted for in the Invariantist framework as well should be no surprise. The 
only difference between Invariantism and Non-Indexical Contextualism is that Invariantism does 
not espouse any form of extra-parameters relativity of truth, but sticks to an absolute notion of truth. 
This however, makes the position highly contentious, for it then becomes unclear how a sentence 
like “Jill is ready” or “It's raining” can express a truth-condition, once “being ready” or “to rain” are 
not only conceived as a monadic predicates, but also the truth value of the sentences is conceived as 
absolute. The critic can legitimately wonder in which case it is true that Jill is ready tout court in an 
absolute way, or in which case it is true that it rains tout court in an absolute way40.)
The examples listed above all largely succeed in virtue of their use of a notion of “said that” which 
keeps track only of the “strict” semantic features of the expressions in question. However, intuitions 
might be reversed as soon as one sets up the scenario in the appropriate way, so as to put emphasis 
on  the  utterance's  overall  significance  in  context  rather  than  on  the  sentence's  strict  semantic 
properties. Since the cases presented above are both about uses of a sentence that take place in two 
distinct contexts c1 and c2, I submit that providing details about these different contexts would make 
it more likely that one judges that the speakers across different contexts do not say the same thing. 
Consider the following scenario (the example is taken from Leslie 2007):
C1: John is woefully unprepared for his APA interviews, and is about to pass out from 
nerves.  He really  needs  more time before his  interviews. He states  “I'm just  not 
ready”.
C2: There is an evangelist hovering around the convention, looking to see whether 
there are any lost souls for whom the time is right to accept Jesus Christ as their 
personal saviour. Spotting John, the evangelist says “Ah, he's ready!”.
Given the larger amount of details provided, I take it that one's intuitions become at least less clear 
when it comes to apply the tests illustrated above about speech reports and same-sayings. First of 
all, one might not be entirely sure now whether John, given the way he used the predicate “ready”  
in c1, could felicitously disquotationally report the evangelist by uttering “The evangelist said that I 
am ready”, nor state anything like “When the evangelist says “He's ready”, what he says that I am 
ready”. Neither it is so sure that, in context c3, a third party could felicitously state, in light of the 
40 The main reply to this objection, which can be found in Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 157-175) but also in Borg 
(2009: 48-9; 2012: 524) goes as follows: the critic's point is simply that minimal propositions such as <that it's 
raining> do not describe any state of affairs such that it could make them true. However, Minimalists note, this is a 
problem which obtains independently of whether one believes in minimal propositions. Even the proposition <that 
it's raining in Paris> may give no sufficient conditions for it to be true. After all, one may wonder: is it raining in 
Paris if it's raining only on the 6th arrondissement, or if it's raining only on the Northern part of the city—and so on? 
No sentence (and the related semantically expressed proposition) fully specifies what has to be the case in the world 
for it to be true. From this it is derived that, if even semantically determined sentences fail to specify how the world 
should be for them to be true, then the problem doesn't threaten minimal propositions. After all, even minimal 
propositions like <that it's raining> are such that they determine a set of possible worlds where these propositions 
are true—namely all those worlds in which it's raining. However, one might observe, all worlds where it's raining 
are worlds where it's raining somewhere. There is no set of worlds where it's raining tout court. So there can't be 
minimal propositions <that it's raining> sorting out worlds where it's raining, full stop. Either we admit for states of 
affairs of it being raining tout court (which is absurd) or we admit that so-called “minimal propositions” are more 
fine-grained (and less minimal) than minimalists want.
137
different contextual details: “John and the evangelist said the same”. 
(Note that, in contrast with the Invariantist/Minimalist, who can explain these contrasting intuitions 
by appealing to the fact that the  speech acts performed can be taken to express different (non-
minimal) propositions (see for instance Cappelen 2008), the Non-Indexical Contextualist doesn't 
have  the  means  to  explain  intuitions  that  involve  attributions  of  different  contents to  the  two 
assertions for,  in his view, the contents of the assertion never differ—what differs is  rather the 
circumstances of evaluation and the truth-value. So intuitions as to the variability of content remain 
unexplained in this framework.) 
The upshot of these considerations is that building up a case that strongly relies on intuitions about 
“what is said” is not an optimal strategy. Intuitions on who said what are unstable and subject to the 
presence  of  background  conditions  and  details:  I  take  it  that  the  case  for  Non-Indexical 
Contextualism  is  considerably  weakened  by  the  possibility  of  going  back  and  forth  between 
contrasting verdicts as to what the speakers “said”. 
The same considerations could be advanced also with respect to tests that employ reports in terms 
of  “agree/disagree”.  The  Non-Indexical  Contextualist  could  claim  that  the  following  is  an 
explanatory advantage of her view: If A asserts “Jill is ready” in context c1 and B asserts “Jill is 
ready” in c2, C could consistently say “A and B agree that Jill is ready”, because A and B are using 
the same monadic predicate “ready”. But do they really agree? It depends on what A and B are 
talking about in their respective contexts (or, put in Austin's (1950) terms, it depends on which 
situations they are demonstratively referring to). The case becomes even less convincing in the case 
of disagreement: A asserts “Jill is ready” in context c1 and B asserts “Jill is not ready” in c2. Could C 
consistently say “A and B disagree over whether Jill is ready”? Well again, it depends on what A 
and B are talking about. Note that the case doesn't gain in plausibility even when we introduce 
disagreement on matters of personal taste. A asserts “Ice cream is tasty” in context c1 and B asserts 
“Ice cream is not tasty” in c2. C says “A and B disagree over whether ice cream is tasty”. But do 
they? This is dubious even by the lights of Non-Indexical Contextualism: if each speaker's assertion 
is regarded as correct with respect to the speaker's own taste-standard, the sense of disagreement 
vanishes  (see  Stojanovic  2007 and MacFarlane  2007a for  considerations  in  this  vein).  General 
considerations on taste disputes such as those offered by Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009 may add 
up. Cappelen and Hawthorne propose a “sceptic therapy” when confronted with an apparent taste-
disagreement: if, in describing the situation, we take factors such as physical dispositions, character 
differences,  culture  and  upbringing  into  consideration,  we  may  be  persuaded  that  no  talk  of 
disagreement is properly in place here.
The advantages offered by Non-Indexical Contextualism so far don't look as exactly sharp, in that 
the intuitions that Non-Indexical Contexualism wishes to exploit are not sharp either, to the extent 
that they employ the rather unstable notion of “what is said”, or “agree/disagree”. But the troubles 
for Non-Indexical Contextualism are not over. It has been recently pointed out (see Kissine 2010) 
that Non-Indexical Contextualism gives wrong predictions of compatibility between the contents of 
assertions in scenarios like the following:
(14) Alvin, speaking about John's preparation for the APA interviews: “John isn't ready”
       The evangelist: “I agree. John isn't ready for the APA interviews, though he's ready”.
Let us assume, for ease of exposition, that Alvin's assertion is true at a circumstance of evaluation 
consisting  of  a  possible  world  w and  Alvin's  purpose-parameter p.  Now  if  the  evangelist's 
expression of agreement is correct, this means that Alvin and the evangelist are evaluating their 
utterances from the same “point of evaluation” (represented as <w, p>). This, however, makes the 
evangelist's assertion of “He's ready” false. So the evangelist could not agree with Alvin in the sense 
of co-habiting the same point of evaluation and at the same time assert that John is ready. The 
puzzle seems to arise from the fact that the Non-Indexical Contextualist (just as the Relativist in this 
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respect) is committed to a context-sensitivity that is global, i.e. it affects an entire sentence, and not 
local,  such as to affect parts  of a sentence,  like terms or phrases. Given the “global” nature of 
context-sensitivity characterising a Non-Indexical Contextualist framework, one cannot just take a 
conjunction “P & Q” and evaluate the conjuncts separately, at different circumstances of evaluation. 
This global feature of context-sensitivity gives rise to the puzzle: the evangelist cannot state that 
John isn't ready (for the APA interviews) and is ready (to be saved), for the context-sensitivity of his 
assertion ties the truth value of the sentence he uses to a single circumstance of evaluation, where 
the conjuncts cannot both be true. Note that Indexical Contextualism, which adopts a notion of 
context-sensitivity as local, i.e. which countenances the possibility to contextually affect the content 
of single sentence components (predicates, phrases), can indeed depict the evangelist as asserting 
that John isn't ready for the APA interviews and is ready to be saved, and therefore explains why the 
evangelist's claim “I agree” is appropriate in the context of the conversation. This further point 
seems to make Non-Indexical Contextualism less desirable as an account of conceptual constraints, 
for it fails to account for certain very strong intuitions about the way language is appropriately used.
A last point that could be raised against Non-Indexical Contextualism has to do with the fact that, 
though one may regard it as a way of dealing with the problem of semantic under-determinacy, once 
the account is adopted semantic under-determinacy itself gets erased, so to speak. This is because 
Non-Indexical Contextualism regards sentences such as “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves 
are green” and so on as semantically determined as far as their content is concerned. The intuition 
of semantic under-determinacy though can be explained away by the Non-Indexical Contextualist 
framework insofar as, though it accepts that the sentences at interest are semantically determined as 
to their  content,  they are underdetermined as far as the circumstances in which they should be 
evaluated. 
This  way  of  looking  at  semantically  under-determined  expressions,  which  essentially  involves 
explaining the intuition of content under-determinacy away, ultimately betrays the strong and—
seemingly—well-rooted intuition that both theorists and ordinary speakers have, to the effect that 
these sentences need completion at the level of what is said. If Non-Indexical Contextualism were 
true,  it  would  remain  unexplained why the  normal  stance  with respect  to  a  sentence  like  “It's 
raining” is to claim that it  “doesn't say enough”. The Non-Indexical Contextualist could always 
invoke the hypothesis that language users are, so to speak, blind to the specific kind of semantic 
under-determinacy that the sentence really displays. This line of response however places a further 
burden onto the Non-Indexical Contextualist's shoulders: for now she owes an explanation of where 
this kind of blindness comes from. Do ordinary speakers—and a great deal of philosophers too—
have some deeply entrenched bias? Are the intuitions of these subjects not enough “educated”, 
perhaps naïve and in need for refinement? If this is so, however, is it fair for a theory like Non-
Indexical Contextualism to dictate what our intuitions should be about? 
The last question seems to me to raise a methodological problem, which has to do with the priority 
of data with respect to the theory. One would think that theories which take initial data seriously 
should not end up saying that, in light of the theory itself, the initial data were misguided. This is 
tantamount to denying data their status as data, departing from them in such a way that the theory 
goes as far as “trumping” its own initial data. I believe that the fact that a theory may lead to such a 
radical reconsideration of its initial data casts a dubious light on the theory itself (see Coliva and 
Moruzzi (MSa) on this point). In the present case, the fact that Non-Indexical Contextualism may 
lead to a radical reconsideration of intuitions concerning semantic under-determinacy—by saying 
that  they  are  deeply  misguided in  that  they  don't  really  concern  content,  but  circumstances  of 
evaluation, seems to me to cast a non-favourable light onto Non-Indexical Contextualism itself. 
To summarise the last argument: Evidence tells us that the language users' semantic intuitions as to 
the under-determinacy of “It's raining” et alia point in the direction of a defectiveness of content, 
and not in the direction of a defectiveness of circumstances of evaluation.  Since Non-Indexical 
Contextualism implies precisely that intuitions as to content defectiveness are wrong—or “blind” 
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with respect to how things really are—this entails that Non-Indexical Contextualism, as a theory 
aimed  at  dealing  with  semantic  under-determinacy,  ultimately  betrays  its  initial  evidence.  This 
(together with the considerations advanced in the previous paragraphs) constitutes a quite strong 
motivation  for  not  adopting  Non-Indexical  Contextualism  when  it  comes  to  capturing  the 
phenomenon of semantic under-determinacy as it is intuited by competent language users.
6. Conceptually Mandated Content
So far I have been dealing with ways in which conceptual constraints could be implemented at the 
level  of  a  formal  semantic  system.  Conceptual  constraints  are,  as  I  argued  in Chapter  2, 
cognitive/discoursive configurations which may help hearers in the comprehension of semantically 
under-determined sentences such as “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “Lisa is tall”, “The leaves are 
green” etc. In Chapter 3, I examined the possibility of regarding conceptual constraints as nothing 
but  hidden  indexical  elements  in  the  syntax  of  expressions,  thus  following  what  is  known as 
Indexical  Contextualism;  in  section  4 of  this  chapter,  I  engaged  with  the  question  whether 
conceptual constraints could be cashed out in terms of Relativism, i.e. in terms of dependence of 
truth  on  so-called  “contexts  of  assessment”;  in  section  5 I  focussed  on  the  possibility  that 
conceptual constraints be represented as simple extra-coordinates in the index of the circumstances 
of  evaluation,  whose  value  is  fixed  by the  context  of  utterance  (rather  than  by the  context  of 
assessment), in the vein of Non-Indexical Contextualism. None of the options I have considered 
proved to supply an adequate account of conceptual constraints at the level of formal semantics. So 
perhaps conceptual constraints should not be implemented at the formal level—be it the syntactic 
level, or the level of truth (metalinguistic level). My suggestion at this point is to look at conceptual 
constraints as operating outside of the formal semantic machinery.
At  the  basis  of  the account  I  will  outline in  this  section  is  a  view of  the  role  that  conceptual 
competences and constraints have in communication.  We may start  to ask what may connect a 
speaker's use of a semantically under-determined sentence with a hearer's understanding of it.  I 
propose the  following answer.  The “bridge” between the  utterer's  use of  a  semantically  under-
determined  sentence  and  the  hearer's  understanding  of  that  utterance  is  precisely  a(n  implicit) 
presupposition of their common conceptual (semantic) competences. On the one hand, a competent 
speaker  of  English  chooses  to  use  under-articulated  sentences  (“It's  raining”,  “Jill  is  ready”) 
because: (a) she trusts that the hearer is as competent as the speaker about the English language and 
about the concepts invoked by the use of the English words that she uses; (b) she relies on the fact 
that, with the help of contextual clues and of conceptual/semantic constraints, the hearer will be 
able  to  grasp  the  content  of  the  speaker's  utterance.  On  the  other  hand,  hearers  who  are  in 
favourable conversational conditions, which means that they are recognised as participants to a 
conversation  and  know  what  the  speaker  is  talking  about,  seldom  question  the  use  of  under-
determined sentences precisely because, with the help of the information they can gather from the 
conversational setting plus the application of the conceptual/semantic constraints they are familiar 
with, they are able to understand and evaluate what an utterance of an under-determined sentence 
says—on the tacit assumption that speakers are as competent as them about the language used and 
about the related conceptual constraints. The “bridging role” of conceptual constraints in verbal 
communication via semantically under-determined sentences could be thus spelled out:
[The Bridge Thesis]
In the production of semantically under-determined sentences, (a) speakers rely on 
the fact that their hearers (who are presumed as conceptually/semantically competent 
as them) will apply conceptual constraints (plus contextual information) in order to 
figure  out  the  utterance's  content  and  truth-conditions;  and  conversely  (b) 
lingustically  and  conceptually  competent  hearers  located  in  favourable 
conversational  conditions  will  be  ready  to  apply  conceptual  constraints  in  their 
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interpretation  of  these  semantically  under-determined  utterances  (trusting  that 
speakers are as competent as them). 
Having  laid  down  the  role  of  conceptual  constraints  in  communication  via utterances  of 
semantically under-determined sentences, let me move on to a characterisation of the status of these 
constraints and of the result of their application.
To begin with, I take conceptual constraints to be ways of organising our thought so as to be able to 
effectively accomplish various cognitive tasks, as e.g. categorisation, memorisation, recognition. 
Conceptual constraints are primarily constraints on thought. However, conceptual constraints  de 
facto coincide with semantic constraints on the use of linguistic expressions for all those speakers 
who are linguistically competent:  this  is  because knowing the meaning of an expression  e in a 
language  L usually  entails  also being competent  about  the concept  F which is  associated to  e. 
However, as I made clear in the Introduction and in Chapter 2 (section 10), conceptual constraints 
may be independent of meaning constraints, for a subject could be competent about a concept F but 
be incompetent about the meaning of the expression e which, by hypothesis, is associated with F in 
L.  The  domain  of  conceptual  constraints  therefore  may  overlap  with  the  domain  of  semantic 
constraints for those speakers who are competent users of a certain expression e of L, even though it 
is conceivable that one is conceptually competent on F without being competent on e (which is by 
hypothesis associated with F in L).
Conceptual/semantic constraints help enrich the content of certain sentences—in the present case, 
we are focussing on semantically under-determined ones. So the conceptual constraint that every 
event of raining is spatially located—corresponding to the semantic constraint that “It's raining” is 
correctly used iff it's raining at a location—may help the interpretation of utterances of “It's raining” 
in that it helps “expand” the under-determined semantic content  <that it's raining> which results 
from compositional, syntax-driven interpretation only. The upshot is something like the following 
picture: for an utterance of “It's raining”, compositional, syntax-driven semantics delivers the under-
determined  content  <that  it's  raining>; conceptual/semantic  competence  enables  the  hearer  to 
expand this defective content by adding a locational component, so as to obtain <it's raining in x>. 
Contextual information may be plugged in so as to assign a value to the variable x which occupies 
the conceptual/semantic slot for locations. If the salient location in context is Paris, the result might 
be  <that it's raining in Paris>.  If no salient location is available, the location variable may be 
bound by an existential quantifier, the result being  <that it's raining somewhere>.  As one may 
appreciate, conceptual/semantic constraints operate on the result of formal, compositional semantic 
processes  to  deliver  an  “expanded”  semantic  content.  So  on  the  one  hand,  we  have  formal, 
compositional semantics, which responds to syntactic/ lexical constraints and delivers a minimal, 
often  semantically  under-determined  content;  on  the  other  hand  we  have  constraints  (at  the 
conceptual/semantic level) that are “semantic” in a broader sense of the term: they pose restrictions 
on correct use of words and on “what is said” with an utterance of a sentence, but they do not do 
that  as  a  result  of  any  syntactic/lexical  rules.  The  present  picture  therefore  opens  the  way  to 
semantic  processes  which  are  syntactically  unconstrained.  The  following  schema  captures  the 
relation between semantics, syntax and conceptual/semantic constraints. 
Semantics (concerns correct use of words 
and the truth-conditions of utterances)
Syntactic/ lexical constraints
Conceptual/semantic constraints
If there are semantic processes which nevertheless do not respond to syntactic constraints, then the 
propositional  components  which  are  introduced  via  conceptual/semantic  constraints  are 
syntactically not represented—they are  unarticulated constituents.  The last remark could suggest 
that,  since  the  result  of  the  application  of  conceptual  constraints  involves  the  presence  of 
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unarticulated constituents, this kind of content will not differ from what has been called explicature 
(by Carston), or impliciture (by Bach). My contention is that the difference between clear cases of 
explicature/impliciture and conceptually mandated content is that, while explicatures/implicatures 
are worked out for context-dependent, purely pragmatic reasons, conceptually mandated content is 
worked  out  for  context-independent,  ultimately  semantic  reasons  (in  the  broadened  sense  of 
“semantics” characterised above). Let me explain this distinction.
Consider how a hearer may be regarded as working out the content expressed by the speaker with 
an utterance of any of these sentences:
(15) Jack and Jill got married
(16) You are not going to die
(17) It will take time to get there
(18) I've had breakfast
Doing the formal semantics for these sentences supposedly delivers contents which can receive an 
evaluation in context. I take (15) to be true in a context iff Jill got married and Jack got married; 
(16) is true iff the addressee is not going to die in the future; (17) is true iff a certain trip, which is 
supposedly  referred  to  with  the  pronoun “it”,  is  going to  take  a  certain  amount  of  time to  be 
completed; (18) is true iff the speaker has had breakfast in the past. In all these cases, the semantic 
content obtained compositionally via a formal semantic machinery is evaluable in a context, so no 
“deep” semantic under-determinacy affects these sentences (for the distinction between “deep” and 
“shallow” semantic under-determinacy, see Chapter 2, section 5). The content obtained via formal 
semantics, however, fails to determine what the speaker usually means with an utterance of (15)-
(18). Thus, with (15) one could mean that Jack and Jill got married  to each other; with (16) one 
could mean that the addressee is not going to die from a minor cut of her finger; with (17) one could 
mean that it will take more time than expected to get there; with (18) one could mean that one has 
had breakfast  that very morning.  In all these cases, I take it that what guides the hearer in the 
working out  of the communicated contents of  (15)-(18) is  context-dependent,  purely pragmatic 
considerations as to what would make these contents maximally relevant, informative, etc. Hearers 
will supposedly search for the content which makes the utterer's contribution maximally relevant, 
useful, informative for the sake of the conversation. Examples of “explicatures” and “implicitures” 
like  (15)-(18)  are  then  worked  out  for  purely  (and  genuinely)  pragmatic  reasons (here  I  am 
momentarily  merging  the  two  notions,  even  though  their  proponents  consider  them relevantly 
different41). 
There's a significant difference between the processes that are regarded as resulting in explicatures 
or implicitures like (15)-(18) and the processes that—if the present account is on the right track—
yield a content that is “conceptually mandated”. As I said, clear cases of explicature/impliciture like 
(15)-(18) are wholly pragmatic in nature, in the sense that these levels of content are worked out for 
genuinely pragmatic reasons. There is, however, a range of expressions for which it doesn't seem 
entirely  correct  to  claim  that  it  is  purely pragmatic  processes  that  guide  their  contextual 
interpretation. These are the cases of “deep” semantic under-determinacy I have been concerned 
with so far, such as “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “Lisa is tall”, “The leaves are green”, etc. In all 
41 The explicatures theorised by Carston are obtained from an initial propositional schema through processes that are 
guided by a principle of relevance. That is, the sentence's content-in-context is the (schematic) input of an inferential 
process that aims at fleshing out that content, maximising its relevance for the purposes of the conversation by at the 
same time saving the most cognitive effort. According to Carston, explicatures still belong to the domain of 
semantics, in that they correspond to what the hearer “says” rather than “implicates”. Implicitures—as Bach calls 
them—differ from explicatures in that they are obtained through clearly “Gricean” processes that, in Bach's view, 
operate at an implicit level. Thus, given an utterance of a semantically under-determined content, the hearer is 
supposed to avail herself of the principle of cooperation and of the maxims in order to figure out what the speaker is 
saying at the implicit level. In Bach's view, implicitures belong to the domain of pragmatics.
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these cases, it  seems that purely pragmatic considerations are only partially involved. For these 
expressions, what really is needed is that they be completed in such a way as to result in evaluable 
contents. Before pragmatic, context-dependent considerations step in, these expressions need to be 
made “semantically kosher”, i.e. they need to be interpreted in such as way that they can receive an 
evaluation. For example, the semantic structure of the sentence “It's raining”, which by the lights of 
formal semantics is simply <that it's raining> needs to be expanded so as to include a locational 
aspect, if any propositional item is to be obtained. Analogously, the semantic structure of “Jill is  
ready”, is to be expanded so as to make room for a purpose-aspect with respect to which Jill can be 
said ready or not ready. What helps in “expanding” the semantic structure of these sentences is not 
context-related, purely pragmatic considerations; it is rather context-independent, purely conceptual  
(semantic) considerations as to what it is to be raining, to be ready and so on. So the interpretation 
of utterances of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready” seems to need that conceptual/semantic considerations 
be run  prior to any purely pragmatic considerations as to relevance, informativeness, perspicuity, 
etc.  The  difference  between  cases  of  explicature/impliciture  like  (15)-(18)  and  cases  in  which 
semantic  considerations  are  prior  to  purely  pragmatic  ones  may be  cashed out  as  a  difference 
between explicatures/implicitures and instances of conceptually mandated content.
Explicatures/Implicitures Conceptually mandated content
“Jack and Jill got married”
“You are not going to die”
“It will take time to get there”
“I've had breakfast”
Context-dependent, purely pragmatic 
considerations guide interpretation.
“It's raining”, 
“Jill is ready”, 
“Lisa is tall”, 
“The leaves are green”.
Context-independent  considerations  are  prior 
with respect to purely pragmatic considerations.
One may point out that it's  just wrong to think that utterance interpretation may be accomplished 
only with the help of conceptual/semantic competences, for conceptual/semantic competences may 
not help at all to find out what the speaker means in a context: In order to figure that out, we 
certainly need some pragmatic mechanisms! The objection is well taken. Of course, in the working 
out of an utterance's “conceptually mandated” content in the specific context in which the utterance 
is performed, the hear may need to retrieve information which is specific to the context of utterance. 
So for example, in working out the content of A's utterance of “It's raining” while speaking of 
location X, B certainly needs to find out information about X, and this can be done only by looking 
at  the  context.  Here  pragmatic  considerations  may well  play  a  role:  I  don't  wish  to  deny that 
pragmatic principles may accompany the application of conceptual constraints, though I wish to 
maintain that pragmatic considerations will always aim at identifying  elements of the background 
such as “what the speaker is talking about”, “what the topic of the conversation might be”, etc.  
Pragmatic considerations may play a role in establishing issues as to what the referential intentions 
of the speaker are, or as to what topic in the conversation she is currently addressing, and so on. But 
note that these pragmatic considerations may only be employed in order to “fill  the gaps” that 
conceptual/semantic constraints open as a result of their application, and not to create those gaps. 
Purely conceptual considerations may elicit  the location-slot at  the level of conceptual/semantic 
structure. This slot having been created on the basis of context-independent information, pragmatic 
considerations as to “which location the speaker is talking about” may provide location X (e.g. 
Paris)  as  the  element  which  is  most  suitable  to  “fill  the  conceptual  gap”  just  created  by  the 
application  of  one's  conceptual  competence.  The  following  picture  represents  the  structural 
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A very straightforward objection to the proposal may be the following: What is the advantage of 
adopting a conceptual constraints view as against a pragmatic enrichment view? The latter seems 
much simpler, while the former looks more complicated. Why should we suppose that processes of 
utterance  comprehension  of  “It's  raining”,  “Jill  is  ready”  etc.  are  this  complicated?  As  a  first 
reaction,  let  me  express  my  skepticism  as  to  the  conclusiveness  of  considerations  concerning 
“simplicity” and “complication”. That a process is represented as “complicated” doesn't necessarily 
entail that that process is more costly in terms of cognitive effort. In particular, when we bring 
conceptual constraints into the picture, chances are that their application makes the processes at 
issue even faster and less effort-taking in virtue of the fact that  conceptual  constraints  may be 
thought  of  as  designed to  pre-organise thought  in  a  very compact  way.  Be that  as  it  may,  the 
objection  fails  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  the  conceptual  constraints  view  is  not  altogether 
incompatible with a pragmatic enrichment view; indeed, I am inclined to think that the conceptual  
constraints view may be regarded as a way of clarifying and refining a pragmatic explanation of the 
comprehension of at least certain sentences—namely the “deeply” semantically under-determined 
sentences that we have been interested in so far. A conceptual constraints view seems to account 
very well for the fact that the pragmatic enrichment of utterances of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready” etc. 
is  not  semantically  unconstrained,  as  opposed  to  the  pragmatic  enrichment  of  e.g.  non-literal 
discourse (metaphorical, metonimical talk), or of sentences like (15)-(18). So, all in all, the greater 
“complication” introduced by the conceptual constraints view may not be a theoretical loss, but a 
theoretical gain, in that it doesn't necessarily entail any additional cognitive efforts and it explains 
the discrepancy between purely pragmatics-guided utterance interpretation (such as that found in 
non-literal talk and in (15)-(18)) and the apparently more constrained interpretation of “It's raining”, 
“Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green” et similia.
To sum up, in this section I have proposed to regard conceptual/semantic constraints as operating 
outside  of  the  formal  semantic  machinery.  Conceptual/semantic  constraints  act  as  a  “bridge” 
between the utterance of  an  under-determined sentence and its  interpretation,  in  the  sense that 
speakers who are conceptually/semantically competent choose to utter such sentences relying on the 
fact that hearers, who are presupposed as equally competent, will be able to reconstruct the content 
of their utterances by employing such constraints. On the other hand hearers accept utterances of 
semantically  under-determined  sentences  because  they  trust  the  fact  that  speakers  are 
conceptually/semantically competent and expect them to employ the same competences to work out 
their  content.  Semantic/conceptual  constraints  give  rise  to  semantic  processes  of  “content 
expansion” which are nevertheless syntactically unconstrained. So the conceptual constraints view 
allows for elements of the proposition semantically expressed which nevertheless do not correspond 
to any articulated items in the sentence's syntax. The presence of unarticulated constituents in the 
proposition worked out by the hearer should not lead one to conclude that contents obtained through 
the exercise of one's semantic/conceptual competences are equivalent to explicatures/implicitures 
like  the  ones  in  (15)-(18):  the  latter  are  determined  by  context-specific,  purely  pragmatic 
considerations as to relevance, informativeness, perspicuity, etc., while the former are determined 
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on the basis of context-independent, semantic/conceptual considerations as to what makes uses of a 
certain concept/expression correct and veridical (plus contextual information, where appropriate).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered the issue whether conceptual constraints should be regarded as 
parameters to which truth is made relative. This strategy would: (i) avoid commitments as to the 
presence of covert elements articulated in the syntactic structure of the sentences under examination 
(unlike Indexical Contextualism); (ii) account for the fact that speakers know at least the intuitive 
truth-conditions  of  utterances  of  under-determined  sentences  when  these  are  listened  “out  of 
context” (unlike Radical Contextualism).
• As a first step, I have introduced the “basic move”, which consists in introducing an extra-
parameter in the index of the circumstances of evaluation;
• I have illustrated how the truth-conditions of semantically under-determined sentences (“It's 
raining”,  etc.)  may  be  modified  after  the  introduction  of  extra-parameters  in  the 
circumstances of evaluation;
• I  have  introduced Non Indexical  Contextualism and (Radical)  Relativism,  two semantic 
approaches that share the “basic move”. Non-Indexical Contextualism has it that truth is 
relative to extra parameters (besides a possible world parameter) and that the value of such 
parameters  is  fixed  at  the  context  of  utterance.  (Radical)  Relativism has  it  that  truth  is 
relative to extra parameters (besides a possible world parameter) and that the value of such 
parameters is fixed at the context of assessment;
• I have then considered the question whether Relativism is enough motivated as an account 
of conceptual constraints. The most interesting defences of Relativism argue that Relativism 
accounts  particularly well  for  disagreement and  retraction in  areas  of discourse such as 
taste,  ethics,  epistemic  modality.  I  argue  that  Relativism  may  successfully  account  for 
disagreement and retraction only when the presumed “context of assessment” to which truth 
is made relative corresponds to a perspective, i.e. a way of looking at the world that doesn't 
correspond to any aspect of the world. However, conceptual constraints do not give rise to 
perspectives, but only to objective features of the world, as e.g. locations, times, comparison 
classes,  parts.  This implies  that  Relativism is  not  ultimately motivated as an account  of 
conceptual constraints;
• I have then moved on to considering whether Non-Indexical Contextualism could capture 
the role of conceptual constraints better than Relativism. I have shown that Non-Indexical 
Contextualism may not be an optimal choice in order to account for conceptual constraints, 
because of problems that theorists  have emphasised in recent work. Most and foremost, 
though, Non-Indexical Contextualism is not desirable in that it imposes a radical revision of 
the nature and content of intuitions of under-determinacy, a result which I have argued to be 
methodologically suspect;
• The  conclusion  of  the  foregoing  considerations  is  that  the  semantic  strategies  so  far 
scrutinised—Indexical  Contextualism,  Relativism and  Non-Indexical  Contextualism—are 
all  inadequate  in  order  to  capture  conceptual  constraints.  My  proposal  is  to  regard  
conceptual constraints as operating outside the formal semantic machinery;
• I propose to regard conceptual constraints as ways of organising thought (and discourse) that 
hearers  may  employ  to  figure  out  the  content  and  truth-conditions  of  certain  under-
determined utterances. Speakers may choose to utter under-articulated sentences precisely 
because  they  rely  on  their  hearer's  capacity  to  exploit  their  conceptual  (semantic) 
competence plus contextual information in order to figure out what they are saying;
• The application of conceptual/semantic constraints gives rise to semantic processes which 
are nevertheless syntactically unconstrained. So the conceptual constraints view allows for 
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elements of the proposition semantically expressed (in a context) which nevertheless do not 
correspond  to  any  articulated  items  in  the  sentence's  syntax.  This  notwithstanding, 
“conceptually mandated” content doesn't correspond to cases of explicature or impliciture 
like  the  ones  in  (15)-(18),  in  that  the  latter  are  the  result  of  context-specific,  purely 
pragmatic considerations, while the former are the result of context-independent, semantic 
considerations (which may be integrated with contextual information, where appropriate).
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Chapter 5
Conceptual Constraints, Content and Context
In the last three chapters, I have addressed the question of how speakers manage to understand and 
evaluate  utterances  of  “It's  raining”,  “Jill  is  ready”,  “The  leaves  are  green”,  even  though  the 
semantics of these sentences under-determines the content of their utterances. In Chapter 2 I have 
argued  that  the  comprehension  of  this  group  of  sentences  depends  in  good  part  on  hearers 
exercising  their  conceptual  (semantic)  competence.  The  linguistic  under-articulation  typical  of 
semantically  under-determined  sentences  leaves  out  certain  components  of  the  proposition 
expressed by the utterance (the location of the rain,  the purpose for being ready, the respect in 
which the leaves are green),  however these components are sufficiently easy to retrieve for the 
audience to the extent that they may correspond to conceptual/semantic aspects that the hearer is 
already  familiar  with.  The  hearer  may  use  such  constraints  in  order  to  expand  the 
conceptual/semantic structure of the sentence, and plug in contextual information (Paris, skiing, on 
the outer surface) where appropriate.
In Chapter 3, my aim has been that of showing that conceptual constraints are not amenable to be 
reduced to hidden syntactic elements (in the way of Indexical Contextualism), while in Chapter 4 I 
offered  reasons  for  not  reducing  conceptual  constraints  to  coordinates  for  truth-relativisation—
whether contexts of assessment (in the way of Relativism) or extra-parameters in the index of the 
circumstances  of  evaluation  (in  the  way  of  Non-Indexical  Contextualism).  My  suggestion, 
eventually,  was  to  regard  conceptual  constraints  as  operating  outside  the  formal  semantic  
machinery. The idea, in a few words, is that the application of conceptual constraints is a process 
which  is  run  in  addition  to  strict,  compositionally  driven  semantic  interpretation.  Applying 
conceptual  constraints  to sentential,  compositionally obtained meaning implies  supplementing it 
with conceptual/semantic  aspects that  are  not  encoded syntactically  or lexically.  Ultimately,  the 
exercise of one's conceptual competences is complementary to the strict, compositionally driven 
semantic interpretation. This is, very sketchily, the proposal which I am going to develop in closer  
detail in the present chapter.
1. The Scope of the Proposal
In this section, my concern will be exclusively that of setting the boundaries of the proposal, in 
order  to  prevent  as  much  as  possible  any  misunderstanding  as  to  the  terrain  on  which  I  am 
operating. What I have been trying to explain throughout the last three chapters is the success of 
communication between language users when what is employed is  fully sentential,  though  non-
proposition-expressing linguistic  entities.  The  examples  I  have  been  using  all  along  are  “It's 
raining”, “Jill is ready”, “Lisa is tall”, “The leaves are green” etc.; all of them meet the requirement 
of  being  fully  sentential  constructions,  which  however  do  not,  in  a  number  of  relevant  cases, 
express the truth-conditions of their utterances, and are as a result unevaluable with respect to a 
possible  world.  These  sentences  do  not,  at  least  at  first  sight,  display  any  form of  ambiguity, 
vagueness, context-sensitivity or syntactic ellipsis; on the other hand, the idea that their utterances 
really express a determinate content is very much implausible. These were the sentences which I 
characterised as semantically under-determined in both the  Introduction and in Chapter 1. It is 
very important, in order to demarcate the field, that we concentrate on exactly this group of cases. 
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In  particular,  a  sharp  distinction  should  be  maintained  between  them and  the  following,  very 
different cases:
Non-sentential assertions. It has been argued (see Stainton & Elugardo 2004, Stainton 2005) that 
genuine assertions can be performed even employing non-sentential expressions. Uttering single 
phrases or even words can qualify as the performance of an assertion. Suppose a speaker, say a 
coffee shop attendant, utters (1) while showing a coffee pack to a customer; or suppose a child 
utters (2) while handing an empty glass to her mother. 
(1) From the mountains of Colombia
(2) Water
In these cases, even though they are not using sentences, speakers have been taken as performing 
genuine, truth-evaluable assertions. Since there is not enough syntactic structure in order to allow a 
semantic interpretation of (1) and (2), the role of pragmatic enrichment in determining the content 
of these assertions has been pointed at as crucial. As Stainton & Elugardo write
context must be contributing to the truth-conditions of the assertion in ways that are 
not traceable to items in the disambiguated syntax, i.e., to slot-filling […] . In which 
case, […] free pragmatic enrichment must be playing a role in determining the literal 
truth-conditional content of [the] assertion. (Stainton & Elugardo 2004: 445)
The  difference  between  the  cases  at  interest  for  me  and  the  ones  focussed  on  by  Stainton  & 
Elugardo is straightforward: the former are examples of sentential constructions, while the latter are 
examples of non-sentential constructions. From the point of view of a proponent of free pragmatic 
enrichment,  the  difference  is  not  particularly  significant,  in  that  pragmatic  mechanisms  of 
enrichment clearly operate irrespectively of whether the linguistic object at issue is a well-formed 
sentence  or  not.  From my point  of  view,  the  difference  is  crucial.  Take the  phrase  “From the 
mountains  of  Colombia”:  here  it  seems  that,  prior  to  exercising  one's  semantic/conceptual 
competence,  one  has  to  reconstruct  the  (presumed)  syntactic  structure  of  the  expression.  This, 
however, is a process that involves investigating the speaker's intentions first. It is only after having 
settled these aspects that conceptual considerations may apply. So in the case of (1), conceptual 
constraints  are  not  immediately  of  help  because  the  priority  goes  to  processes  that  are  purely 
pragmatic, in that they aim at discovering facts that depend on the speaker's intentions, in order to  
assign  a  (even  minimal)  syntactic  structure  to  the  expression.  Things  get  even  worse  with  an 
utterance of (2). Here further structural aspects need to be settled, among which whether (2) is an 
assertion or any other kind of speech act (a question, a command). So once again it seems that 
questions as to the speaker's intentions have to be established prior to any application of conceptual 
constraints, and that conceptual constraints are not immediately of help here.
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  question  of  whether  there  are  non-sentential  assertions,  and  of  which 
mechanisms  help  determine  their  content,  is  not  our  focus  here  (for  views  that  contrast  with 
Stainton's see Stanley 2000, but also more classic authors such as Dummett (1973: 297-8) and 
Evans (1982)); it will suffice to say that the conceptual constraints proposal is not meant to provide 
an (immediate) answer to these issues. 
Evaluable, but Conversationally Inappropriate Assertions.  Another category which should not be 
conflated with the one I am presently dealing with is the one comprising sentences that express full-
fledged propositions, even though these propositions are somehow inappropriate from a pragmatic 
or conversational point of view. Below are some examples:
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(3) It will take time to get there;
(4) She insulted him and he left;
(5) Sam has a good writing;
An utterance of (3) states that it will take a certain amount of time to get to the demonstrated place, 
which is rather trivial; the content of the utterance is fully evaluable (indeed, true), however it is of 
course not what speakers may really intend their hearers to understand, the intended content being 
that it will take more time than expected to get there. The literally expressed content is, therefore, 
fully  propositional  (and  evaluable),  but  uninformative  because  trivially  true,  and  hence 
inappropriate from a strictly conversational point of view. Something similar happens with (4). The 
content expressed by the sentence is that a demonstrated woman insulted a demonstrated man and 
that the man left, but it does not specify either the order or the relation between the two events. This  
is rather odd, because plausibly a speaker who utters (4) intends the hearer to understand that the 
leaving happened after and it was caused by the insulting. Although the content literally expressed 
by  (4)  is  evaluable  (it  has  the  truth-conditions  of  a  logical  conjunction),  it  may  therefore  be 
conversationally  inappropriate.  Example  (5)  also  belongs  to  the  category  of  evaluable,  but 
conversationally inappropriate assertions, if placed in the right context: take and utterance of (5) 
expressed as the content of a recommendation letter for a candidate Ph.D. student: though fully 
evaluable, it goes off-topic in that it doesn't engage in an evaluation of the skills typically distinctive 
of an academic fellow. The fault of any utterance of (5) in a context like this is that of not being 
relevant, or of giving too little information, and hence of being conversationally inappropriate. 
The kind of under-determination exhibited by sentences such as (3)-(5) is not, as I have argued both 
in the  Introduction and in  Chapter 2 (section 5), adequately characterisable in terms of “deep” 
semantic under-determinacy. “Deep” semantic under-determinacy obtains just in case the content 
that a sentence expresses, besides not fully specifying what the speaker intends, does not specify a 
truth-condition  at  all.  According to  this  characterisation,  cases  such as  (3)-(5)  are  not  cases  of 
“deep”  semantic  under-determinacy.  They  are  instead  cases  of  “shallow”  semantic  under-
determinacy, in which a sentence's meaning merely fails to express what the speaker intends, but 
does express an evaluable content anyway.
As one may have noted, I have put together examples which, according to some theorists, belong to 
the category of “explicature”, like (3)-(4), with others that may be viewed as more germane to 
Gricean  implicatures,  like  (5).  There  may  be  differences  between  the  two  sets  of  examples42, 
however  for  present  purposes  I  shall  focus  on  their  similarities,  which  are  worthy  enough  of 
attention. When confronted with an utterance of any of (3)-(5), the hearer has to engage in a form of 
inference  which  plausibly  takes  into  account,  together  with  the  literally  asserted  content,  also 
information concerning the conversation and its (tacit) rules, the speaker's intentions and all those 
elements that may be salient in the context, in order to identify the message really conveyed over 
and beyond the sentence uttered and its literal meaning. This happens to an equal extent in the case 
of explicatures and implicatures, as more than one author admits (see Carston 2002a). The only 
difference that is invoked is between an implicit, spontaneous, unconscious inference in the case of 
explicature and a more explicit, effortful and relatively slow reasoning in the case of implicature. 
These considerations all suggest that an explanation of how the content conveyed by utterances of 
these sentences is arrived at  by hearers doesn't  rely primarily on considerations connected with 
conceptual constraints. Here what seems central to content individuation is finding out what the 
speaker intends to communicate; conceptual considerations may apply, but only as a consequence of 
that.  Again,  then,  I  shall  say that  the conceptual  constraints  view is  not  intended to provide  a 
42 According to Carston (1988), implicatures typically do not imply explicatures, i.e. they cannot be logically 
“stronger” than them; this would make explicatures cognitively redundant. According to Recanati (1989), 
implicatures do not fall within the scope of logical operators, while explicatures (or “what is said”) do. Recanati 
(2004) also emphasises the fact that implicatures are derived from a well-defined sentence-content, while “what is 
said” is typically the product of the enrichment of a sub-propositional sentential content.
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treatment of examples such as (3)-(5), which are better dealt with by means of an account in terms 
of pragmatic processes which proceed through intention-ascription.
How large is, then,  the scope of the account I am defending? Are there any other examples of 
semantic under-determinacy besides the ones I have been referring to all throughout this work? I 
believe there are countless examples of sentences analogous to those considered so far—indeed I 
provided a good number of them in the Introduction. There seems no better way of characterising 
semantically under-determined sentences as those sentences which do not  prima facie look as if 
they suffer from ambiguity, vagueness, indexicality or ellipsis, and about which it seems wildly 
implausible to suppose that they really express a determinate, invariant content across contexts. 
According to Bach (1994a), these sentences are set apart from others in that their content is, as it 
were,  conceptually truncated,  i.e. in that some essential aspects of the concepts involved in the 
expressed content are left unspoken, or unarticulated. Consider for example:
(6) Olivia is tall;
(7) Paracetamol is better;
(8) I'll see you outside;
(9) The guests are late.
In all these cases, the content expressed by the sentence is, as it were, conceptually incomplete. 
Being tall is being so with respect to a comparison class; being better is being such in contrast to  
something  else;  being  outside  is  always  relative  to  some  interior  location;  while  being  late  is 
invariably being so with relation to a certain schedule. All these relational aspects are left out by the 
compositionally derived semantic contents of (6)-(9): that is why Bach attributes to the content of 
these sentences an incompleteness which is conceptual in kind. My view is partially in agreement 
with Bach's insight, for I do believe that semantic under-determinacy could be depicted—at some 
level  of  analysis—as  conceptual  truncation.  My account  though takes  a  further  step  in  that  it 
speculates that the very process of comprehension of (6)-(9) and the like is accomplished thanks to 
the hearer's exploiting of her underlying competence about the concepts (meanings) involved, and 
not thanks to the hearer's employment of Gricean, fully pragmatic mechanisms. 
To sum up, in this section I have circumscribed the range of phenomena for which I am going to 
propose a treatment in terms of conceptual constraints.  Firstly,  I  have ruled out so called  non-
sentential assertions, in that I believe that conceptual considerations are secondary with respect to 
purely  pragmatic  considerations  which  may  be  used  to  establish  a  (albeit  minimal)  syntactic 
structure for the expressions involved. Secondly, I have ruled out all cases of “shallow” semantic  
under-determinacy, i.e. those cases in which a sentence expresses an evaluable semantic content 
which is however pragmatically inadequate. I have admitted as amenable to a conceptual constraints 
treatment all those cases in which we have a sort of semantic under-specification which doesn't 
seem to be imputable to any clear case of ambiguity, vagueness, indexicality or ellipsis; these cases 
seem to involve “conceptual truncation”—something which suggests that a treatment in terms of 
conceptual constraints might be on the right track.
2. Some Background on Utterance Understanding
After  having  delimited  the  scope  of  application  of  the  conceptual  constraints  account,  let  me 
compare the way the conceptual constraints view approaches utterance understanding with other 
approaches to the same topic that may be considered similar to it. The aim is, once again, that of 
providing more details concerning the proposal I am currently advancing. In this section, I shall 
sketch the main positions in the debate concerning what kinds of processes make it possible to 
achieve  an understanding of  utterances  of  under-determined sentences  in  context.  The point  of 
departure for all these approaches is that linguistic meaning under-determines speaker's meaning (or 
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what a speaker means with an utterance) in some “deep” way. It is up to the theorist to indicate the
—linguistic or extralinguistic—means thanks to which communication often turns out as successful, 
notwithstanding the lack of determinacy on the part of language. The main approaches that have 
been defended are essentially three: inferential approaches; non-inferential approaches and syntactic 
approaches.
2.1 Inferential accounts
The first family of accounts identifies inferential processes as the trait d'union between linguistic 
meaning (i.e. the content of a sentence compositionally determined) and speaker's meaning (i.e. the 
content of an utterance of that sentence in the context in which the utterance is performed). The 
main claim of an inferential account may be identified with the following: 
[Inferential account]
What allows a hearer to derive the speaker's meaning m of a certain utterance u of a sentence s is 
invariably an inferential process. 
The speaker's meaning of an utterance is not simply the sentence's content-in-context: even though 
the latter may incorporate elements that depend on the speaker's intentions (like for instance the 
referents  of  demonstrative  expressions  such  as  “that”,  “there”),  it  is  usually  not  considered  an 
example of speaker's meaning. Speaker's meaning requires that the content that the utterer intends to 
convey  departs  to  a  greater  extent  from the  sentence's  conventional  content;  incorporating  the 
intended  references  of  some  expressions  is  not  enough.  For  this  reason,  typical  examples  of 
speaker's meaning are metaphors, metonimies, implied meanings (Gricean implicatures), indirect 
speech acts; less obvious examples of speaker's meaning are provided, for example, by the use of 
quantifier phrases, definite descriptions, relational terms (“tall”, “better”). Among these expressions 
one may list,  interestingly for our purposes,  the semantically under-determined expressions that 
have been surveyed. I take it as a distinctive assumption of an inferential account that, save for clear 
cases  of  indexicality,  the  “gap”  between  sentence  meaning  and  speaker  meaning  is  filled  in 
inferentially for all, more or less typical, cases of speaker's meaning.   
2.1.1 The Gricean approach
Grice's  seminal  work  Logic  and  Conversation may  be  taken  as  the  point  of  departure  of  an 
inferentialist approach to utterance comprehension. Grice's main concern in the article is to account 
for the “divergencies in meaning between […] formal devices […] and […] their  analogues or 
counterparts in natural language” (22). His explanation of how this divergence is overcome relies 
on the  distinction between sentence meaning and speaker  meaning:  the former  is  the semantic 
content  of a  sentence,  determined on the basis  of convention;  the latter  is  the content  that  the 
speaker intends to convey with her utterance of that sentence. While linguistic competence (plus 
knowledge of the context) is sufficient for a hearer in order to figure out sentence meaning (in 
context), it doesn't suffice in order to figure out speaker's meaning. Further competences need to be 
involved, which are not linguistic in nature: these are distinctively inferential competences, together 
with other capacities that we may call “meta-representational”. Let us introduce Grice's model of 
utterance comprehension with an example. Suppose John asks Mary whether she would like to go to 
the cinema. Mary replies “I am tired”; the sentence's conventional meaning doesn't allow John to 
fully grasp what Mary means. On the assumption that Mary is being cooperative, i.e. that she is 
striving to give her best  possible  contribution to  the conversation (see  Chapter 1),  John could 
reason as follows:
1. Mary said that she is tired;
2. She wouldn't have said that she is tired unless she believed that she doesn't want to go to the cinema;
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3. She knows that I can suppose that she might believe that she doesn't want to go to the cinema;
4. She hasn't done nothing to stop me believing that she believes that she doesn't want to go to the cinema;
5. Therefore, she intends me to believe that she believes that she doesn't want to go to the cinema;
6. Therefore (by saying that she is tired) she means/implies that she doesn't want to go to the cinema;
The first important feature of Grice's “working out” schema is that it is an instance of inference to  
the  best  explanation,  where  the  explanandum is  Mary's  conversational  move  as  described  in 
premise (1). The assumption that is operative in the background here is the presumption of speaker's 
cooperativeness; that is, the performance of the whole inference has as an implicit condition that the 
speaker  is  striving  to  give  the  best  possible  contribution  to  the  conversation,  even  though 
appearances may suggest otherwise. Thus, Mary's response may appear to be non-cooperative, in 
that it violates some of the conversational maxims, namely the ones that recommend relevance and 
clarity.  The  hearer  assumes  that,  despite  this  apparent  violation,  the  speaker  is  nevertheless 
cooperating to the communicative enterprise; with this assumption in the background, the hearer 
follows a train of reasoning that leads him to conclude, as the best explanation for (1), that the 
speaker is implying that she doesn't want to go to the cinema. 
The second important feature of a Gricean inference like (1)-(6) is that its premises and conclusion 
all  feature  an  attribution  of  attitude to  the  speaker,  as  e.g.  a  belief-attribution  or  an  intention-
attribution. Attributing a belief, or intention, or desire to another subject is a way of representing 
what is going on in that subject's mind, i.e. it is a way of representing another subject's mental 
representation.  Let  us  call  any  representation  of  another's  mental  representation  a  meta-
representation.  Thus,  the  inferential  schema set  forth  by  Grice  contains,  at  each  step,  a  meta-
representation, such as “Mary believes that φ”, “Mary means/ implies that φ”. Humans are naturally 
capable to form and entertain meta-representations, so Grice's model is plausible insofar as any 
fully developed human cognitively equipped so as to mentally form and entertain an attribution of 
speech, belief and intention to another subject can be thought of as going through one of these 
inferences. 
Several theorists  have criticised the Gricean model in the account  that it  might  be regarded as 
cognitively too demanding, and therefore as psychologically implausible. Sperber (2000), Wilson 
(2000) and Sperber and Wilson (2002) forcefully highlight this limit. In the following excerpt, for 
instance, Sperber rhetorically stresses the 
[…] cumbersome character of the inferences that Gricean pragmatics necessitates 
every time a speaker's meaning diverges from sentence's meaning [...]. Do we really 
have, in the case of implicature, of indirect speech acts, of metaphor, or of irony, to 
reflect  on what  the  speaker  knows we know she knows,  on  what  respecting  the 
maxims requires of her, on what she might mean and not mean? Does it take more 
effort and hence longer to process such utterances? [...] Do we want to attribute to 
young  children  these  complex  inference  patterns  or  to  deny  them the  ability  to 
comprehend metaphor and other forms of so-called indirect speech? As a rational 
reconstruction of how inferential comprehension might be possible, Grice's account, 
though not without problems, is certainly appealing. As a psychologically realistic 
account of the mental processes actually involved in comprehension, it is much less 
so. (Sperber 2000: 131-2)
Critics of Grice argue that, as far as the use of  inference is concerned, it is implausible that even 
fully developed adults ordinarily interpret utterances by performing such complex inferences as the 
one in (1)-(6), in an overt and in a step-by-step fashion. That is, it is implausible to suppose that 
listeners explicitly formulate premisses such as (1)-(5) in their mind, explicitly follow a linear train 
of reasoning and explicitly reach the conclusion at (6). 
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The same considerations have been advanced with respect to meta-representation: critics complain 
that  it  is  implausible  that  fully  developed  adults  consciously  or  explicitly  formulate  the  meta-
representational propositions that feature in (1)-(6), for this would affect negatively the speed and 
easiness  of  the  performance;  quite  to  the  contrary,  it  seems  that  if  we  entertain  any  meta-
representations, we do that implicitly or “by default”. Significant evidence on this point comes from 
developmental psychology. Experiments have shown that pre-verbal infants, who most certainly 
lack the capacity to explicitly form meta-representations, are nevertheless capable of inferential 
communication (see e.g. Bretherton 1991). This suggests that meta-representations are taken care of 
by capacities that are implicit, covert and probably much less sophisticated than the ones that are 
involved at a conscious level in that, for example, they do not presuppose either the capacity to 
reason consciously or any linguistic capacities.
As  a  reaction  to  the  Gricean  model,  some  theorists  have  started  considering  a  view  that 
countenances  utterance  comprehension  as  an  inferential  process  which  takes  place  at  a  sub-
personal, implicit, unconscious level, and which is characteristically fast, painless and automatic. 
This view usually goes hand in hand with a Fodor-style assumption as to the architecture of the 
mind, which distinguishes between modular components and central system components (see Fodor 
1983). Modules run their activity below the level of consciousness, they respond to and manipulate 
only certain specific inputs; moreover,  they characteristically work in isolation,  i.e.  they do not 
communicate with each other and are “blind” to any stimulus that lies outside their domain. On the 
other hand, the central system has access to the outputs (but not to the internal processes) of each 
single module and typically integrates information coming from different domains. Its activity may 
be run at a conscious, reflective level, and it is responsible for what we may identify as reflective,  
rational thought. On the assumption that Gricean inferences may be implemented by central system 
mechanisms, this resulting in slow, effort-taking and too sophisticated instances of reasoning, some 
theorists oppose the Gricean model by arguing that utterance comprehension processes take place at 
a “modular” level, which explains their being unconscious, automatic, fast and non-effort-taking. In 
the next section, I shall present the most notorious example of anti-Gricean, “modular” approach, 
known also as Relevance Theory.
2.1.2. The Relevance-Theoretic Approach
According  to  Relevance  Theory,  communication  through  language  consists  in  essentially  two 
activities:  the  first  one  is  an  encoding-decoding  activity,  and  the  second  one  is  an  inferential 
activity. The encoding-decoding task is what humans undertake when they produce utterances of 
meaningful sentences (or pieces of sentences) in a language. Language is a code to the extent that it  
consists of a collection of symbols provided with a conventional meaning; encoding a message 
means “putting into words” that message; de-coding a message means grasping the content of (or 
“thought” expressed by) a certain sequence of signs by computing together their meanings. The 
encoding-decoding activity usually leads to rather partial results: often, what is encoded in a certain 
occurrence of a sentence is only part of what the speaker means by uttering that sentence43. For 
example, if A and B are both in a shopping mall, and A utters “John is outside”, an important part of 
what A means with her utterance is not encoded in what A said—namely that John is outside of the 
shopping mall A and B are both in. How can the addressee work out the content of  A's utterance?
Here the inferential part of the communication process emerges as key, for inference is thought of 
as being sufficient for filling the gap between the defective sentence meaning and the intended 
content  of  the  utterance.  Though  the  Relevance-theoretic  account  shares  with  Grice  a  strong 
emphasis on inference, the crucial point of departure from Grice is that, for Relevance theorists, the 
43 It is a matter of debate whether sentence meaning needs not encoding all the speaker's meaning as opposed to 
whether sentence meaning cannot encode it. If one thinks that it simply needs not, one is subscribing to a view of 
semantic under-determinacy as merely convenient (see e.g. Quine, 1960: 193-4, Katz 1972); if one believes that 
linguistic meaning can't encode speaker's meaning, one is endorsing a view of under-determinacy as essential to 
language (see Carston 2002).
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inferences at issue cannot be explicit and reflexive, but are conceived as  implicit or subpersonal, 
that is they go on “unconsciously, painlessly, and fast” (Sperber, 1995). The difference between a 
Relevance-theoretic  inference  and a  Gricean one is,  as  mentioned previously,  equivalent  to  the 
difference between a process carried out by a Fodorian “module” and a process carried out by a 
“central system”. 
In  Relevance  Theory,  the  inferential  processes  which  underlie  utterance  comprehension  are 
characteristically aimed at obtaining a relevant result. Relevance is defined as the property carried 
by a stimulus whenever the cognitive processing of that stimulus has the highest possible cognitive 
effects  at  the  lowest  computational  cost  (see  Sperber&Wilson  1986/1995:  153).  The 
Communicative  Principle  of  Relevance  states  that  every communicative act  (be it  an ostensive 
gesture or the articulation of a sentence) carries with it a presumption of relevance, i.e. it by itself 
communicates  to  the  addressee  that  it  is  worth  for  the  addressee  to  attend  to  it.  Given  this 
presumption of relevance, the hearer is entitled to process the content of the communicative act in 
the following way: by following a “least effort” method, she identifies the interpretation which best 
satisfies  the  expectation  of  relevance  raised  by  the  input  stimulus.  Once  this  interpretation  is 
reached, she stops.
A qualification here is in order: Even though they put much weight on  implicit and  unconscious 
trains of reasoning, Relevance theorists are certainly committed to a standard notion of what an 
inference  is.  According  to  Sperber  (1995),  inference  “consists  in  starting  from  some  initial 
assumptions  and in  arriving  through a  series  of  steps  at  some conclusion”.  To go back to  the 
example,  we may depict  the hearer  of A's  utterance of  “John is  outside” as going through the 
following piece of reasoning (here I follow Sperber 1994): let us suppose that the first assumption 
consists in the proposition that A said “John is outside”; the second assumption is to the effect that 
both A and B are in a shopping mall; the third assumption is to the effect that what the speaker said  
is maximally relevant. From these assumptions, the hearer may, through a certain number of steps 
and following the path of least effort, arrive at the conclusion that what A means is that John is 
outside  of  the  shopping mall.  This  all  being  said,  it  should  be  added that,  even if  Relevance-
theorists are, at an abstract level, committed to a standard notion of inference, it  is also largely 
accepted that, in practice, the inferences we use for utterance comprehension may not be a straight 
progression from premisses to conclusions. As Carston makes clear:
the process need not progress strictly logically from the accessing of premisses to 
the  drawing  of  conclusions.  For  instance,  a  particular  conclusion,  or  type  of 
conclusion, might be expected on the basis of considerations of relevance and, via a 
backwards  inference  process,  premises  constructed  [...]  which  will  make  for  a 
sound inference to the conclusion. The process may involve several backwards and 
forwards adjustments of content before an equilibrium is achieved [...]. (Carston 
2002a: 139)
A further  characteristic element of the Relevance-Theoretic approach lies in  that  the inferences 
employed in utterance understanding are performed by a component which is  a sub-part  of the 
human capacity to  read others' minds.  As proponents of the Relevance-theoretic approach hold, 
humans have developed a habit to interpret the behaviour of other subjects in terms of what they 
believe or intend; that is, they have developed an ability to explain others' behaviour by forming and 
entertaining  meta-representations,  i.e.  representations  of  their  fellows'  experiences,  thoughts, 
desires,  intentions.  Meta-representation  is  used  also  in  the  interpretation  of  communicative 
behaviour,  which  is  thought  of  as  a  sub-species  of  intention-driven  behaviour.  When  the 
interpretation of linguistic uses is  at  issue,  Relevance theorists  hold that  what  is  usually called 
“pragmatic processes” of interpretation are inherently meta-representational,  that is,  they aim at 
working out what is meant or intended by the speaker. As Carston writes:
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[T]he pragmatic comprehension system interprets communicative behaviour in terms 
of an intention on the part of the speaker to bring about a certain belief state in the 
addressee.  Currently,  the  idea  is  being  developed  that  […]  the  relevance-based 
comprehension  module  may  be  a  sub-module  of  the  more  general  mental-state 
attributing module [...]. (Carston 2002a: 132)
Here the crucial contrast with the Gricean account is owed to the fact that meta-representational 
pragmatic processes are assumed to be covert or “modular”, while Grice's “working out” inference 
may as well be a piece of overt, reflective reasoning. With respect to meta-representation, the two 
models  differ  in  the  level  of  sophistication:  a  Gricean inference has  both  meta-representational 
premises and conclusion,  thus requiring the performer of the inference to have quite developed 
representational  capacities.  By  contrast  Relevance-theoretic  inference,  being  carried  out  by  a 
modular component, only needs to give a meta-representational conclusion (X means that φ), while 
its premises need not be meta-representational—in fact, they do not even need be accessible to one's 
awareness. As Sperber writes: 
The conclusion of […] an interpretation process is an attribution of a meaning to the 
speaker, hence a metarepresentation, but the premises in the inference process need 
not be metarepresentational. Therefore this procedure can be followed by a relatively 
unsophisticated metarepresenter. (Sperber 2000: 133)
The scientific hypothesis that underlies Sperber's claim is  the following: at  some point in their 
evolution, humans have become endowed with a “mind-reading” or “intention-detecting” module, 
which is responsible for the capacity to explain other subjects' behaviour in terms of beliefs, desires 
and intentions. As communicative practices arose, this module evolved into an even more specific 
“pragmatics” sub-module, devoted to the detection of communicative intentions. The core thought 
is that, the component hosting this “pragmatics-related” mind-reading capacity being a module, the 
inferential  processes  that  it  carries  out  are  typically  input-specific,  intuitive,  spontaneous, 
subpersonal and not even explicitly meta-representational. This starkly contrasts with the Gricean 
picture, which depicts pragmatic processes of utterance interpretation as depending on the capacity 
to  explicitly form and  reason  with  meta-representations.  Schematically,  the  difference  between 
Relevance-theoretic inferences and Gricean inferences could be thus representated:
Gricean Inference
Stimulus: utterance of “ψ”




Output/Conclusion: X means that φ
Relevance-Theoretic Inference
Stimulus: utterance of “ψ”
Pragmatics Sub-Module
Input/Premise: ψ
.                                                       
[Path of least effort]
.
Output/Conclusion: X means that φ
To  sum  up,  in  this  section  I  have  surveyed  the  so-called  “inferential  accounts”  of  utterance 
understanding:  these  accounts  explain  the  success  of  verbal  communication  with  the  idea  that 
inference compensates the under-determinacy that  is  proper to language.  Two approaches to  an 
inferential  account  have  been  identified:  the  Gricean  approach  and  the  Relevance-theoretic 
approach.  The  Gricean  approach  regards  inference  in  utterance  understanding  as  a  conscious, 
explicitly meta-representational process; by contrast, Relevance-theory postulates the existence of a 
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“pragmatics-dedicated” module which terminates with a meta-representational conclusion (X means 
that φ) after having run sub-personal and not overtly meta-representational inferential steps. 
2.2. Non-Inferential Accounts
A position which strongly contrasts with the account just presented has it that understanding tokens 
of  sentences  of  a  natural  language  is  an  altogether non-inferential  activity.  According  to  Ruth 
Millikan, for example, there is no inferential step between hearing an utterance and knowing what 
state of affairs it speaks about. Language understanding is as direct as perception. Of course, the 
reflective speaker could voluntarily focus on the items that serve as a vehicle—the phonemes or 
graphemes, the words, their meanings, the sentence's syntax—and from those infer the content of 
the uttered sentence. However, this is likely to happen only in a minority of cases, and it implies 
performing a less natural or spontaneous task. As Millikan states,
you can directly  perceive the phonemes or directly perceive the words being uttered 
by a speaker if you want to. But usually you perceive only the world affairs spoken 
about. (Millikan 2004: 121).
Even though language understanding doesn't require inference on the part of the hearer, still this 
doesn't mean that there are no processes whatsoever that allow the hearer to go from the auditory 
perception  of  a  certain  utterance  to  the  perception  of  the  state  of  affairs  spoken  about.  These 
processes  are  not  inferential,  but  rather  merely  translational:  they  involve  moving  from  a 
representation to another representation. In particular, these processes are not inferential in the sense 
that:  (i)  they  cannot  be  modelled  in  terms  of  premisses  and  conclusion44;  (ii)  they  involve 
“functionally insulated” signs, i.e. items which are designed to serve only one purpose (or very few 
ones) and can interact only with items very limited in number and format.
The translational model returns a picture in which language is a system of symbols that can be used 
without a user being fully aware of or focussed on its structure (children and even most adults, for 
example, do not know what phonemes are, nor they master a semantic vocabulary); hearers can 
employ this medium in order to have access, via translation, to the cognitions and perceptions of the 
speakers and, ultimately, to the states of affairs that they talk about:
Believing what one hears is exactly like any other way of gaining knowledge by 
perception  without  inference.  [...]  Coming to know something by believing what 
someone else says is making use of another instrument that extends perception—[...] 
the  [...]  perceptual  and cognitive  system of  another  person,  through  which  some 
portion  of  the  world  has  been  carefully  focused  and  then  projected  again  via  a 
medium that one knows how to interpret. (Millikan 1984: 304-5).
In such a framework, language gives us access to others' cognitive and perceptual systems, thus 
literally extending our own perceptual system. This has as a consequence that there is no difference 
between seeing that P and being told that P. In both cases we have a perceptual access to the state of 
affairs that P. Millikan is very explicit on the matter when she writes: 
Rain does not sound the same when heard falling on the roof, on earth, on snow, and 
on the water, even though it may be directly perceived as rain through any of these 
media. Exactly similarly, rain has a different sound when the medium of transmission 
is  the  English  language ("It's  raining!").  And it  sounds  different  again  when the 
medium of transmission is French or German. (Millikan 2004: 122)
44 Note that this is different from the Relevance-theoretic claim (see section 2.1.2) to the effect that inferences need not 
be a linear route from premises to conclusion, for this view still subscribes to a standard notion of inference.
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There are other ways for processes of utterance understanding to be non-inferential, besides being 
translational in Millikan's privileged sense. Recanati (2002b) considers cases in which a sentence's 
schematic meaning is “fleshed out” so as to be made propositional; he observes that the meanings 
that  are  subject  to  these  processes  of  “free  enrichment”  or  “completion”  are  too  abstract  and 
schematic  in  order  to  be  considered  conceptual  representations.  He  then  surmises  that  these 
mechanisms of supplementation, since they manipulate non-conceptual (or non  fully conceptual) 
contents, are not inferential. Suppose John utters “It's raining”, meaning that it's raining in Paris. 
This  sentence  expresses  the  content  that  it's  raining,  which  exhibits  a  conceptual  gap—
corresponding to the locational aspect. The mechanism of completion by which the content gets 
“fleshed out” is considered by Recanati as non-inferential to the extent that it takes as its starting 
point a content which is not (fully) conceptual. 
A second set of processes he considers are what he calls “transfer”. Semantic transfer is involved in 
non-literal talk, and it is typically non-truth-preserving. Consider for example the transfer involved 
in understanding an utterance of “The ham sandwich is getting restless”: it brings the hearer from 
the false proposition that the ham sandwich is getting restless to the true proposition that the ham-
sandwich-orderer is getting restless. In these cases what connects the first, semantically expressed, 
proposition  to  the  second,  intended one,  is  an  “associative”  link  which  is  by  no  means  truth-
preserving, and that is surely not a logical entailment. 
To sum up, in  this  section we reviewed three ways in which utterance understanding could be 
regarded  as  non-inferential:  One  could  claim,  like  Millikan,  that  understanding  an  utterance 
involves merely translational processes, but also, like Recanati, that it involves free-enriching and 
associative processes.  Free  enriching processes  count  as  non-inferential  to  the  extent  that  they 
manipulate non (fully) conceptual material, while associative processes are not inferential insofar as 
they may not preserve truth.45
2.3. Syntactic accounts
An altogether distinct account of how utterance understanding works may be derived from Stanley's 
(2000) claim that all pragmatic effects are traceable to logical form. Let us consider an utterance of 
“It's raining”; as many theorists have written, the location of the rain, which may be part of the 
truth-conditions of the utterance, is not articulated in the syntax of the sentence.  As we saw in  
Chapter 3, authors such as Stanley, Szabó and Rothschild & Segal argue that these elements are 
really articulated at a covert level: They have no phonetic or graphic realisation, however they are 
present in the deep syntax, or logical form of the sentence at issue; at least in contexts in which no 
variable-binding operators occur, they could be represented as unfilled positions or free variables, 
subject to either variable assignment in context or to binding by operators. Utterance understanding, 
then, becomes predominantly a matter of slot-filling, of “saturating” some pre-determined syntactic 
structures. Sentences are represented as partly filled syntactic templates, where empty argument-
places are  to be filled-in only with a  restricted set  of potential  values,  on the basis  of what is  
relevant in context. 
45 The distinction between inferentialists and non-inferentialists is relevant also in the debate concerning the 
epistemology of acceptance of an interlocutor's assertion—or testimony. Non-reductionists about testimony claim 
that we are prima facie justified in believing what we are told, in absence of reasons to believe otherwise; for Burge 
(1993) and McDowell (1993), this implies that there is no inferential process that the hearer needs to go through in 
order to acquire a justification to believe a testimonial report. Reductionists, on the other hand, think that 
justification for believing what others say comes from the subject having independent, non-testimonial reasons to 
believe; these independent reasons may, for some theorists, come from inductive inference as to the reliability of the 
source (see Lyons 1997, Rysiew 2000), as well as from inferences to the best explanation (see Harman 1965, 
Fricker, 1995).
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Proponents  of  the  syntactic  approach claim to be  supported,  in  a  relevant  array  of  cases46,  by 
evidence provided by contemporary research in syntactic theory. Radically pragmatic explanations, 
such  as  those  appealing  to  “pragmatic  intrusions”  or  “free  enrichment”,  are  regarded  as 
methodologically  flawed in that  they straightforwardly choose strong non-semantic,  unorthodox 
claims, without previously making sure that there are no possible syntactico-semantic (and hence 
more orthodox) accommodations of the phenomena they are interested in. As King&Stanley claim:
Suppose a theorist is in the position of arguing that the semantic content of a certain 
construction must  be augmented by pragmatic  information  to  account  for  natural 
readings  of  that  construction.  To  make  out  this  claim,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the 
theorist  to  provide  a  sketch  of  the  correct  syntax  and  semantics  of  the  relevant 
construction. For it is only then that one can evaluate the claim that the syntax and 
semantics for the relevant construction does not by itself deliver the reading at issue. 
Far too often, those who advocate the thesis that a certain reading of a construction is 
due to pragmatics rather than semantics fail  to live up to their obligation,  and so 
make claims that  are  highly speculative and hence difficult  to  evaluate.  (King & 
Stanley 2005: 147)
As we have seen in  Chapter 3,  not  all  approaches in  terms of syntactically articulated hidden 
positions may be immune to criticisms of a methodological kind; indeed in some cases, positing 
hidden  syntactic  elements  may  turn  out  as  methodologically  unwarranted,  if  not  theoretically 
inconvenient (in that for instance it increases the complexity of the theory in an undue way). The 
debate concerns largely empirical questions, and settling the dispute ultimately requires working on 
a case-by-case basis. Be that as it may, in what follows (see section 5), my point against a syntactic 
approach to comprehension will build on the idea that, if no syntactic/empirical claims about the 
presence  of  hidden positions  in  logical  form can be expected  from arguments  so far  provided 
(especially, from Stanley's Binding Argument), this doesn't compel the opponent of the syntactic 
approach to embrace a completely unorthodox, pragmatic account. The reason is that, in the view I 
wish to  propound,  contextual  effects  may be  semantically/conceptually  constrained,  rather  than 
being driven by purely pragmatic considerations, since I argue that conceptual/constraints determine 
semantic effects which are however free from syntactic constraints.
3. Inferences, after all
The aim of this section is that of ruling out the idea that the comprehension of semantically under-
determined sentences such as “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, “The leaves are green” etc. is inherently 
a non-inferential process like the ones envisaged by Millikan or Recanati. Arguably, understanding 
utterances of these sentences is a genuine inferential undertaking.
The view that inferential processes may be involved in the comprehension of, e.g. “It's raining” is 
not accepted by all authors. For example, Recanati (2002b) emphasises that a process can be said 
“inferential” only if it  takes as its input a conceptual content (see  section 2.2). Some sentences 
express contents that are very “abstract” or “schematic”: this may make these contents not enough 
conceptually structured to enter an inference: 
One of the primary pragmatic processes involved in the determination of what is said 
consists  in  "saturating" or  "completing" a  schematic  meaning in  order  to  yield  a 
truth-evaluable representation. All the inferentialists rightly emphasise the abstract, 
46 For example, it has been argued that the syntax of sentences (both in the finite and non-finite mode) articulates 
temporal elements (see King (2003), Enc (1987), Ogihara (1996)); the syntax of comparative constructions and of 
conditionals has also been argued to contain hidden syntactic positions. In King and Stanley's (2005) view, positing 
these syntactic elements helps making sense of the otherwise vague and unorthodox claims that there are “pragmatic 
processes” affecting the interpretation of these constructions.
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schematic character  of the "linguistic meanings" which serve as input  to primary 
pragmatic processes. That schematic, abstract character renders somewhat dubious 
the claim that  those meanings  [...]  are  themselves  "conceptual  representations".  I 
would rather say that they are non-conceptual [...]. (Recanati 2002b: 122)
The conclusion would be that, since they involve non-conceptual contents, processes of enrichment 
of the content of certain sentences are non-inferential. In the case of “It's raining”, Recanati would 
say that, since the content  that it's raining is too abstract or schematic, it is non-conceptual, and 
hence there can be no account in which the enriched content that it's raining in Paris is the result of 
an inference.  The same would apply to  “Jill  is  ready”:  the content  that  Jill  is  ready only is  a 
propositional schema, i.e. a highly abstract and skeletal object; this, in Recanati's view, is enough in 
order for the content at issue to count as non-conceptual. The hearer who enriches the content of 
“Jill is ready” as Jill is ready to ski cannot therefore be described as having carried out an inference.
I do not agree with Recanati's point of view. The fact that a content is “abstract” or “schematic”  
may  make  it  under-determined,  i.e.  incapable  of  expressing  a  truth-condition  in  a  context  of 
utterance, but it doesn't entail that it lacks a conceptual structure. In the case of “It's raining”, it 
seems to me evident that the content expressed by the sentence is a fully conceptually structured 
content. This content may not express a full-blown proposition in the context of utterance of the 
sentence, but this doesn't prevent it from entering in an inferential relation with other propositions. 
As far as I  can see,  the following is  a perfectly  acceptable inference,  in  which the conceptual  
structure  of  the  predicate  “to  rain”  becomes  fully  apparent.  The  starting  assumption  is  the 
following: if one knows what “to rain” means, one knows that, e.g., raining involves drops falling 
from the sky. This implies that one is in a position to use the predicate “to rain” in the following 
inference:
[1] It's raining;
[2] If it's raining, drops are falling from the sky;
[3] Drops are falling from the sky.
That the predicate “to rain” can take part to inferences such as the one above means that it has a 
conceptual content that can be articulated and can explain the inferences the predicate becomes 
involved in. That predicates like “to rain” express a conceptual content, even if they cannot make 
the content of the sentences they occur in fully propositional, is essential for our purposes, for this 
allows us to account for the cases of enrichment we are interested in terms of inference.
Let us illustrate how such processes may be addressed as inferential. Suppose a speaker utters “It's 
raining”. By the lights of formal, compositional semantics alone, the expressed content is <that it's  
raining>. This content is plausibly the object of the enrichment. The hearer could then reason as 
follows: first, she could invoke as a premise of the reasoning the conceptual constraint to the effect 
that, if it's raining, it's raining somewhere; then she could go on acknowledging that location X is 
under discussion; this would lead her to the conclusion that it's raining in X. Again, suppose that the 
speaker utters “Jill is ready”. By the lights of formal, compositional semantics alone, the content 
expressed  is   <that  Jill  is  ready>;  this  content  being  unevaluable,  the  hearer  could  reason as 
follows:  “If  Jill  is  ready,  she  is  ready  for  something”  (thus  applying  a  conceptual  constraint); 
“Activity X is under discussion; so Jill is ready for X”. Or, again, suppose the speaker utters “The 
leaves are green”; formal, compositional semantics delivers the content <that the leaves are green>. 
This content being poor, truth-conditionally speaking, the hearer may reason as follows: “If the 
leaves are green,  they must be green in  some respect”  (thus applying a conceptual  constraint); 
“Being green in way X is under-discussion; so the leaves are X-green”.
It goes without saying that the inferences countenanced here need not surface at the conscious, 
personal level. Still, let me make clear that, even if hearers do not explicitly run these inferences, 
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these pieces of reasoning look like acceptable rational reconstructions of processes that might be 
gone through in an explicit manner by any rational, competent speaker. That these processes are at 
least virtually available to any rational, competent language user would be enough to make the point 
that processes of “enrichment” of the contents of “It's raining” et similia need not be conceived as 
non-inferential, as if the transition from the sentence's meaning to the expressed content and truth-
conditions in context were a matter of “direct perception” (as in Millikan's framework) or of merely 
associative or transfer processes. (As to the question whether empirical tests could shed any light on 
the issue, let me postpone the discussion to the Conclusion of this thesis, where I shall sketch some 
of the possible empirical developments of the conceptual constraints proposal).
To sum up, the main aim of this section was to argue that comprehension of utterances of “It's 
raining” and the like follows an  inferential, rather than a non-inferential path. I first considered 
Recanati's  criterion  to  the  effect  that  a  process  is  inferential  only  if  it  involves  conceptually 
structured material. Then I argued that it is wrong to regard the “schematic contents” of certain 
semantically under-determined sentences as not conceptually structured. For example, “It's raining” 
expresses a very schematic content, but seems to me to exhibit a full-fledged conceptual structure; 
this  is  made  apparent  by  the  fact  that  sentences  expressing  these  “skeletal”  contents  can 
nevertheless  be  used  to  run  semantic  inferences.  Under-determination  of  content  owed  to  the 
sentence's  expressing  a  mere  propositional  “template”  should  not  be  mistaken  as  absence  of 
conceptual structure. These considerations favour the view that understanding an utterance of “It's 
raining” is, after all, an inferential process. 
3.1. Ruling out Conventional and Generalised Implicatures
Let me now move to an important qualification that I believe anyone who defends the position I am 
currently taking owes to the potential critic. One may point out that what I am dealing with, under  
the name of “enrichment through conceptual constraints” is either a conventional or a generalised 
implicature. Let me consider the idea of conventional implicature first. From Grice (1967/1989)47, 
we know that a conventional implicature is part of what a speaker suggests (without saying it) with 
his use of a certain expression, for the simple fact that she has used that expression. This happens 
with “therefore”: using this word in the sentence “He is an Englishman, he is therefore brave” raises 
the implicature that the man's being brave is a consequence of his being an Englishman; though this 
is not strictly speaking said by the sentence, use of the word “therefore” is sufficient to suggest that 
a relation of consequence obtains.
This  being settled,  can  we say that,  with the  enrichment  presently at  issue,  we are facing  just 
another case of conventional implicature? One feature, it seems to me, sets the present case apart 
from cases of recognised conventional implicature. As Grice and others admit, the consequence 
relation suggested by a use of “therefore” is not part of the truth-conditions of the sentence “He is 
an Englishman, he is therefore brave”; it is simply a suggested aspect. If the person referred to by 
“he” were brave, but not as a consequence of being an Englishman, the speaker would still have 
said something true, although she would have implied something false. Now consider an utterance 
of “It rains”; even though the sentence may be true even if it's not actually raining in any specific  
place (as in “Whenever drops are falling from the sky, it rains” : see Chapter 3 for what I called 
“zero readings”) any felicitous use of such a sentence nevertheless evokes a locational component. 
Suppose one were to utter the sentence “Whenever drops are falling from the sky, it rains”. Even 
though this is true even if it's not raining anywhere, still the fact that rain episodes are spatially 
located is a necessary truth. Suppose this necessary truth was somehow conventionally implicated 
by an utterance of “Whenever drops are falling from the sky, it rains”. Being an implicature, it 
should be cancellable. However, cancelling this implicature results in plain incoherence. One cannot 
consistently claim “Whenever drops are falling from the sky, it rains, but not in any place”. If the 
47 But see also the following references from introductory articles and books on the matter: Karttunen & Peters 1979; 
Levinson 1983: 127; Horn 2003: 383.
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locational aspect were implicated, the sentence wouldn't sound contradictory, for implicatures (even 
conventional  ones)  have  no  effect  on  the  truth-conditions  of  the  uttered  sentences.  From this 
comparison I conclude that the alleged conventional implicature incorporated into the meaning of 
“It rains” is more than just an implicature: it is an essential aspect of the utterance's truth-conditions, 
such that if it were not to be included in them, the speaker would be culpable of having said (not 
just suggested) something plainly false.
There  is  a  second  possibility  for  the  theorist  who  wishes  to  assimilate  the  present  brand  of 
enrichment to some already familiar  phenomenon: saying that we are dealing with just  another 
example  of  generalised  conversational  implicature.  What  is  a  generalised  conversational 
implicature? Once again, we have to make reference to Grice (1967/1989) (but see also Levinson 
2000), who claims that a generalised conversational implicature is a conversational (hence non-
conventional) implicature, which has become customary, or habitual. For example, it has become 
customary, when uttering a sentence like “I saw him with a woman, last night”, to imply that the 
woman in question is neither the wife, nor the sister or mother of the man referred to with the 
pronoun “he”.  Another example is the use of “Some” to imply “Not all”:  when a speaker says 
“Some of the protests were shut down” she usually implicates, and hearers normally take her as 
implicating, that not all protests were shut down. The implicature is elicited by default, but it is 
always cancellable. For example, the speaker could say “I saw him with a woman, last night. In fact  
it was his sister.” and “Some of the protests were shut down; indeed, all of them were”. 
Is enrichment through conceptual constraints a case of generalised conversational implicature? It is 
hard to deny that every use of “It's raining” or “Jill is ready” or “The leaves are green” carries with 
it some customary, or habitual aspect. As Carpintero observes,
When a speaker utters a token  i  of ‘is raining’ (as in ‘it is raining’), he takes for 
granted that more information is available in context about the place he is referring to 
than that it is salient when the token i is produced. But it is a conventional fact about 
the use of the present tense with verbs meaning located events such as ‘to rain’ that 
the place referred to is indicated in that way, as it were, by default, and speakers rely 
on their audiences sharing with them this knowledge. (Carpintero 2001: 110)
Here  Carpintero  rightly  notes  that  uses  of  “It's  raining”  take  for  granted  that  some  salient 
information is already available in the context of the utterance for the interpreting audience. This is 
for sure a matter of custom or habit  (or of “convention”,  in Carpintero's words).  But does this 
suffice for the case to be an example of generalised conversational implicature? Here again, there is 
a  fundamental  difference  between  generalised  conversational  implicatures  and  the  cases  of 
enrichment at issue, namely that the former are cancellable, while the latter are not. To repeat, it is 
perfectly fine to retract what one suggested with the use of  “I saw him with a woman, last night” by 
saying “I  saw him with a  woman,  last  night.  In  fact  it  was  his  sister”;  or  to  cancel  what  one 
implicated with his use of the phrase “Some protests” by saying “Some of the protests were shut 
down; indeed, all of them were”. This freedom is lacked by speakers who use sentences like “It's 
raining”. In normal circumstances, it would make no sense to say “It's raining, but there's no place I 
am talking about where it's actually raining”; or “Jill is ready, but I'm not saying that there's some 
activity for which she is ready”; or, again “The leaves are green, but there's no respect in which they 
are  such”.  These  would  not  be  just  instances  of  implicature  erasing;  they  would  be  plain 
contradictions. Note that the same holds even for zero-readings of “It rains”, since even these uses 
evoke a locational aspect which would be erroneous to cancel as if it was an implicature: as already 
noticed, it would be a straightforward incoherence to utter “Whenever drops fall from the sky it 
rains, but not in any place”. To conclude, then, there is evidence that conceptual constraints do not 
give rise to either conventional implicatures or to generalised conversational implicatures.
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4. Reconsidering the Role of Meta-skills
As I made clear in section 1, the range of examples I intend to account for is rather limited: besides 
the repeatedly used “It's raining”, “Jill is ready” and “The leaves are green”, I provided another 
short  list  in  (6)-(9),  which adds up to  the list  provided in the  Introduction.  Understanding an 
utterance  of  each  of  these  sentences  in  a  context  requires,  as  many—myself  included—
acknowledge, a certain effort, aimed to “compensate” the gappy content of these sentences. 
In the last section, I confronted the question whether this “compensating effort” could be described 
as an inference. The whole section was devoted to arguing for a positive answer to this question. 
The inferential process may be reconstructed as follows: first, upon listening to an utterance of, e.g.  
“Jill is ready”, the hearer is presented with an item whose content is, by the lights if compositional 
semantics  alone,  <Jill  is  ready>  (premise  [1]).  The  hearer  then  exploits  her  own  conceptual 
knowledge to add premise [2] to the effect that, for instance, being ready is being ready for some 
purpose. If the hearer has access to the particular context in which the utterance is performed and 
knows what the speaker is talking about, then a further premise may be added ([3]) having to do 
with which activity is salient in context, for instance skiing. From these three premises, the hearer 
can draw the conclusion to the effect that Jill is ready for skiing.
[1] Jill is ready
[2] Being ready is being ready for some purpose
[3] Skiing is the salient purpose
[4] Jill is ready for skiing
As one may have noted,  the inference I  have written above does not involve any ascription of 
intention (“X intends that p”) or belief (“X believes that p”), nor does it involve any speech-report 
(“X said that p”). All these are examples of meta-representation, i.e. of representation of the content 
of other subjects' attitudes and speech acts: beliefs, intentions, desires, assertions, utterances and so 
on. The ability to meta-represent is usually taken to require “mind-reading capacities” (see Sperber 
(2000), Wilson (2000), Sperber and Wilson (2002)). 
Now I contend that, if the inference in [1]-[4] is a good reconstruction of a process really followed 
by hearers, then carrying out such an inference does not,  by itself, require the use of any meta-
representations of the form “X believes/intends that p”, “X said that  p”, etc. The interpretation of 
utterances of such sentences such as “Jill is ready”, “It's raining” etc. is therefore,  by itself, not a 
task that requires the use of a hearer's mind-reading capacities48. We could describe an inference like 
the one in [1]-[4] as the “mechanical” application on sentence meaning of pre-determined rules for 
organising thought and discourse plus some collateral information as to what is salient in context. 
The whole task may well  be performed by exercising capacities  which are independent  of our 
ability to “read our fellows' minds”.
That inferential processes like [1]-[4] may well be, by themselves, meta-representation-free does not 
imply that these inferences cannot interact with meta-representational processes. Indeed there may 
be a role for meta-representation in providing adequate grounds for one or more premisses in the  
inference.  To  illustrate,  consider  the  implicit  reasoning  that  a  hearer  has  to  go  through  when 
interpreting  an utterance  of  “It's  raining”.  In  certain  contexts,  interpreting  an  utterance  of  “It's 
raining” may require that one identifies what location the hearer is referring to, or talking about, or 
presupposing as relevant. In general, I shall take the task of figuring out what a speaker is referring 
to, what a speaker is talking about, what a speaker is presupposing and so on as a mind-reading 
task, and therefore as a  meta-representational task. If this is so, then in certain specific cases, a 
48 After all, one may know that skiing is salient in context for reasons independent on one's meta-representing the 
beliefs and intentions of the interlocutor. Not to mention the fact that the hearer may employ non-meta-
representational strategies in order to establish what is salient in context. For an account of how hearers may gain 
knowledge of the salient aspects of context while not taking the (putative) intentions of the speaker into 
consideration, see Gauker (2008).
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meta-representational  process  may have  to  be  run  in  parallel  with  the  inferential,  conceptually 
constrained process. In general, I shall say that whenever a conceptually constrained  interpretation 
has to take into account such factors as what the speaker is referring to, what the speaker is talking 
about,  what  the  speaker  is  presupposing,  etc.  a  meta-representational  process  will  have  to  be 
followed in parallel  with a conceptually constrained process. So suppose that,  in the context of 
utterance at interest, the speaker intends to talk about the weather in Paris. On the view I propose,  
the  hearer  will  run  two  parallel  processes:  the  first  process  consists  in  the  application  of  the 
conceptual constraint to the effect that to rain is to rain somewhere. This process may be said to 
“expand”  the  semantic/conceptual  structure  of  the  sentence,  thus  opening,  as  it  were,  a  new 
conceptual/semantic slot to be filled in with an appropriate locational value. The second process is a 
process aimed at figuring out  what location the speaker is talking about: this process should be 
regarded as inherently meta-representational. Let us now see how these two processes interact. My 
proposal is that we regard the meta-representational process as yielding a conclusion that provides 
evidential support for one of the premisses in the “mechanical”, conceptually constrained inference. 
This premise shall have to do with what is going on in the context of the conversation, namely with 
what is salient or relevant, and may be identified with premise [3] in the inference-schema just laid 
out. I propose that the relation between premise [3] (or the like) and the meta-representation as to  
what the speaker is talking about will be such that the former is justified by the latter: that is, that 
the speaker is talking about, e.g., Paris shall justify premise [3] to the effect that Paris is salient in  
context. The relation is shown in the figure below:
[1] It's raining;         
[2] To rain is to rain somewhere;                 
[3] Paris is salient in context;
[4] It's raining in Paris.
To sum up what I  have proposed so far:  the interpretation of utterances of semantically under-
determined  sentences  is  an  inferential,  conceptually  constrained  and,  therefore,  “mechanical” 
process  which,  by  itself,  doesn't  require  use  of  the  interpreter's  meta-representational  skills. 
Nevertheless, the process might interact with meta-representations, namely in all  those cases in 
which the hearer has to figure out what the speaker is referring to, talking about, or presupposing. In 
these cases, meta-representations need not directly take part to the interpretive inference, but only 
need provide evidential support for some of its premisses. 
The resulting model is one where the role of meta-capacities is significantly reconsidered. Recall 
that, in the Gricean “working out” schema, meta-representation had a pervasive role, for both the 
inference's premisses and its conclusion were meta-representations (of the form “X said that φ”, “X 
means that φ”). In the Relevance-theoretic framework, processes resulting in meta-representations 
were carried out by modular components. This implied that the reasoning's premisses needn't be 
explicitly  meta-representational;  nevertheless,  the  inference's  conclusion  was  definitely  a  meta-
representational  one.  The model  I  have  proposed differs  from both Grice's  and the  Relevance-
Theorists' models in that, by postulating “mechanical” processes that respond only to conceptual 
demands,  it  envisages  inferences  whose  premisses  and  conclusions  may  be  all  non-meta-
representational. If this is so, then  the role of meta-representation is largely reconsidered: meta-
capacities are involved in settling aspects that pertain to, e.g. what the speaker is talking about, but 
the resulting meta-representations need not also be premisses in the interpretative inference and nor, 
for that matter, the inference's conclusion. Meta-representational elements may rather justify some 
of the inference's premisses. The differences between the three inferential accounts may be captured 
schematically as follows:
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Meta-representation: the speaker is 











(Note that the “conceptual constraints” position is represented in the chart as having it that language 
comprehension  starts  from  non-meta-representational  premisses  and  ends  with  non-meta-
representational conclusion,  thus being  wholly meta-representation-free. However,  what is really 
crucial  about  the position and sets  it  apart  from both the Gricean and the Relevance-Theoretic 
approaches is the fact that comprehension is thought of as giving rise to non-meta-representational 
conclusions. Thus, it is not incompatible with my view that some of the premises in the inference 
may  indeed  be  meta-representational,  as  long  as  they  give  rise  to  a  non-meta-representational 
conclusion49.)
An advantage of the conceptual constraints account is that it explains particularly well the fact that 
speakers seem to be able to interpret utterances of semantically under-determined expressions by 
performing conceptually constrained tasks and meta-representation-oriented tasks independently of  
one another. 
Suppose that, for some reason, exercise of one's meta-representational capacities were impeded. 
There are cases in which comprehension could be accomplished anyway in a context, with the sole 
help of one's use of conceptual constraints and other collateral contextual (but not strictly speaking 
meta-representational) information. For example, imagine a Z-lander who hears an utterance of “It's 
raining”. If she masters the concept of “raining” well enough and she independently knows that 
when it rains, it rains in Z-land, she may not need to meta-represent what the speaker is talking 
about in order to get the content that it's raining in Z-land. Or, suppose that an occurrence of “It's 
raining” is processed by a subject who doesn't have a capacity to meta-represent; if the subject has 
sufficient conceptual competence, she may still derive the content that it's raining somewhere, or 
she could use contextual information that she has independently of any meta-representation of the 
speaker's intentions in order to get the content that it's raining in (say) Paris. Or, finally, suppose one 
simply overhears an utterance of “It's raining”, but one doesn't know anything about the intentions 
of the speaker. If one is a competent user of the concept (predicate) “to rain”, one will be able to 
infer the content that it's raining somewhere. All these tasks I take to be possibly accomplished with 
the help of one's own independently possessed conceptual (semantic) competence, which in these 
cases is exercised altogether independently on one's capacity to meta-represent the intentions of the 
speaker as to what is meant with a certain linguistic act.
But the opposite scenario could also obtain: suppose that one's mastery of the relevant concepts 
were impeached. Still, one could employ one's meta-representational capacities in order to get an 
idea  of  what  the  speaker  is  talking  about,  and maybe,  from that,  “work backwards”  until  one 
identifies the conceptual constraints that should be applied. For example, suppose one were to hear 
the  locution  “movie  snow”.  This  expression  may  make  it  difficult  to  the  listener  to  apply  her 
conceptual competences about either the word “snow”, or “movie”. Still, suppose the hearer can 
meta-represent that the speaker is talking about techniques for faking weather phenomena in films; 
then she can work back to a modified, compound concept which contains novel constraints, such as 
FAKE-SNOW-USED-IN-FILMS. 
One of the motivations for the conceptual constraints account lies in that it seems implausible that 
utterance  comprehension  relies  too  pervasively  on  meta-representation.  Grice's  account,  which 
envisages interpretive inferences that are meta-representational through and through, was indicated 
as cognitively implausible (see Sperber 2000,  Wilson 2000, Sperber and Wilson 2002). However, 
even  the  Relevance-Theoretic  account  assigns  meta-representation  a  massive  role,  for  it 
countenances interpretive processes as being preformed by modules that are dedicated to mind-
49 Thanks to Annalisa Coliva for having made this apparent to me.
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reading, and hence are regarded as invariably resulting in meta-representational conclusions. My 
point in putting forward a conceptual constraints view is exactly to question the idea that the result  
of our interpretations of utterances be invariably meta-representations of the form “X means that φ”, 
“X implicates that φ”. Making this point implies advancing the idea that not all comprehension is  
meta-representation or “mind-reading”. There may be a species of comprehension which eludes 
the exercise of one's capacities to “read other subjects' minds”. 
I believe the latter insight points at an important philosophical distinction, which theorists engaged 
in  investigating  linguistic  comprehension  should  definitely  keep  in  mind.  Supposing  that  the 
conclusion of a comprehension process is invariably a meta-representation such as “Mary means 
that q” is, I take it, tantamount to conflate comprehension with what one may call “hermeneutics”. 
Hermeneutics may be defined as the task of interpreting an utterance with the aim of settling the 
question of what the speaker/writer means; it is typical of those situations in which a disagreement 
may arise as to the speaker/writer's real intentions (what she “means with that sentence”, “intends to 
convey with this choice of words” etc). In other words, hermeneutics is an interpretive enterprise 
whose  final  goal  is  entertaining  a  meta-representation  like  X  means  that  φ.  By  contrast, 
comprehension may be  characterised  as  the  task  by  which  one  arrives  to  entertain,  on  certain 
grounds, an object-level representation  φ.  No doubt,  it  might be the case that,  more often than 
expected, hermeneutics is needed in order to achieve and justify comprehension. This however is 
not a reason for merging the two tasks, especially when one is trying to capture the multifarious 
mechanisms by which language users can be said to  “understand” the content  of their  fellows' 
linguistic productions. A proposal in terms of conceptual constraints is meant to emphasise precisely 
that  not  all  interpretation  of  utterances  needs  result  in  hermeneutic,  i.e.  meta-representational 
conclusions.  Some  processes  are  simply  comprehension  processes,  eventuating  in  object-level 
conclusions (even if this doesn't rule out that meta-representational, hermeneutic considerations can 
support processes ending up in comprehension results). 
To  sum up,  in  this  section  I  have  put  forward  the  view that  inferential  processes  of  content-
enrichment  through  conceptual  constraints  are  meta-representation-free.  The  conceptually 
constrained interpretation of an utterance of “It's raining” in a context may be accomplished by a 
hearer with no need to exercise her mind-reading capacities, hence with no need to reason in terms 
of  belief  or  intention  attributions,  or  speech-reports.  Meta-representation-free  inferences  may 
interact  with  genuinely  meta-representational  processes,  however  the  latter  may  be  viewed  as 
simply providing evidential support for one or more premises of the former. The whole process and, 
most importantly, its conclusions, is conceivable as entirely meta-representation-free.
5. Against Syntactic Constraints: Standard cognitive formatting
In  Chapter 2,  the  argument  by means of  which I  drove attention  onto  the  idea  of  conceptual 
constraints  was  structured  as  follows:  Despite  what  Radical  Contextualists  say,  we  have  an 
understanding of semantically under-determined sentences like “It's raining” or “Jill is ready”, even 
out of a context. I called this kind of understanding intuitive understanding, i.e. knowledge of the 
truth-conditions of any utterance of the sentence, in any context. In addition, one could also achieve 
a  “contextual” understanding,  i.e.  understanding of  the intended truth-conditions  of  a  particular 
utterance in a particular context. What makes intuitive understanding possible is, I suggested, our 
mastery of the relevant concepts invoked by the utterances—e.g. the concept of RAIN or READINESS 
(of course, as I already made clear, conceptual competence coincides with semantic competence for 
all  those  subjects  who  are  competent  language-users). So-called  conceptual  constraints,  to  be 
represented as ways of structuring thought and discourse, help us achieve an intuitive understanding 
of these sentences and may be regarded as also guiding our understanding of particular utterances in 
particular contexts. 
The conceptual constraints  hypothesis  seems to be compatible with a syntactic approach to the 
comprehension  of  semantically  under-determined  sentences.  The  proponent  of  the  syntactic 
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approach could take the remarks laid down in Chapter 2 as suggesting that the sentences at interest 
really exhibit a more complex syntax than meets the eye. Further arguments may be appealed to in 
order to make the point stronger, such as Stanley's “Binding Argument”. As I argued in Chapter 3, 
there are reasons to doubt the cogency of the arguments invoked by proponents of the syntactic 
approach; their commitments as to covert positions at the syntactic level arguably follow from a 
dubious methodology for syntacticians (see Neale 2007, Pupa and Troseth 2011, Collins 2007). By 
contrast, an approach in terms of conceptual constraints doesn't make any dubious commitments as 
to covert elements articulated at the syntactic level. The fact that the predicates “to rain”, “being 
ready”, etc. respond to constraints such as “to rain is to rain in some location”, “to be ready is to be 
ready for some purpose”, etc. is a purely conceptual/semantic fact, a fact that doesn't either suggest 
or reveal anything at the syntactic level. The application of conceptual constraints in figuring out 
the content of an utterance of “It's raining”, “Jill is ready”, etc. is not driven by syntactic demands, 
but  by  the  need  to  reconstruct  a  content  whose  structure  complies  with  the  way  thought  and 
discourse about the relevant matters is standardly organised.  
What does motivate the idea of such a standard cognitive/discoursive “format”? Here is a story that  
could help one to gain a firmer grip on the idea. People belonging to the same social, cultural,  
linguistic community share a certain amount of information about their environment. The way this 
information is organised affects the way thought and discourse about numerous matters is itself 
organised. Yet, if every member of the community had her own way of organising thought and 
discourse, it would be extremely difficult to efficiently exchange information and coordinate action. 
In order for efficient exchange of information and inter-subjective coordination to be possible in 
general then, it seems that the most convenient route for members of the community is to develop 
standard ways to cognitively organise thought and discourse on a number of matters. The strategy 
could be equated with the adoption of a common currency which facilitates financial exchanges and 
trading. The process doesn't need to be the result of a collective decision or stipulation—it may 
ensue from adaptation. With this picture in the background, we may look at communication as a 
domain in which speakers utter sentences and hearers interpret them—also—by trying to relate the 
content of these utterances with some familiar, standard format for thought and discourse. (Note 
that this task is entirely different from—but not entirely incompatible with—a task of mind-reading, 
in that it is guided by pre-determined, pre-existing constraints and depends only marginally on the 
hearer's recognition of speaker's intentions).
The fact that a standard cognitive/discoursive “format” characterises thought and talk about certain 
matters has an important implication as far as the relation is concerned between the words and the 
concepts that we use: at least when certain predicates are at focus, the view is committed to the 
claim that the structure of the concepts (meanings) associated with the predicates is richer than the  
syntactic structure of the predicates themselves. For instance, the structure of the concept RAIN is 
richer than the syntactic structure of the predicate “to rain”. 
One, however, may be skeptic with respect to the distinction suggested here between the syntactic 
structure of a predicate and that of a concept. How is it possible—one might wonder—that a certain  
concept has a more complex structure than that given by the argument places of the predicate used 
to express that concept? Isn't there supposed to be some sort of coordination or “harmony” between 
the conceptual/semantic slots of a concept and the syntactic slots of a linguistic expression? At least 
with respect to the list of expressions I have been dealing with so far, I think that this distinction 
makes sense. My aim in this section is that of showing that it makes sense to separate the syntactic 
aspects and the semantic/conceptual aspects of expressions like “rain”, “ready”, “green”, etc.: the 
semantic/conceptual  structure  of  these  expressions  can  be  shown as  richer  than  their  syntactic 
structure.
Evidence that this is the case is given by cases in which the predicate (whether “rain”, “ready” or 
“green”) is correctly used with a monadic syntactic structure, whereas clearly the concept (meaning) 
associated  with  the  predicate  has  a  more  complex (though implicit)  structure.  In  Chapter 3 I 
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introduced the notion of “zero-reading”, i.e. of a reading in which the predicate is correctly used 
with a monadic syntactic structure. The sentence 
(10) Whenever the temperature and humidity in the air reach a certain level, it rains.
is such that the predicate “to rain” that occurs in it can get a zero-reading, i.e. a reading where “to  
rain” expresses a monadic property of times. Analogously, the sentences 
(11) Whenever she is prepared for an activity, Jill is ready
(12) Whenever something or some salient part of it looks like this, it is green
contain predicates for which a zero-reading is appropriate, i.e. in which “being ready” and “being 
green” can be interpreted as monadic properties of objects. That these predicates can be correctly 
used with a monadic syntactic structure doesn't imply that the concepts (meanings) we associate 
with them do not have a more complicated structure. Clearly the concept TO RAIN doesn't apply just 
to  times;  it  concerns also places,  substances  (e.g.  water,  sulphuric  acid),  manners in  which the 
phenomenon may manifest itself. The word “to rain” in English, as well, seems to have a meaning 
whose semantic complexity is not exhausted by the monadic structure of the predicate rain(t). All 
this speaks in favour of a greater complexity of the concept TO RAIN (and of the meaning of “to 
rain”),  as  opposed  to  the  syntactic  structure  of  the  predicate  “to  rain”.  These  considerations 
obviously apply to “ready” and “green” as well.
I propose to rephrase the distinction between argument-places and conceptual (semantic) constraints 
as  a  distinction  between  argument-places  and adjuncts:  what  I  call  conceptual  (semantic) 
constraints find a representation as adjuncts, and not as argument-places. 
Roughly, an argument-place is a characteristic feature of the logical structure of an expression. Of 
expressions which have argument-places, Frege said that they are “unsaturated entities” (see Frege 
1892). Thus, if an expression contains an argument-place, it will not give a determined contribution 
to the proposition expressed by a sentence in which it occurs until that argument has been assigned 
a value, or “saturated”. This means that providing the value of the argument reduces the degree of 
unsaturatedness of the expression, i.e. it reduces its “adicity”. An adjunct, on the contrary, does not 
cause an unsaturated expression to become saturated, i.e. it doesn't decrease its adicity. It merely 
acts as a modifier of the expression. As Heim and Kratzer write:
Arguments reduce the adicity of the [verb] they combine with; modifiers leave it 
unchanged. […] Restrictive modifiers are characterised by the fact that they leave the 
semantic type, as well as the adicity, of the modifiee completely unchanged. (Heim 
and Kratzer 1998: 64).
Adverbs are a typical case of modifiers. Take, for instance, the adverb “continuously”: when added 
to a verb like “stumble”, it has the effect of making the truth-conditions of a sentence in which the 
verb  occurs  more  precise  or  fine-grained:  there  is  a  difference  between the  truth-conditions  of 
“Sarah stumbles” and the truth-conditions of “Sarah stumbles continuously”. In a way analogous to 
adverbs, adjuncts are devices of modification and not of saturation. For example, in the sentence 
“Sarah sneezes in the living room” the phrase “in the living room” is an adjunct in the sense that it 
modifies the predicate by intersecting the extension of “x sneezes” with the extension of “x is in the 
living room”; it could be thought of as specifying an aspect of the event of Sarah's sneezing, which 
pertains to the location of the event. Note that this doesn't either entail or require that the expression 
“to sneeze” has a hidden argument in deep syntax for the location of the sneezing to be saturated.
Having introduced the distinction between arguments and adjuncts, the point I wish to make is the 
following: on the one hand, argument-places determine mandatory constraints on sentential well-
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